The opinion
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3684-23
IN THE MATTER OF
REGISTRANT P.C.
___________________
Argued October 6, 2025 – Decided February 11, 2026
Before Judges Sabatino, Natali, and Bergman.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. ML-99-13-
0050.
Fletcher C. Duddy, Assistant Public Defender, argued
the case for appellant P.C. (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public
Defender, attorney; Fletcher C. Duddy, of counsel and
on the briefs; Alexander W. Geisel, Legal Fellow, and
Julia Bradley, on the briefs).
Melinda A. Harrigan, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
case for respondent State of New Jersey (Raymond S.
Santiago, Monmouth County Prosecutor; Melinda A.
Harrigan, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
This appeal, which returns to us for a second time, arises from the Law
Division's June 11, 2024 order denying registrant P.C.'s as-applied
constitutional challenge to his lifetime registration and notification obligations
under Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f) (subsection (f)). P.C. contends the
continued imposition of that Megan's Law obligation, after a judicial
determination that he is not likely to pose a risk to the public, violates his
substantive and procedural due process rights, as well as the doctrine of
fundamental fairness enshrined in the New Jersey State Constitution. For the
following reasons, we reject all of P.C.'s arguments and affirm the court's order.
I.
On November 22, 1998, a police investigation uncovered that P.C., who
was nineteen at the time, had sexually assaulted a fourteen-year-old victim by
engaging in sexual intercourse on two occasions. At the time, P.C. had invited
the victim and a friend to a local motel, where the group had rented a room for
the night and also provided alcohol and marijuana. The police investigation also
revealed P.C. admitted that he sexually abused the victim on one instance earlier
that month.
The State charged P.C. with two counts of second-degree sexual assault,
N.J.S.A 2C:14-2(c)(4), two counts of third-degree endangering the welfare of a
child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a), and one count of a disorderly-persons charge of
possession of under fifty grams of marijuana, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(4). On
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March 15, 1999, P.C. pled guilty to a single count of endangering the welfare of
a child and the possession of marijuana offense. On September 24, 1999, the
court sentenced P.C. to two years of probation and community supervision for
life (CSL), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4.1 The court also required P.C. to comply with
the registration and tier classification requirements of Megan's Law under
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(a) and filed a conforming Judgment of Conviction (JOC) on
September 30, 1999.
After his sentencing, on August 24, 2000, the court determined by clear
and convincing evidence that P.C. was a Tier II moderate risk offender under
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(a) to (c). That classification required P.C. to notify
"organizations in the community including schools, religious and youth
organization." N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(c)(2).
Approximately a year and a half after his original conviction, police
arrested P.C. for failure to register as a convicted sex offender, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-
2(a). P.C. pled guilty to charges of failure to register and violation of probation
on January 18, 2002. The court sentenced him to a nine-month term of
incarceration with each charge running concurrently in accordance with a
1
"A 2003 amendment to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4 replaced all references to
'community supervision for life' with 'parole supervision for life.'" State v.
Perez, 220 N.J. 423, 437 (2015).
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January 30, 2002 JOC. P.C. completed his sentence and has not committed any
further offenses since his release.
A. P.C.'s First Application and Appeal
On April 1, 2020, P.C. filed a motion seeking to be relieved of his Megan's
Law requirements pursuant to subsection (f) and his parole supervision for life
(PSL) obligations under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(c). After considering the parties'
submissions and arguments, the court issued an oral opinion and entered a June
17, 2020 order that granted P.C.'s motion to be relieved from PSL but denied his
application to be relieved from his Megan's Law registration requirements.
The court explained P.C. was eligible to be relieved of his PSL obligation
because he had been offense-free for fifteen years since his last conviction and
no longer posed a danger to the community. In granting his application, the
court noted N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(c) provides such a remedy only upon "clear and
convincing evidence that the person has not committed a crime for [fifteen]
years since the last conviction or release from incarceration, whichever is later,
and the person is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others if released
from parole." The court found P.C. remained conviction-free for over fifteen
years following his release from incarceration in 2002 for violating his parole.
