Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

LORENZO RASHAD JOHNSON

v. Case No. 8:20-cr-57-VMC-AEP

8:25-cv-2145-VMC-AEP

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

______________________________/

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Lorenzo Rashad

Johnson’s pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion to Vacate, Set Aside,

or Correct Sentence. (Civ. Doc. # 1; Crim. Doc. # 119). The

United States of America responded on September 15, 2025.

(Civ. Doc. # 6). Mr. Johnson failed to file a reply. Also

pending before the Court is Mr. Johnson’s pro se Motion for

Reconsideration. (Civ. Doc. # 3). For the reasons that follow,

the Section 2255 Motion is dismissed as untimely, and the

Motion for Reconsideration is denied without prejudice.

I. Background

In March 2021, pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Johnson

pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and

ammunition. (Crim. Doc. ## 70, 72, 75). The plea agreement

advised:

It is understood by the parties that the Court is

neither a party to nor bound by this agreement. The

Court may accept or reject the agreement, or defer

a decision until it has had an opportunity to

consider the presentence report prepared by the

United States Probation Office. The defendant

understands and acknowledges that, although the

parties are permitted to make recommendations and

present arguments to the Court, the sentence will

be determined solely by the Court, with the

assistance of the United States Probation Office.

(Doc. # 70 at 16). Mr. Johnson acknowledged in the plea

agreement that he was “entering into this agreement and [was]

pleading guilty freely and voluntarily without reliance upon

any discussions between the attorney for the government and

the defendant and defendant’s attorney and without promise of

benefit of any kind (other than the concessions contained

herein), and without threats, force, intimidation, or

coercion of any kind.” (Id. at 18). The plea agreement

“constitute[d] the entire agreement between the government

and the defendant with respect to the aforementioned guilty

plea and no other promises, agreements, or representations

exist or have been made to the defendant or defendant’s

attorney with regard to such guilty plea.” (Id. at 22).

The Court sentenced him to 70 months’ imprisonment,

which was a one-level downward variance from the applicable

guidelines range of 77-96 months. (Crim. Doc. ## 99, 100).

His judgment of conviction was entered on October 8, 2021.

(Crim. Doc. # 100). The judgment did not specify whether the

federal sentence should be served concurrently or

consecutively with the sentence that had not yet been imposed

in Mr. Johnson’s then-pending state court case. Perhaps

because of the appellate waiver in the plea agreement, Mr.

Johnson did not appeal.

Subsequently, in January 2022, Mr. Johnson was sentenced

in state court on unrelated state charges, including fleeing

or eluding, sale of cocaine, and possession of cocaine. (Crim.

Doc. # 114 at 5-8; Crim. Doc. # 88 at 19-21). The state court

ordered that his state sentence be served concurrently with

his federal sentence. (Crim. Doc. # 114 at 7). His plea in

state court specified that Mr. Johnson would receive credit

on his state sentence for all “time incarcerated in a county

facility before the imposition of the sentence.” (Id. at 6).

As he was in state custody, Mr. Johnson served his state

sentence first. Once released from state custody, he was

transferred to federal custody to serve his federal sentence

in September 2024. (Civ. Doc. # 5 at 2). Because this Court

did not pronounce whether the federal sentence should be

served concurrently or consecutively with the state sentence,

the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) treated the sentences as

consecutive. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (“Multiple terms of

imprisonment imposed at different times run consecutively

unless the court orders that the terms are to run

concurrently.”); United States v. Allen, 124 F. App’x 719,

720 (3d Cir. 2005) (“While a state court may express its

intent that a defendant’s state sentence run concurrently

with a previously imposed federal sentence, this intent is

not binding on federal courts or the BOP.”).

Mr. Johnson then filed the instant Section 2255 motion

on August 5, 2025. (Civ. Doc. # 1; Crim. Doc. # 119). The

United States of America responded, arguing the Motion is

untimely and alternatively fails on the merits. (Civ. Doc. #

6). Mr. Johnson failed to reply. He also filed a Motion for

Reconsideration, seeking reconsideration of an unspecified

order. (Civ. Doc. # 3). The Motions are ripe for review.

II. Discussion

A. Motion for Reconsideration

As a preliminary matter, Mr. Johnson filed an odd Motion

for Reconsideration in this Section 2255 case on August 25,

2025. (Civ. Doc. # 3). It is unclear to the Court for what

order Mr. Johnson seeks reconsideration because no

substantive order was entered in this Section 2255 case at

the time Mr. Johnson sought reconsideration. The Motion asks

that Mr. Johnson “be credited 854 days of time he served in

predetention . . . to his now federal case number he’s

currently serving.” (Id. at 2).

To the extent the Motion is seeking reconsideration of

an order entered by this Court in the criminal case, the

Motion is incorrectly filed in this Section 2255 case. For

that reason, the Motion is denied without prejudice.

