Barry Ingram v. Farmers Insurance Company of Flemington

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2311-24

BARRY INGRAM and ILEANA

INGRAM,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

FARMERS INSURANCE

COMPANY OF FLEMINGTON,

Defendant-Respondent.

______________________________

Argued January 26, 2026 – Decided February 11, 2026

Before Judges Sabatino and Natali.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law

Division, Ocean County, Docket No. L-2217-23.

Frank P. Winston (Lerner, Arnold & Winston, LLP)

argued the cause for appellants.

Kristie L. Trifiolis argued the cause for respondent

(Trifiolis & Griffin, PC, attorneys; Kristie L. Trifiolis,

on the brief).

PER CURIAM

This appeal involves a dispute related to the applicable limits of liability

in a homeowners insurance policy issued by defendant Farmers Insurance

Company of Flemington to plaintiffs Barry and Ileana Ingram for their Ortley

Beach residence. Plaintiffs challenge two Law Division orders. The first

granted summary judgment to defendant and the second denied plaintiffs'

summary judgment application. Plaintiffs assert the court erroneously found

that the policy provided a total limit of $392,000, rather than an additional

$78,400, for the covered loss at issue.

Based on our review of the record and the applicable legal principles, we

are satisfied that when considered in its entirety the policy language related to

the applicable limit of defendant's liability is sufficiently clear and

unambiguous. We therefore reject all of plaintiffs' arguments and affirm.

I.

We review the factual record in the light most favorable to plaintiffs as

the non-moving party, Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540

(1995), and note that the following facts are largely undisputed.

The policy consists of four relevant sections. First, it includes a

declarations page that details, among other things, the applicable coverage

limits. The declarations page instructs plaintiffs to read all portions of the policy

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to "ensure the coverages, limits, and rating information listed are correct and

that you understand the terms, conditions and limitations that apply." It also

states that the limits of liability for the dwelling coverage, designated in the

policy as Section I, Coverage A, totals $392,000. The declarations page also

notes plaintiffs purchased an optional endorsement, entitled "Increased Special

Limit – Section I," for ninety dollars. Notably, directly next to the

endorsement's description, there is no indication that the coverage limit is

increased, as opposed to two other optional endorsements – the Equipment

Breakdown Enhancement and Service Line Enhancement Endorsements – which

appear to increase the limits by $100,000 and $10,000, respectively. 1

Second, the policy includes a homeowners coverage form that details the

covered causes of loss, special and supplemental coverage limits, and additional

policy provisions. The homeowners coverage form adds to Section I, B, as "an

additional policy provision," Building Code or Law (BCL) Supplemental

Coverage, designated as Coverage 11. In effect, Coverage 11 provides

1

Specifically, the limit and premium columns for these endorsements are

accompanied by an upward-oriented caret. Although the premium column for

the Increased Special Limit endorsement reflects the ninety-dollar increase, the

limit column is empty. Contrawise, the Equipment Breakdown Enhancement

and Service Line Enhancement Endorsements reflect corresponding increases in

both the premiums and limits.

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insurance for compliance with building codes and laws that would have been

otherwise excluded by operation of the Building Law Exclusion. That exclusion

states that defendant does not insure losses related to the "enforcement of any

codes, ordinances, or laws, regulating construction, debris removal, demolition,

maintenance, or repair, other than those pertaining to safety glazing."

Coverage 11 further specifies the policy "will cover such for an amount

determined by applying the applicable factor shown . . . above . . . ." The

"applicable factor" referenced is ten percent of the Coverage A limit, or $39,200.

Plaintiffs, however, paid an additional ninety dollars to increase the BCL limit

to twenty percent of the Coverage A limit, or $78,400, as memorialized in an

endorsement appended to the policy and referenced in the declarations, as noted.

Third, it contains common provisions that identify and explain the policy's

standard provisions, supplemental coverages, and exclusions. The common

provisions form contains Section I, B that adds supplemental coverages.

Notably, the introductory language to the Section I, B Supplemental Coverages

states those provisions "do not extend or modify any provisions of this policy

except to the extent specifically described . . . ." It also clearly provides that

"unless otherwise stated, the limits shown for the following are part of, and not

in addition to, the limits . . . ." (emphasis added). As an additional policy

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provision added to this specific section, the parties do not dispute this preamble

applies to Coverage 11.

