People of Michigan v. Kenneth McDonald

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED

February 17, 2026

Plaintiff-Appellant, 1:31 PM

v No. 375243

Macomb Circuit Court

KENNETH MCDONALD, LC No. 2024-002089-FC

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: FEENEY, P.J., and GARRETT and BAZZI, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

On remand by the Michigan Supreme Court,1 the prosecution appeals by leave granted the

opinion and order granting defendant Kenneth McDonald’s motion to suppress related to the

search of his cell phone. We affirm.

I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arose when McDonald was charged with second-degree murder, MCL 750.317,

in relation to the death of his mother-in-law, Stella Maltese (the decedent). On October 12, 2023,

at approximately 11:00 a.m., the decedent and the decedent’s sister were present at the decedent’s

residence when Grace McDonald, who is the decedent’s daughter and McDonald’s wife, stopped

by. At about noon, the decedent’s sister and Grace left the premises, with Grace leaving in the

decedent’s blue van, which the decedent permitted her and McDonald to use.

At approximately 2:45 p.m., McDonald and Grace drove to the decedent’s home to retrieve

tools from the decedent’s garage after not being able to get in contact with her. McDonald went

into the garage and Grace entered the home, where she found the decedent on the floor, with a

cord wrapped tightly around her neck. McDonald removed the cord and began cardiopulmonary

resuscitation (CPR) while Grace called the police. The decedent was pronounced dead after the

1

People v McDonald, ___ Mich ___; 25 NW3d 377 (2025).

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police arrived. After an initial interview at the scene, McDonald and Grace were taken to the

Shelby Township Police Department (STPD) for questioning.

During his subsequent interview with the police, McDonald acknowledged the existence

of an Adult Protective Services (APS) report, in which the decedent alleged McDonald was

embezzling money from her. McDonald denied doing so and denied killing the decedent. In the

course of the interview, the police observed a red mark on the top of McDonald’s hands, between

his thumb and pointer finger, which an officer believed was caused by McDonald strangling the

decedent with a cord. McDonald and Grace claimed to be at their home from noon until the time

they arrived at the decedent’s residence. Throughout the investigation, the police retrieved

surveillance footage of the roads between the decedent’s and McDonalds’ homes. The footage

depicted a blue van returning to the area of the decedent’s residence at about 1:00 p.m. and

returning to the area of the McDonalds’ home at approximately 1:30 p.m., contradicting

McDonald’s and Grace’s contentions.

Detective Phillip Young of the STPD generated a search warrant for McDonald’s and

Grace’s shared residence and their individual cell phones, which were discovered in the blue van

owned by the decedent. On October 13, 2023, STPD Detective Sergeant Charles Johnson authored

the supporting affidavit requesting the specified data be extracted from the phones:

 Call logs, to include incoming, outgoing and missed calls

 Phonebook and contacts to include phone numbers, and e-mail addresses.

 SMS/MMS messages and attached multimedia files, to include incoming

and outgoing.

 Secondary SMS applications and messages to include KIK, TextPlus,

Snapchat and others

 E-mails to include incoming and outgoing

 Pictures and all ExIF information to include geotagging information (GPS

location of the location of the picture.)

 Videos and geotagging information

 Audio files to include any voicemail stored on the device and voice notes

 Secondary phone number accounts such as Skype, Line 2 and other

applications that can assign a second roaming phone number.

 WiFi network information, to include SSID (Network name) and GPS

information of the network

 GPS directions

 Calendar information, including sync’ed [sic] calendars

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 Internet History and usage to including websites visited, search terms and

Cookies

 And any account information, settings, and saved usage information for any

and all installed applications, also known as “apps” on the device.

Detective Johnson wrote the following in support of the search warrant:

On 10/12/2023 at 2:46PM, Shelby Township Police Department received a

911 call from []. Female caller, later identified as Grace Marie McDonald was

reporting that her mother Stella Maltese possibly deceased and had a cord around

her neck. Grace was frantic on the phone. A male, later identified as Kenneth

McDonald got on the phone and stated she was found face down on the floor.

Officers arrived on scene and observed Stella Maltese deceased on the floor. Stella

had a ligature mark across the front and sides of her neck. There was a broken

computer keyboard cord lying on living room floor next to where the victim was

found. The cord was broke off of the keyboard. The chair and the computer tower

were knocked over. Officers observed that the oven was on and there was chicken

cooking inside of it.

