Crawford

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

)

JANICE M. CRAWFORD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

)

v. ) No. 23-cv-02456-SHM-atc

)

PAMELA BONDI, ATTORNEY )

GENERAL, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Janice M. Crawford sues Defendant Pamela Bondi,

Attorney General of the United States of America, alleging a

claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-3(a). Before the Court is Defendant Pamela Bondi’s

Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 75.) For the reasons below,

the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion.

I. Background1

In July 2017, Plaintiff Janice M. Crawford applied for a

job as an administrative officer (“AO”) with the United States

1 In her response to Defendant’s statement of undisputed facts in

support of Defendant’s Motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff

submits no facts of her own. She only disputes some of Defendant’s

facts. (ECF No. 83-2.) The Court’s narrative relies on Defendant’s

Marshals Service (“USMS”) in Seattle, Washington (the “Seattle

Position”). (ECF Nos. 75 at 2 & ECF No. 83 at 2.) Plaintiff

interviewed for the Seattle Position with three people: Jacob

Green, the Selecting Official and Chief Deputy United States

Marshal; Charles Daniels, the Assistant Chief in the Office of

Compliance; and Grace McGrath, an Administrative Officer in

California. (Id.)

On September 11, 2017, Plaintiff was informed that she had

not received the Seattle Position. (ECF No. 83-2 at ¶ 50.)

Another applicant, Wilma Thompson, had been selected. (ECF Nos.

75 at 1 & 83 at 2.) In December 2018, Plaintiff filed an Equal

Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) claim after she was not selected

for a different, unrelated Property Management Specialist

position with the USMS. (ECF Nos. 83 at 2-3 & 83-2 at ¶ 59.)

While reviewing the Report of Investigation about that claim in

August 2019, Plaintiff represents that she, for the first time,

read an affidavit in which a USMS employee, Steven Moody, said

that Jacob Green learned of Plaintiff’s prior, unrelated EEO

claims and did not hire Plaintiff for the Seattle Position

because he “didn’t want to deal with that.” (the “Moody

Affidavit”) (ECF No. 83 at 3.)

statement of undisputed facts and on documents Plaintiff cites in

the record.

On September 6, 2019, Plaintiff filed an EEO claim alleging

retaliation by the USMS for protected activity under Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”) for failing to select her

for the Seattle Position. (ECF Nos. 75 at 11-12 & 83 at 10.)

Plaintiff represents that filing that claim “start[ed] the [EEO]

process.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s EEO claim was adjudicated by the

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”), which

made its Final Agency Decision on March 30, 2023. (ECF No. 1-3.)

In that decision, the EEOC rejected Plaintiff’s claim and

concluded that management had offered legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its hiring decision. (ECF No. 1-2

at 2.)

Plaintiff filed this case on July 31, 2023, in accordance

with the EEOC’s Final Agency Decision, which granted Plaintiff

the right to sue in the appropriate U.S. District Court. (ECF

No. 1.) On May 29, 2024, the Court denied Defendant’s motion to

dismiss (the “May 29 Order”). (ECF No. 17.) In its May 29 Order,

the Court equitably tolled the deadline for Plaintiff to initiate

contact with an EEO counselor based on the allegations in the

Complaint and determined that Plaintiff had adequately alleged

retaliation. (Id.)

Since the May 29 Order, the parties have conducted discovery

for more than a year. On August 20, 2025, Defendant filed the

pending Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 75.) Defendant

argues that the record now shows that Plaintiff is not entitled

to equitable tolling, and that, even if she were, no reasonable

jury could conclude that Plaintiff was retaliated against for

protected activity when she was not hired for the Seattle

Position. (ECF No. 75.) Plaintiff responds that she remains

entitled to equitable tolling based on the record and that the

case should go to trial. (ECF No. 83.)

II. Jurisdiction

Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over all

civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties

of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff brings a

claim under Title VII. (ECF No. 1.) The Court has original

federal question jurisdiction over that claim.

III. Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a court must

grant a party’s motion for summary judgment “if the movant shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). The moving party must show that the nonmoving party,

having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, lacks evidence

to support an essential element of its case. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c)(1); Peeples v. City of Detroit, 891 F.3d 622, 630 (6th

Cir. 2018). All inferences must be drawn in the light most

favorable to the nonmovant. Bledsoe v. Tenn. Valley Auth. Bd. of

Dirs., 42 F.4th 568, 578 (6th Cir. 2022).

