The Board of Regents of the Texas A&M University System v. BE&K Building Group, LLC

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed February 12, 2026.

In The

Fifteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 15-25-00058-CV

THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY

SYSTEM, Appellant

V.

BE&K BUILDING GROUP, LLC, Appellee

On Appeal from the District Court

Brazos County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 20-002171-CV-272

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The Board of Regents of Texas A&M University System (“TAMU”) appeals

the trial court’s denial of its plea to the jurisdiction asserting sovereign immunity.

TAMU filed its plea in response to BE&K Building Group, LLC’s (“BE&K”)

petition seeking damages for an alleged breach of a construction contract. Because

the breach of contract claim falls within the sovereign immunity waiver for state

agencies under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 114.003, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

In August 2016, TAMU hired BE&K to construct the Applied Sciences

Engineering Building on TAMU’s Tarleton State University campus. The parties

entered into a Construction Manager-At-Risk Agreement (the “Agreement”), setting

the project’s maximum price at approximately $40.5 million (later increased to

approximately $41.5 million) and a target substantial completion date of September

29, 2018 (later extended to October 4, 2018).

The Agreement outlines the scope of work, the process for altering the

project’s terms, and the requirements for settling disputes. It is comprised of three

components: (1) the Uniform General Conditions; (2) the Uniform Supplementary

Conditions; and (3) the special conditions. The parties refer to the Uniform General

& Supplemental Conditions together as “the UGSC.”

Relevant here, UGSC Article 9.6.2.2 states that BE&K is “entitled to an

equitable adjustment of time” for certain delays to the project schedule, including

delays due to TAMU’s errors and omissions or changes to work that is critical to

completion. UGSC Article 11.3.1 allows BE&K to recover additional costs incurred

during the project. UGSC Article 10.3 governs TAMU’s duty to pay, along with

documentation requirements, and requires TAMU to reduce or release portions that

it had retained from progress payments—termed “retainage”—once 65% of the

Agreement had been completed. UGSC Article 12 governs the requirements for

TAMU to make final payment. The Agreement also includes a dispute resolution

provision which incorporates the requirements of Chapter 2260 of the Texas

Government Code and requires BE&K to submit written notice of a claim of breach

of contract to TAMU prior to filing suit.

BE&K began construction in April 2017. BE&K asserts that TAMU delayed

the project by making a number of changes to the scope, including storm system and

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roof system redesigns and the addition of a utility-support grid. To accommodate

these changes, BE&K made several time extension requests which TAMU denied.

BE&K claims that it achieved 65% completion of the Project and substantial

completion in 2019, well after the agreed upon substantial completion date. TAMU

refused to release retainage or compensate BE&K for its work.

BE&K sued TAMU under Chapter 114 of the Texas Civil Practice and

Remedies Code, alleging that TAMU breached the Agreement by failing to equitably

extend the substantial completion date and improperly withholding final payment

and retainage. BE&K identified UGSC Articles 9.6, 10.3, and 11.3 as specific

Agreement provisions it claims TAMU breached. BE&K stated that the balanced

owed to it under the Agreement totaled more than $3.5 million.

In response to BE&K’s petition, TAMU filed a plea to the jurisdiction,

arguing that BE&K’s suit under the Chapter 114 limited waiver provision was

improper. TAMU asserted that (1) BE&K did not allege a breach of an express

provision of the Agreement which required TAMU to pay, (2) BE&K’s failure to

comply with the conditions precedent which would obligate TAMU to pay meant

that no jurisdictional facts existed to establish waiver, and (3) BE&K did not comply

with the notice and alternative dispute requirements before filing suit. TAMU

attached to its plea a copy of the Agreement and an affidavit signed by Brett

McCully, Director at the Office of Facilities Planning & Construction for The Texas

A&M University System. In his affidavit, McCully stated that TAMU had not

received the required documentation for final payment, written consent of the surety

for a request of release of retainage, or any documents required to approve change

orders or time extension requests. Also attached was a claim letter from McCully to

Steven Olson, BE&K’s Chief Operating Officer, addressing BE&K’s alleged failure

to comply with the contractual requirements which would obligate TAMU to grant

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time extensions.

