The opinion
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-10817
____________________
WILLIE AARON GREEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JONATHAN SURINE,
in his individual capacity,
CARL MITCHAM,
in his individual capacity,
Defendants-Appellees,
UNIFIED GOVERNMENT OF ATHENS-CLARKE COUNTY
GEORGIA,
The,
Defendant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 3:23-cv-00125-CDL
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 25-10817
Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
On the night of May 13, 2023, Officer Jonathan Surine and
Sergeant Carl Mitcham responded to a noise complaint concerning
music played at the Athens Sports Arena (the “Arena”), a sport and
event venue in Athens, Georgia. Willie Green, one of the Arena’s
owners, resisted the officers’ attempt to issue him a citation for the
noise, claiming that his property was exempt from the relevant
noise ordinance, and refused to provide identification. After
repeated requests, and a warning that his refusal to provide
identification was unlawful resistance and could result in his arrest,
the officers arrested Green for obstruction of a police officer.
Shortly after his arrest, the solicitor general for Athens-Clarke
County dismissed both the noise citation and the obstruction
charge.
Green sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that
the officers violated his Fourth Amendment right by arresting him
for obstruction without probable cause. After discovery and
briefing, the district court granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment and dismissed Green’s lawsuit. The court
concluded that the officers had arguable probable cause to issue the
citation and arrest Green, and thus the officers were protected by
qualified immunity.
After careful consideration, and for the reasons that follow,
we affirm the district court because the officers had arguable
probable cause both to issue the citation and arrest Green.
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25-10817 Opinion of the Court 3
I. BACKGROUND1
The Arena, of which Green is a part owner, is a sport and
event venue located in a neighborhood in the extreme southwest
part of Athens-Clarke County. 2 The Arena is on Commerce
Boulevard, a small, looped side street populated by other
businesses. Immediately to the west of the Commerce Blvd. loop
upon which the Arena sits is a residential neighborhood populated
by around one hundred single-family homes, including the
complainant’s (the “Residential Neighborhood”).
On the evening of Saturday, May 13, 2023, around 7:45 p.m.,
Officer Surine responded to a noise complaint from a resident on
Park West Boulevard, one of the two main streets of the
Residential Neighborhood. Surine traveled to the home of the
complainant, where he could hear audible noise coming from the
direction of the Arena. Surine observed that the Residential
1 This case comes before us on appeal from a grant of summary judgment. As
such, we draw the facts in this opinion from the parties’ motion for summary
judgment briefing materials and present them in the light most favorable to
Green as the non-moving party. Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 875 n.1 (11th
Cir. 2003).
2 We take judicial notice of a Google map depicting the general geographic
features of the neighborhood in which the events of this case took place “as a
source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,” just as our sister
circuits have done in similar circumstances, and as we have done with maps
in the past. Fed. R. Evid. 201; see United States v. Proch, 637 F.3d 1262, 1266 n.1
(11th Cir. 2011); Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1216 n.1 (10th Cir. 2013);
McCormack v. Hiedeman, 694 F.3d 1004, 1008 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Julius, 14 F.4th 752, 756 (7th Cir. 2021) (collecting cases).
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4 Opinion of the Court 25-10817
Neighborhood was composed of single-family homes, and so
assumed they were zoned as single-family residential. At some
point between when he received the notice from dispatch and
heading to the Arena, Surine looked up the complainant’s
residence on qPublic.3 He believed that the qPublic information
concerning the complainant’s residence confirmed his belief that
the Residential Neighborhood was zoned residential. 4 Surine then
drove to the Arena and confirmed that it was the source of the
noise—loud music from a party.
After Surine arrived on the scene at the Arena, the event
host called Green, who made his way over. When Green arrived,
he and Surine began discussing the noise complaint. Surine
informed Green that the Arena was violating Athens-Clarke
County Code Ordinance 3-5-24 (the “Noise Ordinance”) and read
him the relevant code section. 5 Green insisted that Arena was
3 qPublic is a public database of information allowing users to view local
government information and related records online, including tax and zoning
information for plots of land.