The court also concluded two reports from an expert in the field of sex offender
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risk assessment and letters from P.C.'s paramour, brother, and parole officer
"coupled with the fact that registrant has remained arrest free" constituted clear
and convincing evidence that P.C. was "unlikely to pose a risk to the safety of
others if terminated from [P]SL."
The court, however, determined P.C. was ineligible to be relieved of his
Megan's Law obligations under subsection (f), which provides relief from
lifetime obligations if registrants are: (1) offense-free for the fifteen years
immediately following their initial conviction for a sexual offense and (2) not a
danger to the community. Addressing the first prong, the court rejected P.C.'s
argument that the fifteen-year period should commence following his release
from incarceration for his failure to register and violation of probation. Relying
on In the Matter of H.D., 241 N.J. 412, 423 (2020), the court concluded "[a]ny
registrant who commits an offense in the [fifteen] years following his or her
conviction for the underlying sex offense, which subjected him or her to Megan's
Law requirement, is statutorily ineligible for termination under [subsection (f)]."
P.C. appealed the court's denial of his Megan's Law termination
application, and we affirmed. See Matter of P.C., No. A-3863-19 (App. Div.
Oct. 19, 2021). In doing so, we specifically rejected P.C.'s argument that the
fifteen-year offense-free period imposed by subsection (f) ran after P.C. was
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released from incarceration in 2002, despite the term of incarceration being
imposed for violating the terms of the probationary sentence. Matter of P.C.,
(slip op. at 7-9). We adopted a plain reading of subsection (f) that commenced
P.C.'s fifteen-year period on September 30, 1999, when his Megan's Law
registration requirement was imposed. Ibid. Notably, and as explained further
at P.C.'s original June 17, 2020 hearing, he did not bring an as-applied
constitutional challenge and inexplicably did not raise such an issue before us
in first unsuccessful appeal.2 P.C. also did not seek Supreme Court review of
our 2021 decision.
B. P.C.'s Second Application and Appeal
For reasons not entirely clear in the record but assumedly in light of our
2021 decision rejecting his statutory interpretation arguments related to
subsection (f), P.C. re-filed a motion in October 2023 seeking to be relieved of
his Megan's Law requirements as an as-applied constitutional challenge. On
April 3, 2024, the court held a second, separate hearing to determine whether
2
At the motion hearing, P.C. clarified that his application proceeded solely on
a "statutory analysis" basis. He expressly affirmed he had "not made, at this
point, an as-applied constitutional challenge" to his Megan's Law obligations
(emphasis added).
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P.C. should be removed from his Megan's Law obligations. As noted, P.C. is a
Tier II moderate risk offender and has never applied for a tier reduction.
The court denied P.C.'s application and explained its decision in a written
opinion. The court began its analysis with a review of the legislative intent and
purpose of Megan's Law and subsection (f). It explained the legislative purpose
of Megan's Law is "to aid law enforcement in apprehending sex offenders and
to enable the communities to protect themselves from such offenders." It
concluded subsection (f) is an "integral" part of Megan's Law and the
Legislature's "reasonable determination that assessing the risk of re-offense and
informing the public about offenders are effective measures for public safety. "
Addressing P.C.'s constitutional arguments, the court held subsection (f)
did not violate P.C.'s substantive due process rights because it was "rationally
related to a legitimate government purpose." Balancing the factors considered
in a substantive due process analysis, the court concluded the State's interest in
community safety outweighed P.C.'s privacy interest, as established by Matter
of M.H., 475 N.J. Super. 580, 593 (App. Div. 2023), certif. denied, 256 N.J. 195
(2024), and recons. denied, 256 N.J. 444 (2024). The court noted the factual
similarities between P.C.'s challenge and the challenge in M.H., as both cases
involved Megan's Law registrants who were denied relief from their reporting
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obligations because of a failure-to-register offense. Although the registrant in
M.H. did not have a judicial determination in the PSL context, the court
determined the case was nevertheless binding and persuasive because the legal
determination for P.C.'s PSL obligations "does not change the relief that is
ultimately being sought" and accepting P.C.'s arguments would afford him
"more rights merely because [he] was sentenced to both Megan's Law and
[PSL]."
Next, the court held subsection (f) comported with procedural due process
because Megan's Law "provides sufficient notice of an offender's registration
requirements, and, importantly, sufficient notice of what conditions offenders
must meet to terminate those requirements." After balancing the factors outlined
in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), the court found subsection
(f) "provides clear notice of registration obligations and the consequences that
would result if these obligations were violated."
Finally, the court held subsection (f) did not violate the doctrine of
fundamental fairness because the Legislature "clearly intended" to procedurally
bar sex offenders who may establish they are not a danger to the community but
do not satisfy the other fifteen-year time clock condition of subsection (f).
Because P.C. did not satisfy subsection (f)'s requirements, the court found the
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doctrine of fundamental fairness, which protects citizens from unjust and
arbitrary governmental action, was not violated.
This appeal followed, in which P.C. raises the following arguments:
I. PERMANENT MEGAN'S LAW REGISTRATION
VIOLATES THE STATE CONSTITUTION'S
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS GUARANTEE
WHEN A COURT HAS ALREADY FOUND, BY
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THAT
THE REGISTRANT IS NOT LIKELY TO POSE A
RISK TO THE PUBLIC.
A. Megan's Law violates substantive due
process when it imposes liberty restrictions
that are not designed to actively protect
society from sex offender recidivism.
B. Continued application of Megan's Law
to P.C., who has already been deemed not
likely to pose a risk to the public, violates
substantive due process because it is not
reasonably related to Megan's Law's goal
of ensuring public safety.
C. Even under the three-factor balancing
test applied by the trial court, subsection (f)
violates substantive due process as applied
to P.C.
D. The trial court's reliance on [Matter of
M.H.] was misplaced because [M.H.] is
factually and legally distinguishable from
P.C.'s case.
II. LIFETIME MEGAN'S LAW REGISTRATION,
WITHOUT AN OPPORTUNITY TO
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DEMONSTRATE LACK OF RISK TO THE PUBLIC,
VIOLATES THE STATE AND FEDERAL RIGHTS
TO PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.
A. Megan's Law registration substantially
limits P.C.'s enjoyment of his protected
interests in privacy, reputation, and general
liberty.
B. Subsection (f)'s lifetime registration
requirement constitutes an erroneous
deprivation of P.C.'s liberty; but this
deprivation could be alleviated by
affording him an appropriate procedure to
seek removal.
C. The State has no legitimate interest in
keeping P.C. on Megan's Law, and his
removal would only lighten the State's
administrative burden, making Megan's
Law more effective.
D. The trial court erred in relying on
[M.H.] and failing to apply the [Mathews]
factors to P.C.'s case.
III. CONTINUED APPLICATION OF MEGAN'S
LAW TO P.C. VIOLATES THE DOCTRINE OF
FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS.
II.
As P.C.'s constitutional challenges constitute issues of law, we review the
court's June 11, 2024 order de novo. State v. Pimentel, 461 N.J. Super. 468, 480
(2019). "A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that
A-3684-23
10
flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference. "
Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)
(citing State v. Brown, 118 N.J. 595, 604 (1990)). We also note a "presumption
of validity attaches to every statute," and "the party challenging the
constitutionality of a statute . . . bears the burden of establishing its
unconstitutionality." State v. Lenihan, 219 N.J. 251, 265-66 (2014). Having
considered defendant's arguments, we conclude his as-applied challenges are
procedurally improper and substantively without merit. We address our
procedural concerns first, followed by a discussion of the relevant substantive
legal principles on each point raised by P.C.
A.
We first address an issue that we raised with the parties at oral arguments
regarding the seriatim nature of this appeal. As noted, P.C. had previously
unsuccessfully filed for relief from his Megan's Law obligations and appealed
that determination, focusing his arguments on the statutory interpretation of
subsection (f). We conclude P.C.'s failure to raise his current as-applied
constitutional arguments in that first appeal was improper.
It is fundamental that litigants are not permitted to pursue successive
appeals in a case that presents issues already resolved by an appellate court in
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an earlier appeal of that same matter, and when they do, they should not raise
any question that could have been presented in the previous appeal, based on the
record as it stood at that time. See, e.g., Reier v. State Dep't of Assessments &
Tax'n, 397 Md. 2, 21 (2007). We also disfavor piecemeal appellate review.