“The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of

a genuine issue of material fact as to at least one essential

element of the non-moving party's case.” Kurtz v. Sec'y of Army,

No. 3:06-1209, 2009 WL 5066901, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 21, 2009),

aff'd sub nom. Kurtz v. McHugh, 423 F. App'x 572 (6th Cir. 2011)

(citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986)). Once

the moving party has satisfied its burden, the burden shifts to

the non-moving party to set forth “specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Guptill v. City of

Chattanooga, Tennessee, 160 F.4th 768, 776 (6th Cir. 2025)

(citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e))).

The Court “is not required to speculate on which portion of

the record the nonmoving party relies, nor is it obligated to

wade through and search the entire record for some specific facts

that might support the nonmoving party's claim.” InterRoyal Corp.

v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir. 1989).

Although summary judgment must be used carefully, it “is

‘an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are

designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive

determination of every action’ rather than a ‘disfavored

procedural shortcut.’” F.D.I.C. v. Jeff Miller Stables, 573 F.3d

289, 294 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327).

IV. Analysis: Equitable Tolling

A. Standard

Defendant argues that this case is time-barred because

Plaintiff did not diligently pursue her rights by timely

initiating contact with the EEOC. Plaintiff waited two years

after she learned she had not been hired for the Seattle Position

to initiate the EEO process by filing her EEO claim alleging

retaliation. (ECF No. 75 at 3-12.) Plaintiff does not dispute

Defendant’s timeline, but argues that she is entitled to

equitable tolling to allow her claim to proceed. (ECF No. 83 at

10-11.)

“A plaintiff who alleges that a federal agency has engaged

in race discrimination must initiate contact with an EEO

counselor within forty-five days of the date of the alleged

discriminatory act.” Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 330 (6th

Cir. 2007). This forty-five-day limitation is a prerequisite to

filing suit, but “it is subject to equitable tolling, waiver,

and estoppel.” Id.

As the Court noted in its May 29 Order denying Defendant’s

motion to dismiss, the forty-five-day clock began to run when

Plaintiff learned of the USMS’s decision not to hire her, not

when Plaintiff learned the decision might have been

discriminatorily motivated. (ECF No. 17 at 9.) Plaintiff learned

of the hiring decision on September 11, 2017, and did not

initiate contact until September 6, 2019, when she filed her EEO

claim to start the EEO process. (ECF Nos. 1 at 5 & 83-2 at ¶

50.) The Court must equitably toll Plaintiff’s deadline if the

case is to proceed.

“Equitable tolling is an issue of law suitable for

disposition on summary judgment.” Kurtz, 2009 WL 5066901, at *6

(citing Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486, 494 (6th Cir.2009)).

At the summary judgment stage, the decision to equitably toll

the limitation period for filing a charge of discrimination is

“within the discretion of the district court and should be made

on a case-by-base basis.” Black v. Columbus Pub. Schs., 211 F.

Supp. 2d 975, 981 (S.D. Ohio 2002), aff'd, 79 F. App'x 735 (6th

Cir. 2003).

Title VII and subsequent amendments are the exclusive

judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal

employment. Steiner v. Henderson, 354 F.3d 432, 434 (6th Cir.

2003). In allowing federal employees to sue under Title VII,

“Congress conditioned the government's waiver of sovereign

immunity upon a plaintiff's satisfaction of rigorous

administrative exhaustion requirements and time limitations.”

Steiner, 354 F.3d at 434–35 (citing McFarland v. Henderson, 307

F.3d 402, 406 (6th Cir.2002)). The Supreme Court has made clear

that tolling in a Title VII case should be allowed “only

sparingly.” Steiner, 354 F.3d at 435 (citing Irwin v. Dep't of

Veterans Affs., 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)). The “procedural

requirements established by Congress for gaining access to the

federal courts are not to be disregarded by courts out of a vague

sympathy for particular litigants.” Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr.

v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984).