Grace and her Aunt Grace Schmidt, Stella’s sister, stated they were at the

home and Stella was cooking dinner at that time. They left at l245pm in 2 different

vehicles. Grace McDonald drove the 2011 Chrysler Town and Country and Grace

Schmidt drove the 2011 Dodge Journey.

Grace McDonald and Kenneth McDonald stated they needed to get some

tools from the home around 1430hrs. They called Stella two times and she did not

answer. When they arrived they found her on the floor with a cord around her neck.

They both stated they were at home . . .in Macomb Twp between approximately

1245 and 1440hrs

On 4/24/2023, the Shelby Township Police Department received a[n] Adult

Protective Services referral for Stella Maltese. At that time Stella believed checks

were being withdrawn from her Comerica Bank Account. The account was only in

Stella’s name. She advised that the only access her daughter or Kenneth had to the

account were deposit tickets she gave them to repay the Home Equity Line of

Credit. . . .

On 8/21/2023, the Shelby Township Police Department received an Adult

Protective Services referral for Stell[a] Maltese. The referral stated that Stella had

checks drawn off her account that were being forged by her daughter, Grace

McDonald and Kenneth McDonald. Since February the total amount taken is

roughly $19,000. Stella wanted to follow through with pressing charges. Detective

Verdura is in charge of the case. Stella advised that she had credit/bank reports

printed out and she was going to tum them over to him on 10/13/2023.

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Additional investigation of stationary LPR cameras in the area, as well as

intersection video indicates that the Town and Country Van may have returned to

the area of 21 Hayes between 1300 and 1330 in contradiction to statements made

by Grace. The listed devices were located inside the Town and Country van, owned

by Stella, but normally driven by Grace and Kenneth.

Further investigation revealed that Kenneth had markings on his hands that

appeared to be of a similar shape and size to the cord found near Stella’s body.

These markings were indentations and appear consistent with application of

pressure.

As listed devices may contain, in writer’s training and experience,

communications data, location data, and other digital evidence with relation to this

incident, Affiant requests this petition for examination be granted.

The search warrant was granted as requested. Detective Young and Detective Johnson analyzed

the geolocation data obtained from McDonald’s cell phone, which indicated McDonald was at the

decedent’s home at 1:28 p.m. An autopsy was conducted on the decedent, identifying the cause

of death as strangulation and the manner of death as homicide. McDonald was then charged with

second-degree murder.

McDonald moved to suppress the data obtained from his cell phone, contending that the

supporting affidavit failed to establish a nexus between the target cell phone, McDonald, and the

alleged conduct; that the affidavit failed to satisfy the particularity requirement; and that the good-

faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply.2 The trial court held an evidentiary hearing

on January 31, 2025. Detective Johnson was the only witness to testify at the hearing. He was

qualified as an expert in cell phone extraction and analysis. Detective Johnson explained that his

main interest in McDonald’s phone was location data and “communication data from about the

time of the incident.” Detective Johnson was looking for location data because witness statements

indicated that the decedent was alone when she died; however, a license-plate recognition camera

and surveillance footage indicated that the blue van McDonald and Grace had been driving

returned to the area near the decedent’s home between 1:00 p.m. and 1:30 p.m. Detective Johnson

stated that he was looking for communication data between McDonald and Grace that involved

the decedent’s murder.

According to Detective Johnson, he included a long list of areas to search because

communication and location data could be found in different places on the phone. He testified that

the geographical location data was located within the T-Mobile diagnostic folder. The location

data indicated that McDonald’s cell phone was at or near the decedent’s home at 1:35 p.m. The

phone was then in a subdivision in Macomb Township near McDonald’s home at 1:47 p.m. The

cell phone then returned to the area near the decedent’s home at 2:30 p.m. The phone data further

demonstrated that Grace and McDonald sent each other text messages, which contradicted their

statements that they were together. On cross-examination, Detective Johnson acknowledged that

2

McDonald initially moved to suppress the evidence retrieved from both phones; however, he

later withdrew his motion related to Grace’s phone.

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the affidavit did not list a specific date and time with respect to the property to be searched and

seized. He further recognized that he never used the words “murder,” “homicide,” “suspect,” or

“motive” in the affidavit. Detective Johnson additionally admitted he never stated that he was

investigating an offense in the affidavit. The court took the matter under advisement and allowed

the parties to file supplemental briefs.3

The trial court granted McDonald’s motion to suppress, agreeing with McDonald’s

argument that the affidavit did not provide sufficient context connecting the cell phone listed in

the search warrant with any alleged criminal behavior by McDonald. The court observed that

Detective Johnson’s testimony acknowledged that there was no specific offense listed in the

affidavit, and that McDonald was never referred to as a suspect. Further, the trial court resolved

that the warrant, even after incorporating the affidavit, lacked the required particularity to be valid

under the Fourth Amendment. The court explained that the warrant placed no restriction on what

could be searched on the phone that related to the decedent’s death. The trial court noted that

Detective Johnson’s testimony acknowledged that the warrant did not include specific time or date

limitations and included a “broad” statement. The court opined that the warrant permitted the

police to search everything on the phone since its first use.