Brundage v. Estate of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 579 (2008). "A party is required
to raise in a single appeal all of his challenges to the judgment appealed from.
The appellate court has no greater tolerance for piecemeal litigation than do the
trial courts . . . ." Shimm v. Toys From The Attic, Inc., 375 N.J. Super. 300,
304-05 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting In re Unanue, 311 N.J. Super. 589, 598-99
(App. Div. 1998)). We recognize P.C. is presenting arguments of a
constitutional dimension, but those arguments could readily have been advanced
as part of the original appeal. We note, at the time P.C. brought his first appeal
of the denial of relief from his Megan's Law obligations, he possessed all of the
necessary facts and findings for which he now relies, including the key finding
that he no longer poses a risk to public safety with respect to his now-relieved
PSL obligations.
Avoiding successive appeals is not a hypothetical or academic concern.
First, it clearly impacts litigants. The issues raised here could have, and certainly
should have, been resolved in the first appeal. Had P.C. done so, he would have
A-3684-23
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received a determination on October 19, 2021, when we issued our plenary
opinion, to which P.C. never sought Supreme Court review.
Instead, the trial court conducted a separate proceeding, and a different
panel of our court, that last term alone disposed of more than 4,500 appeals and
more than 7,400 motions, among other significant responsibilities, was required
to consider additional briefing, re-review the record, conduct oral argument, and
issue a separate plenary opinion. Although we could dismiss this appeal for
P.C.'s failure to address all issues in a single proceeding, we elect not to proceed
in that manner to ensure P.C. receives a thorough appellate review, and to ensure
that future litigants consider and abide by our comments and concerns.
B.
When addressing P.C.'s substantive arguments, we restate the relevant
applicable legal principles, with respect to Megan's Law, subsection (f), and PSL
obligations that inform our consideration. "Megan's Law is intended 'to protect
the community from the dangers of recidivism by sexual offenders.'" M.H., 475
N.J. Super. at 589 (quoting In re Registrant B.B., 472 N.J. Super. 612, 618 (App.
Div. 2022)). In fact, "[t]he expressed purposes of the registration and
notification procedures [under Megan's Law] are 'public safety' and 'preventing
and promptly resolving incidents involving sexual abuse and missing persons.' "
A-3684-23
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In re Registrant A.A., 461 N.J. Super. 385, 394 (App. Div. 2019) (citing N.J.S.A.
2C:7-1). "The law is remedial and not intended to be punitive." Ibid. (citing
Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 12-13 (1995)).
Depending on the type and time of the offense, Megan's Law requires
certain sex offenders register with local law enforcement agencies and mandates
community notification. In re Registrant T.T., 188 N.J. 321, 327-28 (2006)
(citing N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2). The extent of community notification chiefly results
from a registrant's designation as a Tier I (low), Tier II (moderate), or Tier III
(high) offender. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(a), (c)(1) to (3). Tier II offenders, like P.C.,
must notify "organizations in the community including schools, religious and
youth." N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(c)(2). These tier designations reflect a registrant's risk
of re-offense, as determined by a judge assessing various information, including
thirteen factors referenced in the registrant risk assessment scale (RRAS). A.A.,
461 N.J. Super. at 402. The Guidelines, which contain the RRAS, have been
upheld by our Supreme Court. In re Registrant C.A., 146 N.J. 71, 110 (1996).
"[P]SL is a component of the Violent Predator Incapacitation Act, which
is also a component of a series of laws, enacted in 1994, commonly referred to
as 'Megan's Law.'" Perez, 220 N.J. at 436-37 (quoting State v. Schubert, 212
N.J. 295, 305 (2012)). "[P]SL is designed to protect the public from recidivism
A-3684-23
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by sexual offenders. To that end, defendants subject to PSL are supervised by
the Parole Board and face a variety of conditions beyond those imposed on non -
sex-offender parolees." Id. at 437. Our Supreme Court has explained that the
imposition of PSL "is punitive rather than remedial at its core." Schubert, 212
N.J. at 305.
