The opinion
If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MICHIGAN AMBULATORY SURGICAL UNPUBLISHED
CENTER and PHASE ONE REHAB, LLC, February 13, 2026
9:15 AM
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v No. 369465
Macomb Circuit Court
ESURANCE PROPERTY & CASUALTY LC No. 2023-001857-NF
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: CAMERON, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and YOUNG, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this first-party action for payment of personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under
the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., plaintiffs, Michigan Ambulatory Surgical Center and
Phase One Rehab, LLC, appeal as of right from the trial court order granting summary disposition
to defendant, Esurance Property and Casualty Insurance Company. We affirm for the reasons
stated in this opinion.
I. BASIC FACTS
This case arises from a May 8, 2022, motor vehicle crash in which plaintiffs’ assignor and
defendant’s insured, Angela Howard, was injured. Plaintiffs’ single-count complaint alleged
statutory violations of the no-fault act over defendant’s refusal to pay PIP benefits to plaintiffs
after they provided medical care to Howard following the motor vehicle accident. Defendant
moved for summary disposition, which was initially denied without prejudice. Thereafter,
defendant filed a renewed motion for summary disposition, arguing that Howard had elected PIP
coverage of $50,000 per person, per accident and that the coverage had been exhausted. In
response, plaintiffs argued that Howard’s selection was ineffective under administrative bulletins
that had been issued by the Michigan Department of Insurance and Financial Services (DIFS).
They also asserted that the $50,000 coverage limit had not been exhausted. The trial court granted
defendant’s renewed motion for summary disposition. This appeal follows.
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II. SUMMARY DISPOSITION
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by granting defendant summary disposition. We
review de novo the trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. Glasker-Davis v
Auvenshine, 333 Mich App 222, 229; 964 NW2d 809 (2020).
A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) . . . tests the factual sufficiency of a claim.
When considering such a motion, a trial court must consider all evidence submitted
by the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. A
motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) may only be granted when there is no genuine
issue of material fact. A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record leaves
open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ. [El-Khalil v Oakwood
Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 160; 934 NW2d 665 (2019) (quotation marks and
citation omitted).]
Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc v
Esurance Prop & Cas Ins Co, 348 Mich App 428, 439; 19 NW3d 151 (2023).
B. ANALYSIS
At issue in this appeal is MCL 500.3107c, which provides, in pertinent part:
(1) Except as provided in [MCL 500.3107d and MCL 500.3109a], and
subject to subsection (5), for an insurance policy that provides the security required
under [MCL 500.3101(1)] and is issued or renewed after July 1, 2020, the applicant
or named insured shall, in a way required under [MCL 500.3107e] and on a form
approved by the director, select 1 of the following coverage levels for personal
protection insurance benefits under [MCL 500.3107(1)(a)]:
(a) A limit of $50,000.00 per individual per loss occurrence for any personal
protection insurance benefits under [MCL 500.3107(1)(a)]. The selection of a limit
under this subdivision is only available to an applicant or named insured if both of
the following apply:
(i) The applicant or named insured is enrolled in Medicaid, as that term is
defined in [MCL 500.3157].
(ii) The applicant’s or named insured’s spouse and any relative of either
who resides in the same household has qualified health coverage, as that term is
defined in [MCL 500.3107d], is enrolled in Medicaid, or has coverage for the
payment of benefits under [MCL 500.3107(1)(a)] from an insurer that provides the
security required by [MCL 500.3101(1)].
* * *
(2) The form required under subsection (1) must do all of the following:
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(a) State, in a conspicuous manner, the benefits and risks associated with
each coverage option.
(b) Provide a way for the applicant or named insured to mark the form to
acknowledge that he or she has read the form and understands the options available.
(c) Allow the applicant or named insured to mark the form to make the
selection of coverage level under subsection (1).
(d) Require the applicant or named insured to sign the form.