Courts consider the following five nonexhaustive factors

when determining whether equitable tolling is appropriate in a

Title VII case: (1) lack of notice of the filing requirement;

(2) lack of constructive knowledge of the filing requirement;

(3) diligence in pursuing one's rights; (4) absence of prejudice

to the defendant; and (5) the plaintiff's reasonableness in

remaining ignorant of the particular legal requirement. Dixon,

481 F.3d at 331.

B. Application

1. Factors One, Two, and Five

Factors one, two, and five favor Defendant. Plaintiff has

nowhere argued that she lacked notice, knowledge, or constructive

knowledge of the filing or legal requirements for Title VII

claims in general or for this claim in particular. (ECF Nos. 1

& 83.) She timely initiated EOO counseling as a federal employee

in at least three other cases alleging Title VII violations

before this one. See Crawford v. Skinner, 35 F.3d 565, 1994 WL

443453 (6th Cir. Aug. 15, 1994) Crawford v. Winter, No. 08-2105

(W.D. Tenn.), (ECF No. 12-8); and Crawford v. Carter, No. 13-

2439 (W.D. Tenn.) (ECF No. 12-9). Prior experience with the EEO

process is sufficient to infer a plaintiff’s knowledge of the

relevant procedural requirements. Kurtz, 2009 WL 5066901, at *6

(“plaintiff therefore had experience with the EEO process and

direct contact with an EEO Officer before any of the alleged

incidents of retaliation took place. Because of this, it is

unreasonable that Plaintiff remained ignorant of the procedural

requirements of the EEO Office…and therefore the magistrate did

not err in refusing to apply equitable tolling of the filing

requirement”). Based on Plaintiff’s experience in prior cases,

the Court attributes relevant knowledge of the EEO process to

Plaintiff.

2. Factor Three

The parties’ arguments center on factors three and four.

Factor three addresses whether Plaintiff was diligent in pursuing

her rights. Plaintiff argues that she was diligent because she

“had no reason to believe that she [w]as [sic] the victim of

discrimination or reprisal at the time of her nonselection in

2017.” (ECF No. 83 at 10.) Plaintiff filed an EEO claim to begin

the EEO process about the Seattle Position a few days after she

read the Moody Affidavit. Therefore, Plaintiff argues that she

diligently pursued her rights. (Id. at 10-11.) The Court agreed

with Plaintiff when it denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss and

equitably tolled the filing deadline. (ECF No. 17.)

Defendant argues that the record, as it has developed since

the dismissal stage, should change the Court’s prior conclusion.

(ECF No. 75 at 6-7.) First, Defendant shows that Plaintiff was

generally suspicious about potential retaliation as of April 25,

2017, when Plaintiff told the union president that Plaintiff

“may be getting retaliated against” based on a desk audit. (ECF

No. 83-2 ¶ 49.) That occurred three months before Plaintiff

interviewed for the Seattle Position (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Second,

Defendant shows that, when Plaintiff “did her interview, she

thought she did well, and she was being told that she did well,

but was not selected,” as Plaintiff stated to the EEO

investigator later on. (ECF No. 83-2 at ¶ 50.) Defendant also

shows that two or three weeks after Plaintiff’s interview,

another employee told Plaintiff that he gave her a “good

recommendation” for the Seattle Position.2 (ECF No. 83-2 at ¶

51.) Defendant shows that a different employee said he was

2 Plaintiff appears to dispute whether that employee, Brian Sanders,

actually gave Plaintiff a positive recommendation. (ECF No. 83-2 at

21.) Any such objection is not relevant here, because whether

Sanders gave a positive recommendation and whether Green considered

it does not change what Sanders told Plaintiff. The Court does not

consider Sanders’ statement for the truth of the matter asserted,

but for its effect on the listener, Plaintiff.

“shocked” when Plaintiff was not selected. (ECF No. 75-34 at 1.)3

None of that evidence was in the record or otherwise before the

Court for consideration at the dismissal stage.

Defendant argues that many things have emerged in the record

that should have alerted Plaintiff to the possibility that she

was being retaliated against before she learned of the Moody

Affidavit. Defendant argues that these new facts show that

Plaintiff did not diligently pursue her rights.

The Court said in its May 29 Order denying Defendant’s

motion to dismiss that there were two questions to consider in

deciding Plaintiff’s diligence: whether Plaintiff diligently

sought the information necessary to learn whether she should

consider an EEO action and whether Plaintiff diligently initiated

contact with an EEO employee after being put on notice that she

had a potential claim. (ECF No. 17 at 13) (citing Amini v.

Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 499 (6th Cir. 2001)).