As noted, in 2003, the Legislature intended to "clarify" rather than modify
portions of the original legislation, including changing all references to CSL
with PSL for individuals convicted of certain sexual offenses as well as making
"substantial change[s] to the [P]SL post-sentence supervisory scheme." Id. at
314; Perez, 220 N.J. at 437, 440. PSL's "restrictions . . . monitor every aspect
of the daily life of an individual convicted of a qualifying sexual offense and
expose that individual to parole revocation and incarceration on the violation of
one, some, or all conditions." H.D., 241 N.J. at 421 (quoting State v. Hester,
233 N.J. 381, 441 (2018)). The term of PSL is prospective and "follows
immediately after the parolee's release from incarceration, if applicable." J.B.
v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 433 N.J. Super. 327, 336-37 (App. Div. 2013).
"Registration and community notification under Megan's Law are
presumptively lifetime requirements, unless a registrant can satisfy the
requirements of subsection (f), rebutting any presumption of dangerousness and
A-3684-23
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'demonstrating they no longer pose a risk to their community.'" In re S.O., 482
N.J. Super. 265, 293 (App. Div. 2025) (quoting M.H., 475 N.J. Super. at 601).
To that end, subsection (f) allows Megan's Law registrants to petition for relief
"upon the proof that the person has not committed an offense within [fifteen]
years following conviction or release from a correctional facility for any term
of imprisonment imposed, whichever is later, and is not likely to pose a threat
to the safety of others." N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f). The second prong that a person is
not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others generally "may be granted upon
proof by a preponderance of the evidence." In re J.M., 440 N.J. Super. 107, 116
(Law Div. 2014).
Our Supreme Court has characterized the first prong of subsection (f) as
"unambiguous," in that it "plainly refers to the conviction or release that triggers
the registration requirement." H.D., 241 N.J. at 421. The Court reasoned that
by using similar language, including the term "conviction," in subsection (f) and
the registration mandate in subsection (c), "the Legislature tethered the
registration relief offered in subsection (f) to the same underlying sex offense
that marked the starting point of the registration requirement" and held that
"[u]nder the plain language of subsection (f), the fifteen-year period during
which an eligible registrant must remain offense-free to qualify for registration
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relief commences upon his or her conviction or release from confinement for the
sex offense that gave rise to his or her registration requirement. " Id. at 421, 23.
Finally, the Court stated that "the [registration] mandate commences upon
conviction of a predicate offense for those ‘under supervision in the community
on probation.'" Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(c)(1)).
Meanwhile, a person serving PSL may be released:
only upon proof by clear and convincing evidence that
the person has not committed a crime for [fifteen] years
since the last conviction or release from incarceration,
whichever is later, and that the person is not likely to
pose a threat to the safety of others if released from
parole supervision.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(c).]
Unlike subsection (f), the PSL termination provision does not tether the
period of incarceration to the offense that resulted in the imposition PSL. "[T]he
use of 'last conviction or release from incarceration' . . . is not limited to the sex
offense conviction that led to an offender's [C]SL sentence." H.D., 241 N.J. at
422. A defendant must also demonstrate they no longer pose a threat to the
safety of others, like subsection (f), but must do so "by the higher burden of
'clear and convincing evidence.'" J.M., 440 N.J. Super. at 116.
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C.
In Point I-A, P.C. contends his Megan's Law obligations violate his
substantive due process rights under the New Jersey Constitution because his
restrictions are beyond those "reasonably designed" to protect the public from
sex offenders. He asserts that the continued imposition of his Megan's Law
responsibilities is not "reasonably related" to public safety because he has
already been deemed not a risk to the community when he was relieved from
PSL. P.C. maintains our Supreme Court has concluded Megan's Law obligations
for registrants who have "been found by a court to no longer pose a risk to public
safety . . . serves neither the remedial purpose of Megan's Law nor any other
legitimate state purpose."
Next, in Point I-B, P.C. contends the legal determination that he no longer
poses a risk with respect to his PSL obligations is critically relevant to his
Megan's Law requirements because the two statutory schemes share a "singular
purpose" of public safety. P.C. maintains, as he has already met the burden of
proof for PSL removal, he has also met the burden for the purposes of Megan's
Law to establish he no longer presents a public danger. He further argues, unlike
PSL, Megan's Law violates substantive due process because "it does not allow
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registrants, who can demonstrate their harmlessness, to petition for removal
from the registry."
