O'Brien

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 25-cv-24393-BLOOM/Elfenbein

ROBERTA BOBBIE O’BRIEN, MICHAEL

O’BRIEN, MYCHAEL O’BRIEN LABRECQUE,

MICHAEL LABRECQUE, and MEGHAN O’BRIEN,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES LTD., d/b/a

Royal Caribbean Group, and CAPTAIN

JOHNNY FAEVELEN,

Defendants.

___________________________________________/

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant Royal Caribbean Cruises LTD.’s (Royal

Caribbean) Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”), ECF No. [15]. Plaintiff Meghan O’Brien filed a

Response in Opposition (“Response”), ECF No. [17]. Plaintiffs Roberta Bobbie O’Brien, Michael

O’Brien, Mychael O’Brien Labrecque, and Michael Labrecque adopt and join Meghan O’Brien’s

Response, ECF No. [27]. Royal Caribbean filed a Reply in Support (“Reply”), ECF No. [20]. The

Court has reviewed the Motions, the supporting and opposing submissions, the record, and is

otherwise fully advised. For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 25, 2022, Plaintiffs were passengers on board Royal Caribbean’s Harmony of

the Seas cruise ship. ECF No. [1]. On the morning of September 30, 2022, Roberta Bobbie O’Brien

began experiencing flu-like symptoms. Id. ¶ 74. After reporting her symptoms to staff, Roberta

Bobbie O’Brien was directed to the infirmary where she was tested only for COVID-19, despite

her “respiratory symptoms”. Id. ¶¶ 74-75. Throughout the afternoon of September 30, 2022,

Roberta Bobbie O’Brien’s condition worsened as her throat began to swell shut, “constricting her

airway and eliminating her ability to speak or swallow the prescribed oral medications.” Id. ¶ 76.

Michael O’Brien called the infirmary to report his wife’s worsening condition and was informed,

“there was nothing more that the infirmary or its staff could do.” Id. At that point, Meghan O’Brien

disembarked to Royal Caribbean’s private port facility in Labadee, Haiti to seek out “over the

counter” medication. Meghan O’Brien could not source any medication either at the private port

or on the Harmony of the Seas. Id. ¶¶ 77-78.

During the night of September 30, 2022, Meghan O’Brien observed her mother Roberta Bobbie

O’Brien’s breathing become “severely labored”. She called the ship’s emergency line throughout

the night and received no answer. ¶ 81. On the morning of October 1, 2022, Roberta Bobbie

O’Brien’s throat has swollen “completely shut” and the infirmary agreed to see her. Id. ¶ 83. The

infirmary lacked functional diagnostic equipment. The medical staff resorted to blind treatment

and administered injections for allergic reactions and pain, not respiratory infections. Id. ¶ 84. As

such, Roberta Bobbie O’Brien’s bacterial pneumonia went undiagnosed and untreated. Id.

By the evening of October 1, 2022, Roberta Bobbie O’Brien had not consumed water for nearly

24 hours and was again transported to the infirmary due to her “severe dehydration and need for

intravenous fluids.” Id. ¶ 85. While transported, a senior Royal Caribbean officer observed Roberta

Bobbie O’Brien’s condition, inquired about her health, but ultimately took no action. Id. ¶ 86. At

the infirmary, Roberta Bobbie O’Brien was “documented in severe respiratory distress.” Id. ¶ 89.

Dr. Flores informed the family she suspected Roberta Bobbie O’Brien was suffering from “acute

pneumonia, lung abscess, or severe infection,” but could not confirm because the ship’s x-ray and

diagnostic machines were not working. Id. ¶ 91. On October 2, 2022, Roberta Bobbie O’Brien

finally disembarked and was transported by ambulance to Cape Canaveral Hospital. Id. ¶¶ 103,

105. At the hospital, Roberta Bobbie O’Brien was diagnosed with “bilateral pneumonia with

prolonged hypoxic respiratory failure and dangerously elevated C-reactive protein levels

indicating severe systemic inflammation.” Id. ¶ 105. As such, Roberta Bobbie O’Brien required

“nearly a week of hospitalization in an isolation unit in order to recover from what should have

been a treatable condition if diagnosed promptly.” Id. ¶ 107.

On September 24, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint alleging willful and wanton

negligence against Royal Caribbean (Count I), willful and wanton negligence against Captain

Johnny Faevelen (Count II), vicarious liability of Royal Caribbean for the willful and wanton

negligence of Captain Johnny Faevelen (Count III), willful and wanton negligence against Royal

Caribbean for failure to provide medical evacuation (Count IV), willful and wanton negligence

against Captain Johnny Faevelen for failure to provide medical evacuation (Count V), vicarious

liability against Royal Caribbean for willful and wanton negligence in failing to provide medical

evacuation (Count VI), gross negligence against Royal Caribbean for comprehensive medical

facility failures (Count VII), negligence against Royal Caribbean under general maritime law

(Count VIII), and negligent infliction of emotional distress against Royal Caribbean (Count IX-

XII).

