Reichelderfer

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

AMANDA B. REICHELDERFER, CASE NO. 5:25 CV 1401

Petitioner,

v. JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II

HOLMES COUNTY JAIL, et al.,

Respondents. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

ORDER

Petitioner Amanda B. Reichelderfer (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition seeking a writ of habeas

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1); see also Doc. 1-2 (Memorandum in Support). This case

was referred to Magistrate Judge Jonathan D. Greenberg for a Report and Recommendation

(“R&R”) regarding the Petition under Local Civil Rule 72.2(b)(2). On October 3, 2025, Judge

Greenberg issued an R&R recommending the Court dismiss the Petition pursuant to the fugitive

disentitlement doctrine and deny Petitioner’s other motions as moot. (Doc. 16). Petitioner filed

objections to the R&R. (Docs. 17, 18). Both before and after the filing of the R&R, Petitioner filed

motions for temporary restraining orders and motions related thereto. (Docs. 3, 4, 12, 20, 21, 22).

The Court has jurisdiction over the Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). For the

reasons set forth below, the Court denies Petitioner’s habeas petition and denies as moot

Petitioner’s temporary restraining order motions.

BACKGROUND

This habeas case, filed on July 3, 2025, stems from Petitioner’s conviction on a probation

violation in the Holmes County, Ohio Municipal Court, and resulting 30-day jail sentence. See

State v. Reichelderfer, 2025 WL 842080 (Ohio Ct. App.).

Factual Background

For the purposes of habeas corpus review of state court decisions, findings of fact made by

a state court are presumed correct and can only be contravened if the habeas petitioner shows, by

clear and convincing evidence, erroneous factual findings by the state court. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1); Moore v. Mitchell, 708 F.3d 760, 775 (6th Cir. 2013); Mitzel v. Tate, 267 F.3d 524,

530 (6th Cir. 2001). This presumption of correctness applies to factual findings made by a state

court of appeals based on the state trial court record. Mitzel, 267 F.3d at 530. The Ohio Fifth

District Court of Appeals set forth the following facts on direct appeal:

{¶2} On July 7, 2022, Captain Kim Herman of the Millersburg Police Department

filed a complaint in the Holmes County Municipal Court, charging Appellant with

one count of theft, in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), a misdemeanor of the first

degree. At her arraignment on July 11, 2022, Appellant entered a plea of not guilty

to the charge. Appellant appeared before the trial court on November 15, 2022,

withdrew her former plea of not guilty and entered a plea of no contest. The trial

court sentenced Appellant to a jail term of 30 days, but suspended the sentence and

placed Appellant on probation for a period of one (1) year. The trial court ordered

Appellant to complete a drug and alcohol abuse counseling program.

{¶3} Appellant signed a probation agreement on November 15, 2022. Rule 11 of

the probation agreement required Appellant to “keep all appointments with

probation officer unless otherwise directed.” Probation Agreement, p. 2. In

addition, Appellant was ordered to report monthly or as otherwise directed by her

probation officer. The probation agreement expressly provided:

If you do not report on the correct day DURING BUSINESS

HOURS, you may face revocation of your probation and jail time.

YOU MAY NOT REPORT BY LEAVING A VOICE MESSAGE

AFTER BUSINESS HOURS.

Id.

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{¶4} Further, Rule 5 provided:

You are not permitted to possess, consume, or have under your

control, any controlled substance or their accessories, except those

prescribed by a physician. You shall not visit or remain at a place

where illegal drugs are being used, possessed or sold. You will be

required to submit to whatever type of test the probation officer feels

is necessary to enforce this rule. You shall not possess, consume, or

use any substance or item that is specifically designed or advertised

to interfere with the results of a valid drug test. You shall not possess

or consume any synthetic drug of abuse.

Id. at p. 3.

{¶5} George Crone, Appellant’s original probation officer, did not require

Appellant to submit to drug tests or report in person. In March, 2023, Appellant

was assigned a new probation officer, Tabitha Hemenway, who required Appellant

to report in person to her appointments. Appellant missed her in person probation

appointment on March 20, 2023. Appellant attempted to report via a phone call.

Hemenway informed Appellant a warrant would be issued for her arrest.

{¶6} On March 24, 2023, the State filed a motion to revoke/modify community

control/probation after Appellant failed to abide by the terms of her probation. The

trial court issued a warrant for Appellant’s arrest on March 27, 2023. Appellant

failed to have any communications with her probation officer between March,

2023, and December 19, 2023. The warrant was served on December 19, 2023,

after Appellant was arrested on unrelated charges. That day, Appellant was drug

tested. She admitted using amphetamines. The results of the drug test were positive

for methamphetamines. On January 4, 2024, Appellant tested positive for

methamphetamines and amphetamines, but denied any drug use. Appellant missed

a second in person probation appointment on January 9, 2024.