In Point I-C, P.C. identifies "the several ways his status as a Megan's Law
registrant negatively impacts his life" and notes New Jersey courts "have long
recognized that Megan's Law registration implicates" privacy, reputation, and
general liberty interests. He contends his Tier II status precludes him from
attending adult education classes and traveling interstate with his children,
causing him "a huge source of anxiety, paranoia, and embarrassment." P.C.
asserts he no longer poses a public risk, and there remains no sound
constitutional basis for the continued harmful intrusion.
Finally, in Point I-D, P.C. maintains, unlike Doe, 142 N.J at 89, and other
precedent addressing Megan's Law lifetime obligations, here, a court has
expressly found that he no longer is a danger to the community. P.C. argues this
legal determination for his PSL obligations "is consonant with Doe's central
holding: that Megan's Law is only constitutional insofar as its 'incursion on [a
registrant's] interests is necessary for the protection of the public.'" (citing 142
N.J. at 90-91).
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Under the New Jersey Constitution, equal protection 3 and due process
rights derive from the same language. State v. Pimentel, 461 N.J. Super. at 490.
Although Article I does not contain the terms "equal protection" or "due
process," the New Jersey Constitution does provide that all "persons are by
nature free and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights,
among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and
happiness." N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 1. "It is well settled that the expansive language
of that provision is the source for both of those fundamental [state] constitutional
guarantees." Pimentel, 461 N.J. Super. at 490 (alteration in original) (quoting
Sojourner A. v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 177 N.J. 318, 332 (2003)).
"The guarantee of substantive due process requires that a statute
reasonably relate to a legitimate legislative purpose and not impose arbitrary or
discriminatory burdens on a class of individuals." State in Int. of C.K., 233 N.J.
44, 73 (2018). "Although all laws are presumed to be constitutional, no law can
survive scrutiny under Article I, Paragraph 1 unless it has a rational basis in
furthering some state interest." Ibid. Our courts consider "the nature of the
3
Before us, P.C. has not raised an equal protection claim.
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affected right, the extent to which the governmental restriction intrudes upon it,
and the public need for the restriction." Doe, 142 N.J. at 94.
Our Supreme Court has already "concluded the registration and
community notification provisions of Megan's Law did not violate substantive
due process under the New Jersey Constitution, concluding the State's 'interest
in disclosure substantially outweigh[ed] the interest in nondisclosure.'" M.H.,
475 N.J. Super. at 594 (quoting Doe, 142 N.J. at 90). Against the registrant's
marginal privacy interests in the information being disclosed, the Doe Court
determined the State's "interest in protecting the public is legitimate and
substantial[,]" and the incursion on a registrant's privacy "is necessary for the
protection of the public, as the means chosen are narrowly tailored to that
interest." Doe, 142 N.J. at 90. The Court also considered "the degree and scope
of disclosure is carefully calibrated to the need for public disclosure: the risk of
re[-]offense." Id. at 89.
New Jersey courts have also upheld the constitutionality of the "lifelong
registration and community notification requirements on registrants who fail to
satisfy subsection (f)." M.H., 475 N.J. Super. at 595; see also Matter of J.R.,
478 N.J. Super. 1, 6 n.3 (App. Div. 2024). Heavily relying on Doe and its
analysis of Megan's Law's design, M.H. "acknowledge[d] Doe did not
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specifically address within its analysis whether either Megan's Law's
presumption its requirements will apply indefinitely or the termination
requirements of subsection (f) violate a defendant's substantive due process
rights." M.H., 475 N.J. Super. at 594. Nevertheless, the M.H. court explained
"[s]ubsection (f) was part and parcel of the Legislature's reasonable conclusion
that 'the risk of re[-]offense can be fairly measured, and the knowledge of the
presence of offenders provides increased defense against them.'" Ibid. (quoting
In re Registrant G.H., 455 N.J. Super. 515, 532-33 (App. Div. 2018)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).4
Against these principles, we reject P.C.'s substantive due process
challenge to the Megan's Law registration and community notification
requirements substantially for the reasons expressed in Doe and as explained in
4
As acknowledged by P.C., we note M.H. raised many of the same as-applied
constitutional arguments before us, similarly premised on the contention that
"he pose[d] no greater risk of committing a sex offense than other other member
of the general public." M.H., 475 N.J. Super. at 585. Although M.H. did not
have a judicial determination for the purposes of relief from PSL, the trial court
in his case heard extensive testimony and reports from three experts
demonstrating he no longer posed a public risk. Ibid. Nevertheless, M.H.'s
lifetime reporting requirements under Megan's Law were upheld because he
failed to remain offense-free for fifteen years after his offense. Ibid. Further,
the court concluded his status as a Tier II registrant "undermined" his contention
that he no longer posed a public risk, the other prong necessary for relief under
subsection (f). Id. at 595.