The trial court further determined the exclusionary rule did not apply, relying on this

Court’s opinion in People v Carson, ___ Mich App ___;___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket

No. 355925) (Carson I), rev’d in part on other grounds ___ Mich ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025)

(Docket No. 166923) (Carson II). The court stated that the warrant was a general warrant that no

reasonable police officer could have relied upon in objective good faith. As a result, the trial court

ruled that severance was inappropriate, and McDonald’s motion to suppress was granted.

The prosecution applied for leave to appeal in this Court, which was denied. People v

McDonald, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered July 2, 2025 (Docket No. 375243).

The prosecution then applied for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, which, in lieu of

granting leave, remanded the matter to this Court for consideration as on leave granted. People v

McDonald, ___ Mich ___; 25 NW3d 377 (2025).

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

“We review de novo a trial court’s ultimate decision on a motion to suppress on the basis

of an alleged constitutional violation.” People v Gingrich, 307 Mich App 656, 661; 862 NW2d

432 (2014). “We review a trial court’s findings of fact in a suppression hearing for clear error.”

People v Sammons, 505 Mich 31, 41; 949 NW2d 36 (2020). “Clear error is established when the

appellate court is left with a firm and definite conviction that an error occurred.” People v Horton,

345 Mich App 612, 616; 8 NW3d 622 (2023). “The application of law to those facts is a

constitutional matter that this Court reviews de novo.” Id. “Any ancillary questions of law relevant

to the motion to suppress are also reviewed de novo.” Gingrich, 307 Mich App at 661.

3

Although Detective Johnson’s testimony regarding the drafting of the search warrant and

affidavit is included for context, the four corners of the relevant documents themselves reveal the

numerous deficiencies in both the warrant and the affidavit.

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III. ANALYSIS

The prosecution argues that the trial court erred in granting McDonald’s motion to

suppress, concluding that the search warrant was invalid. We disagree.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and

seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by

Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things

to be seized.” US Const, Am IV. Comparably, the Michigan Constitution of 1963 states:

The person, houses, papers, possessions, electronic data, and electronic

communications of every person shall be secure from unreasonable searches and

seizures. No warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things or to

access electronic data or electronic communications shall issue without describing

them, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation. The provisions

of this section shall not be construed to bar from evidence in any criminal

proceeding any narcotic drug, firearm, bomb, explosive or any other dangerous

weapons seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling house in

this state. [Const 1963, art 1, § 11.]

“Absent a compelling reason, Michigan courts must construe Const 1963, art 1, § 11 to provide

the same protection as that secured by the Fourth Amendment.” People v Brcic, 342 Mich App

271, 277; 994 NW2d 812 (2022). “Cell phones in the modern world hold ‘the privacies of life.’ ”

Carson II, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 16, quoting Riley v California, 573 US 373, 403; 134 S Ct

2473; 189 L Ed 2d 430 (2014). “Therefore, like the protections that extend to the home, ‘Fourth

Amendment principles apply with equal force to the digital contents of a cell phone.’ ” Carson II,

___ Mich at ___; slip op at 16, quoting People v Hughes, 506 Mich 512, 527; 958 NW2d 98 (2020).

“Accordingly, in the context of a cell-phone search, we must jealously guard the requirements of

the Fourth Amendment, including the particularity requirement.” Carson II, ___ Mich at ___; slip

op at 16.

“The last two phrases of the Fourth Amendment, the particularity requirement, only allows

the issuance of search warrants ‘particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons

or things to be seized.’ ” People v Bogucki, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025)

(Docket No. 372629); slip op at 6, quoting US Const, Am IV. The Michigan Constitution contains

a substantively similar provision at Const 1963, art 1 § 11. “ ‘The purpose of the particularity

requirement in the description of items to be seized is to provide reasonable guidance to the

executing officers and to prevent their exercise of undirected discretion in determining what is

subject to seizure.’ ” Brcic, 342 Mich App at 278, quoting People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210,

245; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). “A search warrant is sufficiently particular ‘if the description is such

that the officer with a search warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify’ the people

and property subject to the warrant.” Id. at 278, quoting Steele v United States, 267 US 498, 503;

45 S Ct 414; 69 L Ed 757 (1925). “It is also well settled that a search may not stand on a general

warrant.” People v Hellstrom, 264 Mich App 187, 192; 690 NW2d 293 (2004).