The section also details additional, numbered supplemental coverages.

Several of those provisions contain express language specifying whether the

respective coverage limits are altered or amended, consistent with the preamble.

For example, Collapse Coverage "does not increase the limit," although the

Computers, Computer Media, and Computer Software Coverage and the Credit

Card, Forgery, and Counterfeit Money Coverage in paragraphs three and four

states they provide for "an additional amount of insurance."

Finally, the policy includes additional applicable endorsements that

amend or inform the policy. As noted, this section includes the endorsement for

which the plaintiffs paid ninety dollars to increase the BCL coverage. The

endorsement specifies the BCL Supplemental Coverage has an "increase in

limit" of ten percent, making the "new limit" twenty percent. At the top, the

endorsement also clarifies it only "provides for increases in certain special

maximum limits of liability shown . . . ."

After a fire damaged plaintiffs' home, they learned that the repair costs

exceeded $392,000, based in part on expenses related to compliance with local

building codes and laws. Plaintiffs filed a claim with defendant and were

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reimbursed $392,000, the entire policy limit for the dwelling loss under Section

I, Coverage A. They maintained, however, that the policy provided for an

additional $78,400 in coverage related to losses due to "extended" building code

costs, for which they paid an additional ninety-dollar premium under Coverage

11. Defendant refused plaintiffs' demand, and they subsequently filed a two -

count complaint alleging breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith

and fair dealing.

The parties cross-moved for summary judgement and relied exclusively

on the policy's terms and conditions to support their respective positions. After

considering their arguments and written submissions, the court granted

defendant's application and denied plaintiffs' cross-motion. In a February 28,

2025 oral opinion, the court noted the different policy provisions that addressed

the BCL Supplemental Coverage and concluded "that the [BCL] supplemental

coverages are contained therein and are not addition to" the total limit of liability

and held "under this circumstance, the liability coverage for the loss here . . . is

$392,000, and there [is] no additional limit to be provided." It further found the

defendant complied with all of the terms and conditions of the policy, and

"exhausted its obligation under the contract."

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With respect to provision in the policy that adds the BCL Supplemental

Coverage, the court found it "increase[ed] the coverage, meaning . . . [plaintiffs]

are entitled to receive additional protections [t]hat otherwise would [not] have

been covered." The court concluded this provision does not discuss "increasing

the limits of coverage, only that it extends the protection . . . ." The court also

acknowledged, however, that the endorsement later in the policy does discuss

"an increase in the limits" from ten to twenty percent but only did so to establish

the "limits of exposure" for the BCL coverage. In support, the court specifically

relied on the clear and unambiguous language in the preamble to Section I, B

and concluded, in light of that language, there is "no example of when the

amount of liability is increased for [Coverage] 11 . . . ."

II.

Before us, plaintiffs reprise their argument that the policy's liability limit

is not $392,000 and implore us to "liberally construe" the policy in their favor.

In support, they rely on the term "extended" contained in Section 11 that adds

the BCL Supplemental Coverage and assert extended "can only mean that the

coverage is expanded beyond that which is included the declarations page ." As

a result, plaintiffs maintain the supplemental coverage to which they paid an

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additional ninety-dollar premium provided an additional $78,400, or twenty

percent, in limits.

Plaintiffs ground all of their arguments in the well-established policy

interpretation principles that if language in a policy of adhesion is ambiguous,

it "must be construed in favor of the insured's reasonable expectations." They

further assert the court's conclusion that the BCL coverage limits are subsumed

within the Section I, Coverage A limit renders the BCL coverage and their

ninety-dollar additional premium "unnecessary, misleading, and illusory . . .."

With respect to the language in the other supplemental coverage

provisions in Section I, B, including the preamble, plaintiffs contend the term

"extended" in Coverage 11 "satisfy[ies] the 'unless otherwise stated' requirement

referenced in the preamble of Section [I, B]" and rely on the definition of

"extend" in Black's Law Dictionary as including "to expand, enlarge, prolong,

lengthen, widen, carry, or draw out further than the original limit." We disagree

with all of these arguments.

III.