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M.H. We conclude the continued imposition of P.C.'s Megan's Law obligations
does not violate substantive due process because the enforcement of subsection
(f) to deny P.C. relief reflects the Legislature's decision on how to best protect
the public from sexual offenders. We are satisfied he does not meet the criteria
for relief under subsection (f) based on his conviction for failing to register
within fifteen years of the underlying sexual offense. "Subsection (f) was part
of the original Megan's Law registration and notification requirements, which
[the Supreme Court] declared constitutional in Doe." C.K., 233 N.J. at 64 (citing
Doe, 142 N.J. at 12-13).
To the extent that the conditions of relief are different for Megan's Law
and PSL, we conclude those differences reflect the Legislature's attempt to
quantify dangerousness and protect the public while balancing the intrusion on
an offender's privacy. PSL having less stringent conditions for relief but much
more demanding reporting and monitoring obligations than Megan's Law
reflects the Legislature's balance of the State's interest for safety with the
privacy intrusion for offenders. Thus, it is when a registrant both has been
offense-free for fifteen years and no longer poses a risk to the public's safety
that "the registration requirements no longer serve a remedial purpose." C.K.,
233 N.J. at 63. Simply put, PSL and Megan's Law are different statutes with
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different goals, justifying not only different criteria for relief but also explaining
the statutes' different reporting requirements and burdens of proof for relief, and
thus, we find no merit to P.C.'s claim that the court's PSL finding mandates relief
from his Megan's Law obligations.
Additionally, P.C.'s contention he no longer poses a risk to his community
"is undermined by his status as a Tier II registrant." M.H., 475 N.J. Super. at
595. Doe concluded "the evidence proffered by the registrant with respect to
his risk of re-offense was relevant 'only to his ultimate [t]ier classification,' as
opposed to his obligations under the statute in the first instance." Ibid. (citing
Doe, 142 N.J. at 89). Like M.H., P.C. "has never availed himself of the
procedures provided for under the statute to reduce his burden as a Megan's Law
registrant by seeking Tier I designation." Ibid.
D.
Next, in Point II, P.C. contends the statute violates his procedural due
process rights because, despite his legal determination, he is left without a
procedure to remove himself from the Megan's Law registry. P.C. asserts his
"lifetime Megan's Law registration erroneously and substantially limits his
enjoyment of his privacy, reputation, and liberty interests." P.C. argues Megan's
Law registration at any tier implicates "general liberty interests, including
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freedom from restraint and associative rights." Although P.C. has not applied
for a classification reduction to Tier I, he maintains a reduction "would not
alleviate the harms done" such as the emotional toll and effects on employment.
Further, P.C. contends "the balance of interests weighs in the favor of
allowing registrant to demonstrate his lack of dangerousness to a [c]ourt." He
asserts his Megan's Law obligations "serve no government interest adequate to
counterbalance these liberty limitations, which are erroneously imposed"
because he "poses a vanishingly low risk of sex offense recidivism." He asserts
providing a procedure for him to remove himself from the registry "would not
impose a burden on the Government, since this procedure already exists in the
form of the Megan's Law termination hearing." Taken together, he maintains
withholding the opportunity for P.C. to be removed from his Megan's Law
requirements violates his procedural due process rights. We again disagree with
all of P.C.'s arguments.