(3) If an insurance policy is issued or renewed as described in subsection
(1) and the applicant or named insured has not made an effective selection under
subsection (1) but a premium or premium installment has been paid, there is a
rebuttable presumption that the amount of the premium or installment paid
accurately reflects the level of coverage applicable to the policy under subsection
(1).
Plaintiffs first argue that summary disposition was improperly granted because factual
disputes remained regarding whether defendant issued the renewal no-fault policy to Howard
before she signed an updated choice-of-coverage form. In support of its argument, plaintiffs
request this Court to “defer” to DIFS’s interpretation of MCL 500.3107c. Specifically, they direct
this Court to DIFS Bulletin 2021-25-INS, which provides that an “effective selection” under MCL
500.3107c(1) occurs when “an applicant or named insured completes, signs, and returns to an
insurer or agent [a change-of-coverage form], whether at the initial application or the renewal.”
[Emphasis added.]
Plaintiffs’ argument is analogous to the argument raised by the plaintiff in Bronson Health
Care Group, 348 Mich App at 442. In that case, the plaintiff asserted that the defendant did not
comply with MCL 500.3107c(1) when the insured selected limited PIP medical coverage. The
plaintiff specifically challenged effectiveness of the insured’s selection on the basis that the no-
fault insurer did not provide the insured with a copy of the choice-of-coverage form before the no-
fault policy was purchased. In making that argument, the plaintiff relied on an “FAQ” issued by
DIFS in which DIFS had stated that carriers were required to provide the choice-of-coverage form
“ ‘at the time of new business.’ ” Id. The Bronson Court recognized that deference is generally
afforded to an administrative agency’s interpretation of the statute. Id. However, it reasoned:
There’s nothing in the plain language of MCL 500.3107c(1) to suggest that it
requires the PIP-selection form be provided to the insured before the policy is
issued. Given this, DIFS’s interpretation is clearly wrong because it adds a
requirement to the statute that is not discernible from the statute’s text.
Accordingly, we need not defer to DIFS’s interpretation, and we reject plaintiff’s
argument that the statute requires insureds to complete the PIP-selection form
before coverage is issued. [Id. (quotation marks omitted.]
Under Bronson, therefore, although deference should be afforded to an administrative agency’s
interpretation of a statute, such deference should not be afforded when the agency’s interpretation
is incorrect. Id.
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Here, notwithstanding that MCL 500.3107c(1) requires that, as it relates to all policies
issued or renewed after July 1, 2020, the insured make a selection of the limits of their PIP
coverage, the statute does not specially provide that an updated form be completed at each
subsequent renewal of the policy. Further, although the statute contains several criteria regarding
the choice-of-coverage form, the plain language of the criteria listed in MCL 500.3107c(2)(a)
through (d) does not require that a new and updated choice-of-coverage form be provided by the
named insured at each subsequent renewal. We are not permitted to insert into the statute a
requirement that the Legislature itself did not include. Scugoza v Metro Direct Prop & Cas Ins
Co, 316 Mich App 218, 228; 891 NW2d 274 (2016). Therefore, we conclude that the court did
not err by granting summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), as material factual disputes did
not remain on this issue.
Plaintiffs also argue that Howard’s selection was not effective under MCL 500.3107c(1)
because defendant did not obtain proof of Howard’s Medicaid enrollment when her no-fault policy
was renewed. In support of their claim of error, plaintiffs point to DIFS Bulletin 2020-33-INS,
effective July 28, 2020, and DIFS Bulletin 2023-17-INS, effective June 22, 2023. Both DIFS
Bulletin 2020-33-INS and DIFS Bulletin 2023-17-INS required or require no-fault insurers to
obtain a copy of an individual’s Medicaid card when the individual first applies for coverage and
at every subsequent renewal.
MCL 500.3107c, however, does not impose an obligation or onus on no-fault insurers,
either directly or through their agents, to secure proof of an individual’s Medicaid coverage at the
time of the no-fault policy’s issuance or at the time of renewal. Instead, the statute mandates that
“for an insurance policy . . . issued or renewed after July 1, 2020, the applicant or named insured,
shall, in a way required under [MCL 500.3107e] and on a form approved by the director,” select
one of the available coverages, which in this case was the limit of $50,000. MCL 500.3107c(1)(a).