4 qPublic reported the complainant’s home “Class” as “R3-Residential.” Just
below the “Class” line entry was language stating that “[t]his is for tax pur-
poses only. Not to be used for zoning.” A little further below the “Class”
category was a “Zoning” category, which listed the property’s zoning classifi-
cation as “C-G,” a commercial zoning class.
5 The Noise Ordinance reads, in relevant part,
It is unlawful for any person or persons to play, use, operate,
or permit to be played, used, or operated any radio receiving
device, television, stereo, musical instrument, phonograph
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25-10817 Opinion of the Court 5
exempt from the Noise Ordinance. During this conversation,
Surine asked Green several times to provide identification, and
explained that he needed Green’s identification to be able to issue
the written citation. Each time Green refused to comply.
After some discussion, Green asked for a supervisor. Surine
called Sgt. Mitcham, told him of the course of the interaction, of
Green’s request for a supervisor, and that he believed he had
probable cause to issue a citation for violation of the Noise
Ordinance. After Mitcham arrived, he advised Green that the
Arena was subject to the Noise Ordinance because, even though
the Arena was zoned commercial, the Arena fell within the scope
of the Noise Ordinance because its noise was reaching the
Residential Neighborhood which the officers believed to be zoned
residential. The officers concluded that the Residential
Neighborhood was zoned residential because it was composed of
sound amplifier or other machines or devices for the produc-
ing, reproducing or amplifying of sound and/or noise at such
a volume and in such a manner so as to create, or cause to be
created, any noises or sounds which are plainly audible at a dis-
tance of 300 feet or more from the building, structure or vehi-
cle, or in the case of real property, beyond the property limits,
in which it is located, whichever is farthest . . . between the
hours of 7:00 a.m. and 12:00 midnight on Friday and Saturday.
Athens-Clarke Cnty. Code of Ordinances § 3-5-24(c)(1)(a). The restriction in
§ 3-5-24(c)(1)(a) “shall apply to noises and/or sounds generated by a
commercial entity that are plainly audible within any single-family residential
zoning district more than 300 feet beyond the property boundary of the
property from which the noises and/or sounds emanate.” Id. § 3-5-24(c)(8)(a).
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6 Opinion of the Court 25-10817
single-family homes, and from reviewing the qPublic page about
the complainant’s property. Green continued to insist that his
business was exempt from the Noise Ordinance and refused the
officers’ subsequent requests to provide his identification.
At this point, the officers warned Green that continued
refusal to provide them identification would be obstruction of their
attempts to fulfill their lawful duties, and that he would be subject
to arrest. Green reiterated his refusal. The officers then arrested
Green and charged him with obstruction of a police officer and
cited him for violation of the Noise Ordinance.
The citation and obstruction charge were eventually
dismissed by the solicitor general of Athens-Clarke County.
Concerning the Noise Ordinance citation, the Solicitor General
explained that, “[w]hile someone in the officer’s position that night
might reasonably believe that the [Residential Neighborhood] was
part of a ‘single-family residential zoning district,’ a subsequent
review . . . determined that the neighborhood is contained entirely
within a commercial zone,” and was thus exempt from the
ordinance. Concerning the obstruction charge, although “the
[s]tate could [have] arguably proceed[ed] with the charge of
[o]bstruction,” “given the totality of the circumstances, the [s]tate
believe[d] it [was] in the interest of justice to terminate prosecution
of th[e] case.”
Following the dismissal, Green brought this lawsuit against
the officers alleging they violated his Fourth Amendment right
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25-10817 Opinion of the Court 7
when they arrested him without probable cause.6 The officers
moved for summary judgment, arguing that they had arguable
probable cause for both the arrest for obstruction and issuance of
the Noise Ordinance citation, and therefore they were protected
by qualified immunity. The district court agreed and granted the
officers’ motion. It found that, “although Defendants turned out
to be mistaken in their application of the noise ordinance, they had
arguable probable cause to cite Green for violating it” because their
mistakes were “reasonable and honest.” As for the obstruction
charge, the district court noted that the officers were investigating
a noise ordinance violation for which they had arguable probable
cause. Thus, Green’s refusal to provide identification obstructed
the officers’ lawful investigation.