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The Michigan Supreme Court has expressly rejected the notion that a warrant automatically

authorizes the police to examine all digital data seized based on “the mere possibility that evidence

may conceivably be found anywhere on the device, or that evidence might be concealed,

mislabeled, or manipulated.” Hughes, 506 Mich at 541; see also Carson II, ___ Mich at ___; slip

op at 18. Stated alternatively, the Michigan Supreme Court has declined to endorse a blanket rule

permitting unrestricted review of digital information based on speculative possibilities alone.

“Such a per se rule would effectively nullify the particularity requirement of the Fourth

Amendment in the context of cell-phone data and rehabilitate an impermissible general warrant

that would in effect give police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will amount a person’s

private effects.” Hughes, 506 Mich at 541-542 (citations and quotations marks omitted). Further,

“allowing a search of an entire device for evidence of a crime based upon the possibility that

evidence of the crime could be found anywhere on the phone and that the incriminating data could

be hidden or manipulated would ‘render the warrant a general warrant in violation of the Fourth

Amendment’s particularity requirement.’ ” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

“Ultimately, the degree of particularity required to adequately direct a search depends on the crime

being investigated and the items sought.” Carson II, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 23.

In this case, the search warrant at issue sought an extensive range of data from McDonald’s

cell phone, including call logs, contacts, text messages, e-mails, pictures, videos, audio files, GPS

coordinates, calendar, Internet history, and all account information for any installed applications.

In the last paragraph of the affidavit, Detective Johnson stated that in his training and experience,

McDonald’s cell phone “may contain . . . communications data, location data, and other digital

evidence with[] relation to this incident. . . .” However, Detective Johnson did not identify the

specific “incident” to which he referred. The affidavit not only mentioned the decedent’s murder

but also referred to two prior incidents of possible financial crimes involving the decedent. The

language used in the affidavit indicates that the financial offenses may have been a motive for

McDonald and Grace to murder the decedent; however, Detective Johnson does not expressly

make this connection. Moreover, the only fact to indicate McDonald was a suspect was the single

sentence describing the markings discovered on McDonald’s hands, which matched the cord found

near the decedent. The affidavit does not mention McDonald’s police interview, when he claimed

he removed the cord and attempted CPR, resulting in the markings.

At the evidentiary hearing, Detective Johnson testified that he was mainly concerned with

obtaining location data and communication data from McDonald’s phone at the approximate time

of the decedent’s death. However, Detective Johnson did not limit the search to these specific

categories or to a specific time or date range. See Carson II, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 18 (“The

lack of instruction on the scope, breadth, or focus of the search shifts the particularity requirement

from the warrant, where it belongs, to the executing officer’s discretion.”)

In issuing the contested opinion and order, the trial court relied on Carson I, which the

prosecution contends was improper. In Carson I, the police obtained a search warrant to search

the contents of the defendant’s cell phone and uncovered incriminating text messages and other

circumstantial evidence connecting the defendant to the offenses charged. Carson I, ___ Mich

App at ___; slip op at 3-4. The defendant was convicted and appealed, arguing ineffective

assistance of counsel, contending that the “affidavit in support of the police’s request for a search

warrant was inadequate in that it failed to establish probable cause to believe that the cell phone

would contain relevant evidence.” Id. at 6-7. In the defendant’s motion for a new trial, the trial

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court determined defense counsel erred by failing to move to suppress the cell phone’s contents

but determined the error was harmless, because the good-faith exception applied. Id. at 7.

Regarding the underlying search of the cell phone, this Court held, “The warrant

authorizing a search of the contents of [the] defendant’s cell phone was too broad in violation of

the particularity requirement, and the good-faith exception is inapplicable to these facts.” Id. at 10-

11. The search warrant in Carson I, among other things, sought:

Any [sic] physical keys, encryption devices and similar physical items that are

necessary to gain access to the cellular device to be searched or are necessary to

gain access to the programs, data, applications and information contained on the

cellular device(s) to be searched; Any [sic] passwords, password files, test keys,

encryption codes or other computer codes necessary to access the cellular devices,

applications and software to be searched or to convert any data, file or information

on the cellular device into a readable form; This [sic] shall include thumb print and

facial recognition and or digital PIN passwords, electronically stored

communications or messages, including any of the items to be found in electronic

mail (“e-mail”). Any and all data including text messages, text/picture messages,

pictures and videos, address book, any data on the SIM card if applicable, and all

records or documents which were created, modified, or stored in electronic or

magnetic form and any data, image, or information that is capable of being read or

interpreted by a cellular phone or a computer. [Id. at 12.]

