The opinion
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2804-24
B.D.,1
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
A.B.,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted January 27, 2026 – Decided February 13, 2026
Before Judges Firko and Vinci.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Mercer County,
Docket No. FV-11-1101-25.
Jonathan F. Marshall, attorneys for appellant (Brian C.
McCauley, on the brief).
Respondent has not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
1
We use initials to protect the parties' privacy and the confidentiality of these
proceedings. R. 1:38-3(d)(10).
In this one-sided appeal, defendant A.B. appeals from the March 26, 2025
final restraining order (FRO) entered against him in favor of plaintiff B.D.
pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17
to -35, based on the predicate act of simple assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a)(1). The
Family Part judge determined an FRO was necessary to protect plaintiff from
future acts of domestic violence. The parties are unrelated but resided together
at a residence where they shared common areas. We affirm because the judge's
factual findings are supported by substantial credible evidence, and she correctly
applied the law.
I.
The facts were established at the one-day hearing in March 2025. Plaintiff
was represented by counsel and defendant was self-represented. The parties
were the only witnesses who testified. The parties are Polish immigrants. They
utilized the aid of a Polish interpreter at the hearing. Photographs taken of
plaintiff's injuries and a criminal order previously entered against defendant
were moved into evidence.
The parties were housemates and rented out separate rooms in a residence
located in Trenton. Plaintiff acted as the landlord's agent, collecting rent and
utility payments from the tenants. In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that on
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February 1, 2025, defendant "purposely and knowingly" struck her left arm with
a closed fist. Plaintiff claimed defendant then kicked her left leg, resulting in
"visible signs of injury" to her left arm, shoulder, and leg, including bruises and
scratches. Plaintiff stated defendant also grabbed her nose with his middle and
pointer fingers and twisted it, causing her nose to bleed.
The following day, February 2, plaintiff filed a domestic violence
complaint and sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)
against defendant, which was granted. Defendant was served with the TRO and
arrested on criminal charges related to the incident. The day after obtaining the
TRO, February 3, plaintiff went to the hospital for an examination and treatment.
X-rays were taken of her left arm and leg, she was prescribed pain medication,
and released.
Plaintiff and her attorney appeared at the initial hearing date, which was
scheduled for February 19, 2025, but defendant did not. The FRO hearing was
rescheduled for March 18, 2025. Before proceeding, the judge informed
defendant that he had a right to retain an attorney, what plaintiff was alleging
against him, and what she had to prove. The judge explained the serious
consequences associated with the entry of an FRO. The judge also instructed
defendant that the hearing would be limited to the allegations in the complaint.
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3
The judge asked defendant if he wanted an adjournment in order to retain
an attorney. Defendant told the judge he needed an attorney and requested an
adjournment. The judge granted a one-week adjournment,2 once again, advised
the parties there would be no further adjournments, and rescheduled the matter
on a try or dismiss basis.
Nonetheless, defendant did not retain an attorney. At the FRO hearing,
plaintiff testified defendant moved to the residence in September 2024, when
she had already been residing there. There were three tenants who resided at the
residence, the parties and a man, H.P. On the first day of each month, the parties
would meet in the kitchen to handle the bills.
It is undisputed by the parties that on Saturday night, February 1, 2025,
the parties had an argument over money in the kitchen. Plaintiff testified that
H.P. was not home at the time. Plaintiff testified that she asked defendant to
pay his share of the utilities because he was already behind on payment for the
previous month and owed the landlord $300. According to plaintiff, defendant
advised her he was not going to pay.
2
The judge indicated on the record that the FRO hearing was rescheduled to
March 25, 2025 at 1:30 p.m. However, the record indicates the FRO hearing
occurred on March 26, 2025.
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Plaintiff testified the disagreement escalated from an "exchange of words"
to a "brawl." She repeatedly asked defendant why he was not going to pay, and
in response, he attacked her, consistent with the allegations set forth in her
complaint. Plaintiff explained she could not sleep afterwards that night, so a
female friend came over and spent the night with her.
In seeking an FRO, plaintiff testified "I am scared of this man very much
because he attacked me twice. I don't know what else he is going to do to me.
I sometimes pass him in the street." Plaintiff testified she goes to the same stores
and bank as defendant.
The judge permitted defendant to cross-examine plaintiff. In response to
a question as to why plaintiff did not yell or call for help during the incident,
plaintiff testified she "was yelling" and asked him "to stop."
Defendant testified the parties were seated at the kitchen table, but that
the conversation consisted of plaintiff informing him of her intention to raise his
rent and require him to pay a "new" $80 fee for cleaning supplies. In contrast
to plaintiff's testimony, defendant claimed their discussion concluded with him
electing to vacate the premises at the end of the month. Defendant testified he
had no "motive" to "attack" and "beat" plaintiff. When he decided not to pay,
defendant stated he left the table and walked away. Defendant claimed he did
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not call H.P. to testify because H.P. was possibly "afraid" and maybe "because
he still lives there." Defendant testified he is "[sixty-eight] years old," "retired,"
and has never been arrested before. Defendant stated he never beat up anyone
before, "especially a woman."
Defendant testified that on the following day, February 2, the parties had
an additional disagreement about finances, and then he "went to [his] room."
Three hours later, he was arrested. Following his testimony, defendant
informally requested an adjournment to call as witnesses the two police officers
who took plaintiff's report of the incident to ascertain if they observed plaintiff's
"blood" or "bruises." The judge denied defendant's request , noting it was his
obligation as a litigant to subpoena third-party witnesses. In addition, the judge
reasoned having the police officers testify on another day was not going to
support defendant's "theory." The judge also denied defendant's request to have
his friend T.G. testify, who helped him find the residence, on relevancy grounds.
After considering the parties' testimony and items moved into evidence,
the judge placed her findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record. The
judge deemed plaintiff "very credible" and found defendant "not to be credible."
The judge found plaintiff had "an open demeanor," was "inherently believable,"
and "quite emotional." Relying heavily on the photographs, the judge observed
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plaintiff's injuries were inflicted on the date of the incident even though the
photographs were taken a day or two later. The judge highlighted defendant
"twisted" plaintiff's nose so badly that "she suffered a bloody nose." The judge
noted it was "very clear" that there were red marks around the area where
plaintiff described defendant "grabbed her by the nose." In addition, the judge
found defendant "punched" plaintiff's legs and arms "at least eight times
repeatedly" and "[y]ou can almost see the footprint right in the top of the thigh."
The judge determined plaintiff sustained a "humongous bruise on the
upper part of her thigh" and a "very wide" bruise on her arm. The judge credited
plaintiff's testimony that these injuries "caused her pain." The judge emphasized
that defendant did not testify with "candor," avoided her questions, and barely
looked at her during the course of his testimony.
Regarding jurisdiction, the judge reasoned the parties qualified as
household members under the Act because they had lived at the same residence
for several months. The judge then described plaintiff's injuries in detail, noting
she sought treatment at a hospital and then went to police headquarters to file
her complaint and seek a TRO. The judge concluded that plaintiff proved the
predicate act of assault by "well more than a preponderance of the credible
evidence."
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Finally, the judge found that plaintiff needed an FRO. In doing so, the
judge credited plaintiff's testimony that she is afraid of defendant. The judge
analyzed both Silver3 prongs and recognized the need for an FRO is
"perfunctory" in cases like this, where a plaintiff is physically assaulted, and
determined plaintiff needed an FRO to protect her from future abuse. The judge
determined there is "obvious immediate danger" to plaintiff given the
"significant physical injuries" defendant inflicted upon her and in light of the
"money dispute" between the parties. This appeal followed.
Before us, defendant argues:
(1) the judge effectively amended the complaint
without providing him an opportunity to address same
warranting a remand for a new FRO hearing before a
different judge;
(2) the judge's attempt to validate the photographs
without his participation raised more questions than it
answered;
(3) the denial of his adjournment request constituted an
abuse of discretion;
(4) he was denied a meaningful opportunity to cross-
examine plaintiff; and
(5) the judge's findings were insufficient to justify the
entry of the FRO.
3
Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125-27 (App. Div. 2006).
A-2804-24
8
II.
Generally, "findings by a trial court are binding on appeal when supported
by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428
(2015). "We accord substantial deference to Family Part judges, who routinely
hear domestic violence cases and are 'specially trained to detect the difference
between domestic violence and more ordinary differences that arise between
couples.'" C.C. v. J.A.H., 463 N.J. Super. 419, 428 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting
J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 482 (2011)). "[D]eference is especially
appropriate 'when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of
credibility.'" MacKinnon v. MacKinnon, 191 N.J. 240, 254 (2007) (quoting
Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998)).
We will not disturb a trial court's factual findings unless "they are so
manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant [,] and
reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Cesare, 154
N.J. at 412 (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J.
474, 484 (1974)). However, we do not accord such deference to legal
conclusions and will review such conclusions de novo. Thieme v. Aucoin-
Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 283 (2016).
A-2804-24
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The purpose of the Act is to "assure the victims of domestic violence the
maximum protection from abuse the law can provide." G.M. v. C.V., 453 N.J.
Super. 1, 12 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting State v. Brown, 394 N.J. Super. 492, 504
(App. Div. 2007)); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18. Consequently, "[o]ur law is
particularly solicitous of victims of domestic violence[,]" J.D., 207 N.J. at 473
(quoting State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 584 (1997)), and courts will "liberally
construe [the Act] to achieve its salutary purposes." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 400.
Our Legislature has pronounced in the Act "it is the responsibility of the
courts to protect victims of violence that occurs in a family or family-like setting
by providing access to both emergent and long-term civil and criminal remedies
and sanctions." N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18. Moreover, the Act's remedies are to be
applied broadly in this State's civil and criminal courts. Ibid. "Accordingly, the
Act affords greater protection than generally given to victims of crimes." S.Z.
v. M.C., 417 N.J. Super. 622, 625 (App. Div. 2011).
Pursuant to the Act, a "victim of domestic violence" is defined as:
any person who is [eighteen] years of age or older or
who is an emancipated minor and who has been
subjected to domestic violence by a spouse, former
spouse, or any other person who is a present household
member or was at any time a household member.
'Victim of domestic violence' also includes any person,
regardless of age, who has been subjected to domestic
violence by a person with whom the victim has a child
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in common, or with whom the victim anticipates having
a child in common, if one of the parties is pregnant.
'Victim of domestic violence' also includes any person
who has been subjected to domestic violence by a
person with whom the victim has had a dating
relationship.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d) (emphasis added).]
The Act does not define the term "household member." Nonetheless, the
term has been interpreted liberally when expanding the court's jurisdiction in a
domestic violence situation. S.P. v. Newark Police Dep't., 428 N.J. Super. 210,
224 (App. Div. 2012). The Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-3 to -16, as originally enacted,
mandated cohabitation between the alleged perpetrator and the victim. Ibid.
However, in 1991, the Act expanded the parameters of the definition to include
"present or former household member[s]." Ibid. We have addressed the breadth
of this definition. R.G. v. R.G., 449 N.J. Super. 208, 219 (App. Div. 2017)
(quoting Tribuzio v. Roder, 356 N.J. Super. 590, 595 (App. Div. 2003)). When
considering if a defendant is a "former household member," courts should
evaluate if "the 'perpetrator's past domestic relationship with the alleged victim
provides a special opportunity for abusive and controlling behavior.'" N.G. v.
J.P., 426 N.J. Super. 398, 409 (App. Div. 2012).
Further, New Jersey courts have liberally construed the definition based
on the premise that the [Act] is directed at "violence that occurs in a family or
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family-like setting." Ibid. (quoting Smith v. Moore, 298 N.J. Super. 121, 125
(App. Div. 1997)). The touchstone of a "household" is not whether parties reside
under a single roof, but instead varies based on the circumstances. Gibson v.
Callaghan, 158 N.J. 662, 672 (1999).
Courts have applied the six-factor test enunciated in Coleman v. Romano,
388 N.J. Super. 342, 351 (Ch. Div. 2006) when determining whether a party is
considered a "former household member" pursuant to the Act:
(1) the nature and duration of the prior relationship;
(2) whether the past domestic relationship provides a
special opportunity for abuse and controlling behavior;
(3) the passage of time since the end of the relationship;
(4) the extent and nature of any intervening contacts;
(5) the nature of the precipitating incident; and
(6) the likelihood of ongoing contact or relationship.
[N.G., 426 N.J. Super. at 409-10 (quoting Coleman, 388
N.J. Super. at 351-52).]
The focus is "whether the parties have been so entangled, emotionally or
physically—or they will be in the future—that the court should invoke the Act
to protect the plaintiff and prevent further violence." Id. at 410 (quoting
Coleman, 388 N.J. Super. at 351).
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In 2015, the definition was amended again, replacing "former household
member" with "any other person who is a present household member or was at
any time a household member." N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d); R.G., 449 N.J. Super. at
219. We determined the 2015 amendments reflect a "significant change" in
expanding the scope of the "household member" definition. R.G., 449 N.J.
Super. at 219-20.
When determining whether to grant an FRO, a trial judge must engage in
a two-step analysis. J.D. v. A.M.W., 475 N.J. Super. 306, 313 (App. Div. 2023)
(citing Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 125-27). "First, the judge must determine
whether the plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the credible evidence,
that one or more of the predicate acts set forth" in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a) has
occurred. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 125. Second, the judge must assess whether
a restraining order is necessary to protect the victim from immediate danger or
to prevent further abuse. J.D., 207 N.J. at 475-76 (quoting Silver, 387 N.J.
Super. at 126-27). The second determination depends on the seriousness of the
predicate offenses, and history of domestic violence between the parties,
including prior threats, harassment, and physical abuse. Corrente v. Corrente,
281 N.J. Super. 243, 248 (App. Div. 1995) (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)). An
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FRO may only be granted when both prongs have been met. See J.D., 207 N.J.
at 475-76; see also N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a).
A request for an adjournment rests in the sound discretion of the trial
judge, who, in the context of a domestic violence case, must balance both the
interests of both parties to a speedy but fair resolution. Kosmowski v. Atl. City
Med. Ctr., 175 N.J. 568, 575 (2003) (recognizing a "request for an adjournment
is addressed to the trial judge's discretion"). Thus, we review a denial of an
adjournment request under an abuse of discretion standard. Smith v. Smith, 17
N.J. Super. 128, 131-32 (App. Div. 1951).
III.
Defendant contends the judge "effectively amended the complaint"
without giving him additional time to confront the "new allegations" that arose
at the FRO hearing. Defendant maintains plaintiff testified about two alleged
incidents—February 1 and 2—whereas her complaint only mentions February
1. The judge reviewed the content of plaintiff's cell phone and concluded she
was assaulted on February 2, without his participation. The judge stated:
[V]ery clearly, sir, she was bruised on her leg
significantly on February 2[] when she took those
pictures. . . . The picture in P-1 is the big bruise on her
thigh where she says that you kicked her, and that was
taken the next day. . . P-2 and P-5 of her arm is very
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clear to me that something happened to her on February
2[].
[(Emphasis added).]
Defendant argues that if it was clear something happened to plaintiff on
February 2, then due process required an adjournment of the hearing, so he could
defend himself as to those allegations. Additionally, defendant points to
plaintiff's testimony suggesting she took the photographs of her injuries on
February 3, when the attack occurred on February 1. He argues plaintiff waited
two days after the assault and one day after she went to the police to take these
photographs. After gaining knowledge of this at the hearing, defendant asserts
he had good reason to ascertain whether law enforcement observed plaintiff's
bruising on February 2, and it was unreasonable for him to assume he needed to
subpoena third-party witnesses, such as the police officers, before then.
Additionally, defendant argues he was treated unfairly because the judge
held at the prior FRO hearing date that the rescheduled hearing would be "try or
dismiss." Then, during the second FRO hearing, the judge rejected his second
adjournment request but later advised plaintiff's counsel she "would . . . allow
[her] to amend and bring the defendant back" regarding the February 2 incident,
if she had failed to prove that the February 1 alleged assault was "a pretty
significant event." We are unpersuaded.
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The Act specifically requires a hearing be held "within [ten] days of the
filing of a [domestic violence] complaint." N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a). However,
"ordinary due process protections [still] apply in the domestic violence context,
notwithstanding the shortened time frames for conducting a final hearing." J.D.,
207 N.J. at 478. "At a minimum, due process requires that a party in a judicial
hearing receive 'notice defining the issues and an adequate opportunity to
prepare and respond.'" Ibid. (quoting H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 175 N.J. 309, 321
(2003)). Therefore, "it is clearly improper to base a finding of domestic violence
upon acts or a course of conduct not even mentioned in the complaint." L.D. v.
W.D., Jr., 327 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 1999). "It constitutes a fundamental
violation of due process to convert a hearing on a complaint alleging one act of
domestic violence into a hearing on other acts of domestic violence which are
not even alleged in the complaint. . . ." Ibid. (quoting J.F. v. B.K., 308 N.J.
Super. 387, 391-92 (App. Div. 1998)).
The New Jersey Domestic Violence Procedures Manual specifically
speaks to when a judge makes a motion sua sponte to amend a party's initial
TRO complaint:
[w]hen the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint are
incomplete and/or it becomes evident at the final
hearing that the plaintiff is seeking a restraining order
based upon acts outside the complaint, the court, either
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on its own motion or on a party's motion, shall amend
the complaint to include those acts.
Due process requires that the judge make an inquiry as
to whether the defendant needs additional time to
prepare due to the amended complaint. A brief
adjournment may be required if the judge determines
that the defendant did not have adequate notice and
needs time to prepare. . . .
[New Jersey Domestic Violence Procedures Manual §
IV (G)(5)(b)(2) (2022).]
We conclude the judge preserved defendant's right to due process. At the
outset of the first FRO hearing date where defendant appeared, the judge
explained to him how the hearing would be conducted, the legal standards for
the entry of an FRO, and the consequences he would face if an FRO was entered.
Further, the judge advised defendant that he had a right to retain an attorney.
Defendant does not claim he misunderstood any of the judge's instructions.
Rather, on appeal, he suggests he was confronted by "new allegations" at the
time of the hearing, and the judge should have "liberally" granted his
adjournment request.
Although the judge altered the date of when she believed plaintiff's injury
occurred, the complaint itself was not amended. Moreover, the judge never
misconstrued the alleged predicate act or changed the nature of plaintiff's
injuries as alleged in the complaint. Plaintiff was not permitted to allege
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additional acts of domestic violence or a previous history of domestic violence
at the hearing.
Further, there is no suggestion in the record that defendant was not
prepared to proceed or address plaintiff's allegations or evidence. Instead,
defendant testified without hesitation regarding the incident alleged. We are
convinced the judge based her ultimate findings on events "clearly set forth in
the complaint." Pazienza v. Camarata, 381 N.J. Super. 173, 186 (App. Div.
2005).
Our courts have distinguished the present situation with previous matters:
This is not a situation like J.F. . . . , where the
predicate offense of the domestic violence finding was
based upon conduct not set forth in the complaint. Nor
is it a situation like H.E.S.[, 175 N.J. at 321] . . ., where
the complaint was, in effect, amended by testimony
regarding acts not set forth in the complaint, and
defendant was denied a continuance of reasonable
duration to meet the charges which ultimately formed
the basis of the predicate offense.
[Id. at 185-86.]