This appeal timely followed.
II. DISCUSSION
We review a district court’s order granting summary
judgment de novo. Edger v. McCabe, 84 F.4th 1230, 1235 (11th Cir.
2023).
Green argues that his arrest for obstruction violated his
Fourth Amendment right because the officers lacked probable
cause. More specifically, Green argues that his resistance was
lawful under Georgia law because the investigation he
6 Green also sued Athens-Clarke County. However, after the County filed its
motion for summary judgment, Green voluntarily dismissed the County from
the case.
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8 Opinion of the Court 25-10817
obstructed—the officers’ attempt to issue the noise citation—was
being pursued without probable cause, and thus was itself not
lawful. The defendants counter that qualified immunity defeats
Green’s Fourth Amendment claims because they had arguable
probable cause to cite the Arena, through its agent Green, for
violation of the Noise Ordinance.
Government officials, including police officers, are
protected by qualified immunity when they act in the exercise of
their discretionary duties. Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346
(11th Cir. 2002). Once an official proves he was acting within his
discretion, the plaintiff can rebut the official’s entitlement to
qualified immunity “by showing that the government officials
(1) committed a constitutional violation; and (2) that this violation
was ‘clearly established’ in law at the time of the alleged
misconduct.” Edger, 84 F.4th at 1235.
Here, the parties do not dispute that the defendants acted
within the scope of their discretionary authority. Their dispute
turns on whether the defendants’ actions violated clearly
established Fourth Amendment law. For Fourth Amendment
purposes, arrests are seizures and are unreasonable unless
supported by probable cause. See Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d
1130, 1137 (11th Cir. 2007). Furthermore, we have said that an
officer is entitled to qualified immunity if he had even “arguable
probable cause.” Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 734 (11th
Cir. 2010). “In the false arrest context, arguable probable cause
exists where a reasonable officer, looking at the entire legal
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landscape at the time of the arrests, could have interpreted the law
as permitting the arrests.” Edger, 84 F.4th at 1236–37 (quotation
omitted). The arguable probable cause inquiry is not a broad
general analysis, but “must be undertaken in light of the specific
context of the case.” Id. at 1237. In other words, “whether an
officer possesses either actual or arguable probable cause depends
on the elements of the alleged crime and the operative fact
pattern.” Id.
The officers had arguable probable cause that the Arena was
violating the Noise Ordinance. The Noise Ordinance makes it a
crime for commercial businesses to make noise which can be heard
in a “single-family residential zoning district” that is at least 300 feet
away from the business. See Athens-Clarke Cnty. Code of
Ordinances § 3-5-24(c). It is undisputed that the Arena and the
Residential Neighborhood sit in the same commercially zoned
neighborhood. The only dispute is whether the officers made a
reasonable mistake when they concluded that the Residential
Neighborhood was a “single-family residential zoning district.”
The officers relied on two pieces of information to conclude
that the Residential Neighborhood was zoned as single-family
residential. First, the officers observed that the Residential
Neighborhood was composed of single-family homes. Second, the
officers used the qPublic database to look up the zoning
information relating to the complainant’s home in the Residential
Neighborhood. They observed that the qPublic database reported
the complainant’s home “Class” as “R3-Residential.” According to
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10 Opinion of the Court 25-10817
Sgt. Mitcham, “[a]t that point we were going off of the belief that a
single-family residence would be zoned as such, and off of qPublic
[data].” With their observation corroborated by what they saw on
the qPublic website, the officers concluded that the Residential
Neighborhood was a “single-family residential zoning district”
under the Noise Ordinance.
Green argues that the officers’ conclusion was flawed, as
they “turn[ed] a blind eye to information clearly before the
officer[s] that would have shown Green’s innocence,” thus denying
them probable cause to arrest Green. Green points to two pieces
of information on qPublic’s page for the complainant’s residence.