{¶7} On January 10, 2024, the State filed a second motion to revoke/modify

community control/probation based upon Appellant’s two failed urine screens and

failure to report for a scheduled probation appointment. Appellant filed a

memorandum in opposition to the State’s motion to revoke.

{¶8} At the initial hearing on the probation violation on January 24, 2024, the trial

court set a $25,000.00 bail. The trial court conducted a pretrial on February 6, 2024,

and an adjudicatory hearing on February 27, 2024. The adjudicatory hearing

addressed both the March 24, 2023, and January 10, 2024 motions to revoke.

{¶9} At the adjudicatory hearing, Tabitha Hemenway, Appellant’s probation

officer, testified Appellant was transferred to her supervision in early March, 2023.

Hemenway instructed Appellant to report in person on March 20, 2023. Appellant

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did not appear for the appointment. Hemenway advised Appellant she would be

issuing a warrant for her arrest due to her failure to report. Appellant was arrested

on the warrant as well as on another charge on December 19, 2023. Hemenway

noted Appellant did not report during those nine (9) months. Once Hemenway made

contact with Appellant, Appellant was drug screened. Appellant admitted to using

methamphetamines. Appellant failed the drug screen. The test was positive for

methamphetamines.

{¶10} Appellant was drug screened a second time on January 4, 2024, and tested

positive for methamphetamines and amphetamines, but denied any drug use at the

time. Hemenway instructed Appellant to report in person on January 9, 2024.

Appellant failed to report.

{¶11} Appellant testified on her own behalf. She admitted she missed her March

20, 2023 in person probation appointment, but explained she was working out of

town and had no transportation. Appellant stated she called Hemenway to try to

reschedule the appointment. With respect to her missed appointment on January 9,

2024, Appellant explained she was ill and had fallen asleep due to her medication.

Appellant claimed she called Hemenway later in the day. Appellant explained

George Crone, her original probation officer, allowed her to report via telephone

due to the fact she lived a distance from Holmes County then she was “told it’s

something else and it was never gone over with me how she [Hemenway] wanted

things done versus how he [Crone] had things set up for me.” Transcript of February

27, 2024 Adjudicatory Hearing at p.18.

{¶12} Via Probation Violation/Adjudicatory Hearing, the trial court terminated

Appellant’s probation and sentenced her to thirty (30) days in the Holmes County

Jail, finding Appellant had violated the terms and conditions of her probation.

Reichelderfer, 2025 WL 842080, at *1-2.

Procedural Background1

Petitioner was charged with theft in Holmes County Municipal Court on July 7, 2022. (Doc.

8-1). She was released on bond and arraigned on July 13, 2022. See State v. Reichelderfer, No. 22

CRB 00115 (Holmes Cnty. Mun. Ct.); Doc. 8-32, at 9-10 (copy of trial court docket). Plaintiff

entered a not guilty plea and Attorney Mark Baserman, Jr. was appointed to represent her. See

Doc. 8-32, at 9. Attorney Baserman requested discovery on July 18, 2022. See id. A pretrial

1. The following procedural background is taken from the documents submitted by Petitioner with

her Petition, Respondent with its Answer, as well as the state trial and appellate court dockets.

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conference was scheduled for July 26, but rescheduled three times at the request of Petitioner’s

counsel and once by the Court, ultimately to November 15, 2022. See id.; Docs. 8-3 to 8-6.

On November 15, 2022, Petitioner entered a no contest plea to the theft charge and the

Court found her guilty. (Doc. 8-7). The court sentenced Petitioner to one year of probation, with

30 days of jail time suspended upon successful completion of probation. Id.

On March 27, 2023, the State filed a motion to revoke or modify Petitioner’s probation.

(Doc. 8-8). It asserted Petitioner had violated the terms of her probation by failing to report for a

scheduled appointment on March 20, 2023. Id. at 2. The court issued a warrant in response to the

motion. (Doc. 8-9).

Petitioner was ultimately arrested pursuant to the warrant on December 19, 2023, when she

was arrested for another unrelated offense. Attorney Baserman was again appointed to represent

her and she was released on bond. (Doc. 8-10). A pretrial conference was initially scheduled for

January 9, 2024, but continued at Attorney Baserman’s request to January 23, 2024. (Doc. 8-10).

On January 10, 2024, the State filed a second motion to revoke or modify Petitioner’s probation

based on her failure to report as instructed to her probation officer on January 9, as well as positive

drug tests for methamphetamine and amphetamines. (Doc. 8-11). The court issued a warrant. See

Doc 8-12.

On January 23, 2024, Petitioner’s counsel filed a memorandum in opposition to the State’s

motion to revoke. On January 24, the court held an initial hearing on the probation violation, which

Petitioner attended with her attorney. (Doc. 8-13). The case was ultimately set for an adjudicatory

hearing on February 27, 2024. (Doc. 8-14).

