BYNUM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JONI S. BYNUM, ef al., individually and on

behalf of a proposed class,

Plaintiffs,

Civil Action No. 24-7065 (MAS) (RLS)

© MEMORANDUM OPINION

RED RIVER TALC, LLC f/k/a LLT

MANAGEMENT LLC f/k/a LTL

MANAGEMENT, LLC ef al,

Defendants.

SHIPP, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court upon Defendants Red River Talc, LLC (“Red River’),

Johnson & Johnson (T&S), New JJCI, Johnson & Johnson Holdco (NA) Inc., Janssen

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Kenvue Inc., and J&J Services, Inc.’s (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion

to Strike the Class Allegations and Dismiss Plaintiff Joni S. Bynum’s (“Bynum”) Medical

Monitoring Claim (the “Motion”). (ECF No. 46.) Plaintiffs Bynum, Robin Coburn, James Coburn,

Donnaletta F. Ruiz, and Shelly Williams (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) opposed (ECF No. 49), and

Defendants replied (ECF No. 50). After careful consideration of the parties’ submissions, the Court

decides Defendants’ Motion without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the

reasons outlined below, Defendants’ Motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

This action arises out of the long-running multidistrict litigation captioned /n re Johnson

& Johnson Talcum Powder Products Marketing, Sales Practices and Products Liability Litigation

(the “Talc Litigation,” MDL No. 16-2738). Because the parties are familiar with the underlying

MDL, the Court recounts only those facts necessary to resolve the instant motion.

On June 17, 2024, nearly eight years after the Talc Litigation commenced, Plaintiffs filed

the instant action as a putative class action complaint. (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1.)

Plaintiffs seek to represent a nationwide class consisting of: (1) all female U.S. residents who

genitally applied Johnson’s Baby Powder and/or Shower to Shower products (the ‘Defendants’

Products”) between 1960 and the present for more than four years, and who have not commenced

an individual action or signed a written retainer agreement with non-class counsel for the pursuit

of any individual, non-class personal injury claims arising from the use of and/or exposure to

Defendants’ Products (“Qualifying Talc Users”); (2) the authorized representatives of deceased or

legally incapacitated or incompetent Qualifying Talc Users; and (3) the spouses or family members

of Qualifying Talc Users who may properly assert derivative or independent claims. (Am. Compl.

q 44, ECF No. 30.)

Plaintiffs allege that their use of Defendants’ Products either caused them to develop

epithelial ovarian cancer, fallopian tube cancer, or primary peritoneal cancer (a “Defined Injury”),

or placed them at an “increased risk of developing” one of these cancers. (/d. at 3, {J 1-5.) Of the

five named Plaintiffs, one alleges that she developed serous fallopian tube cancer as a result of her

use of Defendants’ Products; three allege no present physical injury and instead assert claims based

on an “increased risk” of developing a Defined Injury; and one asserts a derivative claim based on

his relationship to another named Plaintiff.' (/d. §§ 1-5.)

' Plaintiff James Coburn brings a derivative claim based on his spouse Robin Coburn’s use of

Defendants’ Products. (Am. Compl. § 5.)

Plaintiffs assert a total of nineteen claims against Defendants, including medical

monitoring, strict liability, negligence-based claims, fraud and misrepresentation, statutory

consumer protection claims under numerous state laws, conspiracy-based claims, loss of

consortium, wrongful death, survival, and claims for punitive damages. Ud. J] 336-496.)

Plaintiffs assert these claims on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated in

five discrete subclasses. (See id. § 45.) Specifically, Subclasses 1, 2, and 5 include individuals with

no current Defined Injury, while Subclasses 3 and 4 include individuals who allege a Defined

Injury. Ud.) Moreover, while Subclasses 1, 2, and 3 seek medical monitoring, Subclasses 4 and 5

seek compensatory and punitive damages. (/d.) Plaintiffs define the five subclasses as follows:

[Subclass 1: Independent Claim For Medical Monitoring—]

Qualifying Talc Users (Class Members) residing in Alaska, Arizona,

Arkansas, California, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Florida,

Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New

Hampshire, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, West

Virginia, or Wyoming and the Representative Claimants of legally

incapacitated or incompetent Qualifying Tale Users (residing in the

aforementioned jurisdictions) who as of the date of the Court’s

Preliminary Approval and Class Certification Order have not been

diagnosed with a [Defined Injury].