Alternatively, the Court notes that Mr. Johnson states

at the beginning of the Motion that the Motion is brought in

part under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Thus, if the Motion was correctly

filed in the criminal case, the Court would construe this

Motion as a Section 2241 motion. Indeed, a Section 2241

motion, rather than a Section 2255 motion, is the proper

avenue for Mr. Johnson to seek relief on his claim that the

BOP has miscalculated the county jail credits he should

receive. See United States v. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d 1340, 1345

(11th Cir. 2000) (“A claim for credit for time served is

brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 after the exhaustion of

administrative remedies.”); Allen, 124 F. App’x at 721 (“The

exclusive remedy for challenging the BOP’s calculation of a

federal sentence is a habeas corpus petition filed pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, directed to the district court in the

United States District where the petitioner is

incarcerated.”).

Section 2241 motions, however, must be filed in the

district court in the district in which the defendant is

confined. See Fernandez v. United States, 941 F.2d 1488, 1495

(11th Cir. 1991) (“Section 2241 petitions may be brought only

in the district court for the district in which the inmate is

incarcerated. Fernandez is confined at FMC–Rochester in

Minnesota. Consequently, even if we were to construe

Fernandez’s claim as a section 2241 motion, the district court

for the Southern District of Florida would not have

jurisdiction.”).

Here, Mr. Johnson is housed in the El Reno Federal

Correctional Institution, which is in Oklahoma. Therefore,

Mr. Johnson may only file a Section 2241 Motion in the Western

District of Oklahoma. To the extent the Motion would be

construed as a Section 2241 Motion, it would be due to be

dismissed because this Court would lack jurisdiction over the

Motion.

B. Section 2255 Motion

1. Timeliness

First, the United States argues that Mr. Johnson’s

Section 2255 Motion should be dismissed as untimely. (Civ.

Doc. # 6 at 5). The Court agrees.

“The [Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (‘AEDPA’)] established a one-year statute of limitations

applicable to § 2255 motions, which begins to run from, inter

alia, ‘the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes

final.’” Ramirez v. United States, 146 F. App’x 325, 326 (11th

Cir. 2005) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255). “In most cases, a

judgment of conviction becomes final when the time for filing

a direct appeal expires.” Id.

Judgment was entered in this case on October 8, 2021.

(Crim. Doc. # 100). Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure

5(b)(1)(A), Mr. Johnson had fourteen days — until October 22,

2021 — to file a notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 5(b)(1)(A).

But Mr. Johnson did not file a notice of appeal. Thus, Mr.

Johnson’s judgment of conviction became final on October 22,

2021. “The limitation period started the next day, and the

time to file a Section 2255 motion expired a year later” — on

October 23, 2022. Salley v. United States, No. 8:19-cr-317-

MSS-AEP, 2023 WL 3568618, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 18, 2023). The

date Mr. Johnson filed his Section 2255 Motion, August 5,

2025, is over two and a half years after the October 23, 2022,

deadline.

Furthermore, the Court determines that the one-year

statute of limitations did not begin to run under Section

2255(f)(4) when Mr. Johnson was transferred to federal

custody after serving his state sentence. See 28 U.S.C. §

2255(f)(4) (stating that the limitation period shall run from

the latest of multiple dates, including “the date on which

the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have

been discovered through the exercise of due diligence”). Mr.

Johnson knew at the time his judgment became final that his

plea agreement and judgment in the federal case did not

discuss the calculation of jail credits such that, with the

exercise of due diligence, he would have discovered his

counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness at that time. Thus, the

Motion is untimely.

Finally, Mr. Johnson has not established entitlement to

equitable tolling. “Because equitable tolling is an

extraordinary remedy, it is limited to rare and exceptional

circumstances and typically applied sparingly.” Hunter v.

Ferrell, 587 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). “The petitioner has the

burden of proving entitlement to equitable tolling by showing

that ‘extraordinary circumstances that were both beyond his

control and unavoidable even with diligence’ prevented filing

the petition on time.” Jones v. United States, 304 F.3d 1035,

1040 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted) (emphasis original).

Mr. Johnson cannot meet that burden.

He argues that his delay in filing his Section 2255

Motion was caused by his misunderstanding over whether his

federal sentence was concurrent with his later-imposed state

sentence. (Civ. Doc. # 1 at 12). According to Mr. Johnson, he

did not learn that his federal sentence was not running

concurrently with his later-imposed state sentence until he

was transferred from state custody into federal custody in

September 2024. (Id.). “Since arriving to federal custody, it

was brought to [his] attention by [his] case manager that

[he] did not receive credit for time spent in federal hold

overs” and he complains he was unable “to have access to [his]

legal document while in state or federal custody.” (Id.).

