Opinion

YEWAISIS

Court
District Court, D. New Jersey
Filed
Jan 28, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 38.7%

“[I]n a diversity action, the plaintiff must state all parties’ citizenships such that the existence of complete diversity can be confirmed.”

How later courts described this case

  • “[I]n a diversity action, the plaintiff must state all parties’ citizenships such that the existence of complete diversity can be confirmed.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JOSEPH YEWAISIS,

Civil Action No.: 25-01536

Plaintiff,

v. OPINION AND ORDER

UNION COUNTY SAVINGS BANK, et

January 28, 2026

al.,

Defendants.

SEMPER, District Judge.

THIS MATTER is before this Court upon Defendants Union County Savings Bank

(“UCSB”), Sydney Colin Neill, Kelly Watson, Doris Hawkins, Teresa Soto Vega, Thomas Ramos,

Bill Fenstemaker (improperly pled as “Robert Fenstemaker”), Joseph Garibaldi, IV, and William

Jones’1 (“Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Joseph Yewaisis’s (“Plaintiff”) First Amended

Complaint (ECF 25, “FAC”). (ECF 29, “Motion.”) Plaintiff did not oppose the Motion. The Court

decided the Motion upon the submissions of the parties, without oral argument, pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and Local Rule 78.1. For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss is GRANTED.

WHEREAS Plaintiff Joseph Yewaisis brought this wrongful termination action against

Defendants on February 27, 2025. (See ECF 1.) On July 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed the First Amended

Complaint. (ECF 25.) In the FAC, Plaintiff, the former Chief Operating Officer and later Chairman,

1 Defendants Sydney Colin Neill, Kelly Watson, Doris Hawkins, Teresa Soto Vega, Thomas Ramos, Bill Fenstemaker,

Joseph Garibaldi, IV, and William Jones are current or former members of the UCSB Board of Directors (the “UCSB

Board Members”). (See FAC ¶¶ 10-17.)

President, and Chief Executive Officer of UCSB, alleges that he was wrongfully terminated “after

exposing the Bank’s negligent, fraudulent, discriminatory, and financially reckless conduct.” (FAC

¶¶ 1, 8.) Plaintiff claims that UCSB’s Board of Directors, individually named as Defendants (id.

¶¶ 10-17), engaged in a scheme to conceal fraud and other misconduct and terminated Plaintiff in

retaliation for his refusal to participate in their scheme. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 28-49, 56-62, 75-79.) The FAC

asserts the following causes of action: breach of contract against UCSB (Count 1) (id. ¶¶ 80-104);

wrongful termination in violation of New Jersey’s Conscientious Employee Protection Act against

UCSB and the UCSB Board Members (Count 2) (id. ¶¶ 105-22); fraud and negligent

misrepresentation against UCSB and the UCSB Board Members (Count 3) (id. ¶¶ 123-68); civil

conspiracy against the UCSB Board Members (Count 4) (id. ¶¶ 169-179); and aiding and abetting

against the UCSB Board Members (Count 5) (id. ¶¶ 181-93). The FAC alleges that the Court has

federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. (Id. ¶ 6); and

WHEREAS on August 18, 2025, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). (ECF 29.) On September

16, 2025, Defendants filed a letter on the docket informing the Court that Plaintiff had not filed an

opposition to the Motion. (ECF 30.) On the same day, counsel for Plaintiff filed a letter stating his

understanding that the case would be dismissed without prejudice on jurisdictional grounds. (ECF

31.) On December 3, 2025, counsel for Plaintiff informed the Court that he would be withdrawing

from active practice and his pending matters. (ECF 32.) Although Plaintiff could have voluntarily

dismissed this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41—which would have led to

the same result without wasting the Court’s resources—Plaintiff’s counsel instead filed another

letter on the docket again requesting that the Court dismiss the case without prejudice for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. (ECF 34.) Plaintiff’s counsel has yet to withdraw from this matter; and

WHEREAS Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) permits a defendant to move at any

time to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on either facial or factual

grounds. See Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000). A facial

challenge asserts that “the complaint, on its face, does not allege sufficient grounds to establish

subject matter jurisdiction.” Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 438 (D.N.J. 1999)

(citing Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1997)). A factual

challenge, on the other hand, “attacks allegations underlying the assertion of jurisdiction in the

complaint, and it allows the defendant to present competing facts.” Hartig Drug Co. v. Senju

Pharm. Co., 836 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d

347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014)); and

WHEREAS Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss the FAC for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction because none of Plaintiff’s causes of action arise under federal law. (ECF 29-1,

“Defs. Br.” at 5-8.) The Court agrees. “In order to have subject matter jurisdiction, a District Court

must be able to exercise either diversity jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction.” Haiying Xi

v. Shengchun Lu, 226 F. App’x 189, 190 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332). The

plaintiff “bears the burden of proving that the federal court has jurisdiction.” McCracken v.

Murphy, 129 F. App’x 701, 702 (3d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).

WHEREAS federal question jurisdiction exists when a dispute “aris[es] under the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. As Defendants explain in

the Motion to Dismiss, although “Plaintiff peppers his First Amended Complaint with allegations

asserting that the UCSB Defendants violated various federal laws in support of his causes of action

arising under state law, [ ] no actual federal question is identified to be decided by this Court.” (Br.

at 5.) Plaintiff’s causes of action all arise under state law. (See generally FAC.) Thus, Plaintiff’s

claims do not “arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §

1331; see also Ben-Haim v. Avraham, No. 15-6669, 2016 WL 4621190, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 6, 2016)

(“As generally interpreted, a right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United

States must be an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff’s cause of action.” (quoting United

Jersey Banks v. Parell, 783 F.2d 360, 365 (3d Cir. 1986))); and

WHEREAS a district court also has original jurisdiction over an action when there is

diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Although Plaintiff alleges that subject matter

jurisdiction arises pursuant only to federal question jurisdiction (FAC ¶ 6), the Court briefly

addresses diversity jurisdiction. Diversity jurisdiction exists when there is a dispute between

citizens of different states alleging an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000. 28 U.S.C. §

1332. Plaintiff has not alleged his state of citizenship and does not allege that the Court has

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See Chem. Leaman Tank Lines v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,

177 F.3d 210, 222 n.13 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[I]n a diversity action, the plaintiff must state all parties’

citizenships such that the existence of complete diversity can be confirmed.”). Therefore, the Court

does not have diversity jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims; and

WHEREAS under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, a federal court may exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over state law claims if it has federal question or diversity jurisdiction. Because the

Court does not have original jurisdiction over any of Plaintiff’s claims, the Court likewise cannot

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. See Ben-Haim, 2016 WL 4621190, at

*5 (“[T]here must be an independent basis for federal jurisdiction before supplemental jurisdiction

may exist.” (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 554 (2005))).

Accordingly, IT IS on this 28th day of January 2026,

ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF 29) is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that the First Amended Complaint (ECF 25) is dismissed without prejudice

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is directed to close this matter.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Jamel K. Semper .

HON. JAMEL K. SEMPER

United States District Judge

Orig: Clerk

cc: Stacey D. Adams, U.S.M.J.

Parties

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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