This Court concluded that the warrant “was a general warrant that gave the police license to search

everything on defendant’s cell phone in the hopes of finding anything, but nothing in particular,

that could help with the investigation.” Id. at 12 (emphasis in original). This Court explained that

making an opening reference to an investigation of larceny in a building and safe breaking “was

negated by the ensuing instruction to search for such items by searching and seizing the entirety

of the phone’s contents.” Id. at ____; slip op at 12. This Court found it particularly troubling that

the warrant specifically authorized a search of the defendant’s photographs and videos, “despite

there being no evidence suggesting that these files would yield anything relevant . . . .” Id. at ___;

slip op at 12. The Carson I Court further opined:

Numerous other examples establish that many states have joined in our conclusion

that that the particularity requirement disallows the issuance of warrants

authorizing police to search the entirety of a person’s cell phone contents for

evidence of a particular crime; the massive scale of the personal information people

store on their mobile devices means that there must be some limits to the scope of

the search. [Id. at 14.]

In Carson II, the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed this Court’s holding with respect to the

particularity requirement for the search and seizure of cell phones but reversed on the ground that

the defendant was unable to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Carson II, ___ Mich at

___; slip op at 23-24, 29-30.

As in Carson, the search warrant in this case was insufficient to satisfy the particularity

requirement of the Fourth Amendment because it essentially authorized the collection of all data

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from McDonald’s phone since the phone’s first use. See Carson II, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at

21 (“Put simply, when information concerning the relevant time frame of the criminal activity

exists, this time limitation should be included in the search warrant to ensure adequate

particularity.”) In addition, neither the affidavit, nor the warrant connected the data to be searched

with any suspected criminal behavior by McDonald, thus failing to establish a nexus between the

records sought and the offense alleged. For example, there was no information in the affidavit or

warrant explaining how all of McDonald’s photos, e-mails, calendar, or contacts would be relevant

to the decedent’s murder or even the previously alleged financial offenses. While Detective

Johnson clarified at the evidentiary hearing that he was primarily interested in the geolocation and

communication data from McDonald’s cell phone, the warrant requested significantly greater

information. See Bogucki, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 6 (“A search warrant for access to

everything on a cell phone, for the purpose of finding anything that could assist with an

investigation, is a general warrant that fails the particularity requirement.”) Additionally,

Michigan caselaw provides that review of a search warrant is strictly confined to the four corners

of the warrant and its supporting affidavit, rather than relying on material never presented to the

issuing magistrate. See People v Keller, 479 Mich 467, 475-477; 739 NW2d 505 (2007); see also

People v Russo, 439 Mich 584, 603-604; 487 NW2d 698 (1992).

The police had sufficient information to appropriately curtail the search warrant in

accordance with constitutional standards, yet failed to do so, and the magistrate compounded this

failure by authorizing a warrant with obvious deficiencies. As opined by the Michigan Supreme

Court:

The need for specificity about the types of data expected to be encountered and

searched must be weighed against the fact that law enforcement often will not be

certain what evidence exists and where it will be located. This does not, however,

free them from the obligation to provide the most specific description possible and

to support a request to search each category of data mentioned in a warrant affidavit.

Nor does it permit magistrates to approve boundless searches of electronic data

when the information available provides a basis for a more reasonably tailored

search.

* * *

In our modern age, when cell phones carry a virtually unlimited amount of private

information, such wide-ranging exploratory rummaging is constitutionally

intolerable and clearly violates the Fourth Amendment. [Carson II, ___ Mich at

___; slip op at 22, 24.]

Accordingly, the trial court properly granted McDonald’s motion to suppress on this basis.

The prosecutor further argues that even if the search warrant was invalid, the evidence

seized should still be admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

“Generally, evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible at trial.”

People v Hughes (On Remand), 339 Mich App 99, 110-111; 981 NW2d 182 (2021). “The

exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy that originated as a means to protect the Fourth

Amendment right of citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” People v

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Hawkins, 468 Mich 488, 498; 668 NW2d 602 (2003). “The exclusionary rule, modified by several

exceptions, generally bars the introduction into evidence of materials seized and observations

made during an unconstitutional search.” Id. at 498-499 (footnote omitted).

“However, there are exceptions to the exclusionary rule.” Bogucki, ___ Mich App at ___;

slip op at 7. “Among the exceptions is the good-faith exception, which ‘renders evidence seized

pursuant to an invalid search warrant admissible as substantive evidence in criminal proceedings

where the police acted in reasonable reliance on a presumptively valid search warrant that was

later declared invalid.’ ” Hughes (On Remand), 339 Mich App at 111, quoting Hellstrom, 264

Mich App at 193. “In those cases, it is the magistrate rather than the officer who made an error

and therefore excluding the evidence does not further the deterrence rationale behind the

exclusionary rule. . . .” Hughes (On Remand), 339 Mich App at 111. “At the same time, this Court

has recognized that a warrant may be so facially deficient, in failing to particularize the place to

be searched or the things to be seized, that executing officers could not reasonably have presumed

it to be valid.” Bogucki ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 7.

The prosecution contends the suppression of the evidence was improper because there were

no allegations of police misconduct. The prosecution asserts the only misconduct that the trial

court penalized was “grammatical,” because Detective Johnson specifically limited his search to

the items listed in the affidavit. While there were no claims of police misconduct, the prosecution

ignores this Court’s holdings in Carson I and Bogucki. In Carson I, ___ Mich App at ___; slip

op at 15, this Court concluded that “the warrant in this specific case was so facially deficient by

virtue of its failure to particularize the places to be searched and things to be seized that the

executing officers could not have reasonably presumed it to be valid,” rendering the exclusionary

rule inapplicable. In Bogucki, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 7, this Court adopted the holding

in Carson I with respect to the exclusionary rule regarding improper searches of cell phones.

Because the warrant in this case was similar to the warrant in Carson, the good-faith exception

does not apply.

The prosecution asserts that the exclusionary rule would not bar total admission of the

evidence, and this Court should sever the noncompliant portions of the search warrant. The

prosecution relies on Judge Redford’s dissent in Carson I. In his dissent, Judge Redford explained

even if the warrant was constitutionally defective, the exclusionary rule would not bar the

admission of the text messages between the defendant and his coconspirator, which had probable

cause. Carson I, ___ Mich App at ___ (REDFORD, J., dissenting); slip op at 11. Dissenting

opinions are not binding nor precedent. People v Woolfolk, 304 Mich App 450, 478; 848 NW2d

169 (2014), aff’d 497 Mich 23 (2014).

Whether severance is applicable is a multiple-step analysis. Keller, 479 Mich at 478-479.

“First the court must divide the warrant into categories. Then, the court must evaluate the

constitutionality of each category.” Id. at 479. “If only some categories are constitutional, the

court must determine if the valid categories are distinguishable from the invalid ones and whether

the valid categories make up the great part of the warrant.” Id. (quotation marks and citation

omitted). The prosecution does not provide an analysis and relies on Judge Redford’s dissent to

support its position that the geolocation and communication data from October 12, 2023, may be

severed from the warrant. The prosecution fails to explain how that could occur given the

complexity and scope of the search. See Blackburne & Brown Mtg Co v Ziomek, 264 Mich App

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615, 619; 692 NW2d 388 (2004) (“An appellant may not merely announce its position or assert an

error and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for its claims, unravel or

elaborate its argument, or search for authority for its position. Insufficiently briefed issues are

deemed abandoned on appeal.”) (Quotation marks and citations omitted).

Ultimately, the facts in this case mirror those in Carson. Although the prosecution

correctly notes that the search warrant incorporated an affidavit, the affidavit neither identified a

suspect nor the offense under investigation and failed to establish any limiting factors relevant to

the search. Such deficiencies run directly contrary to the core protections of the Fourth

Amendment, which exist to prevent precisely this type of unfettered governmental intrusion. Law

enforcement had an obligation to tailor the warrant in a manner consistent with constitutional

requirements yet neglected to do so, as did the magistrate in authorizing the improper warrant.

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that the exclusionary rule was inapplicable

and in granting McDonald’s motion to suppress.4

Affirmed.

/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney

/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett

/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi

4

We decline to address the parties’ arguments regarding whether there was sufficient probable

cause to authorize the warrant, as we have concluded that the contested search warrant failed to

meet the particularity requirement. Further, due to the ambiguities in both the search warrant and

affidavit regarding the underlying offense investigated, it is unclear as to which offense the

probable-cause standard would pertain to.

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