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After that hearing, the court found Petitioner violated the terms of her probation, terminated

her probation, and imposed the previously-suspended 30-day jail sentence. (Doc. 8-15). She was

instructed to report to the Holmes County Jail on April 28, 2024. (Doc. 8-16).

On March 25, 2024, Petitioner filed a pro se motion to impose community control in lieu

of imprisonment. See Doc. 8-32, at 7. The court denied the motion on April 1, 2024, and ordered

Plaintiff to report to the jail as previously ordered. (Doc. 8-17). Petitioner failed to appear on April

28, 2024, and the court issued a warrant for her arrest. See Doc. 8-32, at 6-7.

On May 15, 2024, Petitioner filed a pro se motion for leave to file a delayed appeal and

requested appointed counsel. See id. at 6. The Court again appointed Attorney Baserman. (Doc. 8-

19). Baserman then moved with withdraw, and the court appointed attorney Haley McElroy for

Petitioner’s appeal. (Doc. 8-20). The court recalled the previously-issued warrant and granted

Petitioner’s motion to stay her sentence. (Doc. 8-21).

A copy of the trial court record and transcript of proceedings was filed with the Ohio Fifth

District Court of Appeals on July 2, 2024. See State v. Reichelderfer, No. 24 CA 0009 (Ohio Ct.

App.); Doc. 1-43 (appellate court docket) On July 29, 2024, Attorney McElroy filed an Anders

brief certifying she found no non-frivolous arguments for appeal. (Doc. 8-39). Upon receipt of that

brief, the appellate court granted Petitioner leave to file a pro se brief in support of her appeal.

Petitioner did so. See Doc. 1-43.

On March 17, 2025, the appellate court affirmed the trial court after examining the issues

raised in counsel’s Anders brief as well as Petitioner’s pro se brief. See Reichelderfer, 2025 WL

842080. On March 19, 2025, Petitioner filed a motion to stay execution of her sentencing pending

reconsideration and further appeal and on March 24, 2025, she filed a motion for reconsideration.

The appellate court denied both motions on March 31, 2025. See Docs. 8-42, 8-44. In its order

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denying reconsideration, the appellate court addressed Petitioner’s contention that the court

“erroneously implied that a probation officer had authority to unilaterally modify the terms of

Appellant’s probation.” (Doc. 8-42, at 2). It stated:

“[P]ursuant to the terms of her probation agreement, Appellant was required to

report monthly or as otherwise directed by her probation officer.” Reichelderfer,

2025-Ohio-899 at ¶ 36. “Officer Crone did not require Appellant to report in

person,” however, her case was “transferred to Officer Hemenway, who explicitly

informed Appellant she would have to report in person.” Id. Appellant was always

required to report to her probation officer. The fact that one probation officer did

not require her to report in person, while her new probation officer did, was not a

modification of the reporting requirement.

Id. at 2-3.

On March 28, 2025, the trial court lifted its previous stay of Petitioner’s sentence and

ordered Petitioner to report to the Holmes County Jail to serve her 30-day sentence by April 25,

2025. (Doc. 8-23).2 On March 31, 2025, the trial court reissued a judgment entry instructing the

same. (Doc. 8-24).

On April 14, 2025, Petitioner filed with the trial court an emergency motion to stay

execution of sentence. See Doc. 8-32, at 3. On April 28, 2025, she filed a “Renewed Motion to

Stay Execution of Sentencing Pending Resolution of Void Judgment Claim”, and a “Renewed

Motion to Vacate Void Judgment and Demand for Ruling on Pending Motions.” Id.

On April 21, 2025, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court and two

days later filed an emergency motion for stay of her sentence pending appeal. See Doc. 1-28. The

Ohio Supreme Court denied the motion to stay on April 24, 2025. State v. Reichelderfer, 257

N.E.3d 176 (2025) (table). On May 6, 2025, the Ohio Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner’s appeal

2. In its order, the trial court stated that Petitioner “ha[d] not filed any further appeals or motions”

following the appellate court’s affirmance. (Doc. 8-23). This is seemingly an incorrect statement

as Petitioner had filed the above-referenced motions to stay execution of her sentence pending

reconsideration and further appeal and for reconsideration with the appellate court.

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for failure to file a Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction. State v. Reichelderfer, 257 N.E.3d

203 (2025) (table). It also subsequently denied Petitioner’s motion to reinstate her appeal on June

10, 2025. State v. Reichelderfer, 260 N.E.3d 431 (2025) (table). The Ohio Supreme Court further

denied Petitioner’s motion to substitute a corrected emergency motion for stay of execution. See

id.