Royal Caribbean moves to dismiss and argues the claims are time-barred by the limitation

terms and conditions set forth in the Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines ticket contract. ECF No. [15]

at 5. In the alternative, even if the case is not time-barred, Plaintiffs have failed to state any claim

upon which relief can be granted. Id. at 11, 16. Plaintiffs respond that the one-year contractual

limitation is unenforceable because Royal Caribbean’s violations voided the cruise ticket contract.

ECF No. [17] at 8.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss

A pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual

allegations,” it must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, (2007);

see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading standard

“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”).

Additionally, a complaint may not rest on “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual

enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “Factual allegations

must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. If

the facts satisfy the elements of the claims asserted, a defendant's motion to dismiss must be

denied. Id. at 556.

When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court, as a general rule, must accept the plaintiff's

allegations as true and evaluate all plausible inferences derived from those facts in favor of the

plaintiff. See Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012); AXA Equitable

Life Ins. Co. v. Infinity Fin. Grp., LLC, 608 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (“On a motion

to dismiss, the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all

facts alleged by the non-moving party are accepted as true.”). A court considering a Rule 12(b)

motion is generally limited to the facts contained in the complaint and attached exhibits, including

documents referred to in the complaint that are central to the claim. See Wilchombe v. TeeVee

Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009). While the court is required to accept as true all

allegations contained in the complaint, courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiffs’ Claims are Time-Barred by the Ticket Contract

Courts will enforce a limitations period contained in a cruise ticket contract which limits the

time frame in which an injured passenger may file suit if the “contract provided the passenger with

reasonably adequate notice that the limit existed and formed part of the passenger contract.” Nash

v. Kloster Cruise A/S, 901 F.2d 1565, 1566 (11th Cir. 1990). In the Eleventh Circuit, this standard

is applied using the “reasonable communicativeness” test. See Estate of Myhra v. Royal Caribbean

Cruises, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1233, 1244 (11th Cir. 2012) (applying the reasonable communicativeness

test to a cruise ticket contract); Krenkel v. Kerzner Int'l Hotels Ltd., 579 F.3d 1279, 1281 (11th

Cir. 2009) (applying same to guest hotel contract). The test requires a two-pronged analysis of the

physical characteristics of the clause in question and plaintiff's opportunity to review and

understand the contract terms. Id. Thus, “[t]he reasonable communicativeness test involves ‘an

analysis of the overall circumstances ... of the ticket itself, but also of any extrinsic factors

indicating the passenger's ability to become meaningfully informed of the contractual terms at

stake.’” Lankford v. Carnival Corp., No. 12-24408-CIV, 2013 WL 12064497, at *4 (S.D. Fla. June

18, 2013) (quoting Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 835 (9th Cir. 2002)). “Whether

the notice to passengers was reasonably adequate is a question of law.” Nash, 901 F.2d at 1567

(citations omitted).

Under the first prong, the Court examines the term's physical characteristics, such as typeface,

conspicuousness, and clarity, to determine whether the term is reasonably presented to the

passenger. Myhra, 695 F.3d at 1245-46 (citing Wallis, 306 F.3d at 885-36 and Spataro v. Kloster

Cruise, Ltd., 894 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1990)); see also Roberts v. Carnival, 824 F. App'x 825, 828

(11th Cir. 2020) (“The first factor is limited to a review of the contract itself.”).

Under the second prong, the Court examines whether the passenger “had the ability to become

meaningfully informed of the clause and to reject its terms.” Myhra, 695 F.3d at 1246. This

analysis includes the circumstances surrounding the passenger's purchase of the ticket, the

passenger's ability and incentive to become familiar with its terms, and any other notice that the

passenger received outside of the ticket. Id. (quoting Wallis, 306 F.3d at 836); see also Lankford,

2013 WL 12064497, at *4. Importantly, the second prong of the reasonable communicative test

does not require a court to determine whether the passenger actually read the contract term in

question; rather, the relevant inquiry is whether the passenger had reasonable opportunity to review

that term. See Roberts, 824 F. App'x 828 (“[W]hether Roberts read ‘the terms and conditions is

not relevant to the reasonable communicativeness inquiry.” (citation omitted)); Myhra, 695 F.3d

at 1246 n.42 (“We note that whether the [plaintiffs] chose to avail themselves of the notices and

to read the terms and conditions is not relevant to the reasonable communicativeness inquiry.”

(citation omitted)); Kirby v. NCL (Bah.) Ltd., No. 10-23723-CV, 2010 WL 11556551, at *1 (S.D.

Fla. Dec. 28, 2010) (“[I]t is well settled that the issue is not whether a passenger has read its ticket,

but instead whether the passenger had the opportunity to read its ticket.” (collecting cases)).

The second prong may be satisfied by constructive notice when a reasonable opportunity to

become meaningfully informed of the contract term is provided to the passenger's agent who books

travel arrangements on the passenger's behalf. McArthur v. Kerzner Int'l Bah. Ltd., 607 F. App'x

845, 847-48 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[B]ecause the [plaintiffs’] trip involved travel arrangements made

by the travel agent, they are charged with constructive notice of the terms and conditions in the

contract the travel agent had with the [resort].”); Kirby, 2010 WL 11556551, at *1 (noting “[c]ourts

have even held that a travel agent's possession of the ticket is sufficient to charge passengers with

constructive notice of the ticket provisions” (citing Gomez v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, 964

F. Supp. 47, 50-51 (D.P.R. 1997); Hicks v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 1995 A.M.C. 281, 288–89

(E.D. Pa. 1994); Shankles v. Costa Armatori, S.P.A., 722 F. 2d 861, 863-64 (1st Cir. 1983))).

i. First Prong – Review of Contract

Here, the Ticket Contract, the validity of which is not in dispute, contains large, bold, capital

letters informing the passenger:

YOU ARE ESPECIALLY DIRECTED TO CAREFULLY READ AND

UNDERSTAND SECTIONS 3, AND 10 THROUGH 12, AS THEY CONTAIN

SIGNIFICANT LIMITATIONS ON YOUR RIGHTS TO ASSERT CLAIMS

FOR PERSONAL INJURIES, ILLNESS OR DEATH, AND BAGGAGE AND

PERSONAL PROPERTY LOSS OR DAMAGE, AGAINST CARRIER, THE

VESSEL, RELATED ENTITIES AND THEIR OFFICERS, AGENTS AND

EMPLOYEES, INCLUDING TIME LIMITS AND FORUM FOR CLAIMS

AND SUITS, APPLICABLE LAW, ARBITRATION, AND WAIVER OF

JURY TRIAL, CLASS ACTIONS AND IN REM PROCEEDINGS.

ECF No. [15-1] at 12. Paragraph 11 of the Ticket Contract states:

WITHIN SIX (6) MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE INJURY, ILLNESS OR

DEATH AND SUIT IS COMMENCED (FILED) WITHIN ONE (1) YEAR FROM

THE DATE OF SUCH INJURY, ILLNESS OR DEATH AND PROCESS

SERVED WITHIN 120 DAYS AFTER FILING, NOTWITHSTANDING ANY

PROVISION OF LAW OF ANY STATE OR COUNTRY TO THE CONTRARY.

To that end, Plaintiffs do not argue they lacked reasonably adequate notice, but rather that three

“independent grounds void the contractual limitation period.” ECF No. [17] at 9.

First, Plaintiffs argue Royal Caribbean materially breached the Ticket Contract by violating

46 U.S.C. §3509’s “mandatory equipment standards.” ECF No. [17] at 10. As such, Plaintiffs argue

that “[u]nder basic contract principles, a party that materially breaches a contract cannot enforce

provisions favorable only to itself.” Id. However, as Royal Caribbean points out, “[t]here is no

case or statutory law cited by Plaintiff to support that any alleged violation of this statute would

void a limitations provision in a ticket contract.” ECF No. [20] at 9.

Second, Plaintiffs argue the contract is void ab initio because Royal Caribbean was

“actively violating 46 U.S.C. §3509 at the moment of formation.” ECF No. [17] at 10. Again,

Plaintiffs fail to cite to any case law or statute to support their claim that the alleged violation of

46 U.S.C. §3509 would void the entirety of the Ticket Contract.

Finally, Plaintiffs argue the contract is void for fraudulent inducement. ECF No. [17] at 11.

Specifically, Plaintiffs claim Royal Caribbean’s eMuster “directed passengers to medical facilities

while concealing the catastrophic medical failures” and “affirmatively misrepresent[ed] the ship's

medical capabilities.” Id. at 12. As such, Plaintiffs argue that had they known the truth, they would

have disembarked. Id. Once again, Plaintiffs fail to provide case law to support their theory that

the Ticket Contract “did not execute until the Harmony departed at 5:00 PM on September 25,

2022.” Id. at 11. Rather, the Ticket Contract states, “Purchase or use of this Ticket Contract,

whether or not signed by the Passenger, shall constitute the agreement by Passenger, on behalf of

himself and all other persons traveling under this Ticket Contract.” ECF No. [15-1] at 12. As such,

the contract was formed prior to the alleged fraudulent statements.

In sum, the Court finds Plaintiffs had reasonably adequate notice of the one-year limitation

period contained within the Ticket Contract and therefore, this action is time-barred. Because this

case is time-barred, the Court need not reach Royal Caribbean’s arguments that Plaintiffs have

failed to state claims upon which relief can be granted.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Defendant’s Motion, ECF No. [15], is GRANTED;

2. This case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

3. The Clerk is DIRECTED to CLOSE this case.

Case No. 25-cv-24393-BLOOM/Elfenbein

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, ebruary 9, 2026.

BETH BLOOM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ce:

counsel of record

Roberta Bobbie O'Brien

212 Whitestone Drive

Canton, GA 30115

PRO SE

Michael O'Brien

212 Whitestone Drive

Canton, GA 30115

PRO SE

Mychael O'Brien Labrecque

212 Whitestone Drive

Canton, GA 30115

PRO SE

Michael Labrecque

212 Whitestone Drive

Canton, GA 30115

PRO SE

Meghan O'Brien

212 Whitestone Drive

Canton, GA 30115

PRO SE