Here, Plaintiff did not seek information about the Seattle

AO employment decision until after she had read the Moody

Affidavit, nearly two years after she learned she had not been

3 Defendant also cites other evidence in the record surrounding a

different EEO complaint Plaintiff was considering filing about a

different position. (ECF No. 75 at 8-9.) Although that evidence

might show a generally litigious disposition on the part of

Plaintiff, it does not necessarily show that she could or should

have suspected retaliation when she was not selected for the Seattle

Position.

hired for the Seattle Position. (ECF No. 83 at 10.) In its May

29 Order, the Court, considering a motion to dismiss, reasoned

that “it is difficult to determine how Plaintiff could have

surmised that her non-selection was retaliatory.” (ECF No. 17 at

15.) The evidence that has emerged in the record now shows that

Plaintiff was or should have been on notice that there was the

possibility she was subject to retaliation. Plaintiff testified

that “she thought she did well, and she was being told that she

did well, but was not selected.” (ECF No. 83-2 at ¶ 50.) Two or

three weeks after her interview—and well within the 45-day period

to initiate contact with an EEO counselor—another employee told

Plaintiff that he had given her a good recommendation for the

Seattle Position. (ECF No. 83-2 at ¶ 51.) Other employees were

“shocked” that Plaintiff had not been selected. (ECF No. 75-34

at 1.) These facts combine to show that Plaintiff could have

surmised that her non-selection was retaliatory and that she was

not diligent in pursuing her rights. Although Plaintiff later

discovered additional evidence of potential discrimination, that

information was not critical to initiating the EEO process in

the initial 45-day period. “A plaintiff need not know all the

facts of [her] case in order to comply with Title VII's

administrative exhaustion requirement.” Tenenbaum v. Caldera,

45 F. App'x 416, 421 (6th Cir. 2002).

Other courts have equitably tolled the deadline for a Title

VII claim when the plaintiff has lacked information critical to

her case. See Dixon, 481 F.3d at 330 and Seay v. Tenn. Valley

Auth., 339 F.3d 454, 469 (6th Cir.2003). In those cases, however,

“the defendant withheld information or provided misleading

information that plaintiff needed to raise a suspicion that the

defendant's actions were motivated by discrimination or

retaliation.” Taylor v. Donahoe, 452 F. App'x 614, 618 (6th

Cir. 2011) (describing Dixon and Seay). There, “the period was

tolled, but only until [plaintiff] was aware of the possibility

that he had suffered an adverse employment action because of

illegal discrimination.” Taylor, 452 F. App'x at 618. Dixon

and Seay are inapplicable here, where there is no allegation of

employer wrongdoing in withholding information or providing

misleading information.

“To successfully raise a claim of equitable tolling, a party

must show either fraudulent concealment of the critical facts

that would lead one to know that [she] can sue, or a

misrepresentation of those facts—whether made in good faith or

not—that was calculated to induce a plaintiff to forego the right

to sue.” Tenenbaum, 45 F. App'x at 421 (cleaned up). Plaintiff

does not argue that she was prevented or hindered from inquiring

or accessing evidence about her case. Although it was possible

that concealment or misrepresentation would emerge in the record

during discovery after the dismissal stage, the record does not

contain any such evidence.

Because Plaintiff was aware of the possibility that she had

suffered an adverse employment action motivated by illegal

discrimination when she learned she had not been hired for the

Seattle Position, and because there is no evidence or allegation

of employer concealment or misrepresentation that prevented

Plaintiff from pursuing her rights, Dixon and Seay are

distinguishable. Plaintiff did not diligently pursue her rights.

As the Sixth Circuit held in Amini, courts “will not, absent

other circumstances weighing in favor of equitable tolling,

suspend the running of the statute of limitations in a

discrimination action until the plaintiff learns sufficient

facts that would lead [her] to suspect that the defendant acted

with discriminatory intent.” 259 F.3d at 502. There are no

such circumstances here. Factor three favors Defendant.

3. Factor Four

Factor four addresses prejudice to the defendant. “The

Supreme Court has held that the absence of prejudice to the

defendant employer ‘is not an independent basis for invoking the

doctrine and sanctioning deviations from established

procedures.’” Steiner, 354 F.3d at 437 (citing Baldwin Cnty.

Welcome Ctr., 466 U.S. at 152. “Although absence of prejudice

is a factor to be considered in determining whether the doctrine

of equitable tolling should apply once a factor that might

justify tolling is identified, it is not an independent basis

for invoking the doctrine.” Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks

Museum of Art, Inc., 209 F.3d 552, 562 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing

Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146, 151 (6th Cir.1988)). “Prejudice

may only be considered if other factors of the test are met [by

the plaintiff] and therefore can only weigh in [the defendant’s]

favor.” 3799 Mill Run Partners, LLC v. City of Hilliard, Ohio,

839 F. App'x 948, 951 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Townsend v. Soc.

Sec. Admin., 486 F.3d 127, 132 (6th Cir. 2007)).