Here, the judge satisfied her obligation to determine if defendant had
adequate notice and time to prepare by initially advising defendant of his right
to an adjournment at his first appearance, granting his adjournment request, and
correctly finding it was his obligation as a litigant to subpoena any witnesses to
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testify prior to the hearing, which he had over one month to accomplish. See R.
1:9-1 ("[a] subpoena may be issued by . . . [a] party in the name of the clerk." )
Additionally, the judge specifically ordered the parties during the hearing to stop
testifying about incidents not alleged in the complaint, such as the February 2
knife incident. Under these circumstances, there was no error and no "effective
amended complaint" considered by the judge. We add defendant fails to
articulate a scintilla of evidence, except what witnesses might testify to, that he
would have produced to refute plaintiff's allegations.
IV.
Next, defendant argues the judge disregarded her responsibility to
exercise control over the mode and order of presenting witnesses and evidence
by taking plaintiff's cell phone, which contained photographs of her injuries, and
searching for date stamps without including him in the process. N.J.R.E. 611(a).
Defendant claims his due process rights were violated because he was denied a
meaningful opportunity to review plaintiff's cell phone. Defendant also
maintains the judge violated Rule 1:2-3, because she failed to preserve all
evidence pending appeal and the photographs on plaintiff's cell phone were not
produced as exhibits.
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We are convinced the judge did not err, and similarly convinced that
defendant was not prejudiced or deprived of due process. In L.M.F. v. J.A.F.,
Jr., we likewise held the trial court properly permitted text messages to be read
into the record by plaintiff directly from her cell phone. 421 N.J. Super. 523,
527 n.2 (App. Div. 2011). Defendant did not object to this procedure at the
hearing. It is of no moment that plaintiff did not produce paper copies of the
photographs depicting her injuries. The judge found plaintiff's testimony was
credible, and the photographs corroborated her testimony. We discern no abuse
of discretion.
V.
We reject defendant's argument he was denied a meaningful opportunity
to cross-examine plaintiff. Defendant contends he was not permitted to question
plaintiff directly with leading questions intended to highlight the key points of
his defense, but instead, the judge translated his questions into open-ended
questions. Defendant argues the judge did not even wait for plaintiff's counsel
to object before ruling plaintiff did not have to answer certain questions.
The denial of the opportunity to cross-examine or present witnesses
violates due process. Peterson v. Peterson, 374 N.J. Super. 116, 124-26 (App.
Div. 2005). However, "[t]he conduct of a trial . . . is within the discretion of the
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trial court." Persley v. N.J. Transit Bus Operations, 357 N.J. Super. 1, 9 (App.
Div. 2003). This discretion is not disturbed "unless there is a clear abuse of
discretion which has deprived a party of a fair trial." Ibid. The judge has broad
authority to "exercise reasonable control over the mode . . . of interrogating
witnesses," N.J.R.E. 611(a), and discretion regarding the scope of cross -
examination. N.J.S.A. 611(b).
Therefore, our trial courts "retain wide latitude . . . to impose reasonable
limits on . . . cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things,
harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or
interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant." State v. Budis, 125
N.J. 519, 532 (1991) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679
(1986)). These limits, however, must not deprive a party of their right to due
process by prohibiting one party from presenting relevant witnesses or from
cross-examining other witnesses. Peterson, 374 N.J. Super. at 125-26.
We conclude the judge did not abuse her discretion by requiring defendant
to proffer his cross-examination questions to her, who then conveyed them to
plaintiff. There was a TRO in effect and defendant was restricted from having
"any oral . . . contact or communication with [plaintiff]." Therefore, the judge
was well within her discretion to conduct the hearing with the TRO in mind. We
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defer to the limits the judge imposed and her considerations of safety and
repetitive interrogation. See Budis, 125 N.J. at 532. In any event, the outcome
would not have been affected based on the overwhelming substantial and
credible evidence in the record supporting the issuance of the FRO.
To the extent that we have not commented on them explicitly, all
remaining arguments presented by defendant lack sufficient merit to be
discussed in this opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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