On May 12, 2025, the trial court issued an additional judgment entry after Petitioner failed

to appear to serve her sentence on April 25, 2025. (Doc. 8-25). Therein, the court noted the

appellate court’s affirmance on March 17 and its own prior order issued March 28 requiring

Petitioner to report to the Holmes County Jail on April 25, 2025. Id. The court explained that,

following Petitioner’s failure to appear to serve her sentence, she

then began the process to appeal her case to the Supreme Court of Ohio. The

Defendant requested a stay of execution of sentence to this Court and the Supreme

Court. No stay was ever granted. The Defendant’s appeal to the Ohio Supreme

Court was dismissed on May 6, 2025. Therefore, the sentence is now imposed upon

the Defendant.

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, the original sentence that was stayed

pending appeal is hereby imposed. The Defendant shall report to the Holmes

County Jail on May 28, 2025 at 9:00 a.m.

Id. Petitioner again failed to appear for execution of her sentence and the court issued a bench

warrant. See Doc. 8-26.

Habeas Petition

In her habeas Petition, Petitioner raises four grounds for relief:

GROUND ONE: Violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment:

Probation Terms were changed and enforced without notice, hearing, or court order.

Supporting Facts: After my original probation officer, George Crone provided

verbal modifications to my probation conditions (including telephone reporting,

counseling in the county that I live in instead of the 180 Institute, and no drug

testing), my new probation officer, Officer Hemenway, unilaterally reverted to the

original written terms without a court motion to modify. I was not given notice, nor

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did I sign any new conditions. When I missed a single in-person appointment due

to being out of town for work (after notifying probation), a warrant was issued. This

led to a probation revocation without proper notice or process.

* * *

GROUND TWO: The trial court reimposed my jail sentence on 03/28/2025

while multiple post-judgement motions were still pending – including a Motion to

Correct the Record (filed 03/26/2025), Motion for Reconsideration (filed

03/24/2025), and a Motion to Stay Execution of Sentence (filed 03/19/2025[)].

Supporting Facts: These motions were not ruled on before the court reimposed

sentence, violating my right to due process. The court then reimposed the same

sentence again on 05/12/2025, even though the Fifth District Court of Appeals had

not issued its mandate and my jurisdictional appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court was

still active. This created confusion about finality and jurisdiction, and exposed me

to double jeopardy concerns, as the same sentence was imposed multiple times

without clear legal authority or procedural closure. Also[,] a motion to reconsider

denia[l] of supplementing the record remained pending until 03/31/2025[.] Trial

court impos[]ed on 03/28/2025. Fifth District remained ruling on motions until

05/14/2025 showing jurisdiction was still within appeals status.

* * *

GROUND THREE: Violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment:

No probable cause hearing held before probation revocation; no opportunity to

contest violation.

Supporting facts: No probable cause hearing held before probation revocation,

violating due process. I was never allowed to contest the basis of the alleged

violation[.] Issue was railed with counsel and in appellate filin[g] but Fifth District

deemed it forfeited for lack of objection. Counsel failed to preserve it. I was not

given a probable cause hearing and was unaware I needed to object on the record

to preserve the issue.

* * *

GROUND FOUR: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel under the Sixth Amendment.

Supporting facts: Trial counsel failed to object to material due process violations,

including the absence of a probable cause [h]earing an[d] admission of a drug test

without testimony from the administering officer. He also failed to [c]hallenge

incorrect dates in probation documents that affected jurisdiction and tolling,

dismissing their importance. Counsel did not pursue key witnesses, including the

initial probation officer and employer. He dismissed my concerns about [O]fficer

Hemingway’s unauthorized charges as frivolous[,] [f]ailed to raise the issues about

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[O]fficer Crone[’]s terms that were [b]eing selectively enforced as well as no new

probation terms were signed with [O]fficer Hemingway. This deprived me of

effective assistance of counsel guaranteed under the 6th and 14th Amendments.

(Doc. 1, at 5, 7, 8-9, 10).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) “dictates a highly

deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings which demands that state-court decisions be

given the benefit of the doubt.” Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455 (2005) (internal citation and

quotation omitted). An application for habeas corpus cannot be granted for a person in custody

pursuant to a state conviction unless the adjudication: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based upon an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under the first path, a court may grant habeas relief if the state

court arrives at a conclusion that is contrary to a decision of the Supreme Court on a question of

law, or if the state court decides a case differently than did the Supreme Court on a materially

indistinguishable set of facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000).

The appropriate measure of whether a state court decision unreasonably applied clearly

established federal law is whether that state adjudication was “objectively unreasonable” and not

merely erroneous or incorrect. Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-11; see also Machacek v. Hofbauer, 213

F.3d 947, 953 (6th Cir. 2000). “It bears repeating that even a strong case for relief does not mean

the state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102

(2011). The habeas standard is intended to be difficult to meet and reflects the view that habeas

corpus is a “guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a

substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102-03 (citation

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modified); see also Brown v. Davenport, 596 U.S. 118, 133 (2022) (describing habeas as an

“extraordinary remedy, reserved for only extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice system

and different in kind from providing relief on direct appeal”) (citation modified). To obtain “habeas

corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim

being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well

understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded

disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103.

DISCUSSION

R&R / Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine

The R&R recommends the Court dismiss the Petition pursuant to the fugitive

disentitlement doctrine. See Doc. 16. At the time of filing and at the time of the R&R’s issuance,

Petitioner was not in the custody of the State of Ohio, and was a fugitive. See Docs. 1-2, at 3; Doc.

16, at 6. The fugitive disentitlement doctrine limits access to the Court “by a fugitive who has fled

a criminal conviction in a court in the United States.” In re Prevot, 59 F.3d 556, 562 (6th Cir.1995).

However, Petitioner’s more recent filings indicate she is being held in the Holmes County Jail. See

Docs. 20, 21, 22. As the R&R recognizes, application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine “‘is

inappropriate under certain circumstances,’” including “‘if the fugitive is recaptured.’” (Doc. 16,

at 7) (quoting Moller v. Alameda, 2006 WL 778624, at *3 (N.D. Cal)). And the doctrine is

“discretionary, not jurisdictional.” Id. (citing Moller, 2006 WL 778624, at *3). Therefore, the

Court will evaluate the merits of the underlying Petition rather than resolve the case on the fugitive

disentitlement doctrine.

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Petition

In addition to arguing the fugitive disentitlement doctrine applies, Respondent contends:

“Petitioner’s grounds for relief all center on alleged misapplication of Ohio Law or her

disagreements with the State Court’s admission of evidence and finding of facts during the

adjudicatory hearing.” (Doc. 8, at 12). It further contends Petitioner’s grounds for relief have been

“fully adjudicated by the courts of the State of Ohio, and the petitioner was afforded her rights to

Counsel and Due Process under the U.S. Constitution.” Id. at 13. Finally, Respondent contends the

petition “does not cite a clear violation of federal law,” nor demonstrate the state court decision

was “clearly unreasonable and unsupported by the record.” Id. The Court addresses each of

Petitioner’s Grounds for Relief in turn and finds she has not demonstrated a basis for habeas relief

Ground One

In Ground One, Petitioner asserts a due process violation on the basis that her probation

terms “were changed and enforced without notice, hearing, or court order.” (Doc. 1, at 5).

The state appellate court rejected this claim factually. It found Petitioner’s probation

agreement required her “to report monthly or as otherwise directed by her probation officer” and

that agreement expressly provided that failure to report on the correct day during business hours

could not be cured by leaving a voice message after business hours. Reichelderfer, 2025 WL

842080, at *1. The appellate court further summarized the probation violation adjudicatory

hearing, including testimony from both Petitioner and Petitioner’s probation officer indicating the

latter instructed Petitioner to appear in person on March 20, 2023, that Petitioner failed to report,

and that Petitioner admitted missing the appointment, but offered excuses for her failure to do so.

See id. at *2. Addressing this contention on reconsideration, the appellate court explained:

“[P]ursuant to the terms of her probation agreement, Appellant was required to

report monthly or as otherwise directed by her probation officer.” Reichelderfer,

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2025-Ohio-899 at ¶ 36. “Officer Crone did not require Appellant to report in

person,” however, her case was “transferred to Officer Hemenway, who explicitly

informed Appellant she would have to report in person.” Id. Appellant was always

required to report to her probation officer. The fact that one probation officer did

not require her to report in person, while her new probation officer did, was not a

modification of the reporting requirement.

(Doc. 8-42, at 2). Again, the state court found factually that “Officer Hemenway . . . explicitly

informed Appellant that she would have to report in person.” Reichelderfer, 2025 WL 842080, at

*5. These facts are presumed correct, and Petitioner has not shown them, by clear and convincing

evidence, to be erroneous. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). These facts directly contradict Petitioner’s

claims that her probation terms were changed at all, much less changed in a manner that violates

the due process clause.

The Court finds Petitioner has not demonstrated an entitlement to habeas relief on Ground

One.

Ground Two

In Ground Two, Petitioner asserts the trial court reimposed her jail sentence on March 24,

2025, following her appeal, despite the presence of pending motions for reconsideration and a stay

that had not yet been ruled upon by the appellate court. (Doc. 1, at 7). She contends this violates

due process. Id. Petitioner further contends the trial court then reimposed her sentence on May 12,

2025 “even though the Fifth District Court of Appeals had not issued its mandate and [her]

jurisdictional appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court was still active.” Id. Petitioner contends this

“created confusion about finality and jurisdiction” and “exposed [her] to double jeopardy

concerns.” Id.