The statutory language further provides an important qualification that the selection of the $50,000
coverage limit “is only available to an applicant or named insured” under certain delineated
circumstances. MCL 500.3107c(1)(a). One of the qualifications outlined in the statute is that
“[t]he applicant or named insured is enrolled in Medicaid . . . .” MCL 500.3107c(1)(a)(i)
(emphasis added). MCL 500.3157(15)(e) defines the term “Medicaid” as “a program for medical
assistance established under subchapter XIX of the social security act, 42 USC 1396 to 1396w-5.”
MCL 500.3157 does not otherwise speak to the issue of Medicaid enrollment and does not contain
any requirement that an insurer secure proof of Medicaid enrollment either when an individual
applies for a policy or at the time of subsequent renewals.
Moreover, the Legislature intentionally used the present-tense word “is,” in MCL
500.3107c(1)(a)(i) when requiring that the “applicant or named insured is enrolled in
Medicaid . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The Legislature’s use of the present-tense word “is” indicates
“prospective-only application.” McLain v Roman Catholic Diocese of Lansing, 514 Mich 1, 24;
22 NW2d 284 (2024). MCL 500.3107c(1) also specifies that an applicant or named insured is
required to select “1 of the following coverages” for PIP benefits “for an insurance policy . . .
issued or renewed after July 1, 2020 . . . .” Therefore, a plain reading of the statute supports the
logical conclusion that an individual who selects the limited $50,000 PIP coverage is required to
be enrolled in Medicaid at the time of the policy’s issuance or renewal.
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In sum, contrary to plaintiffs’ claim, there is nothing in the language of the statute
mandating that insurers secure proof of Medicaid enrollment either at the time of an individual’s
application or at a subsequent renewal. Again, we are not permitted to supplement the text of a
statute by adding requirements that the Legislature did not itself determine necessary. Scugoza,
316 Mich App at 228. Therefore, we decline plaintiffs’ invitation to read into MCL 500.3107c a
requirement that insurers secure proof or documentation of an individual’s Medicaid enrollment
either at the time the individual applies for the policy or during the subsequent renewal process.
As such, the trial court did not err by granting summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), as
material factual disputes did not remain on this issue.1
Plaintiffs’ next challenge to the effectiveness of Howard’s selection of limited PIP medical
coverage relates to Howard’s signature on the choice-of-coverage form. Plaintiffs specifically
contend that the court erred in granting summary disposition because factual disputes existed
regarding whether Howard’s signature on the choice-of-coverage form was valid under MCL
500.3107c and MCL 500.3107e. We disagree.
In Bronson Health Care Group, 348 Mich App at 443-444, this Court recognized that MCL
500.3107c requires that an insured select a coverage option “ ‘ in a way required under’ ” MCL
500.3107e. MCL 500.3107e provides, in pertinent part:
(2) A person must make a selection under [MCL 500.3009] or [MCL
500.3107c], or an election under [MCL 500.3107d] in 1 of the following ways:
(a) Marking and signing a paper form.
(b) Giving verbal instructions, in person or telephonically, that the form be
marked and signed on behalf of the person. To be an effective selection or election,
the verbal instructions must be recorded and the recording maintained by the person
to whom the instructions were given. If there is a dispute over the effectiveness of
a selection or election under this subdivision, there is a presumption that the
selection or election was not effective and the insurer has the burden of rebutting
the presumption with the recording.
(c) Electronically marking the form and providing an electronic signature
as provided in the uniform electronic transactions act, 2000 PA 305, MCL 450.831
to 450.849. [Emphasis added.]
The choice-of-coverage form contained Howard’s signature in typed form. The parties
here do not contend that Howard gave verbal instructions that the choice-of-coverage form be
marked and signed on her behalf to the extent that MCL 500.3107(2)(b) would be applicable.