“Prejudice for purposes of the doctrine of equitable tolling

means the disposal of evidence and the inaccessibility of

witnesses, the dimming of recollections and other disadvantages

incident to the lapse of time.” Monnheimer v. Nielsen, No.

1:08CV356, 2008 WL 5333808, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 19, 2008)

(citing Salins v. City of Dayton, 624 F.Supp. 632, 634 (S.D.Ohio

1985)).

The Court need not consider prejudice to Defendant because

no other factor favors Plaintiff. Courts have denied requests

for equitable tolling even when no prejudice to the defendant

had been shown. See, e.g. Steiner, 354 F.3d at 437; Graham-

Humphreys, 209 F.3d at 562; Garrett v. Structured Cabling Sys.,

Inc., No. CIV. 10-55-DLB, 2010 WL 3862994, at *12 (E.D. Ky. Sept.

28, 2010); and Amini, 259 F.3d at 502

Nevertheless, factor four favors Defendant. At the

dismissal stage, Defendant did not show and made no argument

attempting to show that she would be prejudiced by the Court’s

equitably tolling Plaintiff’s deadline to initiate the EEO

process. (ECF No. 17 at 15.) Defendant argues now that she was

prejudiced by Plaintiff’s delay in two ways. First, Defendant

argues that her access to witnesses was hindered, because three

employee witnesses had left the USMS by January 2020, four months

after Plaintiff first sought EEO counseling in September 2019.

(ECF Nos. 75 at 11 & 83-2 at ¶ 60.) Plaintiff does not address

this argument.4 The two-year delay in initiating the EEO process

meant that Defendant had more difficulty accessing witnesses.

Second, Defendant cites witnesses’ memory loss caused by

the two-year delay. (ECF No. 75 at 11-12.) Defendant accurately

cites the deposition testimony of Jacob Green, Eddie Laster, and

Steve Moody that shows a failure of memory about certain events

and details. (ECF No. 75 at 11-12.) Green ascribed his difficulty

recalling events to the passage of time. (ECF No. 75-2 at 29).

Moody testified that the fact he was deposed after his June 2022

retirement affected his ability to recall key events.5 (ECF No.

4 Plaintiff incorrectly asserts that “the only prejudice the

Defendant can point to deals with witness recollection.” (ECF No. 83

at 11.)

5 Moody’s subsequent declaration, submitted by Plaintiff in her

response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, clarifies some,

75-7 at 5.) Laster, at his deposition, also implied that the

passage of time had hindered his ability to recall events. (ECF

No. 75-18 at 33-34.)

Memory naturally fades with time, and it is impossible to

say definitively whether a witness’s memory would be better

absent Plaintiff’s two-year delay. A witness’s faded memory

might also be due in part to the fact that the case had to

proceed through an administrative process before reaching this

Court. (ECF No. 1-2.) Plaintiff argues that these lapses in

memory occurred in response to questions that strategically favor

Defendant. (ECF No. 83 at 11-13). However, the Court must

consider the fact that three key witnesses attributed their lack

of memory to the passage of time, potentially prejudicing

Defendant and hindering the case, given Plaintiff’s two-year

delay in initiating the EEO process.

The heightened difficulty of accessing witnesses and the

fading memory of other witnesses prejudice Defendant.

4. There Are No Extenuating Circumstances

All of the factors weigh against equitable tolling in this

case. Plaintiff knew the procedures for initiating the EEO

process, she suspected or should have suspected she was

potentially being retaliated against when she was not selected

but not all, of the gaps Defendant cites in Moody’s memory during

his deposition. (ECF No. 83-1.)

for the Seattle Position, and Defendant would be prejudiced by

Plaintiff’s two-year delay in initiating the process. Even in

the absence of prejudice to Defendant, equitable tolling would

be inappropriate.

Because the Dixon factors are “not exhaustive, and equitable

tolling is decided on a case-by-case basis, this inquiry must

consider any additional, relevant factors.” Garrett, 2010 WL

3862994 at *12. The parties have cited no additional factors,

and the Court finds none relevant here.

V. Conclusion

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. After

full consideration of the record, the Court finds that all of

the Dixon factors weigh against equitably tolling Plaintiff’s

filing deadline. Because Plaintiff did not initiate the EEO

process within forty-five days after learning she had not been

hired for the Seattle Position, the retaliation and reprisal

claim is time-barred and dismissed WITH PREJUDICE.

So ordered this 11th day of February, 2026.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.

SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE