Bushuev

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION

PAVEL BUSHUEV,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 1:25-cv-213 MAL

IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS EN-

FORCEMENT – ENFORCEMENT

AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS, et al.,

Respondents.

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION

Pavel Bushuev, a Russian national, has been living in the United States ille-

gally. Having never been lawfully “admitted” into the country, he was detained by

federal officials and awaits immigration removal proceedings. Bushuev now chal-

lenges the legality of his detention—petitioning this Court1 for a writ of habeas cor-

pus on grounds that he has been detained for over a month without a bond hearing,

and that immigration officials’ refusal to grant his requests for a bond hearing con-

stitutes a due process violation. Doc. 1 at 6. He requests “that this Court grant the

1 While the caption of the petition identifies the United States District Court for the

Western District of Missouri, see Doc. 1 at 1, it was filed in the Eastern District of

Missouri—the proper venue. “For ‘core habeas petitions,’ ‘jurisdiction lies in . . . the

district of confinement.’ ” Trump v. J.G..G., 604 U.S. 670, 672 (2025) (per curium)

(quoting Rumsfield v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004)). Because Bushuev clearly

states in his petition that he is being detained at the St. Genevieve Detention Center

located within the Eastern District of Missouri, see Doc. 1 at 1, this Court has juris-

diction over his petition.

writ of habeas corpus and order his release or, in the alternative, order a bond hear-

ing.” Id. at 7.

But aliens present in the United States without having been formally admit-

ted must be detained without bond during removal proceed-

ings. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Because Bushuev was living in the country without hav-

ing been admitted, the federal government may continue to detain him without bond

pending his removal proceedings. Accordingly, Bushuev’s petition must be denied.

BACKGROUND2

Bushuev is a Russian national who is charged with being in the country un-

lawfully. Doc. 1-1 at 6–7. He appears to have entered the United States about four

years ago, id. at 8, and he does not dispute that he “freely admitted to being in the

US illegally/without inspection.”3 Id. at 7. He has an employment authorization card

from the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service and a pending applica-

tion for asylum. Id. at 8. The federal government detained Bushuev on November 6,

2025, and he remains in custody pending the completion of removal proceedings. Id.

Bushuev, proceeding pro se, now petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus under

28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking release or, in the alternative, a bond hearing. Doc. 1 at 7.

LEGAL STANDARD

“Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by … the district courts … within their

respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). A district court may grant a writ of

habeas corpus if the petitioner “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treaties of the United States . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “Habeas is at its core a

remedy for unlawful executive detention.” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008).

2 These facts are drawn from Bushuev’s petition and the documents he attached in

support. For purposes of this petition, the Court assumes these facts are true.

3 In his petition, Bushuev says he has “no criminal record” and “followed all immigra-

tion rules . . .” Doc. 1 at 6. But he does not dispute that he “freely admitted to being

in the [United States] illegally/without inspection.” See Doc. 1–1 at 7. And entering

the United States while “elud[ing] examination or inspection by immigration officers”

is a crime. 8 U.S.C. § 1325.

If the petitioner’s detention is lawful, “the writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to

[the petitioner.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c).

ANALYSIS

Bushuev’s petition is based on his belief that he is entitled to an individualized

bond hearing. The question, then, is whether the federal government can lawfully

detain Bushuev without having a bond hearing. As this Court has already concluded

in a functionally similar case—Cutiopala v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-211-MAL, 2026 WL

113567 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 15, 2026)—the federal government must detain pending re-

moval proceedings any alien seeking admission when the examining immigration of-

ficer determines that the alien is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admit-

ted. Because Bushuev is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, he

must be detained pending removal, and the statute does not provide for a bond hear-

ing.

I. Bushuev is lawfully detained under § 1225(b)(2).

This issue is straightforward. Title 8 of the United States Code, Section

1225(b)(2), commands that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission,

if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is

not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained

for a [removal] proceeding[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) (emphasis added). Read most

naturally, § 1225(b)(2) mandates detention of “applicants for admission” until re-

moval proceedings have concluded. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018).4

“Until that point, however, nothing in the statutory text imposes any limit on the

4 The Board of Immigration Appeals has also recently interpreted § 1225(b)(2) to pro-

hibit an immigration judge from holding bond hearings for aliens who, like Bushuev,

have been in the United States for longer than two years. See Matter of Yajure Hur-

tado, 29 I&N Dec. 216, 228 (BIA 2025).

length of detention. And neither § 1225(b)(1) nor § 1225(b)(2) says anything whatso-

ever about bond hearings.” Id.