"In examining a procedural due process claim, we first assess whether a
liberty or property interest has been interfered with by the State, and second,
whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation are constitutionally
sufficient." Doe, 142 N.J. at 99. "The minimum requirements of due process
. . . are notice and the opportunity to be heard." Id. at 106.
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To determine what procedural protections are required in a given case,
New Jersey courts have adopted the Mathews factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute safeguards; and finally, the [g]overnment's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.
[Id. at 106-07 (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S.
113, 127 (1990)).]
Our Supreme Court has applied these factors and upheld the registration
and community notification requirements of Megan's Law with respect to
procedural due process but held "a hearing is required prior to notification under
Tiers [II] and [III]." Id. at 107. "Megan's Law provide[s registrants'] clear
notice of [their] registration obligations and the consequences that would result
if [they] violate[] those obligations." M.H., 475 N.J. Super. at 600.
"[S]ubsection (f) allows a registrant to seek relief from those requirements
fifteen years after [the underlying sexual offense], provided he has been offense-
free and is 'not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others.'" C.K., 233 N.J. at
47-48 (internal citation omitted).
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With these principles in mind, we are further convinced enforcing
subsection (f) with respect to P.C. does not violate his procedural due process
rights because it provides him with a clear path for relief if he met the two
necessary criteria, which P.C. did, and does, not. P.C. does not dispute he has
already taken advantage of the process subsection (f) affords, and only after a
hearing, and appeal, was he denied relief because he does not meet that criteria.
In addition to applying for relief under subsection (f), we note P.C. can also
apply for a tier reduction, a procedure which P.C. has not yet utilized, despite
its potential to reduce P.C.'s reporting responsibilities to only "law enforcement
agencies" in Tier I. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(c)(1).
E.
Finally, in Point III, P.C. asserts lifetime registration and notification
under Megan's Law run afoul of the fundamental fairness doctrine of the New
Jersey Constitution. P.C. contends forcing him to remain on the Megan's Law
registry despite already demonstrating his lack of dangerousness is a "common-
sense denial of fair treatment." P.C. asserts the "arbitrary, inexplicable"
conclusion to deny him relief from Megan's Law violates his fundamental
fairness.
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After oral arguments, P.C. filed a letter brief, citing A.A., 461 N.J. Super.
at 394. P.C. contends A.A. represents an example where our court relied on the
doctrine of fundamental fairness, "specifically in the context of a Megan's Law
case," to hold "a state action . . . ran afoul of the New Jersey Constitution."
New Jersey's doctrine of fundamental fairness:
serves to protect citizens generally against unjust and
arbitrary governmental action, and specifically against
governmental procedures that tend to operate
arbitrarily. [It] serves, depending on the context, as an
augmentation of existing constitutional protections or
as an independent source of protection against state
action. This unique doctrine is not appropriately
applied in every case but only in those instances where
the interests involved are especially compelling[.]
[Doe, 142 N.J. at 108 (quoting State v. Ramseur, 106
N.J. 123, 377 (1987)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).]
In Doe, our Supreme Court held fundamental fairness required registrants
under Megan's Law have "procedural protections that will ensure that his
classification, and its related consequences, are tailored to his particular
characteristics and are not the product of arbitrary action." 142 N.J. at 109.
We conclude subsection (f), as applied to P.C., does not offend
fundamental fairness because its application to P.C. is not arbitrary action but
rather represents a reasonable interpretation of subsection (f)'s plain meaning.
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Further, we are satisfied the different criteria for relief under PSL and Megan's
Law does not violate fundamental fairness based on those statutes' different
goals and different reporting responsibilities that reflect varying levels of
privacy intrusion on offenders' lives and the conditions.
We are unpersuaded A.A. compels a different result. As P.C.
acknowledges, the issue in A.A. concerned protections "afforded to individuals
who committed crimes outside New Jersey when law enforcement allege that
those crimes are 'similar to' Megan's Law offenses . . . ." 461 N.J. Super. at 390.
We are satisfied that case bears no factual similarity to the case before us and
no legal relevance to our analysis of subsection (f), the constitutionality of which
has been robustly affirmed. See M.H., 475 N.J. Super. at 589.
To the extent we have not addressed any of the parties' remaining
arguments, it is because we have determined they lack sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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