BE&K responded to the plea, arguing that the only jurisdictional fact required

for Chapter 114’s immunity waiver was BE&K’s claim for breach of an express

contract provision. According to BE&K, TAMU misconstrued Chapter 114 as

requiring BE&K to prove the merits of its claim—an interpretation foreclosed by the

Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Pepper Lawson Horizon International Group,

LLC v. Texas Southern University, 669 S.W.3d 205 (Tex. 2023) (per curiam). BE&K

also argued that it substantially complied with the Agreement’s notice provision,

relying on the McCully affidavit’s references to past correspondence about the

dispute and information that had been submitted to support BE&K’s request for time

extensions. Attached to BE&K’s opposition was (1) a status update letter from

BE&K’s counsel to the trial court asserting that BE&K’s work on the project was

complete, (2) a transcript of McCully’s deposition addressing his affidavit, and (3)

an affidavit of Read Ballew, BE&K’s Senior Vice President and Texas Business

Unit Leader, asserting that BE&K had satisfied all conditions precedent.

TAMU replied to BE&K’s opposition, arguing that immunity had not been

waived, that the notice provision was jurisdictional, and that Ballew’s affidavit was

factually incorrect. TAMU attached an affidavit of Calvin Boydstun, Chief

Executive Officer of TAMU’s independent auditor, asserting that he had not

received a number of required documents from BE&K.

On March 21, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on TAMU’s plea to the

jurisdiction and denied the plea. TAMU appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A plea to the jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity implicates a trial

court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and presents a question of law reviewed de novo.

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State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 642 (Tex. 2007); Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife

v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). The court must determine “whether

the plaintiff has met its burden to allege facts affirmatively showing the trial court’s

jurisdiction, but the court ‘may [also] consider evidence and must do so when

necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised.’” Pepper Lawson, 669 S.W.3d

at 211 (alteration in original) (quoting Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d

547, 555 (Tex. 2000)).

A defendant may challenge the court’s jurisdiction through a plea to the

jurisdiction based on either the sufficiency of the pleadings or on the existence of

jurisdictional facts. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226–27. When a plea challenges the

pleadings, the court, construing the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff, must

“determine if the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s

jurisdiction to hear the cause.” Id. at 226. When a plea challenges the existence of

jurisdictional facts, the standard “generally mirrors that of a summary judgment

under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c).” Id. at 228. The plaintiff has the

burden to adduce evidence to “raise a fact question on the jurisdictional issue.” Id.

The Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant to

determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Town of Shady Shores v.

Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex. 2019). In determining whether a genuine issue

of material fact exists, we are mindful that we are not permitted to inquire “so far

into the substance of the claims that plaintiffs would be required to put on their case

to establish jurisdiction.” Pepper Lawson, 669 S.W.3d at 211 (citing Bland, 34

S.W.3d at 554).

ANALYSIS

In three issues, TAMU asserts that (1) BE&K could not establish jurisdiction

without presenting evidence of TAMU’s duty to pay as of September 1, 2020, (2)

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BE&K’s failure to comply with a statutory notice provision precludes jurisdiction,

and (3) the inability for the jurisdictional defect to be cured necessitates dismissal.

As discussed below, we overrule each issue.

I. TAMU is Subject to the Sovereign Immunity Waiver Under Chapter

114 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

In its first issue, TAMU argues that BE&K failed to provide evidence of

TAMU’s duty to pay and that Section 114.003’s sovereign immunity waiver

consequently is inapplicable absent a breach of an express provision of the

Agreement. According to TAMU, the trial court was required to grant its plea to the

jurisdiction unless TAMU presented evidence that BE&K had (1) completed the

work required under the Agreement, (2) submitted documents needed to audit costs,

and (3) submitted proper change orders underlying its claims.

BE&K responds that it was not required to present such evidence at this early

juncture, invoking the Texas Supreme Court’s unanimous holding in Pepper

Lawson—a recent opinion involving a similar construction contract suit. BE&K

interprets Pepper Lawson to require only proof that the Agreement is a covered

contract under Chapter 114 and proof that BE&K is suing for breach under a covered

contract. BE&K argues that it is not required to present any proof that its claim is

meritorious at this juncture. Alternatively, BE&K argues that it has presented such

evidence.

We agree with BE&K that this issue is controlled by the text of Chapter 114

and the Texas Supreme Court’s Pepper Lawson opinion. Sovereign immunity

protects divisions of state entities, including universities, from lawsuits for damages

except where the Legislature or the Constitution waives that immunity. Pepper

Lawson, 669 S.W.3d at 210. A statute, however, cannot waive immunity except by

“clear and unambiguous language.” Id. (citing Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.034). BE&K

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argues that the Legislature waived immunity for construction-contract suits like this

one by enacting a statute that provides:

[a] state agency that is authorized by statute or the constitution to enter

into a contract and that enters into a contract subject to this chapter

waives sovereign immunity to suit for the purpose of adjudicating a

claim for breach of an express provision of the contract, subject to the

terms and conditions of this chapter.

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 114.003. This waiver provision applies to “a claim

for a breach of a written contract for engineering, architectural, or construction

services . . . brought by a party to the written contract, in which the amount in

controversy is not less than $250,000 . . . .” Id. § 114.002. The Texas Supreme Court

has interpreted this statutory language to be a “clear and unambiguous waiver of

immunity for construction-contract suits.” Pepper Lawson, 669 S.W.3d at 209.

The question therefore becomes what a construction-contract plaintiff must

do to defeat a plea to the jurisdiction using Chapter 114’s immunity waiver. Pepper

Lawson answers that question. In that case, construction contractor PLH sued Texas

Southern University—a state university—for breach of a construction contract. PLH

pleaded that TSU breached the construction contract by withholding pay after the

university refused to grant project deadline extensions for delays. Id. at 207–09.

Specifically, PLH “alleged that TSU (1) entered a written contract with PLH for

construction services, (2) did not timely pay the balance owed under the contract,

and (3) did not equitably adjust the contract price and time as contractually required

for excusable delays.” Id. at 211. Although PLH’s pleadings invoked Section

114.003 of the Remedies Code and identified the breached provisions of the

construction contract, TSU asserted sovereign immunity in a plea to the jurisdiction

and argued that PLH failed to “plead facts” showing “breach of an express provision

of the contract.” Id. at 209–10. TSU also argued that PLH “could not prevail on its

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claims under the construction contract and change orders, which were attached to its

plea.” Id. at 211. In response, PLH asserted that its petition “sufficiently invoked

Section 114.003’s immunity waiver by pleading the express contract provisions TSU

allegedly breached and detailing how TSU defaulted on its obligations under those

provisions.” Id. at 210.

The court of appeals had granted TSU’s plea, holding that the breach claim

against TSU was not subject to Chapter 114’s waiver because no express contract

provision required TSU to perform as PLH alleged. Id. at 210. The Texas Supreme

Court reversed, holding that “PLH was not required to prove that ‘the parties’

contract unambiguously waives TSU’s immunity.’” Id. at 211. Nor was PLH

required to show “breach of an express provision of the parties’ contract.” Id. By

requiring such proof, the court of appeals “conflated statutory-construction rules

with contract interpretation,” improperly requiring PLH “to prove its case.” Id.

Rather, the Texas Supreme Court held that PLH “only had to establish that Chapter

114, not the contract, unambiguously waived immunity.” Id. Accordingly, PLH had

carried its burden under Chapter 114 to “allege facts affirmatively demonstrating the

court’s jurisdiction to hear the cause.” Id.

The case before this Court is controlled by Pepper Lawson. Similar to the

contractor in Pepper Lawson, BE&K alleged it in its original petition that TAMU

(1) entered into the Agreement and (2) breached the Agreement by, among other

reasons, refusing time extensions and compensation for delays, failing to pay BE&K

for additional work, and refusing to release retainage. BE&K further identified the

specific contract provisions TAMU allegedly breached––UGSC Articles 9.6, 10.3,

and 11.3. These allegations are sufficient to invoke the immunity waiver of Section

114.003, which only requires TAMU to have entered into a construction services

contract for the purposes “adjudicating a claim for breach of an express provision”

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of the contract. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 114.002–.003; see also Pepper

Lawson, 669 S.W.3d at 211. Thus, BE&K met its burden to “allege facts

affirmatively demonstrating the court’s jurisdiction to hear the cause.” Pepper

Lawson, 669 S.W.3d at 211. 1

Despite the factual commonalities to Pepper Lawson, TAMU argues that,

because its plea challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts instead of the

sufficiency of the pleadings, we should decide this case based on Miranda. In

Miranda, the plaintiff sued the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department for negligence

and gross negligence after a tree limb fell on her in a state park. Miranda, 133

S.W.3d at 220–21. The Department responded by filing a plea to the jurisdiction,

asserting that the claims were “insufficient to invoke a waiver of the Department’s

sovereign immunity under the standard established in the Tort Claims Act and the

recreational use statute.” Id. at 221–22. The Department attached evidence to its

plea, which challenged the factual allegations supporting jurisdiction. Id. at 231.

Because the evidence established that the Department was not grossly negligent, the

court held that the Tort Claims Act’s immunity waiver was inapplicable and,

therefore, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 232.

Key to Miranda’s holding was the “unusual confluence of standards erected

by the Legislature for waiver of sovereign immunity in the Texas Torts Claims Act

and the recreational use statute.” Id. at 221. The Court noted that sovereign immunity

includes two distinct principles: immunity from suit and immunity from liability. Id.

at 224. The Tort Claims Act, however, created a “unique statutory scheme in which

the two immunities are co-extensive.” Id.; see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code

§ 101.025(a) (“Sovereign immunity to suit is waived and abolished to the extent of

1

The parties do not dispute that the Agreement is subject to Chapter 114. See Tex. Civ.

Prac. & Rem. Code § 114.002.

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liability created by this chapter.”). The Act’s waiver of immunity to suit was limited

to the scope of the liability waiver in the recreational use statute. Miranda, 133

S.W.3d at 225; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 101.021, .058. The recreational use

statute and relevant case law had established that a governmental unit waived

sovereign immunity only if it was grossly negligent. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 225;

see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 75.002(c)–(d). Thus, Miranda presented a

circumstance “in which the determination of the subject matter jurisdiction of the

court implicate[d] the merits of the parties’ cause of action.” Miranda, 133 S.W.3d

at 228. The Court stated that “[d]ue to the standard erected (gross negligence), the

determination of whether immunity was waived may require consideration of

extrinsic facts after reasonable opportunity for targeted discovery.” Id. at 233.

Though the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to survive a plea to the jurisdiction on

the pleadings, the Department’s extrinsic evidence showed a lack of gross

negligence, and the plaintiff failed to challenge this finding. Id. at 230, 232.

Here, TAMU argued in its plea that jurisdictional facts establishing waiver do

not exist because BE&K did not satisfy the conditions precedent that would obligate

TAMU to pay. These alleged conditions include BE&K’s delivery of written consent

of the surety to release retainage, BE&K’s delivery of the documentation required

for requests for additional costs and time extensions, and BE&K’s obligation to

complete the project prior to receiving payment. TAMU attached evidence to its plea

in the form of the Agreement itself and Brett McCully’s affidavit supporting

TAMU’s claims. TAMU later provided an affidavit from its independent auditor

asserting that the auditor did not receive the required documentation from BE&K.

TAMU also argues on appeal that BE&K failed to provide sufficient evidence of its

compliance with the conditions precedent.

Though TAMU challenges a number of facts asserted in BE&K’s pleadings,

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these challenges go to the merits of BE&K’s cause of action rather than the

jurisdictional inquiry. The only jurisdictional facts required for Section 114.003’s

waiver are (1) TAMU’s entry into a contract subject to the provision, (2) BE&K’s

“claim” for breach of contract, and (3) BE&K’s identification of the express contract

provisions that TAMU allegedly breached. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code

§ 114.003. Whether TAMU had an obligation to pay and release retainage pursuant

to the Agreement’s provisions and breached these obligations is a merits inquiry

separate from Section 114.003’s requirements.

Further, unlike the Tort Claims Act and recreational use statute in Miranda,

Section 114.003 does not create a circumstance in which the jurisdictional inquiry

necessarily “implicates the merits” of BE&K’s cause of action. Miranda, 133

S.W.3d at 227. The jurisdictional waiver in Miranda required the Department to

have acted with gross negligence, and an evidentiary challenge to the gross

negligence claim was enough to establish an absence of jurisdiction. See id. at 225

(“[A] governmental unit waives sovereign immunity under the recreational use

statute and the Tort Claims Act only if it is grossly negligent.”). In contrast, the plain

text of Section 114.003 does not condition waiver on whether a breach actually

occurred, but rather on BE&K bringing the claim in the first place. See Tex. Civ.

Prac. & Rem. Code § 114.003 (waiving immunity for “the purpose of adjudicating

a claim for breach of an express provision of the contract”). BE&K did so.

TAMU responds that the court’s discussion of conditions precedent in Pepper

Lawson may suggest that a proper evidentiary challenge to the breach-of-contract

claim could implicate the trial court’s jurisdiction under Section 114.003. Pepper

Lawson states that “[t]o the extent the jurisdictional inquiry implicated the merits of

PLH’s cause of action, TSU failed to conclusively establish that (1) it did not breach

an express provision of the contract when it refused to equitably adjust the contract

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time and price for ‘additional costs’ incurred for PLH’s alleged excusable delays that

were within TSU’s ‘reasonable control’ and (2) PLH did not follow the procedures

triggering TSU’s obligation to pay.” Pepper Lawson, 669 S.W.3d at 211–12. The

court also discussed TSU’s failure to properly deny that the contractor satisfied all

conditions precedent. Id. at 212 (“Because TSU did not specifically deny that PLH

satisfied all conditions precedent, the court of appeals erred in holding that PLH

failed to plead a cognizable Chapter 114 claim based on any failure to satisfy

contractual conditions precedent to requesting a time extension.”).

We do not interpret the Pepper Lawson court’s discussion as a definitive

statement that Section 114.003’s waiver necessarily implicates the merits of a

breach-of-contract claim. The Texas Supreme Court expressly rejected the court of

appeals’ attempt to decide immunity based on the requirements of the contract rather

than Section 114.003. Id. at 211. (“But PLH was not required to prove that ‘the

parties’ contract unambiguously waives TSU’s immunity from suit for PLH’s

breach-of-contract claim,’ as the court of appeals held. PLH only had to establish

that Chapter 114, not the contract, unambiguously waived immunity.” (internal

citation omitted)). The Texas Supreme Court further reasoned that TSU had

“brought forward a host of contract defenses pertaining to the merits of PLH’s

claims” and attached the contract and change orders to its plea, none of which

convinced the court to rule in TSU’s favor. Id. at 211, 213. Our holding is likewise

based on the text of Section 114.003 rather than the provisions of the Agreement or

any defenses TAMU asserts. Thus, we refrain from “authoriz[ing] an inquiry so far

into the substance of the claims that [BE&K] would be required to put on [its] case

to establish jurisdiction.” Id. at 211.

Even if Pepper Lawson required us to consider evidence of BE&K’s

compliance with conditions precedent to decide jurisdiction, BE&K has met its

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burden to show a genuine issue of material fact. See Swanson, 590 S.W.3d at 550.

BE&K submitted Read Ballew’s affidavit as evidence that BE&K had satisfied the

preconditions to TAMU’s payment, including (1) submitting a payment application,

(2) completing the project, (3) fully complying with TAMU’s audit request, and (4)

satisfying all conditions precedent. Though TAMU offered its own evidence to the

contrary, Ballew’s affidavit is enough to show a fact issue on the satisfaction of the

conditions precedent. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmovant, id., BE&K has met its burden.

We hold that the Legislature waived sovereign immunity pursuant to Section

114.003 and overrule TAMU’s first issue.

II. BE&K’s Alleged Failure to Comply with Notice Requirements Does

Not Preclude Jurisdiction.

In its second issue, TAMU argues that jurisdiction is precluded by BE&K’s

failure to provide formal notice of its breach of contract claims in accordance with

contractual and statutory requirements. TAMU relies on Section 311.034 of the

Texas Government Code, which states that “[s]tatutory prerequisites to a suit,

including the provision of notice, are jurisdictional requirements in all suits against

a governmental entity.” BE&K responds that any purported failure to comply with

the notice requirements does not preclude TAMU’s waiver of sovereign immunity

under Chapter 114. BE&K also contends that it substantially complied with the

notice requirements.

Chapter 2260 of the Texas Government Code requires units of state

government to include a provision in an applicable contract stating that the dispute

resolution process under the chapter “must be used to attempt to resolve a dispute

arising under the contract.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 2260.004(a). The Agreement

includes such a provision, stating in full:

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The dispute resolution process provided in Chapter 2260, Texas

Government Code, and the related rules adopted by the Texas Attorney

General pursuant to Chapter 2260, shall be used by Owner and

Contractor to attempt to resolve any claim for breach of contract made

by Contractor that cannot be resolved in the ordinary course of

business. Contractor shall submit written notice of a claim of breach of

contract under this Chapter to the Chancellor of The Texas A&M

University System, who shall examine Contractor’s claim and any

counterclaim and negotiate with Contractor in an effort to resolve the

claim.

Relatedly, Section 2260.051(b) of the Texas Government Code requires a

contractor to “provide written notice to the unit of state government of a claim for

breach of contract not later than the 180th day after the date of the event giving rise

to the claim.” In addition, Section 114.005 of the Remedies Code states that

“[a]djudication procedures, including requirements for serving notices or engaging

in alternative dispute resolution proceedings before bringing a suit . . . that are stated

in the contract subject to this chapter . . . are enforceable. . . .”

This Court has addressed a similar issue in Texas Southern University v.

Westwood Restoration, LLC, No. 15-24-00064, 2025 WL 2078670 (Tex. App.—

15th Dist. July 24, 2025, no pet.). In Westwood, a contractor, invoking the immunity

waiver under Chapter 114 of the Remedies Code, sued TSU for breach of contract.

Id. at *1. TSU filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the immunity waiver did

not apply partly because the contractor “failed to comply with its contractual

obligations to use the ADR [alternative dispute resolution] procedures set out in

Chapter 2260 of the Government Code before filing suit.” Id. at *2. We held that the

contractor’s failure to comply was not a jurisdictional defect. Id. at *3. We reasoned

that while Chapter 114 makes the ADR requirements “enforceable,” it does not make

the requirements “jurisdictional.” Id. (“Yet while Section 114.005 makes these

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contractual ADR provision [sic] ‘enforceable,’ it does not say they are

jurisdictional.”).

We reiterate our holding in Westwood. Although the Agreement incorporates

the dispute resolution process of Chapter 2260, this suit invokes the immunity

waiver of Chapter 114. Section 114.005 states that all “adjudication procedures” in

an applicable contract, including both ADR proceedings and “serving notices,” are

“enforceable.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 114.005. Similar to the ADR

provisions in Westwood, Section 114.005 therefore only makes the notice provisions

of the Agreement “enforceable” as well, and we refrain from characterizing the

Agreement’s notice requirement as “jurisdictional” under Chapter 114 when the

statute does not require us to do so. Thus, any failure of BE&K to comply with the

notice requirements would not preclude jurisdiction.

Further, TAMU’s reliance on Section 311.034 of the Government Code is

misplaced. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.034 (“Statutory prerequisites to a suit,

including the provision of notice, are jurisdictional requirements in all suits against

a governmental entity.”). Chapter 114 concerns contractual pre-suit procedures, not

statutory prerequisites to suit. Westwood, 2025 WL 2078670, at *3 n.22 (“Since

Chapter 114 enforces only contractual pre-suit ADR procedures, state law making

statutory prerequisites to suit jurisdictional does not apply.”). Thus, any enforceable

pre-suit procedures under Chapter 114 cannot function as a statutory prerequisite

under Section 311.034.

TAMU also argues that Chapter 114 does not preclude a notice requirement

for jurisdiction. TAMU contends that the Legislature did not “clearly and

unequivocally consent[] to suits that lack a pre-suit notice.” According to TAMU,

Chapter 114 “does not eliminate the jurisdictional import of notice provisions,” and

because Chapter 2260 is required in all construction contracts with the state, finding

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jurisdiction here would mean that notice contracts would be effectively nullified

state-wide. These arguments fail. As stated above, Chapter 114 concerns contractual

pre-suit procedures, not statutory prerequisites. See Westwood, 2025 WL 2078670,

at *3 n.22. Our holding does not nullify the notice requirements under the Agreement

or Chapter 114. Rather, it recognizes such notice requirements to be only matters of

enforcement, not jurisdiction.

We hold that any alleged failure to comply with the notice requirements does

not preclude subject-matter jurisdiction. We therefore overrule TAMU’s second

issue.2

III. Dismissal is Not Warranted.

In its third and final issue, TAMU argues that dismissal is proper when the

evidence disproves jurisdiction. See Young v. Texas Parks & Wildlife Dep’t, No. 15-

24-00052-CV, 2025 WL 1200947, at *7–8. (Tex. App.—15th Dist. Apr. 24, 2025,

pet. filed). Because we hold that BE&K has demonstrated jurisdiction under Chapter

114 by alleging breaches of what is indisputably a construction contract, dismissal

is not warranted on this ground. We overrule TAMU’s third issue.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s denial of TAMU’s plea to the jurisdiction.

/s/ April Farris

April Farris

Justice

2

Because our resolution disposes of the issue entirely, we do not reach the arguments of

whether BE&K failed to provide notice or whether BE&K substantially complied with the notice

requirements.

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Before Chief Justice Brister and Justices Field and Farris.

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