Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION

CASE NO. 25-60420-CIV-SMITH/HUNT

THOMAS ROGERS,

Plaintiff,

vs.

W.R. BERKLEY CORPORATION,

Defendant.

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

THIS CAUSE is before this Court on Defendant’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees. ECF

No. 73. The Honorable Rodney Smith referred Plaintiff’s Motions to the undersigned for

a report and recommendation. ECF No. 79; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636; S.D. Fla. L.R.,

Mag. R. 1. Upon thorough review of the Motion, the response and reply thereto, the case

file, and applicable law, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS the Motion be

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as set forth below.

This action initially arose out of an automobile accident in which Plaintiff was

injured. After settling the case, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Florida state court alleging

claims of bad faith insurance practices, fraudulent misrepresentation, unfair claims

handling, and punitive damages against Defendants. Defendant W.R. Berkley

Corporation (“WRBC”) removed the state court action to this Court, where it was

ultimately dismissed.

As an initial matter, the undersigned finds that Defendant is entitled to reasonable

attorney’s fees and costs. As Defendant points out, and Plaintiff does not dispute,1 a

relevant settlement agreement between the Parties contains an attorney’s fees clause for

the prevailing party. See ECF No. 49-4 at *5. The Court found that Plaintiff’s claims

against Defendant should be dismissed with prejudice, in that they were simply not

cognizable claims and patently frivolous. ECF No. 67 at *5. As the prevailing party, per

the terms of the settlement agreement, Defendant is entitled to reasonable attorney’s

fees.

This Court uses the lodestar method to calculate reasonable attorney’s fees,

multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended.

Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988). A

reasonable hourly rate for attorney’s fees is determined by evaluating “the prevailing

market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably

comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Id. (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,

895 (1984)); see also ACLU v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 438 (11th Cir. 1999) (“The significant

disparity in their experience should be reflected in the rates awarded.”); Brown v. Sch. Bd.

of Broward Cty., No. 08-61592-CIV-DIMITROULEAS, 2010 WL 3282584, at *3 (S.D. Fla.

June 30, 2010) (reducing the requested hourly rate).

The movant bears the burden of proving the requested rate is consistent with

prevailing market rates. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299. In addition to evidence presented by

1 In response, Plaintiff made no specific objections to Defendant’s requests, instead

challenging the validity of the Court’s decision to dismiss the case. ECF No. 74. The

Court has since ruled on these objections, ECF Nos. 80; 103, and the undersigned need

not revisit them.

the movant, “[a] court . . . is itself an expert on the question and may consider its own

knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an

independent judgment either with or without the aid of witnesses as to value.” Id. at 1303

(quoting Campbell v. Green, 112 F.2d 143, 144 (5th Cir. 1940)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Thus, even when the submitted evidence is deficient, a court has the power to

make a fee award without the need of further pleadings or an evidentiary hearing. Id.

Moreover, “[a]n evidentiary hearing is unnecessary for issues about which the

district court possesses sufficient expertise: ‘Such matters might include the

reasonableness of the fee, the reasonableness of the hours, and [the] significance of the

outcome.’” Thompson v. Pharmacy Corp. of Am., 334 F.3d 1242, 1245 (11th Cir. 2003)

(quoting Norman, 826 F.2d at 1309). The primary issues here are the reasonableness of

counsel’s hourly rate and the reasonableness of the number of hours expended, matters

over which this Court possesses sufficient expertise.

A. Reasonable Hourly Rate

Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees based upon professional services rendered. When

“determining what is a ‘reasonable’ hourly rate and what number of compensable hours

is ‘reasonable,’” this Court must consider twelve factors. Meyrowitz v. Brendel, No. 16-

81793-CIV-MARRA, 2018 WL 4440492, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 17, 2018). These factors

are:

(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions;

(3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion

of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the

customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations

imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the

results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys;

(10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the

professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.

The reasonable hourly rate is defined as the prevailing market rate in the

relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably

comparable skills, experience, and reputation. The fee applicant bears the

burden of establishing the claimed market rate. The Court may use its own

experience in assessing the reasonableness of attorney’s fees.

Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).

This Court has considered the attorneys’ affidavits and the twelve factors.

Because of their practice, reputation, and legal experience, counsel request the following

hourly rates:

• Joseph V. Manzo, a Capital Partner with Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, has been

practicing law in Florida for approximately 17 years and requests a rate of

$290.00 per hour.

• Vicente I. Cortesi, an Associate with Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, has been

practicing law in Florida for approximately five years and requests a rate of

$240 per hour.

• Jamie Hodges, a paralegal with Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, is licensed in

Florida, has more than 30 years of experience, and requests a rate of $135.00

per hour.

Comparable fee awards indicate the proposed rates are well below rates

previously awarded in the Southern District. See, e.g., Domond v. PeopleNetwork APS,

750 F. App’x. 844, 848 (11th Cir. 2018) (determining that the average partner rate of $655

was reasonable); Karpel v. Knauf Gips KG, No. 21-24168-CIV-SCOLA, 2023 WL 22173,

at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 3, 2023) (finding that attorney rates ranging from $365.00 to $595.00

were reasonable).

Regarding the paralegal, “in general, fees for paralegal or other non-attorney work

are recoverable to the extent that the [professional] performs work traditionally done by

an attorney.” TYR Tactical, LLC v. Productive Prod. Enter., LLC, No. 15-61741-CIV-

BLOOM/VALLE, 2018 WL 3110799, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 11, 2018), report and

recommendation adopted sub nom. TYR Tactical, LLC v. Protective Prod. Enterprises,

LLC, No. 15-61741-CIV-BLOOM/VALLE, 2018 WL 3109624 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2018),

amended, No. 15-61741-BLOOM/VALLE, 2018 WL 2672391 (S.D. Fla. June 5, 2018)

(internal quotation omitted). A review of Plaintiff’s submissions shows that the

compensable paralegal work was of the kind traditionally done by an attorney. Further,

the undersigned finds the rate requested reasonable. Id. at *10 (finding $150 per hour

reasonable for paralegals).

Accordingly, the requested hourly rates are approved.

B. Hours Reasonably Expended

Upon determination of the hourly rate, a court must determine the reasonable

number of hours expended in the litigation. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433

(1983). Inquiry into the reasonable number of hours focuses on an attorney’s exercise of

“billing judgment,” such as the attorney’s exclusion of hours “that would be unreasonable

to bill a client, and therefore to one’s adversary irrespective of the skill, reputation, or

experience of counsel.” Barnes, 168 F.3d at 428 (quoting Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis omitted). Fee applicants must exclude

hours that were not “reasonably expended” or that are determined to be “excessive,

redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” from their fee calculations. Hensley, 461 U.S. at

434.

According to Defendant, Manzo, a partner, spent 65.3 hours working on the case.

Cortesi, an associate, spent 0.9 hours on the case, while Hodges, a paralegal, spent 16.8

hours on the case. An examination of the docket demonstrates that Plaintiff was a prolific

litigant, filing numerous motions throughout the case, none of which appear to have been

successful. Despite the fact that this Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims as frivolous in

June 2025, see ECF No. 67, Plaintiff has continued filing as recently as October 2025,

leading the docket to contain nearly 40 additional entries since closure of the case. Again,

none of these filings were found to have merit. Given how prolific Plaintiff has been in

his filings, and the responses required by Defendants to those filings, the undersigned

finds the number of hours claimed reasonable.

C. Lodestar Amount and Adjustment

“[T]here is a ‘strong presumption’ that the lodestar figure is reasonable, but that

presumption may be overcome in those rare circumstances in which the lodestar does

not adequately take into account a factor that may properly be considered in determining

a reasonable fee.” Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 553 (2010). The Supreme Court

has specifically identified three circumstances that may justify a deviation from the

lodestar amount: 1) “where the method used in determining the hourly rate employed in

the lodestar calculation does not adequately measure the attorney’s true market value,

as demonstrated in part during the litigation”; 2) “if the attorney’s performance includes

an extraordinary outlay of expenses and the litigation is exceptionally protracted”; and 3)

when there are “extraordinary circumstances in which an attorney’s performance involves

exceptional delay in the payment of fees.” Id. at 554–56.

In this case, the undersigned finds no reason to depart from the lodestar,

calculation. Therefore, Defendant should be awarded $18,937 for Manzo (65.3 hours at

$290 per hour), $216 for Cortesi (0.9 hours at $240 per hour); and $2,268 for Hodges

(16.8 hours at $135 per hour), for a total award of $21,421.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned RECOMMENDS Plaintiffs Motion for

Attorney’s Fees and Costs, ECF No. 73, be GRANTED to the extent that Defendant

should be awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of $21,421.

Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and

Recommendation, any party may serve and file written objections to any of the above

findings and recommendations as provided by the Local Rules for this district. 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1); S.D. Fla. Mag. R. 4(b). The parties are hereby notified that a failure to timely

object waives the right to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order based on

unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report and

Recommendation. 11th Cir. R. 3-1 (2018); see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).

DONE AND SUBMITTED at Fort Lauderdale, Florida this 13th day of January

2026.

Be m/l

PATRICK M. HUNT

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Honorable Rodney Smith

All Counsel of Record