Instead, at issue is whether Howard made her selection under MCL 500.3107c by electronically
marking the form and providing an electronic signature as provided in the UETA. The relevant
1
Given our determination that proof of Medicaid enrollment is not required either at the time of
her application or at a subsequent renewal, any factual dispute regarding the date of the photograph
of Howard’s Medicaid card is not dispositive.
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provision of the UETA, MCL 450.832, defines an electronic signature as “an electronic sound,
symbol, or process attached to or logically associated with a record and executed or adopted by a
person with the intent to sign the record.” Under the UETA, an electronic signature is attributable
to an individual “if it is the act of the person.” MCL 450.839(1). MCL 450.839 further provides,
in pertinent part:
(1) . . . The act of the person may be shown in any manner, including a
showing of the efficacy of any security procedure applied to determine the person
to which the electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.
(2) The effect of an electronic record or electronic signature attributed to a
person under subsection (1) is determined from the context and surrounding
circumstances at the time of its creation, execution, or adoption, including any
agreements of the parties, and otherwise as provided by law.
While plaintiffs rely heavily on Bronson Health Care Group, 348 Mich App 435, 436, as
support for their position, Bronson is both procedurally and factually distinguishable. In Bronson,
the plaintiff had argued that the defendant had failed to put forth evidence establishing that the
insured had electronically signed the choice-of-coverage form in a manner permitted under MCL
500.3107e. Id. The defendant countered that the insured had signed the form electronically as
allowed by MCL 500.3107e(2)(c). Id. at 436. The defendant had produced “IT metadata showing
IP addresses,” claiming that this evidence established that the insured had given a valid electronic
signature. Id. at 446. Observing that neither party had hired an expert to explain the metadata and
its impact on the validity of the insured’s signature, the Bronson Court vacated the trial court’s
order granting the defendant-insurer’s summary disposition and remanded for additional discovery
on the matter. Id. Stated differently, the Bronson Court concluded, under the specific facts of that
case, that the defendant’s production of the typed name on a choice-of-coverage form, without any
indication from the document itself that it was the insured who had executed or adopted the
document, did not establish that the signature was made by an act of the insured. See id. at 445-
446. Bronson Health Care Group does not, therefore, stand for the broad principle of law that a
typed name, in and of itself, will not suffice to establish that the insured signed the choice-of-
coverage form electronically as required by MCL 500.3107e.
In the present case, defendant included the full copy of the choice-of-coverage document,
reflecting Howard’s typewritten initials, in which she verified that she understood her election and
its impact on her PIP coverage. The change-of-coverage document also showed a typewritten “X”
where Howard had made her election of PIP coverage. A review of the choice-of-coverage
document itself does not provide further information regarding whether Howard’s alleged
electronic signature was the product of Howard’s actions and is not helpful in determining the
context and surrounding circumstances at the time of the choice-of-coverage form’s “creation,
execution, or adoption, . . . .” MCL 450.839(2). Yet, unlike the plaintiff in Bronson Health Care
Group, 348 Mich App at 435-436, plaintiffs here did not assert that defendant had not produced
evidence to establish that the signature of the insured was valid under MCL 500.3107e.
Accordingly, given that plaintiffs did not provide the trial court with evidence, such as an affidavit,
the trial court did not err by granting summary disposition in favor of defendant. MCR 2.116(G)(4)
(“When a motion under subrule (C)(10) is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his or her pleading, but must, by
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affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.”).
Finally, plaintiffs argue that defendant’s payment log only reflected that defendant paid
$47,941.50 for allowable expenses under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Plaintiffs also contend that there
are factual questions as to whether three of the payments were for allowable expenses. 2 We
disagree.
