Opinion

In Re: S.H.A., Appeal of: K.L.A.

Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Filed: Feb 11, 2026
Status: Unpublished
Author: Kunselman
On the bench: Kunselman
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 38.5%

“It is well-settled that this Court will not review a claim unless it is developed in the argument section of an appellant’s brief, and supported by citations to relevant authority.” (citation omitted)

How later courts described this case

“It is well-settled that this Court will not review a claim unless it is developed in the argument section of an appellant’s brief, and supported by citations to relevant authority.” (citation omitted)
“In cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the - 20 - J-S43014-25 J-S43015-25 parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.” (citation omitted)
“In cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.” (citation omitted)
the focus of Section 2511(a) is the conduct of the parent, whereas the focus of Section 2511(b) is the best interests of the child

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN RE: S.H.A., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: K.L.A., MOTHER :

: No. 1942 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Decree Entered July 8, 2025

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Orphans' Court at No(s):

A2025-0007

IN RE: S.H.A., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: A.T.A., FATHER :

: No. 1997 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Decree Entered July 8, 2025

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Orphans' Court at No(s):

A2025-0007

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 11, 2026

In these matters, K.L.A. (Mother) and A.T.A. (Father) appeal from the

decrees that terminated their parental rights to their now over two-year-old

son, S.H.A. (the Child or Child), pursuant to the Adoption Act. See 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b). Because each parent’s

appeal raises substantially the same issues and involves the same facts and

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circumstances, we address the parents’ appeals together in one decision.

After review, we affirm.

We discern the following factual and procedural history from the

orphans’ court’s opinion. In October 2023, while Mother was pregnant with

the Child, Mother and Father traveled from Lehigh County to Philadelphia to

buy illegal drugs. On the way, Mother went into labor and had an emergency

c-section in Philadelphia.

At his birth, the Child and Mother tested positive for several illicit

substances. Mother told medical staff she had been using two to three bags

of heroin daily, which was a reduction due to her concern that the drugs would

impact the Child. Mother was fearful that if she went through withdrawal while

pregnant, the Child would suffer. Within a few days after his birth, it became

obvious that the Child was drug-impacted. He was placed in the NICU. While

the Child was hospitalized, Mother and Father visited him only a handful of

times, with the last visit being on October 24, 2023. Conversely, a foster

family began visiting the Child daily. The Child was discharged into the foster

family’s care in November 2023, five and a half weeks after he was born, and

he has remained there ever since.

The Child was adjudicated dependent. Mother’s court-ordered

recommendations included: submitting urinalysis to show sobriety as

recommended by the Lehigh County Office of Children and Youth Services (the

Agency); completing a drug and alcohol evaluation and any treatment

recommended; and obtaining and maintaining legal income and stable

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housing. Father’s court-ordered recommendations included: submitting

urinalysis to show sobriety as recommended by the Agency; obtaining and

maintaining legal income and stable housing; and notifying the Agency of any

changes in his address or contact information.

Over the next fourteen months, Mother and Father failed to comply with

their court-ordered recommendations and did not maintain contact with the

Agency or the Child. On February 7, 2025, the Agency filed petitions to

involuntarily terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. The orphans’

court held a termination hearing on April 23, 2025. 1 Two Agency caseworkers,

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1 The Child was represented by counsel at the termination hearing who also

served as the Child’s guardian ad litem (GAL) in the dependency proceedings.

Our Supreme Court has mandated that appellate courts sua sponte “verify

that the orphans’ court indicated that the attorney [in a dual role of GAL and

legal counsel] could represent the child’s best interests and legal interests

without conflict.” In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1236 (Pa.

2020); see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a). Counsel representing a child’s legal

interests must advocate for the child’s preferred outcome even if counsel does

not agree with it, whereas the GAL representing a child’s best interests must

express what the GAL “believes is best for the child’s care, protection, safety,

and wholesome physical and mental development regardless of whether the

child agrees.” In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1082 n.2 (Pa. 2018) (citation

omitted).

Here, the record does not contain clear findings by the trial court regarding

whether a conflict existed between the Child’s legal and best interests.

However, the Child was a little over a year and a half old at the time of the

termination hearing, and there is record evidence that he was still learning to

speak and had a limited vocabulary. See N.T., 4/23/25, at 68, 75, 77, 81;

Recommendations – Permanency Review, 3/19/24, 9/12/24, 2/25/25 (noting

that the Child was too young to express his views). Given the Child’s young

age and his stage of development, it would have been impossible to ascertain

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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a foster care adoption case manager, and Mother testified. On July 8, 2025,

the orphans’ court involuntarily terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental

rights to the Child.

Mother and Father timely filed these appeals. We will address Mother’s

appeal first. Mother presents the following two issues 2 for our review:

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his preferred outcome. Thus, there could not have been a conflict between

the Child’s interests, and dual representation was appropriate. See T.S., 192

A.3d at 1088 (recognizing that “where a child is too young to express a

preference, it would be appropriate for the GAL to represent the child’s best

and legal interests simultaneously.” (citation omitted)).

Nevertheless, we remind the orphans’ court and all counsel that the orphans’

court is required to determine whether counsel can represent the dual

interests of a child before appointing an individual to serve as GAL/counsel

for the child. See K.M.G., supra. The orphans’ court is not permitted to

delegate this responsibility to counsel. See Matter of Adoption of A. C. M.,

333 A.3d 704, 708-09 (Pa. Super. 2025). As a best practice, when a child is

too young to express a preference, the orphans’ court should indicate this in

the order appointing the GAL as the child’s legal counsel for the termination

proceeding.

2 Mother’s Appellate Rule 1925(b) statement raises approximately six issues,

none of which directly match the issues she lists in her brief. See Mother’s

Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal. Two of her issues

broadly challenge the termination by stating that it was not supported by

sufficient evidence and that the Agency had not met its burden of proof. See

id. Although her next three issues do not specifically cite which statutory

subsections she is challenging, we surmise from the language used that they

refer to Section 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8). See id. Mother’s sixth issue cites

Section 2511(a)(8) and (b). See id. However, none of Mother’s issues

specifically cite Section 2511(a)(1) or use the language from that subsection.

See id.

We remind and caution Mother and her counsel that, pursuant to Appellate

Rule 1925(b), issues “not included in the Statement and/or not raised in

accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.” Pa.R.A.P.

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its

discretion in finding that the Lehigh County Office of

Children and Youth Services met the requirements of 23

Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5) and (a)(8) by clear

and convincing evidence?

2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its

discretion in finding that the Lehigh County Office of

Children and Youth Services sustained their burden of

proof by clear and convincing evidence that the

termination of biological parent’s’ parental rights to [the

Child] best met the needs and welfare of the Child as

required by 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(b)?

Mother’s Brief at 4 (cleaned up) (numbering added) (excess capitalization and

suggested answers omitted).

We begin with our well-settled standard of review:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights

cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact

and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are

supported by the record. If the factual findings are

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial

court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A

decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only

upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court’s

decision, however, should not be reversed merely because

the record would support a different result. We have

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that

often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning

multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks

omitted).

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1925(b)(4)(vii). Nevertheless, because a challenge to (a)(1) is derivative of

the broader issues included in her concise statement, our appellate review

was not impeded. Thus, we decline to find waiver in this instance.

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Our Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that in termination cases,

deference to the trial court is particularly crucial. In re Adoption of L.A.K.,

265 A.3d 580, 597 (Pa. 2021); see also Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108,

1124 (Pa. 2021) (“When a trial court makes a ‘close call’ in a fact-intensive

case involving . . . the termination of parental rights, the appellate court

should review the record for an abuse of discretion and for whether evidence

supports that trial court’s conclusions; the appellate court should not search

the record for contrary conclusions or substitute its judgment for that of the

trial court.”). The abuse-of-discretion standard in termination cases “is a

highly deferential standard and, to the extent that the record supports the

court’s decision, we must affirm even though evidence exists that would also

support a contrary determination.” In re P.Z., 113 A.3d 840, 849 (Pa. Super.

2015) (citation omitted); see also T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. Furthermore, the

“trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and

is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in

the evidence.” In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation

omitted).

Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that is so “clear, direct,

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re

C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of

Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)).

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Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only

if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants

termination of his or her parental rights does the court

engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to

Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of

the child . . . .

In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 261-62 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted);

see also Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 830 (Pa. Super. 2022).

Instantly, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s rights under Section

2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b). As we may affirm under any of

the subsections of Section 2511(a), we review the court’s decision as to

Section 2511(a)(1). That subsection provides:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the

following grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the

petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or

failed to perform parental duties.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1).

Here, the termination petitions were filed on February 7, 2025; thus,

the statutory timeframe to examine Mother’s actions began on August 7,

2024. Our Supreme Court has reinforced “the view that the six-month period

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immediately preceding the filing of the petition is the most critical period to

evaluate for affirmative conduct or its absence . . . .” In re Adoption of

C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 367 (Pa. 2021) (citation omitted) (some emphasis in

original). “The trial court must examine the individual circumstances of each

case and consider all of the explanations of the parent to decide if the

evidence, under the totality of the circumstances, requires involuntary

termination.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 10 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citing In re

B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 872 A.2d 1200

(Pa. 2005)).

Regarding parental duties, we have explained that:

There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties.

Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of

a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and

support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be

met by a merely passive interest in the development of the

child. Thus, . . . the parental obligation is a positive duty

which requires affirmative performance.

B.,N.M., 856 A.2d at 855 (citation omitted).

Furthermore,

Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with

good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every

problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship

to the best of his or her ability, even in difficult

circumstances. A parent must utilize all available resources

to preserve the parental relationship, and must exercise

reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path

of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights

are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or

convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities

while others provide the child with [the child’s] physical and

emotional needs.

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Id. (internal citations omitted).

Once a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights or a failure to

perform parental duties is established, “the court must engage in three lines

of inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation for [the parent’s] conduct; (2) the

post-abandonment contact between [the] parent and [the] child; and (3)

consideration of the effect of termination of parental rights on the child

pursuant to Section 2511(b).” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super.

2008) (citing Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d at 92).

Here, the orphans’ court determined that the Agency had proven the

statutory grounds for terminating Mother’s parental rights under Section

2511(a)(1). The court explained:

Addiction played the predominant role in guiding both

parents’ behavior for the first 17 months of Child’s life. He

was adjudicated dependent following a hearing held

November 7, 2023, which they did not attend. They did not

attend any of the dependency hearings pertaining to Child

or try to comply with [any] of the court-ordered services the

Juvenile Division set forth to help Mother and Father reunify

with Child. After their last visit with Child on October 24,

2023, at the NICU in Philadelphia, they did not visit Child at

all. They did not contact [the Agency] to find out how Child

was doing, except that on March 25, 2024, Mother reached

out to [. . .] the original [Agency] caseworker in the matter,

and provided updated contact information for herself and

Father. [The original caseworker passed that information to

the new caseworker, who immediately reached back out to

Mother. Mother provided updated contact information for

herself and Father. The caseworker attempted to engage

Mother in services, but after the caseworker let Mother know

what was expected of her and that Mother could visit with

the Child, Mother did not respond.] [. . .] Neither parent

responded to subsequent attempts [the caseworker] made

to contact the parents, whether by phone, mail, or text.

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On or about September 3, 2024, the Juvenile Division

granted the Agency’s petition for a finding of aggravated

circumstances based on the parents’ failure to maintain

contact with Child for a period of six months. On March 5,

2025, nearly a year after her last contact with the Agency,

Mother contacted the Agency for the second time since Child

went into the Agency’s care. She provided her current

contact information at the recovery house and requested

visits with Child. [The caseworker] then reached out to

Father using new contact information Mother had provided

to ask if he would like visits as well.

[The caseworker] scheduled visits for Mother and for

Father to occur on March 19, 2025. Child was 17 months

old at the time and it would be the first time either parent

had seen him since October 24, 2023. Mother attended the

visit, but Father failed to confirm the visit as required and

was unable to attend. Notably, Child clung to his foster

father at the start of the visit. During the visit, Mother was

appropriate with Child and spoke to him throughout the

visit. He reacted to Mother the same way he does to

complete strangers: Rather than playfully initiating, as he

does when he is with people whom he knows and with whom

he is comfortable, he kept to himself or responded to

Mother’s initiation of play.

Another visit was scheduled for Father for April [15],

2025, but it had to be cancelled because Child was sick. As

of the date of the termination hearing, Mother had two

supervised hour-long visits with Child. Father had not seen

Child at all.

The [orphans’ court] recognizes that Mother has recently

made progress, but the Agency’s petition to terminate

Mother’s and Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.

§2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8) is nevertheless well-founded

and should be granted. Child has been continuously in

placement since November 7, 2023. From October 24,

2023, (the parents’ last visit with Child at the Temple

University Hospital) until approximately two months before

the termination hearing, neither parent showed any interest

in performing parental duties or taking the steps necessary

to provide Child with the essential parental care, control, or

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subsistence he needs for his physical and mental wellbeing.

(See 23 Pa.C.S. §2511(a)(1) and (2).) In addition, they

exhibited an apparent “settled purpose of relinquishing

parental claim to [their] child” for a period in excess of six

months by their failure to have any involvement with Child

or with the Agency regarding Child. (23 Pa.C.S

§2511(a)(1).)[FN 5]

FN 5 Neither parent contacted the Agency for nearly a

year, between Mother’s March 25, 2024, phone

contact and her March 5, 2025, phone contact. Father

apparently never tried to reach the Agency. Mother

testified that she tried to reach [the caseworker] in

January of 2025 while her inpatient counselor was

with her but that she was unsuccessful. The only

contact from Child’s parents that [the caseworker]

described was a phone call in January [2025] that was

actually from a case manager at Pyramid’s inpatient

center at Langhorne. The individual called [the

caseworker] to notify her that each of the parents had

been in the hospital for more than a month due to an

overdose. (Mother indicated during her testimony

that there never was an overdose; rather, the parents

were detoxing as previously described.) The case

manager further conveyed that Father’s mother had

received a letter giving Father notice of a permanency

review hearing scheduled in February and she was

requesting a continuance of the hearing. However,

the [orphans’ court] notes that neither parent

responded to attempts the Agency made by phone

call, text, email, or regular mail to contact Mother

and/or Father regarding Child after Child was placed

in the Agency’s care on November 7, 2023.

Orphans’ Court Opinion (O.C.O.), 7/8/25, at 4-6 (some footnotes omitted).

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On appeal, relevant to (a)(1),3 Mother argues that because she did not

have physical custody of the Child since removal and was limited to only

supervised contact with the Child, “she did not truly have the opportunity after

adjudication to provide ongoing, consistent parental care” to the Child.

Mother’s Brief at 13. Therefore, she did not fail or refuse to provide ongoing,

consistent parental care to the Child. See id. She also “had certainly not

evidenced any settled purpose of relinquishing her rights” to the Child. Id.

Mother also claims that this Court must consider all her circumstances which

were largely beyond her control. See id. at 14. According to Mother, her

efforts to remain in contact with the Child were never made easier by the

Agency. Id. Thus, Mother reiterates that she did not evidence a settled

purpose to relinquish her parental rights to the Child, nor did she intentionally

fail to parent him. Id. She claims she could not parent the Child because the

dependency court removed him from her care and placed him into foster care.

Id.

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3 In her brief, although Mother utilizes some of the language from Section

2511(a)(1), she fails to clearly delineate which parts of her argument relate

to (a)(1). Thus, we would have cause to find Mother’s first issue waived due

to lack of proper development. See, e.g., In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462,

465 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“It is well-settled that this Court will not review a claim

unless it is developed in the argument section of an appellant’s brief, and

supported by citations to relevant authority.” (citation omitted)).

Nevertheless, we decline to do so, and instead only address Mother’s

arguments that relate to a Section 2511(a)(1) analysis.

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Our review of the record supports the orphans’ court’s decision and

belies Mother’s arguments. In the six-month statutory period (August 2024

to February 2025), Mother never contacted the Agency about her reunification

goals or the Child. See N.T., 4/23/25, at 41, 43, 45, 48. Mother never visited

with the Child during that period. See id. at 45. Mother did not attend the

Child’s adjudication hearing or any permanency review hearings. See id. at

13, 32, 37, 43, 120. The permanency review orders entered in this case found

that Mother had no compliance with the permanency plan and had made no

progress toward alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original

placement. See Recommendations – Permanency Review, 3/19/24, 9/12/24,

2/25/25. In fact, aggravated circumstances were granted for both parents in

September 2024 because they had no contact with the Child for six months.

See N.T. at 43.

Additionally, Mother did not comply with any of her court-ordered

recommendations. She did not submit urine screens. Id. at 33, 38, 44, 48.

She did not complete a drug and alcohol evaluation or follow through with its

recommendations. Id. at 33, 38, 44-45. The Agency could not confirm if

Mother had stable housing or income or refer her to services because Mother

had no contact with the Agency. See id. at 35, 41, 45, 48.

Essentially, Mother did absolutely nothing during the six-month period.

She did not visit or have any contact with the Child, and she never even

reached out to the Agency to ask about him. Although Mother testified at the

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termination hearing that she went into detox in December 2024 followed by

inpatient and outpatient treatment, Mother did not reach out to the Agency

again until March 5, 2025. See id. at 49, 101-03. The caseworker was

unaware that Mother had entered a detox facility, had completed inpatient

treatment, or was in a recovery house until Mother contacted the Agency in

March. See id. at 55-57. Therefore, at the February 2025 permanency review

hearing, Mother’s progress was unknown because she had not contacted the

Agency. See id. at 57.

Further, Section 2511(b) makes clear that, with “respect to any petition

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6), or (8), the court shall not consider

any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which

are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.”

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). Thus, Mother’s contact with the Agency on March 5,

2025, the first time the Agency had heard from her since March 25, 2024,

cannot be considered because it occurred after the termination petition was

filed on February 7, 2025. See id.; N.T. at 48-49. Additionally, the Agency

did not learn about any of Mother’s treatment until she finally reached out in

March 2025, after the termination petition had already been filed. Related to

post-abandonment contact, Mother’s two subsequent visits with the Child after

she contacted the Agency in March 2025 also cannot be considered, because

they occurred post-termination petition. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

Moreover, Mother admitted at the termination hearing that she could not have

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the Child with her where she was currently residing, and she had only secured

a job the week before the hearing. See N.T. at 106-07, 26.

Like the orphans’ court, we acknowledge that Mother has made some

recent progress with receiving treatment and beginning to visit the Child.

However, that does not negate the extended period that the Child was in

placement before the termination petition was filed (from November 2023 to

February 2025), during which Mother only contacted the Agency once (in

March 2024) and never had contact with the Child. Further, we acknowledge

that Mother testified that she attempted to contact the caseworker with her

counselor in January 2025 and did not receive a response. See id. at 122-

24. However, the orphans’ court noted that neither parent responded to the

Agency’s attempts by phone call, text, email, or regular mail to contact them

regarding the Child. O.C.O. at 6 n.5. We reiterate that the orphans’ court

was free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and to make

credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence. See M.G.,

supra.

Lastly, Mother testified at the termination hearing that she felt she

needed to stay away from the Child until she was clean and sober. See N.T.

at 100, 120, 134-35. Although we commend Mother for the effort she has

made in becoming sober, we reiterate that “the parental obligation is a

positive duty which requires affirmative performance.” B.,N.M., 856 A.2d at

855 (citation omitted). “Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a

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more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities

while others provide the child with [the child’s] physical and emotional needs.”

Id. (citation omitted). As the orphans’ court cogently explained, during “this

17-month period in which his parents were mostly or completely absent, a

foster family stepped in to fulfill the parental role that was otherwise missing

for this little boy.” O.C.O. at 7. Under the totality of the circumstances,

Mother’s explanation for her conduct does not excuse her complete absence

from the Child’s life until after the termination petition was filed.

Thus, there was competent evidence to support the orphans’ court’s

conclusion that Mother evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing her

parental claim to the Child or refused or failed to perform parental duties for

the six-month statutory period. See Interest of A.M., 256 A.3d 1263, 1270–

71 (Pa. Super. 2021) (noting that “where a child is in foster care, a parent has

the affirmative duty to work towards the return of the child by cooperating

with the Agency to obtain the rehabilitative services necessary for her to be

capable of performing her parental duties and responsibilities.” (citation

omitted)). We discern no error of law or abuse of discretion with the orphans’

court’s decision under Section 2511(a)(1).

Mother’s second issue challenges the orphans’ court’s findings under

Section 2511(b), the second part of the bifurcated analysis in termination of

parental rights cases. Section 2511(b) provides:

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the

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developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

The “determination of the child’s particular developmental, physical, and

emotional needs and welfare must be made on a case-by-case basis,” but

“courts should consider the matter from the child’s perspective, placing [the

child’s] developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare above

concerns for the parent.” In the Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105 (Pa.

2023) (citations omitted); see also C.M.K., 203 A.3d at 261-62 (the focus of

Section 2511(a) is the conduct of the parent, whereas the focus of Section

2511(b) is the best interests of the child) (citation omitted).

“The plain language of Section 2511(b) clearly mandates that, in

assessing the petition to terminate parental rights, the ‘primary consideration’

must be the child’s ‘developmental, physical and emotional needs and

welfare.’” K.T., 296 A.3d at 1105. It is well-established that the child’s

“emotional needs” and “welfare” include “intangibles such as love, comfort,

security, and stability.” Id. at 1106 (citing T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267). Our

Supreme Court also requires courts to consider, not only whether the children

have a bond with their biological parent, but also whether the children are in

a pre-adoptive foster home and whether they have a bond with their foster

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parents. Id. (citing T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268; In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 677

(Pa. 2014)).

Here, the orphans’ court concluded that terminating Mother’s parental

rights best served the Child’s needs and welfare. The court explained:

Child has been in the home of Kinship Parents since

November 8, 2023, and has been outside of the parents’

care since his birth. Mother and Father had just four or five

visits with Child during the first month of his life. Recent

attempts to establish visitation confirmed that Mother is

essentially a stranger to Child and that he has no bond with

her. He did not have a name for Mother, but he calls his

foster parents “Mommy” and “Daddy.” In light of Child’s

very young age and Father’s failure to see the [C]hild at all

since October of 2023, it is hard for [the orphans’ court] to

imagine that Child has any bond with Father, either.

In contrast, Child had regular ongoing contact with the

foster family before he was placed with them, and he has

lived with them continuously since placement. By all

accounts, he is well-adjusted and happy, closely bonded to

all members of the family, and really is a family member in

the foster family. All of his day-to-day needs, medical

needs, and developmental needs are consistently met by his

foster family. They advocated for him to receive physical

therapy (PT) when they noticed that his neck and core

muscles appeared weak. They ensured he attended PT from

January to July of 2024, and they followed through with the

recommended exercises until he completed all

recommended therapy. They promote frequent sibling visits

between Child and his brother S., who is in the legal custody

of S.’s great aunt and uncle. [4] Child’s foster parents

consistently meet all of his physical, medical, and emotional

needs. He is spontaneously affectionate with them,

____________________________________________

4 Here, the trial court noted Mother and Father have another son together, the

Child’s older brother, S. See N.T. at 21-22, 40. The brother does not reside

with either Mother or Father and was not involved in this appeal. See id. at

40, 67-68, 116-17.

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whereas he is guarded with others, including with his

biological Mother.

Child needs and deserves stability, security, consistency,

nurturance, and permanency. Each of these needs is ably

met by his foster parents, with the exception of

permanency. They want to give him permanency, as well,

and plan to adopt him if parental rights are terminated. We

therefore find it best serves Child’s needs and welfare to

terminate both parents’ rights so that legal effect can be

given to the relationship that already exists in fact between

them.

O.C.O. at 8-9.

On appeal, Mother argues that separating the Child from her does not

serve his needs. See Mother’s Brief at 16. She claims that Section 2511(b)

“specifically notes that factors ‘beyond the control of the parent’ may not be

the sole basis for terminating parental rights.” Id. Mother asserts that many

of the barriers to her having custody of the Child were beyond her control,

such as housing and substance abuse disorder which is a documented health

condition. Id.

Mother’s argument misapprehends the relevant law and is belied by the

record. Specifically, a full reading of Section 2511(b) reveals that the “rights

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors

such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if

found to be beyond the control of the parent.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

Contrary to Mother’s argument, this section applies specifically to

“environmental factors” that a court finds to be beyond the control of the

parent. See id. However, the orphans’ court did not terminate Mother’s rights

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based solely on factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income,

clothing, or medical care, nor did the court find any of those factors to be

beyond Mother’s control. Instead, her decision to be absent from the Child’s

life until after the termination petition was filed, and to have nearly no contact

with the Agency during the Child’s placement, was within her control. We do

not minimize the impact substance abuse can have on a parent, but courts

“must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind. Children are young

for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation to see to their healthy

development quickly.” K.T., 296 A.3d at 1108 (citing T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 269)

(emphasis omitted). Mother’s argument is unavailing.

Further, Mother makes no cogent argument that she has any type of

bond with the Child. Mother visited with the Child four times in October 2023

while he was in the hospital after being born. See N.T. at 15. Her next visit

with the Child did not occur until March 2025, after the termination petition

was filed. See id. at 49-50. By that time, the Child was seventeen-months

old and had not seen Mother since he was less than a month old. He did not

recognize Mother nor call her “mom.” See id. at 60-61. The Child did not

initiate interactions with Mother and initially clung to his foster father and the

supervisor. See id. at 78. Thus, there was no evidence of any bond between

Mother and the Child. See In re Adoption of C.P.D., 324 A.3d 11, 27 (Pa.

Super. 2024) (“In cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the

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parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.” (citation

omitted)).

Conversely, the Child’s foster family began visiting him while he was still

in the hospital, and he has lived with them since he was released. See N.T.

at 16, 28, 51, 73. The Child is now extremely bonded with his foster parents

and foster siblings. See id. at 51-53, 74-76, 80. The Child’s foster family

takes care of all his needs and are an adoptive resource for him. See id. at

52-53, 76-77, 87. The Child refers to his foster parents as “mommy” and

“daddy.” See id. at 68, 77. The Child also has consistent visits with his older

sibling. See id. at 40, 44, 67. The Agency caseworker testified that the Child

needed permanency, and it was her opinion that parental rights should be

terminated. See id. at 68-69. Similarly, the case manager recommended

that the Child stay with his foster family. See id. at 80. Thus, the record

supports the orphans’ court’s decision. We discern no error of law or abuse

of discretion in the orphans’ court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights

under Section 2511(b).

We now address Father’s appeal. Father presents the following two

issues5 for our review:

____________________________________________

5 Father’s Appellate Rule 1925(b) statement is identical to Mother’s statement.

Thus, our concerns with Mother’s statement, as discussed in Footnote 2, apply

equally to Father’s statement, which also does not specifically address Section

2511(a)(1). As with Mother, we remind and caution Father and his counsel

that issues “not included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its

discretion in finding that the Lehigh County Office of

Children and Youth Services met the requirements of 23

Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5) and (a)(8) by clear

and convincing evidence?

2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its

discretion in finding that the Lehigh County Office of

Children and Youth Services sustained its burden of proof

by clear and convincing evidence that the termination of

biological parent’s parental rights to [the Child] best met

the needs and welfare of the Child as required by 23

Pa.C.S.A. §2511(b)?

Father’s Brief at 4 (cleaned up) (numbering added) (excess capitalization and