This is not an exceptional circumstance that warrants

equitable tolling. Courts in the Eleventh Circuit “have not

accepted a lack of a legal education and related confusion or

ignorance about the law as excuses for a failure to file in

a timely fashion.” Perez v. Fla., 519 F. App’x 995, 997 (11th

Cir. 2013). “As with any litigant, pro se litigants ‘are

deemed to know of the one-year statute of limitations.’” Id.

(citation omitted). Thus, Mr. Johnson’s confusion over

whether his federal sentence was concurrent with his state

sentence and over how the jail credits would be calculated

for his federal sentence does not justify equitable tolling.

Nor does his vague claim that he did not have access to an

unspecified “legal document” support equitable tolling. See

Dodd v. United States, 365 F.3d 1273, 1283 (11th Cir. 2004)

(“[L]ockdowns and periods in which a prisoner is separated

from his legal papers are not ‘extraordinary circumstances’

in which equitable tolling is appropriate.”), aff’d, 545 U.S.

353 (2005).

In short, Mr. Johnson’s Motion is untimely, and the

Motion is dismissed.

2. Merits

Alternatively, even if the Motion were timely, the Court

would deny it on the merits. Mr. Johnson bears the burden of

proving that he is entitled to relief under Section 2255.

Rivers v. United States, 777 F.3d 1304, 1316 (11th Cir. 2015).

Mr. Johnson raises two grounds in his Section 2255

Motion. (Civ. Doc. # 1). In his first ground, he raises a

claim of ineffective assistance of his counsel, Mr. Howard

Anderson. His argument in its entirety is this:

Counsel was ineffective in [not] bringing up

matters orally in court pertaining to time credit

negotiations between prosecution and I. Also,

defense counsel failed to insert time credit clause

into plea agreement as he promised he would. I have

731 days of 854 days that should be credited to me

[while sitting] in Pinellas County Jail.

(Id. at 5). Thus, the Court construes this ground as

complaining only about credits for jail time he served before

his federal sentence was imposed, rather than the time he

served in state custody after his state sentence was imposed.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, a petitioner must show that (1) his counsel’s

performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance

prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687 (1984). To establish deficient performance, Mr.

Johnson must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence

“that particular and identified acts or omissions of counsel

‘were outside the wide range of professionally competent

assistance.’” Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1314

(11th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). In other words, Mr.

Johnson must show that “no competent counsel would have taken

the action that his counsel did take.” Id. at 1315. In

deciding whether an attorney’s performance was deficient,

courts are “highly deferential” and “indulge [the] strong

presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable and

that counsel made all significant decisions in the exercise

of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 1314 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

To satisfy Strickland’s second prong — prejudice — Mr.

Johnson must show that “there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of

the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “[I]f

a claim fails to satisfy the prejudice component, the Court

need not make a ruling on the performance component.” Ortiz

v. United States, No 8:15-cr-409-VMC-JSS, 2017 WL 6021645, at

*2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 11, 2017).

Here, Mr. Johnson’s first ground fails because there is

no prejudice. Section 3585(b) provides:

A defendant shall be given credit toward the

service of a term of imprisonment for any time he

has spent in official detention prior to the date

the sentence commences —

(1) as a result of the offense for which the

sentence was imposed; or

(2) as a result of any other charge for which the

defendant was arrested after the commission of the

offense for which the sentence was imposed;

that has not been credited against another

sentence.

18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). “Authority to calculate credit for time

served under section 3585(b) is vested in the Attorney

General,” through the BOP, “not the sentencing court.” United

States v. Alexander, 609 F.3d 1250, 1259 (11th Cir. 2010);

see United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 331 (1992) (“The

Attorney General, through the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), has

responsibility for imprisoning federal offenders.”). Indeed,

the Supreme Court has held that Ҥ 3585(b) does not authorize

a district court to compute the credit at sentencing.” Wilson,

503 U.S. at 334.

Thus, section 3585(b) requires that a defendant be given

credit for time served in jail pre-sentencing and vests the

authority to make that calculation with the BOP — not this

Court at sentencing. Given this, there was no reason for Mr.

Johnson’s counsel to put on the record at sentencing that Mr.

Johnson is entitled to credit for his time served in jail.

Nor would a provision in the plea agreement that Mr. Johnson

is entitled to jail credit be needed. The statute applies

regardless such that there is no prejudice from counsel’s not

mentioning this statute during sentencing or in the plea

agreement.

Mr. Johnson also was not prejudiced by his counsel’s

failure to put on the record the specific number of days Mr.

Johnson believed he should be credited or to ask the Court to

calculate the credits that should be given to Mr. Johnson.