At its core, Petitioner’s second ground for relief sounds in Ohio law and Ohio state court

procedure. Plaintiff contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to reimpose her sentence both on

March 24 and May 12, 2025.. But the Ohio courts rejected her claims when she sought a stay on

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this basis. “A federal court may not issue [a] writ [of habeas corpus] on the basis of a perceived

error of state law.” Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-

68 (1991) (“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court

determinations on state-law questions.”); see also Cristini v. McKee, 526 F.3d 888, 897 (6th Cir.

2008) (“[A] violation of state law is not cognizable in federal habeas [ ] unless such error amounts

to a fundamental miscarriage of justice or a violation of the right to due process in violation of the

United States Constitution.”).

Moreover, even if Petitioner could somehow establish that the trial court lacked jurisdiction

at the time it issued its March 24, 2025, order, the trial court ultimately reimposed Petitioner’s 30-

day sentence on May 12, 2025. Although Petitioner contends this was somehow inappropriate

because her appeal was still active, she is incorrect. The appellate court denied her appeal on March

17, 2025, and further denied her motions for reconsideration and to stay on March 31, 2025. The

Ohio Supreme Court dismissed her appeal on May 6, 2025. That Petitioner later filed unsuccessful

motions to continue to challenge those decisions does not render her appeal “active and

unresolved” on May 12, 2025, as she asserts. (Doc. 1-2, at 8). Even if Petitioner could establish

some error in the state court procedure, she has not established an error that “amounts to a

fundamental miscarriage of justice or a violation of the right to due process in violation of the

United States Constitution.” McKee, 526 F.3d at 897. Petitioner has failed to point to clearly

established Supreme Court caselaw supporting her claim that her constitutional rights were

violated. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on Ground Two.

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Ground Three

In Ground Three, Petitioner asserts a due process violation on the basis that “[n]o probable

cause hearing [was] held before the probation revocation [and she had] no opportunity to contest

[the] violation.” (Doc. 1, at 8).

The United States Supreme Court has determined “that the revocation of parole is not part

of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding

does not apply to parole revocations.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972). The same

is true for probation revocation. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781-82 (1973). In Morrissey

(parole) and Gagnon (probation), the Supreme Court held that alleged violators are entitled to two

hearings. The first is a preliminary hearing at the time of arrest and detention to determine whether

there is probable cause to believe the accused committed a violation of her parole, and the other is

a somewhat more comprehensive hearing held prior to entry of the final revocation decision.

Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480; Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782.

It is well-settled that revocation proceedings (of parole or probation) need only meet the

“minimum requirements of due process” by providing the following procedural safeguards:

(a) written notice of the claimed violations of (probation or) parole; (b) disclosure

to the (probationer or) parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard

in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to

confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer

specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a ‘neutral and

detached’ hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need

not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as

to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking (probation or) parole.

Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786 (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489).

Petitioner raised the substance of Ground Three to the Ohio appellate court in her pro se

brief, and counsel addressed it in the Anders brief. The state appellate court addressed this claim

as follows:

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{¶19} Counsel for Appellant raises a potential argument the trial court violated

Appellant’s due process rights by failing to conduct a probable cause hearing.

{¶20} “Before a defendant’s probation can be revoked, a two-part due process

requirement must be met.” State v. Grove, 2016-Ohio-4818, ¶ 12 (7th Dist.), citing

Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973). First, the trial court must conduct

a preliminary hearing to determine whether there is probable cause to believe the

defendant violated the terms of his probation. (Citation omitted.) Id. Next, the court

must hold a final hearing to determine whether probation should be revoked. Id.

The purpose of such a hearing is to inquire into whether the probationer’s conduct

comported with the terms of his court-ordered probation. State v. Richard, 2016-

Ohio-8562, ¶ 5 (7th Dist.). However, “the judgment of a trial court revoking

probation or community control sanctions will not be reversed where two separate

hearings have not been held unless it appears from the record that the defendant

was prejudiced by the failure to hold a preliminary hearing”. State v. Kiser, 2009-

Ohio-1337, ¶ 21 (5th Dist.)

{¶21} Appellant did not object to the claimed due process violations. Generally,

failure to object to due process violations during a probation revocation waives all

but plain error. State v. Klosterman, 2016-Ohio-232, ¶ 15 (2nd Dist.). Under the

plain error standard of review, Appellant bears the burden of “showing that but for

a plain or obvious error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been otherwise,

and reversal must be necessary to correct a manifest miscarriage of justice.” State

v. West, 2022-Ohio-1556, ¶22. An appellate court has discretion to notice plain

error and is not required to correct it. Id.

{¶22} Upon review of the record, we find Appellant was not prejudiced by the trial

court’s failure to conduct a preliminary hearing. We further find no error, plain or

otherwise, as the result of the trial court’s failure to hold separate hearings.

{¶23} We agree with appellate counsel’s conclusion there is no merit to an

argument Appellant was denied due process.

* * *

{¶34} In her second assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court violated

her right to due process by failing to conduct a probable cause hearing, during

which she could have explained her understanding of the terms of her probation as

told to her by her original probation officer, George Crone.

{¶35} We addressed the trial court’s failure to conduct a probable cause hearing

under Appellate Counsel’s first potential assignment of error, and found Appellant

was not prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to conduct a preliminary hearing. We

also found no error, plain or otherwise, as the result of the trial court’s failure to

hold separate hearings.

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{¶36} We further note, pursuant to the terms of her probation agreement, Appellant

was required to report monthly or as otherwise directed by her probation officer.

Officer Crone did not require Appellant to report in person. Appellant’s case was

subsequently transferred to Officer Hemenway, who explicitly informed Appellant

she would have to report in person. Appellant’s actions based upon Officer Crone’s

initial terms and conditions is irrelevant to whether she violated the terms and

conditions as required by Officer Hemenway. A probable cause hearing would not

have affected the outcome.

{¶37} Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled.

Reichelderfer, 2025 WL 842080, at *4, *5-6.

The state appellate court cited the relevant United States Supreme Court standard

(Gagnon), and found Petitioner had not demonstrated she was prejudiced by the trial court’s failure

to hold separate preliminary and final adjudicatory hearings.

To obtain habeas relief a petitioner must demonstrate “actual prejudice” from the alleged

constitutional violation. See Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 267 (2015) (“[H]abeas petitioners ‘are

not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in ‘actual

prejudice.’”) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). Petitioner cannot do so

here where she was provided notice of the claimed probation violations, the evidence of her

violation was provided at the hearing, and she was afforded the opportunity to be heard, as well as

the opportunity (through counsel’s advocacy) to confront and cross-examine the probation officer

witness against her. Further, she was appointed counsel from the outset, and a judicial officer

conducted her adjudicatory hearing and issued a written decision. She was thus provided the

“minimum requirements of due process” Gagnon and Morrisey expressly require. Contrary to

Petitioner’s contention that she had “no opportunity to contest [the] violation” (Doc. 1, at 8),

Petitioner was in fact provided a full opportunity to do so. She has thus demonstrated no prejudice

from any alleged constitutional violation.

17

Other courts applying Gagnon and Morrisey have similarly found no basis for habeas relief

when a petitioner has a single hearing rather than the two hearings contemplated, where the hearing

provided the basic requirements of due process and the petitioner was not prejudiced. See, e.g.,

Vashey v. Wall, 2004 WL 1242548, at *5 (D.R.I.) (denying habeas relief and stating: “Gagnon and

Morrissey are primarily concerned with ensuring that an alleged probation/parole violator receives

a fair proceeding consistent with the due process clause. As the U.S. Supreme Court found in

Gagnon, a prompt probable cause hearing followed by more comprehensive final revocation

hearing is sufficient to satisfy the due process clause. However, nothing in Gagnon nor Morrissey

prohibits a state from combining those hearings into one, prompt full hearing, where all the rights

set forth in Gagnon and Morrissey are provided. . . . Accordingly, I find that the state Supreme

Court’s decision is not contrary to federal law.”); see also Pierre v. Wash. State Bd. of Prison

Terms & Paroles, 699 F.2d 471, 473 (9th Cir. 1983) (denying habeas relief and holding “Morrissey

does not contain an absolute requirement that there be two hearings, rather than one, when the

formal on-site parole revocation hearing is promptly held and fully satisfies the due process

requirements enunciated in that case”); cf. Ellis v. Dist. of Columbia, 84 F.3d 1413, 1423–24 (D.C.

Cir. 1996) (holding, in a § 1983 class action, that a preliminary hearing is unnecessary when a

formal revocation hearing is held within thirty days of execution of parole violation warrant).

In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on

Ground Three.

Ground Four

In Ground Four, Petitioner contends her trial counsel was ineffective for multiple reasons.

(Doc. 1, at 10). Petitioner raised a similar contention on her direct appeal.

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The two-part test in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), is the clearly

established federal law governing ineffective-assistance claims. This standard requires the habeas

petitioner to establish (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness based on all the circumstances in the case, such that the attorney did not function

as “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance

prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. To satisfy the first prong, the habeas

petitioner “must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness.” Id. at 668. To satisfy the prejudice prong, the habeas petitioner must show “a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.