Our review is guided by established principles of jurisprudence. We

review the disposition of a summary judgment motion de novo, applying the

same standard used by the motion judge. Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 59

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(2015). Like the motion judge, we view "the competent evidential materials

presented . . . in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, [and

determine whether they] are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve

the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Town of Kearny

v. Brandt, 214 N.J. 76, 91 (2013) (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of

Am., 142 N.J. at 540 (1995)); see also R. 4:46-2(c). If "the evidence 'is so one-

sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law,'" courts will "not hesitate

to grant summary judgment." Brill, 142 N.J. at 540 (quoting Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).

Furthermore, "[a] trial court's interpretation of an insurance policy's terms

is a legal determination, not a factual inquiry, and is accordingly reviewed de

novo." AC Ocean Walk, LLC v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 256 N.J. 294, 312

(2024) (citing Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hudson E. Pain Mgmt. Osteopathic

Med. & Physical Therapy, 210 N.J. 597, 605 (2012)). Because the homeowner's

policy here is a contract of adhesion, we like other New Jersey courts "give

special scrutiny to [such] insurance contracts because of the stark imbalance

between insurance companies and insureds in their respective understanding of

the terms and conditions of insurance policies." Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co.,

168 N.J. 590, 594 (2001).

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We also consider "[the] parties' arguments in the context of well-settled

principles governing insurance contract interpretation." Birmingham v.

Travelers N.J. Ins. Co., 475 N.J. Super. 246, 256 (App. Div. 2023). "An

insurance policy 'will be enforced as written when its terms are clear in order

that the expectations of the parties will be fulfilled,' with undefined terms

construed in accordance with their 'plain and ordinary meaning.'" AC Ocean

Walk, 256 N.J. at 312 (quoting Flomerfelt v. Cardiello, 202 N.J. 432, 441

(2010)). "If the language is clear, that is the end of the inquiry." Ibid. (quoting

Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 195 N.J. 231, 238 (2008)).

Courts do not "engage in a strained construction to support the imposition of

liability' or write a better policy for the insured than the one purchased." Chubb,

195 N.J. at 238 (quoting Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hurley, 166 N.J. 260, 273

(2001)). "We have long recognized 'the basic notion that the premium paid by

the insured does not buy coverage for all . . . damage but only for that type of

damage provided for in the policy.'" AC Ocean Walk, 256 N.J. at 312 (quoting

Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 81 N.J. 233, 237 (1979)).

Further it is "well-established that the coverage sections of an insurance

policy are to be liberally construed in favor of the insured, exclusions are to be

read narrowly, and ambiguities are to be construed against the insurer." DEB

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Assocs. v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 407 N.J. Super. 287, 293 (App. Div.

2009); see also Mac Prop. Grp. LLC & The Cake Boutique LLC v. Selective

Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 473 N.J. Super. 1, 18 (App. Div. 2022), certif. denied sub

nom., 252 N.J. 258 (2022), and certif. denied sub nom., 252 N.J. 261 (2022).

"An ambiguity arises in an insurance contract when 'the phrasing of the policy

is so confusing that the average policyholder cannot make out the boundaries of

coverage.'" Birmingham, 475 N.J. Super. at 256 (quoting Weedo, 81 N.J. at

247).

"An insurance policy is a contract that will be enforced as written when

its terms are clear in order that the expectations of the parties will be fulfilled. "

Flomerfelt, 202 N.J. at 441 (citing Kampf v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 22 N.J. 36

(1960)). When an "endorsement modifies, qualifies or restricts the terms of the

original policy, the . . . endorsement controls." Gabriele v. Lyndhurst

Residential Cmty., LLC, 426 N.J. Super. 96, 104-05 (App. Div. 2012) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting 2 G. Couch, Couch on Insurance, § 21.22 (2d

ed. 2010)); see also 4 Eric Mills Holmes, Appleman on Insurance, § 20.1 (2d ed.

1998) (explaining that "[i]f any irreconcilable conflict exists between provisions

of the policy and provisions of an endorsement, then the latter must control. ").

"The rationale of this principle is that 'when a specific form of insurance is

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provided by an endorsement tailored to meet the particular needs of the insured

and the [insurer], that language must be followed to carry out the intention of

the parties.'" Gabriele, 426 N.J. Super. at 104-05 (alteration in original) (quoting

St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 655 F.2d 521, 524 (3d

Cir.1981)).