Section 1225(b) clearly applies to Bushuev. Section 1225(b)(2) requires detention

of “applicants for admission” during removal proceedings. An “applicant for admis-

sion” under § 1225 is defined as any alien who “is present” in the country but “has

not been admitted[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1); Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. And an alien

is “admitted” into the country only upon “lawful entry . . . into the United States after

inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A).

That makes Bushuev an “applicant for admission” under § 1225. Despite living in

the United States, Bushuev never lawfully entered. Instead, Bushuev entered the

country without a visa or inspection, see Doc. 1-1 at 7–8, and does not dispute that he

“freely admitted to being in the US illegally/without inspection.” Id. at 7. Thus,

Bushuev is an “applicant for admission” who must be detained under § 1225(b)(1)

while his removal proceedings continue.

Some courts have concluded that § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to aliens who have

been living in the United States for an extended period. Those courts have reasoned

that § 1225(b)(2) applies to aliens “seeking admission” and, because aliens living in

the country are not actively seeking lawful entry, they are not “seeking admission.”

This Court has already rejected that argument, see Cutiopala, 2026 WL 113567, and

so has every other decision addressing it in this judicial district. See Mejia Olalde v.

Noem, No. 1:25-cv-168-JMD, 2025 WL 3131942 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2025); Suarez v.

Noem, No. 1:25-cv-202-JMD, 2025 WL 3312168 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 28, 2025); Ramirez v.

Noem, No. 1:25-cv-206-CMS, 2026 WL 251725 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 30, 2026). There is good

reason to reject the argument too. Namely, to “seek” is a synonym of to “apply” for,

“[s]o by applying for admission, [an alien] is necessarily seeking admission.” Cuti-

opala, 2026 WL 113567 at *3. It makes no sense to say that a job applicant is not

seeking a job. So too here. Read ordinarily, an “applicant for admission” is “seeking

admission.”

Because the plain text of the statute expressly deems Bushuev an “applicant for

admission,” the Court finds that § 1225(b)(2) applies to him. Thus, § 1225(b)(2) au-

thorizes the federal government to detain Bushuev without bond until the conclusion

of his removal proceedings.

II. Bushuev is not entitled to a bond hearing.

Section 1225(b)(2)’s application to Bushuev resolves his petition. The only

grounds Bushuev asserts in support of habeas relief are (1) that he has been detained

for three months without a bond hearing, and (2) that immigration officials’ refusal

to grant his requests for bond hearing constitutes a due process violation. Doc. 1 at

6. Both arguments essentially raise the same issue: whether Bushuev is entitled to

a bond hearing while he awaits removal proceedings. He is not. The statute giving

the federal government authority to detain him does not require a bond hearing, and

neither does the Due Process Clause.

As already discussed, Bushuev is lawfully detained under § 1225(b)(2). Read

most naturally, § 1225(b)(2) mandates detention of “applicants for admission” like

Bushuev until removal proceedings have concluded. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S.

281, 297 (2018). “Until that point, however, nothing in the statutory text imposes

any limit on the length of detention,” and § 1225(b)(2) “says [nothing] whatsoever

about bond hearings.” Id. Thus, Bushuev’s continued detention without bond pend-

ing his removal proceedings is statutorily authorized—i.e., with “due process of law.”

U.S. Const. amend. V. (emphasis added).

This does not violate the Due Process Clause. For decades it has been settled

“that the Government may constitutionally detain deportable aliens during the lim-

ited period necessary for their removal proceedings.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510,

526 (2003); Banyee v. Garland, 115 F.4th 928, 931 (8th Cir. 2024) (stating that in

Demore, “[the Supreme Court] reaffirmed its ‘longstanding view that the

[glovernment may constitutionally detain deportable aliens during the limited period

necessary for their removal proceedings.’ ” (quoting Demore, 538 U.S. at 526)). That

remains true even if the alien is neither dangerous nor a flight risk. Jd. at 524-25,

531 (reaffirming Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952), where the Supreme Court

rejected a reading of the Due Process Clause that would allow aliens detained pend-

ing removal proceedings to be released if they are neither a flight risk nor individu-

ally dangerous.). While constitutional concerns may exist for mandatory immigration

detentions exceeding six months—see Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001)

(interpreting separate immigration statute to require hearing after six months to

avoid constitutional issues); but see Jennings, 583 U.S. at 299-300 (rejecting use of

the constitutional avoidance canon to read into §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) an implicit

six-month limit on the detention)—Bushuev has not been detained for over six

months. Doc. 1 at 4. Therefore, there is no due process violation to remedy here.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Bushuev’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28

U.S.C. § 2241, Doc. 1,is DENIED and dismissed.

Dated this 9th day of February, 2026.

MARIA A. LANAHA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE