Cisneros, Jose v. Brandenburg Industrial Service Co.

FILED

Jan 22, 2026

11:15 AM(CT)

TENNESSEE

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

APPEALS BOARD

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Jose Cisneros Docket No. 2025-80-2327

v. State File No. 860110-2025

Brandenburg Industrial

Service Co., et al.

Appeal from the Court of Workers’

Compensation Claims

Allen Phillips, Judge

Reversed and Remanded

In this appeal, the employer asserts that the trial court erred in denying its motion for

summary judgment based on its assertion that the employee failed to file a petition seeking

workers’ compensation benefits in a timely manner. Following a hearing, the court found

that the employer had negated an essential element of the employee’s claim but also

concluded the employee had presented sufficient evidence regarding the insurer’s handling

of his claims to establish disputed issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment.

The court found that, if it credited the employee’s recitation of events, it could find that the

employer’s or its insurer’s delays estopped them from relying on its statute of limitations

defense. The employer has appealed. Having carefully reviewed the record, we reverse

the trial court’s decision and remand the case for the court to enter an order consistent with

this opinion.

Judge Pele I. Godkin delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding Judge

Timothy W. Conner and Judge Meredith B. Weaver joined.

Travis J. Ledgerwood, Mt. Juliet, Tennessee, for the employer-appellant, Brandenburg

Industrial Service Co.

Jose Cisneros, employee-appellee, pro se

Factual and Procedural Background

Jose Cisneros (“Employee”) alleges he sustained injuries on June 27, 2023, October

12, 2023, and February 28, 2024, while in the course and scope of employment for

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Brandenburg Industrial Service Co. (“Employer”). On April 11, 2025, Employee filed a

petition for benefit determination (“PBD”) that listed all three dates of injury. Employer

did not, at any time, pay benefits related to any of the three claims. 1 In August 2025,

Employer filed a motion for summary judgment, accompanied by a memorandum of law

and a statement of undisputed facts. In its motion and memorandum of law, Employer

asserted that Employee’s claims were all barred by the applicable one-year statute of

limitations and that an employee’s assertion that he or she provided timely notice of the

claims does not affect the running of the statute of limitations. In support of its motion,

Employer filed Employee’s responses to requests for admission, in which Employee

responded “I admit” to each request. Specifically, those requests identified the alleged

dates of injury, the date Employee filed his PBD, and a confirmation that Employer’s

insurance carrier had not provided any workers’ compensation benefits related to any of

the claims.

On October 6, 2025, Employee filed a response to Employer’s statement of

undisputed facts. With respect to the alleged injury dates identified as June 27, 2023,

October 12, 2023, and February 28, 2024, Employee disagreed that one or more of these

were correct. He also asserted that the adjuster’s handling of the claims was deficient,

although he did not explain how that could affect the various dates on which he alleged he

was injured. In addition, Employee asserted that the adjuster contacted him in April 2024

to discuss details of all three alleged injuries and that she followed up in an email the same

day providing her name and noting that she was with “workers’ compensation.” Employee

later testified he understood this to mean that the caller was “affiliated” with the Bureau of

Workers’ Compensation. He further asserted there were multiple errors contained in the

first report of injury that the adjuster filed on May 3, 2024, including listing the date of

injury as July 27, 2023. He then argued that, despite his timely cooperation, the adjuster

continued to delay the process, “ultimately causing the statutory time limit for my claim to

expire.” Although he admitted he had received a notice of denial from Employer’s insurer

dated August 30, 2024, he argued that the notice itself was for a date of injury of July 27,

2023, and thus he was unaware that injuries he claimed in June 2023, October 2023, and

February 2024 were denied based on that notice.

Following the hearing, the trial court issued an order denying Employer’s motion

for summary judgment. The court concluded that Employer had negated an essential

element of Employee’s claim, i.e., the timely filing of a PBD pursuant to Tennessee Code

Annotated section 50-6-203(b)(1). Thus, the burden shifted to Employee to demonstrate

the existence of one or more genuine issues of material fact that could lead the court to find

in his favor. The court concluded that Employee had met this burden, observing he had

“offer[ed] evidence” that could support a finding, based on the adjuster’s alleged delayed

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Employee had previously attempted to file all three claims with the Texas Division of Workers’

Compensation in August 2024, as that is his state of residence. Employee testified that he filed his PBD in

Tennessee because the Texas Division advised him that his “best option” was to contact the Tennessee

Bureau of Workers’ Compensation.

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and/or deficient handling of the claim, that Employer is estopped from relying on the statute

of limitations defense. Specifically, the court was troubled that Employer did not file a

notice of denial until August 2024, despite knowing of Employee’s alleged June 2023

injury in April 2024. The court noted that, pursuant to the claims handling standards

contained in Tenn. Comp. R. and Regs. 0800-02-14-.04(6), decisions on compensability

“shall be made . . . within fifteen (15) calendar days of the verbal or written notice of

injury.” The court reasoned that, because Employer delayed making made this decision

until four months after receiving notice of the injury, Employee was unaware Employer

had denied the first injury until after the statute of limitations had expired and still believed

the other alleged injury dates were timely. The court noted that “the record is silent as to

when, or if, [Employer] made a compensability decision regarding those injuries.” Thus,

the trial court reasoned that Employee was unaware his claims had been denied, which

could support a finding that Employer was equitably estopped from asserting the expiration

of the statute of limitations.

Standard of Review

The grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is a matter of law that we

review de novo with no presumption that the trial court’s conclusions are correct. See Rye

v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 250 (Tenn. 2015). As such,

we must “make a fresh determination of whether the requirements of Rule 56 of the

Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure have been satisfied.” Id. Moreover, a trial court has

broad discretion to control the pace of litigation and set hearings to address pre-trial

motions. Valladares v. Transco Products, Inc., Nos. 2015-01-0117 & -0118, 2016 TN

Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 31, at *26 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. July 27, 2016)

(“a trial court has the necessary discretion to control the pace of litigation through the use

of case supervision and docket management”); see also Smith v. Smith, No. E2017-01295-

COA-R3-CV, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 59, at *20 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2019) (“trial

courts have broad discretion to control their dockets”).

Analysis

In its notice of appeal, Employer argues that the trial court erred in denying its

motion for summary judgment based on the expiration of the statute of limitations,

emphasizing what it views as the court’s misplaced reliance “on the doctrine of equitable

estoppel to deny the motion.” Employer asserts that none of the three claims were

accepted, no disability or medical benefits were ever paid, and there are no expert opinions

providing a date of maximum medical improvement (“MMI”) or an impairment rating.

Further, according to Employer, it was not required to send a settlement offer to Employee

pursuant to Tennessee claims handling standards. Next, Employer argues that the failure

to timely deny the compensability of a claim after an investigation “is not a genuine issue

of material fact regarding the estoppel claim. There must be an allegation of affirmative

misrepresentation or concealment of material fact.” Employer asserts that Employee failed

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to allege this type of conduct in his response to its motion and that there is no evidence in

the record that any such misrepresentation occurred.

Conversely, Employee contends he “relied entirely on the claims adjuster – his only

point of contact – for information regarding the status of his claim.” He asserts that due to

his “language barriers and lack of knowledge of Tennessee law, it was reasonable for [him]

to depend on the adjuster’s representations and omissions.” Specifically, Employee asserts

the adjuster stated on multiple occasions that the claim was “under investigation” and this

created a reasonable belief that no further action was required by him. In addition,

Employee argues that the adjuster failed to inform him of a “one-year filing requirement

or that filing a claim in Texas did not preserve his rights in Tennessee.”

When an employer files a properly-supported motion for summary judgment that

negates an essential element of the employee’s claim, the burden of production then shifts

to the employee to demonstrate the existence of one or more genuine issues of material fact

at the summary judgment stage that would support the need for a trial. Rye v. Women’s

Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 265 (Tenn. 2015). In considering an

order granting summary judgment, an appellate court must view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party and must also draw all reasonable inferences in the

nonmoving party’s favor. Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tenn. 1993). Further, “[a]

fact is material ‘if it must be decided in order to resolve the substantive claim or defense at

which the motion is directed.’” Akers v. Heritage Med. Assocs., P.C., No. M2017-02470-

COA-R3-CV, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 5, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2019) (quoting

Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 215). “A ‘genuine issue’ exists if ‘a reasonable [factfinder] could

legitimately resolve that fact in favor of one side or the other.’” Akers, 2019 Tenn. App.

LEXIS 5, at *15 (quoting Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 215). Here, the trial court concluded that

Employer’s motion for summary judgment was supported by affirmative evidence that

Employee filed his petition for benefit determination more than one year after any of the

alleged injury dates, that no benefits had been paid to date on any of the claims, and that,

therefore, Employer had negated an essential element of Employee’s claim, specifically

the timely filing required under section 203(b)(1). We agree.

As a result, the burden then shifted to Employee to demonstrate the existence of

specific facts that could lead the court to find in his favor at an evidentiary hearing with

respect to application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The court concluded that

Employee met his burden, relying on Employee’s testimony that Employer failed to timely

investigate his claims and failed to file its notice of denial in a timely manner. The court

noted that Employer did not deny the first claim until after the statute of limitations had

expired and that Employee was unaware of any action on either of the other two claims,

which could have reasonably led him to believe that they were timely. The court

emphasized that the purpose of a PBD is to assist with disputed issues, reasoning that

Employee was unaware of any disputed issues at the time his claims expired. Finally,

relying on Baker v. Total Air Grp. LLC, No. W2016-00965-SC-R3-WC, 2017 Tenn.

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LEXIS 465, at *23 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Aug. 7, 2017), the court concluded that

if Employee’s statements were correct, it could find that Employer’s purported delays

estopped them from relying on the statute of limitation defense.

In its brief on appeal, Employer points to the Tennessee Supreme Court’s Special

Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel’s decision in Arnold v. Courtyard Mgmt. Corp.,

No. W2015-02266-SC-WCM-WC, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 648 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel

Sept. 28, 2016), to illustrate the proper circumstances under which an employer may be

estopped from relying on the statute of limitations as a defense. Specifically, the Supreme

Court explained:

In Lusk v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 655 S.W.2d 917, 920 (Tenn. 1983),

the Tennessee Supreme Court held that estoppel may apply in a workers’

compensation claim if an employee justifiably relies upon misrepresentation

or concealment of a material fact by her employer which results in failure to

file suit within the one-year period of limitations. When equitable estoppel is

raised, the trial court must determine whether the employer engaged in

conduct specifically designed to prevent the employee from suing in a timely

manner. Fahrner v. SW Mfg., Inc., 48 S.W.3d 141, 145 (Tenn. 2001). “The

party invoking the doctrine of equitable estoppel bears the burden of proof.”

Hardcastle v. Harris, 170 S.W.3d 67, 85 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citations

omitted). The plaintiff’s reliance on the alleged misrepresentation is also a

required element of estoppel. Id.

Arnold, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 648, at *10-11. Thus, according to Employer, without any

evidence of a material misrepresentation, the doctrine of equitable estoppel cannot be

applied.

Employer further argues that Baker, which the trial court cited, is distinguishable

from the present case. We agree. In Baker, the employee received workers’ compensation

benefits pursuant to Mississippi law for a compensable claim over which Tennessee had

jurisdiction. Id. at *3. The employee then argued that his claim was improperly handled

under Mississippi law and that the employer failed to send him a specific form that was

required by Mississippi law to be filed at the conclusion of his claim and that governed the

running of the statute of limitations. Id. at *15-16. No settlement offer was made, and

sometime later, the employee requested additional medical treatment, which the employer

authorized but for which it did not pay. Id. at *5-6. The employee filed his claim in

Tennessee, and the employer denied his Tennessee claim as barred by the statute of

limitations. The Appeals Panel concluded that the employer erroneously handled the claim

under Mississippi law, given that the claim should have been handled pursuant to

Tennessee law, and that the employee was sufficiently prejudiced as a result to justify the

use of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Id. The Baker court also observed, however, that

equitable estoppel tolls the running of the statute of limitations where the defendant has

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“misled the plaintiff into failing to file [his] action within the statutory period of

limitations. . . . Where equitable estoppel has been raised, therefore, a court must determine

whether the defendant engaged in conduct specifically designed to prevent the plaintiff

from suing in time. Id. at *15 (citing Fahrner, 48 S.W.3d at 145 (citations omitted)). The

Appeals Panel went on to observe that “negligent silence” may also serve to estop an

employer from raising the statute of limitations defense and that it was the employee’s

burden to “prove such conduct by the defendant, as well as reliance on the alleged

conduct.” Id. at *14-15.

Here, the claim was not accepted as compensable, no workers’ compensation

benefits were paid, no determination of MMI or permanent impairment had been made,

there was no requirement for Employer to send a settlement offer letter to Employee, and

the claim was handled under Tennessee law. Thus, we agree with Employer that Baker is

distinguishable. In the present case, the adjuster spoke with Employee and initiated an

investigation into the claim, eventually providing a notice of denial. Employee has

presented no evidence of an affirmative misrepresentation or concealment of a material

fact by Employer or its insurance representative. We can find no precedent, and none has

been cited to us, suggesting that an employer in a workers’ compensation case has an

affirmative duty to advise an employee as to when his or her statute of limitations will

expire. As the Tennessee Supreme Court’s Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel

explained:

More than 170 years of Tennessee case law reveals a general public policy

of this State as well as an age-old principle of common law—mere ignorance

of the law will not serve as an excuse for a litigant’s error or omission. See,

e.g., Bell v. Steel, 21 Tenn. 148 (Tenn. 1840) (“It is a well-known maxim that

ignorance of law will not furnish an excuse for any person, either for a breach

or omission of duty.”).

Mosby v. McDowell Ctr. for Children, No. W2012-02715-WC-R3-WC, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS

707, at *18 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Oct. 2, 2014). Moreover, we respectfully

disagree with the trial court that the adjuster’s timeliness in investigating the claim could,

under any reasonable view of the evidence, constitute “negligent silence” or any other

conduct “specifically designed to prevent” Employee from filing a claim. We are aware

of nothing in the rules governing claims handing standards that indicates one possible

remedy for a violation of Rule 0800-02-14-.04(6) (addressing an adjuster’s decisions on

compensability) is the tolling of a statute of limitations.

We find the current case most analogous to Beckett v. Gaylord Ent’t Co., No. 01S01-

9610-CV-00209, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 328 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel June 24, 1997).

In Beckett, the employee alleged he suffered a work-related injury in May 1994. Id. at *1.

Although he was advised by his physician in June 1994 that he had a hernia, the employee

did not tell his physician he believed the hernia had occurred at work. Id. at *2. The

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employee was terminated for unrelated reasons in August 1994 but did not tell his employer

he had suffered a hernia at work at the time of his termination. Id. at *2-3. After being

told he needed surgery in April 1995, the employee reported a claim to his prior employer’s

workers’ compensation carrier. Id. at *3. With respect to this portion of the case history,

the court explained:

[The adjuster] informed [the employee] that [the third-party administrator]

would investigate the claim, and then she took steps to obtain medical records

from his doctors. [The adjuster] also attempted to contact the two persons

[the employee] claimed to have notified about his injury. She did not tell

him that his claim would be paid, or that his claim was compensable, or offer

to negotiate.

....

[The employee] acknowledged that [the adjuster] never said that she was

negotiating a claim or would settle the claim, but that she was “still

investigating” the claim, and that he would hear from her when she decided

the claim. [The employee] realized that [the adjuster] could just as easily

deny the claim as she could approve it.

[The employee] argued that the actions of [the adjuster] in investigating the

claim estopped [the employer] from relying on the Statute of Limitations

and/or constituted a waiver of the Statute of Limitations. [The employee]

acknowledged at trial that there was no misrepresentation or concealment of

material facts by [the employer] but contended that the actions of the adjuster

“lulled him to sleep.”

Id. at *3-4. The employer in Beckett filed a motion for summary judgment on the statute

of limitations issue, and the trial court bifurcated the case and ultimately dismissed the

employee’s petition based on its rejection of the employee’s estoppel theory. Id. at *1-2.

On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court’s Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel

affirmed, also rejecting application of an equitable estoppel theory. The court explained:

[T]he existing doctrine of equitable estoppel with its requirement that the

opposing party have engaged in misconduct more appropriately strikes a

balance between the need for predictable procedural rules on the one hand

and the need to relieve innocent parties of the consequences of the expiration

of the [statute of] limitations on the other.

The plaintiff must prove an affirmative misrepresentation by the

defendant to implicate the doctrine of waiver or equitable estoppel and we

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agree with the trial judge that the statements by [the adjuster] are not

equatable to affirmative misrepresentation.

Id. at *5-6 (some emphasis added).

In short, we conclude Employee has come forward with no evidence at the summary

judgment stage to suggest the adjuster misrepresented any fact in the case or advised

Employee his claims would be accepted. Although Employee alleges he was relying on

the adjuster, he has pointed to no specific actions or inactions on the part of Employer or

its claims representative that were designed to mislead him or prevent him from timely

filing his claim. The adjuster had no affirmative duty to advise Employee as to the date

she believed his statute of limitations would expire with respect to any claim he asserted.

Finally, we agree with Employer that the late filing of a Notice of Denial, standing

alone, is insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether a

material misrepresentation occurred or whether Employer should be estopped from raising

the statute of limitations as a defense. Accordingly, because Employer affirmatively

negated an essential element of Employee’s claim and because Employee failed to establish

that a genuine issue of material fact exists meriting a trial, Employer’s motion for summary

judgment should have been granted.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order denying summary

judgment and remand the case to the trial court for entry of an order consistent with this

opinion. Costs on appeal are taxed to Employee.

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TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Jose Cisneros Docket No. 2025-80-2327

v. State File No. 860110-2025

Brandenburg Industrial

Service Co., et al.

Appeal from the Court of Workers’

Compensation Claims

Allen Phillips, Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Appeals Board’s decision in the referenced case

was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service on this the 22nd day of

January, 2026.

Name Certified First Class Via Via Sent to:

Mail Mail Fax Email

Travis J. Ledgerwood X travis.ledgerwood@zurichna.com

christi.mejias@zurichna.com

Jose Cisneros X jose.cisneros68@yahoo.com

Allen Phillips, Judge X Via Electronic Mail

Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge X Via Electronic Mail

Penny Shrum, Clerk, Court of X penny.patterson-shrum@tn.gov

Workers’ Compensation Claims

Olivia Yearwood

Clerk, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board

220 French Landing Dr., Ste. 1-B

Nashville, TN 37243

Telephone: 615-253-1606

Electronic Mail: WCAppeals.Clerk@tn.gov