First, that the R3-Residential classification of the complainant’s
home was expressly caveated as a tax, not zoning, classification by
the language (immediately beneath the “Class” information)
stating that “[t]his is for tax purposes only. Not to be used for
zoning.” Second, that just beneath the “Class” information was a
“Zoning” categorization, which listed the property’s zoning
classification as “C-G,” a commercial zoning class. 7
7 Green also argues that the officers cannot rely on the qPublic website for
their arguable probable cause analysis because, since their body camera
footage does not show them viewing the website, we should infer that they
did not access the website during their investigation of the noise complaint.
We disagree for two reasons. First, there are several gaps in the body camera
footage during which the officers could have accessed the website, and they
stated in sworn testimony that they did access it. Second, removing the
qPublic information from the analysis is harmful to Green’s argument, not the
officers. Green relies on the officers’ mistaken interpretation of the qPublic
database to argue their lack of probable cause. Without the qPublic database
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25-10817 Opinion of the Court 11
Green’s argument is misplaced in light of our arguable
probable cause caselaw. To be sure, the officers were wrong about
the facts. But the inquiry is whether they had “arguable” probable
cause, an inquiry focused on what a reasonable officer’s
interpretation of the law would be considering the facts facing the
officer defendants. Edger, 84 F.4th at 1236–37. Here, it was
reasonable for the officers, observing the class of the complainant’s
home on the qPublic website in the broader context of the
composition of the Residential Neighborhood, to not look further
than the “Class” information in reaching the honest but mistaken
belief that the neighborhood was zoned residential. The officers’
mistaken conclusion about the Residential Neighborhood’s zoning
status is especially reasonable considering the degree of physical
separation between the Residential Neighborhood and Arena’s
commercial district on Commerce Boulevard. While the two areas
are next to each other, they are separated by hundreds of feet,
which supports the officers’ inference that they are part of separate
subdivisions and therefore separate zoning classifications. Thus,
considering the broader factual and legal context facing the officers,
they had arguable probable cause that the Arena was violating the
Noise Ordinance. 8
information, the officers’ only information about the zoning of the Residential
Neighborhood is their observation about its composition—a plainly
reasonable basis to conclude that it is a single-family residential zoning district.
8 Green’s reliance on Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004),
is also misplaced as the facts of Kingsland are not analogous to the facts here.
In Kingsland—which we called “unique and exceptional”—there was strong
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12 Opinion of the Court 25-10817
The officers also had probable cause to arrest Green for
obstruction because his refusal to provide identification upon
request was an unlawful interference with the officers’ duty. “A
knowing and willful refusal to provide identification to an officer
acting in the lawful discharge of his official duties may constitute
obstruction under OCGA § 16–10–24(a).” 9 Brown v.
GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc., 331 Ga. App. 890, 892–93 (2015). Here, as
explained above, the officers were acting in the lawful discharge of
their official duties when they requested Green’s identification
because they were attempting to issue a citation to Green for which
they had arguable probable cause.
Green’s actions in refusing to provide his identification were
knowing and willful. The officers asked Green numerous times for
his identification. Surine informed him that without his
identification they would not be able to issue the citation—thus
conveying to Green the knowledge that continued resistance
meant hindering the officers’ objective of issuing the citation. The
officers also warned Green that continued refusal may cause them
circumstantial evidence that the officers potentially fabricated the fact that
they detected cannabis odor so that they could arrest the plaintiff, and in doing
so, “chose to either ignore or misrepresent” the facts behind the arrest. Id. at
1226–27, 1231. Green offers no evidence beyond the content of the qPublic
site to support his contention that the officers intentionally ignored the
information on the site.
9 OCGA § 16–10–24(a) states that “a person who knowingly and willfully
obstructs or hinders any law enforcement officer in the lawful discharge of his
official duties is guilty of a misdemeanor.”
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to arrest him for obstruction. And so, when Green continued to
refuse to comply, his decision to do so was knowing and willful
despite the possible consequences. Thus, the officers had probable
cause to arrest Green, they did not violate Green’s Fourth
Amendment right, and they are protected by qualified immunity.
III. CONCLUSION
Considering the analysis above, the district court did not err
in concluding that qualified immunity protected the defendant
officers. 10
AFFIRMED.
10 Green’s motion to take judicial notice of the contents of certain qPublic
pages is denied as moot.