MCL 500.3107c(1)(a) provides that a named insured or applicant for a policy of no-fault
insurance may select limited PIP medical coverage of “$50,000.00 per individual per loss
occurrence for any personal protection insurance benefits under [MCL 500.3107(1)(a)].” MCL
500.3107 provides, in pertinent part:
(1) Subject to the exceptions and limitations in this chapter, and subject to
chapter 31A, personal protection insurance benefits are payable for the following:
(a) Allowable expenses consisting of reasonable charges incurred for
reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations for an injured
person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation. [Emphasis added.]
Plaintiffs argue that a review of defendant’s payment log reflects that it only paid $47,941.50,
rather than the full $50,000 in PIP medical claims. Plaintiffs also point to three specific payments
defendant made, asserting that because they do not include a medical payee, factual disputes exist
regarding whether the expenses were allowable under MCL 500.3107(1)(a) for “reasonably
necessary products, services and accommodations for an injured person’s care, recovery, or
rehabilitation.”
A review of the three challenged payments in the payment log does not support plaintiffs’
contention that the payments were not for allowable expenses under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). For
example, while the September 12, 2022, October 10, 2022, and October 21, 2022, payments all
list Howard as the payee, there is no indication from the record that the payments defendant made
to Howard did not pertain to allowable expenses under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Instead, the
challenged payments are all described as “PIP-Medical Coverage-Medical Payments,” the same
description applied to payments made to various medical providers that plaintiffs apparently accept
as reflecting allowable expenses. This is in contrast to payments that were not for allowable
2
After plaintiffs filed their brief on appeal in this Court, defendant filed a motion to correct or
expand the record, in which it noted that the pay log submitted in support of its motion for summary
disposition and renewed motion for summary disposition was “outdated,” and was therefore
included by mistake. This Court denied defendant’s motion to correct or expand the record without
prejudice, stating that the motion could be refiled for consideration by the case call panel. Mich
Ambulatory Surgical Ctr v Esurance Ins Co, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered
September 26, 2024 (Docket No. 369465). Defendant filed a renewed motion to correct or expand
the record, which we denied. Mich Ambulatory Surgical Ctr v Esurance Ins Co, unpublished order
of the Court of Appeals, entered January 15, 2026 (Docket No. 369465).
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expenses under MCL 500.3107(1)(a), such as a series of payments to Howard that are described
as “PIP Work Loss-Wage Loss” and “PIP-Medical Coverage-PIR-Replacement Services.” See
MCL 500.3107(1)(b) and (c) (identifying benefits for wage loss and replacement services
separately from allowable expenses for reasonably necessary products, services, and
accommodations). Plaintiffs also did not support their challenge to whether the expenses were
allowable under MCL 500.3107(1)(a) with evidentiary support. MCR 2.116(G)(4). Accordingly,
the trial court did not err in granting summary disposition in defendant’s favor with respect to this
issue, given that genuine issues of material fact did not remain for trial on the issue whether the
three discrete payments that plaintiffs challenged were not for allowable expenses under MCL
500.3107(1)(a).
Next, the trial court did not expressly address the amount of defendant’s payments, but the
court held generally that plaintiffs had not provided evidentiary support for their claims that
genuine issues of material fact precluded summary disposition. The trial court’s determination
was correct because, while plaintiffs challenged defendant’s assertion that it had paid out $50,000
in PIP medical claims, aside from their bare allegations that the calculations were incorrect and
their own chart calculating the charges included in their brief on appeal, plaintiffs did not submit
documentary and evidentiary support for their assertion that factual issues existed to withstand
summary disposition. MCR 2.116(G)(4). For example, along with their chart, plaintiffs could
have submitted an affidavit or deposition testimony of one of defendant’s employees stating that
the policy limits were not paid in full, but they did not do so. Therefore, the trial court did not err
by concluding that, rather than resting on their “mere allegations,” plaintiffs had not, with
evidentiary support, “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” with
respect to whether defendant had paid policy limits on Howard’s claim. MCR 2.116(G)(4).
Affirmed. Defendant may tax costs as the prevailing party. MCR 7.219(A).
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Adrienne N. Young
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