Because the BOP is the entity tasked with calculating credits,

this Court would not have agreed to calculate the amount of

jail credit for Mr. Johnson even if Mr. Johnson’s counsel

asked during sentencing. See Wilson, 503 U.S. at 334 (holding

that Ҥ 3585(b) does not authorize a district court to compute

the credit at sentencing”); Nyhuis, 211 F.3d at 1345 (“The

granting of credit for time served ‘is in the first instance

an administrative, not a judicial, function.’” (citation

omitted)).

For these reasons, the Motion would be due to be denied

as to the first ground.

In his second ground, Mr. Johnson conclusorily states:

“My guilty plea was entered because the agreement was

petitioner will be getting all jail credit and nothing was

said on record.” (Civ. Doc. # 1 at 6). Mr. Johnson does not

specify what type of claim this is, but he does assert that

he did not raise this argument on direct appeal because of

“ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Id. at 7). This second

ground appears to be a claim that Mr. Johnson’s guilty plea

was not voluntary, but it also could potentially be construed

as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

However the claim is construed, it lacks merit. On its

face, this claim is insufficiently pled. See Tejada v. Dugger,

941 F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that conclusory

statements, unsupported by specific facts or the record, are

insufficient to demonstrate entitlement to habeas relief);

Brown v. United States, No. CR 19-00019-JB-B, 2022 WL 3643653,

at *5 (S.D. Ala. June 24, 2022) (“Brown’s claim of an illegal

sentence is subject to summary denial because it rests

entirely on unsupported generalizations and is contradicted

by the record.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. CR

19-00019-JB-B, 2022 WL 3638175 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 23, 2022).

Mr. Johnson does not allege that his guilty plea was

involuntary. He does not allege that, had he known that he

would not receive the entire amount of pre-sentencing jail

time to which he believed he is entitled as credit against

his federal sentence, he would not have pled guilty in the

federal case. Mr. Johnson signed his plea agreement, and the

Court accepted Mr. Johnson’s guilty plea after a plea

colloquy. (Crim. Doc. ## 70, 72, 75). There is no mention in

the plea agreement that the Court would order that Mr.

Johnson’s federal sentence be served concurrently with his

not-yet-imposed state sentence. (Crim. Doc. # 70). Nor is

there mention of the amount of jail credits Mr. Johnson would

receive. (Id.). Rather, the plea agreement stated that Mr.

Johnson was entering the agreement voluntarily and not based

on a “promise of benefit of any kind (other than the

concessions contained herein)” or “threats, force,

intimidation, or coercion of any kind.” (Id. at 18). The plea

agreement also made clear that “the sentence will be

determined solely by the Court.” (Id. at 16).

Thus, Mr. Johnson’s unsworn statement, suggesting he

believed the plea agreement required that he receive the

amount of jail credit he anticipated, is insufficient to prove

his guilty plea was involuntary. Nor does Mr. Johnson’s

alleged confusion over the amount of jail credit he would

receive establish that his counsel’s assistance was

ineffective or prejudicial. See Pio v. United States, No. 13-

23666-CIV, 2014 WL 4384314, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 3, 2014)

(“Conclusory allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel

are insufficient to state a claim.”).

For these reasons, the Motion would also be due to be

denied as to the second ground.

III. Evidentiary Hearing

As the Court readily determined that Mr. Johnson’s

Section 2255 Motion was untimely and alternatively lacks

merit, no evidentiary hearing is required. See 28 U.S.C. §

2255(b) (stating that an evidentiary hearing is not necessary

if “the motion and the files and records of the case

conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no

relief”); see also Hernandez v. United States, 778 F.3d 1230,

1232-33 (11th Cir. 2015) (“To establish that he is entitled

to an evidentiary hearing, Hernandez had to allege facts that

would prove that his counsel performed deficiently and that

he was prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient performance.”).

IV. Certificate of Appealability and Leave to Appeal In

Forma Pauperis Denied

The Court declines to issue a certificate of

appealability because Mr. Johnson has failed to make a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right

as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Nor will the Court

authorize Mr. Johnson to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis

as to either the Section 2255 Motion or the construed Section

2241 Motion because such an appeal would not be taken in good

faith. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). Mr. Johnson shall be

required to pay the full amount of the appellate filing fee

pursuant to Section 1915(b)(1) and (2).

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

(1) Lorenzo Rashad Johnson’s pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion

to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence. (Civ. Doc. #

1; Crim. Doc. # 119) is DISMISSED as untimely.

(2) Lorenzo Rashad Johnson’s pro se Motion for

Reconsideration (Civ. Doc. # 3) is DENIED without

prejudice. To the extent Mr. Johnson wishes to pursue

relief under Section 2241, he should file such motion

with the federal court in the district in which he is

housed.

(3) The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly and

to close this case.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this

20th day of January, 2026.

Eigen Mocely GFR.

VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ’COVINGTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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