Establishing that a state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d)

is all the more difficult. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105. First, the standards of Strickland and §

2254(d) are both highly deferential. See Strickland, 486 U.S. at 689.When both apply, the ordinary

deference in habeas review is “doubly so.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009).

Second, unreasonableness under Strickland is different from unreasonableness under § 2254(d).

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105. When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel’s actions

were reasonable. Id. Instead, the question is whether a reasonable argument exists that counsel

satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard. Id. Because the Strickland standard is a general one, the

range of reasonable applications is substantial. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. at 123.

The state appellate court addressed both counsel’s raising of an ineffective assistance of

counsel issue in her Anders brief and Petitioner’s pro se argument and concluded Petitioner had

not established prejudice:

19

{¶24} Counsel also raises a potential argument Appellant was denied the effective

assistance of counsel.

{¶25} A properly licensed attorney is presumed competent. State v. Hamblin, 37

Ohio St.3d 153 (1988). Therefore, in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, Appellant must show counsel’s performance fell below an

objective standard of reasonable representation and, but for counsel’s error, the

result of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989). In other words,

Appellant must show counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of

the adversarial process the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just

result. Id.

{¶26} We have reviewed the record and do not find trial counsel committed any

error which, but for, would have resulted in a different outcome in the proceedings.

Appellant’s trial counsel zealously advocated for her by filing a memorandum in

opposition, arguing Appellant’s term of probation was tolled by the filing of the

March 24, 2023 motion to revoke. Trial counsel further asserted the January 10,

2024 motion to revoke was not actionable because the conditions of Appellant’s

probation did not require her to report in person or submit to drug testing. At the

revocation hearing, trial counsel cross-examined Tiffany Hemenway, Appellant’s

probation officer, about the violations. Trial counsel also called Appellant to the

stand to explain her failure to report and her understanding of the terms and

conditions of her probation. Trial counsel also moved the trial court to extend

Appellant’s supervision in lieu of jail time.

{¶27} We agree with appellate counsel’s conclusion there is no merit to an

argument Appellant was denied the effective assistance of counsel.

* * *

{¶28} In her first assignment of error, Appellant raises a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel. Specifically, Appellant maintains trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to submit key evidence, including a doctor’s note and work

orders, which would have explained her missed appointments, failing to object to

the use of the January 4, 2024 drug screen which was obtained during an unrelated

matter, and failing to challenge the “unauthorized changes” made to the terms and

conditions of her probation by Officer Hemenway. Appellant concludes she was

prejudiced as a result of these omissions.

{¶29} We addressed a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in Appellate

Counsel’s second potential assignment of error. Upon review of the record, we find

no evidence to establish trial counsel committed any error which, but for, would

have resulted in a different outcome in the proceedings.

20

{¶30} At the revocation hearing, Appellant testified and explained her reasons for

missing her probation appointments. Appellant has failed to establish the admission

of evidence supporting her explanations, such as a doctor’s note or work orders,

would have resulted in a different outcome.

{¶31} With respect to trial counsel’s failure to object to the admission of the results

of the drug screen, we note, “[t]he failure to object to error, alone, is not enough to

sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” State v. Fears, 86 Ohio St.3d

329, 347 (1999), quoting State v. Holloway, 38 Ohio St.3d 239, 244 (1988). A

defendant must also show he was materially prejudiced by the failure to object.

Holloway, supra at 244. Appellant is unable to make such a demonstration.

{¶32} Finally, even if trial counsel challenged Officer Hemenway’s “unauthorized

changes” to Appellant’s probation, such challenge would not have been successful.

Pursuant to her probation agreement, Appellant was required to report monthly or

as otherwise directed by her probation officer. Although Officer Crone did not

require Appellant to report in person, Officer Hemenway specifically required

Appellant to report in person. Officer Hemenway had the authority to make changes

to the terms and conditions of Appellant’s probation.

{¶33} Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.

Reichelderfer, 2025 WL 842080, at *4-5. Upon review, the Court finds Petitioner has not

established the state court decision regarding her ineffective assistance of counsel claim was

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of Strickland.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is

ORDERED that the recommended final disposition of Judge Greenberg’s R&R (Doc. 16)

– that the Petition be dismissed – be, and the same hereby is, ADOPTED as the Order of this Court,

for the alternate reasons stated herein, and the Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED as set forth specifically

herein; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motions for Temporary Restraining Orders (Docs.

3, 4, 12, 20, 21, 22) be, and the same hereby are, DENIED as moot; and it is

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FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion/Request for Waiver of PACER Fees and

Restoration of Access (Doc. 23) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED as moot; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that, because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of a

denial of a constitutional right directly related to her conviction or custody, no certificate of

appealability shall issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b); Rule 11 of Rules

Governing § 2254 Cases. And the Court

FURTHER CERTIFIES that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).

s/ James R. Knepp II

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: February 10, 2026

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