[Subclass 2: Medical Monitoring Remedy—Qualifying Talc Users]

(Class Members) residing in California, the District of Columbia,

Guam, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey,

New York, Ohio, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Carolina,

Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Virginia, or

Washington and the Representative Claimants of legally

incapacitated or incompetent Qualifying Talc Users (residing in the

aforementioned jurisdictions) who as of the date of the Court’s

Preliminary Approval and Class Certification Order have not been

diagnosed with a [Defined Injury].

[Subclass 3: Medical Monitoring Remedy—] Qualifying Talc Users

(Class Members) residing in Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware,

Georgia, Illinois, lowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska,

Oklahoma, Oregon, Wisconsin and the Representative Claimants of

legally incapacitated or incompetent Qualifying Tale Users

(residing in the aforementioned jurisdictions) who as of the date of

the Court’s Preliminary Approval and Class Certification Order

have been diagnosed with a [Defined Injury].

[Subclass 4: Compensatory and Punitive Damages for Current

Defined Injury—] Qualifying Talc Users (Class Members) residing

in any state or territory of the United States who as of the date of the

Court’s Preliminary Approval and Class Certification Order have

been diagnosed with a [Defined Injury].

[Subclass 5: Compensatory and Punitive Damages for Future

Defined Injury—] Qualifying Talc Users (Class Members) residing

in any state or territory of the United States who as of the date of the

Court’s Preliminary Approval and Class Certification Order have

not been diagnosed with a [Defined Injury].

(id.)

Defendants move to strike Plaintiffs’ class allegations under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(f),” and to dismiss Plaintiff Bynum’s medical monitoring claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

(ECF No. 46.) The Motion is now ripe for disposition.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Strike Class Allegations

“The class action is an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on

behalf of the individual named parties only.” Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348 (2011)

(quotation marks omitted). “To invoke this exception, every putative class action must satisfy the

four requirements of Rule 23(a) and the requirements of either Rule 23(b)(1), (2), or (3).” Marcus

BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 590 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)-(b)).

* All references to “Rule” or “Rules” hereafter refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

To satisfy Rule 23(a), (1) the class must be “so numerous that joinder of all members is

impracticable” (numerosity); (2) there must be “questions of law or fact common to the class”

(commonality); (3) “the claims or defenses of the representative parties” must be “typical of the

claims or defenses of the class” (typicality); and (4) the named plaintiffs must “fairly and

adequately protect the interests of the class” (adequacy of representation, or simply, adequacy). In

re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d 275, 291 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)-(4)).

Rule 23(b) permits class certification if: (1) separate actions would create a risk of

inconsistent adjudications; (2) injunctive or declaratory relief is sought; or (3) common questions

predominate over the individual questions and a class action is superior to other methods of

bringing the suit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). Rule 23(b)(3) requires that common class questions

predominate over questions affecting only individual members and that the class action mechanism

be superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

Although class certification typically follows discovery, courts may strike class allegations

at the pleading stage where it is clear from the face of the complaint that the requirements of Rule

23 cannot be satisfied as a matter of law. See Zarichny v. Complete Payment Recovery Servs., Inc.,

80 F. Supp. 3d 610, 615 (E.D. Pa. 2015). Rule 12() permits courts to strike any “redundant,

immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter” from a pleading, and Rule 23(c)(1) requires courts

to determine “[a]t an early practicable time” whether a proposed class satisfies class certification

requirements. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f), 23(c)(1).

Whether to grant a motion to strike is reserved to the discretion of the district court. Krisa

v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 109 F. Supp. 2d 316, 319 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (citation omitted).

A district court may strike class action allegations without permitting discovery or waiting for a

certification motion where the complaint and any affidavits clearly demonstrate that the plaintiff

cannot meet the requirements for a class action. See Zarichny, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 615; Semenko v.

Wendy’s Int'l, Inc., No. 12-0836, 2013 WL 1568407, at *11 (W.D. Pa, Apr. 12, 2013).

B. Motion to Dismiss

Rule 8(a)(2) “requires only a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and

the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

A district court conducts a three-part analysis when considering a motion to dismiss under

Rule 12(b)(6). See Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (d Cir. 2011). First, the court must

identify “the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675

(2009). Second, the court must identify all of the plaintiffs well-pleaded factual allegations, accept

them as true, and “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Fowler v.

UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 Gd Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). The court can discard bare

legal conclusions or factually unsupported accusations that merely state the defendant unlawfully

harmed the plaintiff. See Igbal, 556 US. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U-S. at 555). Third, the court

must determine whether “the [well-pleaded] facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show

that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (quoting Igbal, 556

USS. at 679), A facially plausible claim “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd. at 210 (quoting Jgbal, 556 U.S. at 678). On a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the “defendant bears the burden of showing that no claim has been

presented.” Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr Packages, Inc.

y. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)).

I. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Strike Class Allegations

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ proposed class and subclasses cannot be certified as a

matter of law because they fail Rule 23’s adequacy, predominance, and superiority requirements.

(See generally Defs.’ Moving Br., ECF No. 46-1.) Because Rule 23’s adequacy requirement is

dispositive of Defendants’ Motion to Strike, the Court addresses this issue first.

Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the class representatives “fairly and adequately protect the

interests of the class.’? Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). The adequacy inquiry “serves to uncover conflicts

of interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v.

Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (citations omitted). The “linchpin of the adequacy requirement

is the alignment of interests and incentives between the representative plaintiffs and the rest of the

class.” Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 681 F.3d 170, 183 (3d Cir. 2012) (citations

omitted).

Ifa “fundamental” conflict exists within a class, the adequacy requirement is not satisfied,

and class certification will be denied. Dewey, 681 F.3d at 183-84; In re Nat'l Football League

Players Concussion Inj. Litig., 821 F.3d 410, 431 Gd Cir. 2016), as amended (May 2, 2016)

(explaining that a “fundamental” conflict “will defeat a finding of adequacy”). One such

fundamental conflict arises when a proposed class combines both “present and future injury

plaintiffs.” In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Inj. Litig., 821 F.3d at 431.

“The adequacy-of-representation requirement tends to merge with the commonality and

typicality criteria of Rule 23(a), which serve as guideposts for determining whether. . .

maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the named plaintiffs claim and the class

claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately

protected in their absence.” Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 626 n.20 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). “The adequacy heading also factors in competency and conflicts of class

counsel.” Id.

Two decisions from the Supreme Court, Amchem and Ortiz, address this fundamental

conflict in the context of mass tort litigation, and provide the governing framework for the Court’s

analysis. See Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 591; Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815

(1999).

In Amchem, counsel sought to approve a class settlement and certify a nationwide class of

persons who were exposed to asbestos-containing products. See Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at

591. The class settlement purported to resolve the claims of persons who had already sustained

injuries because of asbestos exposure, and those who had been exposed to asbestos, but had not

yet developed any injury. See id. The district court approved the settlement and certified the class,

but the Third Circuit reversed, finding, infer alia, that “serious intra-class conflicts” existed

between the “presently injured and future[] plaintiffs,” and this conflict precluded a finding of

adequacy. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 630-31 (3d Cir. 1996), aff'd sub nom.,

Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). As the Third Circuit explained,

presently-injured plaintiffs, and plaintiffs without any injury, have materially different priorities

in negotiating a settlement. Jd. While presently-injured plaintiffs seek to “maximize current

payouts,” exposure-only plaintiffs seek to preserve funds for future claims, protect against

inflation, ensure flexibility as science evolves, and retain meaningful opt-out rights should injury

later occur. Jd. The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit on this point and agreed that “the

interests of those within the single class are not aligned.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626.

Ortiz reinforced this principle.’ There, the Court emphasized that after Amchem, it is

“obvious” that a class divided between holders of present and future claims “requires division into

* Ortiz also concerned a settlement in a class action suit against an asbestos manufacturer. 527 U.S.

at 855-59,

homogeneous subclasses .. , with separate representation to eliminate conflicting interests of

counsel.” Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 856 (citations omitted).

The principles articulated in Amchem and Ortiz apply in equal force here. Plaintiffs seek

to litigate a class action on behalf of individuals who allege a present cancer diagnosis, as well as

individuals who allege no present injury at all. (See generally Am. Compl.) As the Supreme Court

recognized in Amchem and Ortiz, these groups have materially divergent interests. Amchem, 521

USS. at 626; Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 856. Those already diagnosed with cancer may reasonably prioritize

immediate compensatory and punitive damages, while those without a cancer diagnosis may

reasonably prioritize a fund for medical monitoring, long-term preservation of resources, and

protections against premature valuation of their claims.

Plaintiffs attempt to address these material conflicts by dividing the class into five

subclasses. (Am. Compl. {] 45.) Critically, however, Plaintiffs do not identify separate counsel for

the different subclasses or articulate any safeguards to ensure that the interests of one group are

not subordinated to those of another. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 856 (“[A] class divided between holders

of present and future claims . . . requires division into homogenous subclasses . . . with separate

representation to eliminate conflicting interests of counsel.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

The Amended Complaint offers no explanation of how counsel would navigate these competing

incentives without separate representation, or how the conflicts identified in Amchem and Ortiz

would otherwise be eliminated. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627 (denying class certification where

Although Amchem and Ortiz arose in the settlement context, their adequacy analysis is not limited

to settlement classes. In both cases, the Supreme Court’s reasoning relied on Rule 23(a)(4) itself,

which applies equally to litigation classes. See In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank

Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 818 (3d Cir. 1995) (explaining that “the standard for [class]

certification is the same for settlement classes as for conventional classes”).

there was no “structural assurance of fair and adequate representation for the diverse groups and

individuals affected”).

Plaintiffs principally rely on Jn re Valsartan to argue that their subclasses are sufficient.

(Pls.’ Opp’n Br. 16, 18, 20-23, ECF No. 49 (citing Jn re Valsartan, Losartan, & Irbesartan Prods.

Liab. Litig., No. 19-2875, 2023 WL 1818922, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 8, 2023)).) Plaintiffs’ reliance on

this case, however, is misplaced. In Valsartan, the defendants did not challenge the adequacy of

the medical monitoring subclasses, nor contend that the interests of the class members were not

aligned. 7a re Valsartan, 2023 WL 181922, at *35. The Court, accordingly, did not analyze

adequacy under Amchem or Ortiz, nor discuss the varying interests between holders of present and

future claims.® See id.

Applying the principles articulated in Amchem and Ortiz, the Court concludes that absent

structural protections such as separate representation for the different subclasses, the proposed

class suffers from a fundamental adequacy defect that cannot be cured through discovery. See

Georgine, 83 F.3d at 631 (denying class certification and holding that “[t]he lack of any structural

protections in this case thwarted the adequate representation of the disparate groups of plaintiffs’).

The Court, accordingly, will grant Defendants’ Motion to Strike, and Plaintiffs’ class allegations

will be stricken from the Amended Complaint. See Semenko, 2013 WL 1568407, at *11 (granting

The facts of Valsartan are also distinguishable. Valsartan involved a products liability action in

which it was “uncontested that the defendants’ products were contaminated.” In re Insulin Pricing

Litig., No. 17-699, 2024 WL 416500, at *40 (D.N.J. Feb. 5, 2024) (denying class certification and

finding Valsartan “distinguishable”). The Valsartan plaintiffs also proposed extensive

subclasses—asserting 93 subclasses for one set of economic loss claims and 19 subclasses for

another—to account for variances in state law. Jn re Valsartan, 2023 WL 1818922, at *5. Here,

by contrast, Defendants vigorously dispute Plaintiffs’ core factual allegations, and Plaintiffs

propose only five subclasses to encompass nineteen different claims. (See generally Am. Compl.)

10

motion to strike on the pleadings because “no amount of discovery will demonstrate that the class

can be maintained”).’

B. — Motion to Dismiss®

Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiff Bynum’s medical monitoring claim as

insufficiently pleaded under either New Jersey or Washington law. (Defs.’ Moving Br. 37-38.)

Defendants argue that both jurisdictions permit medical monitoring claims only where a plaintiff

alleges a present, existing injury, and here, Bynum alleges none. (/d.)

Plaintiffs do not dispute that Bynum has not been diagnosed with a Defined Injury, nor do

they dispute that New Jersey and Washington law require a present injury to sustain a medical

7 Because the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the adequacy requirement, the

Court does not reach Defendants’ additional arguments regarding predominance and superiority.

Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 543 F.3d 141, 147-49 3d Cir. 2008). The Court, however,

notes that Plaintiffs may face substantial obstacles to class certification if this litigation proceeds.

See, e.g., Georgine, 83 F.3d at 627 (discussing the “proliferation of disparate factual and legal

issues” that make class certification of medical monitoring and related claims improper); Almond

v. Janssen Pharms., Inc., 337 F.R.D. 90, 95-96 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (dismissing a nationwide no-injury

medical monitoring class because “the variation in state law alone is sufficient to establish that

maintenance of the action as a class is inappropriate” (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted)); Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 146 (3d Cir. 1998) (concluding class

treatment involving medical monitoring claims was inappropriate in part because each class

member would need to “present evidence” regarding his medical history); Arch v. Am. Tobacco

Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 489 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (finding “individual issues predominate over common

issues” for medical monitoring claims).

While Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss seeks dismissal of “Plaintiffs’ medical monitoring claims,”

(Defs.’ Moving Br. 40), Plaintiffs correctly observe that Defendants only advance Rule 12(b)(6)

arguments as to Plaintiff Bynum’s medical monitoring claim (Pls.’ Opp’n Br. 34). Defendants do

not contest this characterization in their reply. (See generally Defs.’ Reply Br., ECF No. 50.) The

Court therefore confines its Rule 12(b)(6) analysis to Plaintiff Bynum’s medical monitoring claim.

11

monitoring claim.’ (Am. Compl. § 1; Pls.’ Opp’n Br. 34-35.) Plaintiffs instead contend that Bynum

adequately alleges an injury because her asserted need for medical monitoring constitutes “a

present and ongoing economic injury.”!° (Pls.’ Opp’n Br. 34-35.)

Plaintiffs’ argument is unpersuasive. As an initial matter, the Amended Complaint does

not plausibly allege Bynum has suffered any economic injury. (See generally Am. Compl.) After

reviewing the 189-page Amended Complaint, the Court can discern only a vague and conclusory

allegation that Plaintiffs “have suffered economic losses.” (Am. Compl. § 429.) Plaintiffs,

however, allege no facts in support of this claim, and the Court therefore cannot plausibly infer a

present, economic loss from the allegations in the Amended Complaint.!! (See id.) Even assuming,

arguendo, that Bynum plausibly alleged an economic injury, economic harm alone is insufficient

to sustain a medical monitoring claim under either New Jersey or Washington state law. Sinclair

v. Merck & Co., 948 A.2d 587, 595 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2008) (holding that “injury” for a medical

Plaintiffs also do not dispute that either New Jersey law (where Defendants reside) or Washington

law (where Bynum resides) governs Bynum’s medical monitoring claim. (Pls.’ Opp’n Br. 34-35.)

Because both jurisdictions require a present injury, the Court need not engage in a choice-of-law

analysis. See P.V. ex rel. T.V. v. Camp Jaycee, 197 N.J. 132, 143 (2008) (citations omitted)

(explaining that under New Jersey’s choice-of-law framework, “there is no choice-of-law issue to

be resolved” where no actual conflict exists).

10 Plaintiffs further argue, in cursory fashion, that because talcum powder exposure has been linked

to “chronic inflammation and oxidative stress on genital tissues or cells,” Bynum has suffered a

physical injury sufficient to support a medical monitoring claim. (Pls.’ Opp’n Br. 34-35.) The

Amended Complaint, however, does not allege that Bynum experiences chronic inflammation,

oxidative stress, or any other physical injury. (See generally Am. Compl.) Rather, it cites a single

study concluding that “talc is a possible cause of cancer based on the totality of evidence .. . and

a plausible biological pathway including chronic inflammation and oxidative stress.” (Am. Compl.

{ 133(z).) Because Plaintiffs do not allege that Bynum herself suffers from any physical injury,

and because it is “axiomatic” that a plaintiff may not amend a complaint through opposition

briefing, this argument fails. See 'rederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 202 (3d Cir. 2007).

"| Plaintiffs also fail to cite any specific paragraph of the Amended Complaint in support of their

asserted economic-injury theory. (See Pls.’ Opp’n Br. 34.)

12

monitoring claim “requires something physical” such as illness or death); Duncan v. Nw. Airlines

Inc., 203 F.R.D. 601, 606, 609-10 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (explaining that Washington law does not

permit recovery for a potential disease absent a “present, actual injury” and a “reasonable certainty

that [the plaintiff] will contract the disease” (internal quotation and citations omitted)).

The Court, accordingly, dismisses Bynum’s medical monitoring claim for failure to state a

claim.

TV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion is granted. The Court strikes Plaintiffs’

class allegations, and Bynum’s medical monitoring claim is dismissed without prejudice. The

Court will issue an Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DATED: January 29, 2026

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