Ultimately, a reviewing court should seek to support the "objectively

reasonable expectations of the parties." Werner Indus., Inc. v. First State Ins.

Co., 112 N.J. 30, 35 (1988). Ideally, the plain and ordinary language of the

policy should reflect those expectations, but should a reasonable alternate

interpretation exist, the ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the insured. See

Passaic Valley Sewerage Com'rs v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 206 N.J.

596, 608 (2011) ("If the policy terms are clear, we interpret the policy as written

and avoid writing a better insurance policy than the one purchased."). "This is

so even if a 'close reading' might yield a different outcome or if a 'painstaking'

analysis would have alerted the insured that there would be no coverage."

Flomerfelt, 202 N.J. at 441 (first citing Zacarias, 168 N.J. at 595; and then citing

Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 100 N.J. 325, 338-39 (1985)). Courts, however, as

noted, are again cautioned against rewriting an insurance policy to provide better

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coverage for the insured. See Kimber Petroleum Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co.,

298 N.J. Super. 286, 300 (App. Div. 1997).

Applying these principles, we are satisfied the BCL limit is not in addition

to, but rather part of, the $392,000 total coverage limit, and thus are convinced

the court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants and denied

plaintiffs' cross-motion. As the court cogently explained, the policy clearly

provides that the supplemental BCL coverage neither alters nor expands the

limit beyond $392,000.

Beginning with Section I, B, we note, again, that the preamble expressly

provides "the following are part of, and not in addition to the limits shown in

the [d]eclarations." (emphasis added). And the applicable endorsement specifies

only the "special maximum limits of liability" are amended, and nowhere in that

endorsement are the overall coverage limits mentioned or changed.

Finally, Coverage 11, in which the BCL Supplemental Coverage is

provided, clearly states that the provision "extend[s]" coverage that would

otherwise have been excluded by operation of the building law exclusion in

Section I, D. The extension of that coverage is entirely consistent with the

Black's Law Dictionary definition relied upon by plaintiffs because it

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"expand[s]" and "enlarge[s]" the otherwise excluded coverage. See Black's Law

Dictionary 960 (12th ed. 2024).

We also note that the other supplemental coverages in Section I, B

similarly use the word "extended," yet, unlike certain of those provisions, the

BCL coverage does not state that its limit "is an additional amount of insurance,"

as it did with the Computers, Computer Media, and Computer Software

Coverage and the Credit Card, Forgery, and Counterfeit Money Coverage. Nor

does the declarations page state or imply that the BCL coverage is in addition to

the stated dwelling limits as it did with respect to the Equipment Breakdown

Enhancement or Service Line Enhancement Endorsements. In light of all of the

policy's relevant provisions, read in context, we are convinced plaintiffs

received expanded BCL coverage with an increase limit from ten percent to

twenty percent as a result of paying the additional premium. AC Ocean Walk,

256 N.J. at 312 (quoting Flomerfelt v. Cardiello, 202 N.J. 432, 441 (2010)). We

therefore disagree that plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of receiving an

additional $78,400 in insurance proceeds in addition to the Section I, Coverage

A $392,000 dwelling limit. Passaic Valley Sewerage Com'rs, 206 N.J. at 608.

We also reject any contention that our interpretation of the policy renders

the BCL coverage illusory. AC Ocean Walk, 256 N.J. at 312 (quoting Weedo,

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81 N.J. at 237). As defendant correctly explains, had plaintiffs' loss not

exceeded the $392,000 coverage limit, the expanded supplemental BCL

coverage would have been more robust, providing up to an additional twenty

percent or limits, to a maximum of $78,400. For example, if plaintiffs' loss had

been $170,000, with $70,000 of those losses separately attributed to BCL

expenses, defendant would have been obligated to pay $114,000, representing

the $100,000 in Part A coverage plus twenty percent, or $14,000, in the

"expanded" BCL coverage, the limits of which were increased from ten percent

to twenty percent as a result of plaintiff's additional ninety-dollar premium.

To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of the parties'

remaining arguments, it is because we have determined they lack sufficient merit

to warrant discussion in a written opinion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

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