In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of M.L.V.

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0228-24

IN THE MATTER OF THE

CIVIL COMMITMENT OF

M.L.V., SVP-318-03.

_______________________

Submitted September 24, 2025 – Decided February 11, 2026

Before Judges Currier and Smith.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law

Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. SVP-318-03.

Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for

appellant M.L.V. (Stefan Van Jura, Assistant Deputy

Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for

respondent (Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney

General, of counsel; Stephen Slocum, Deputy Attorney

General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

M.L.V.,1 a formerly committed resident under the Sexually Violent

Predators Act (SVPA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38, appeals from an order

vacating his conditional release and recommitting him to the Special Treatment

Unit (STU), a secure custodial facility designated for the treatment of persons

in need of commitment pursuant to the SVPA. For the reasons set forth below,

we affirm.

I.

A.

We recount M.L.V.'s history, prior to his initial commitment, from the

direct appeal of his 2003 temporary and final orders of commitment.

M.L.V.'s record dates to April 1971, when he was

fifteen years old. In January 1973, M.L.V. was

sentenced to a juvenile detention facility after he caused

substantial damage to six new cars. He was paroled in

August 1973 and in October 1973, while on parole,

M.L.V. and a friend abducted a 19-year old woman in

a parking lot, forced her into her car at knife point and

drove several miles to a wooded area, where they forced

the woman to remove her clothing and raped her. After

the assault, M.L.V. and his accomplice drove south

with their victim. Two days later, the victim was able

to seek assistance. M.L.V. and his accomplice were

arrested in Virginia. M.L.V. was returned to the

juvenile detention facility. He was released in February

1975.

1

Records relating to civil commitment proceedings are confidential, thus we

refer to M.L.V. by initials to comply with our Court Rules. R. 1:38-3(f)(2).

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On August 14, 1976, M.L.V. broke into the

apartment of J.M., a 64-year-old deaf mute woman. He

was wearing a stocking over his head to conceal his

identity. J.M. was asleep on the couch. M.L.V.

awakened J.M. and forced her to go to the bedroom,

where he tied her wrists and ankles to the bedposts.

M.L.V. cut off J.M.'s clothes with a knife and raped her.

When M.L.V. heard noises from a nearby apartment, he

removed J.M.'s restraints, stole $75 from her purse and

fled.

A few weeks later, on September 3, 1976, M.L.V.

entered S.O.'s apartment. M.L.V. was wearing a

stocking on his head but S.O. recognized him and called

him by name. M.L.V. pointed a knife at S.O. and told

her not to scream. M.L.V. allowed S.O. to go to the

kitchen to feed her young child, but he kept one hand

on her and, according to S.O., repeatedly ran the knife

across her face. When S.O. screamed and tried to pull

away, M.L.V. punched her in the face and fled.

M.L.V. was arrested and charges were filed

respecting the incidents involving J.M. and S.O.

M.L.V. pled guilty of the rape while armed of J.M. He

also pled guilty to breaking and entering S.O.'s

apartment with intent to steal while armed. M.L.V. was

sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of up to thirty

years at the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center

(ADTC) for the rape; a term of nine to ten years for the

armed portion of the rape charge; a three to five-year

term for breaking and entering with intent to steal; and

two to three years for the armed portion of the breaking

and entering charge.

M.L.V. escaped from the ADTC in August 1979

but he was captured and returned to that facility the

following month. While out of confinement, M.L.V.

and an accomplice committed a robbery. M.L.V. was

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convicted and sentenced to a twelve-year term for

robbery, which was made concurrent to the previously

imposed sentences. In March 1993, M.L.V. was

released on parole after having been incarcerated for

sixteen years.

In 1995, M.L.V. picked up a female hitchhiker.

M.L.V. said that the woman agreed to perform oral sex

and engage in sexual intercourse for money. M.L.V.

paid the agreed upon price[,] but the hitchhiker refused

to engage in sexual intercourse and refused to return the

money, which she claimed to have dropped outside the

building where M.L.V. had taken her. M.L.V. said that

he tied the woman's wrists and he went outside to look

for the money. The woman escaped and called the

police. The charges arising from this incident were

downgraded to simple assault. M.L.V. pled guilty and

he was sentenced to time served. . . .

On February 2, 1997, M.L.V. was arrested for

burglary. While this charge was pending, M.L.V. was

arrested for soliciting a prostitute who was in fact an

undercover police officer. He pled guilty to a

disorderly persons offense and was fined. . . .

[In re Civ. Commitment of M.L.V., 388 N.J. Super.

454, 457-59 (App. Div. 2006).]

We affirmed both M.L.V.'s temporary and final orders of commitment,

finding sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the trial court's order

involuntarily committing M.L.V. Id. at 466-67. M.L.V. was committed to the

STU until his conditional release in 2015. The record shows that M.L.V.'s

release required him to "cooperate and abide by [p]arole [s]upervision, as if he

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were on [p]arole [s]upervision for [l]ife[] and cooperate with the applicable

provisions of the Standard Condition[s]" of parole.

In June 2016, while on conditional release, M.L.V. was charged with:

first-degree attempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1(a)(1) and 2C:11-3(a)(1); first-

degree kidnapping, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(b)(2); and third-degree endangering an

injured victim, N.J.S.A 2C:12-1.2(a). M.L.V. entered into a plea agreement,

pleading guilty to second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1).

M.L.V. was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment subject to the No Early

Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.

M.L.V. recounted the incident during an evaluation at South Woods State

Prison as:

In New Brunswick the girl propositioned me. I made

the mistake of agreeing. I knew a park down the street

in Edison. While she was giving me fellatio, she tried

to take my wallet out of my pants. At that point

everything stopped. . . . I got mad, I always keep a pipe

next to my seat. Bad decision I picked the pipe up and

hit her with it numerous times.

In contrast, the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report stated that:

[The victim] was offered a ride by – eventually became

known as [M.L.V.], and . . . they negotiated it seems

like some fee for some sexual act . . . . She reported

that he drove to a wooded area, that she complied with

giving him fellatio, and then he told her to undress and

forced her to engage in unprotected vaginal intercourse.

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She reported then that [M.L.V.] then took a metal bar

and struck her repeatedly on the head and her body.

B.

On October 5, 2023, upon M.L.V.'s release, the State petitioned for civil

commitment of M.L.V. under the SVPA. During the commitment hearing on

May 13, 2024, the State called two witnesses, Dr. Roger Harris, a psychiatrist,

and Dr. Jamie Canataro, a psychologist, to testify regarding M.L.V.'s proposed

involuntary commitment to the STU. M.L.V. did not testify or call an expert.

He stipulated to the qualifications of the State's witnesses.

Dr. Harris diagnosed M.L.V. with other specified paraphilic disorder

(coercion), and antisocial personality disorder. Dr. Harris testified that he

considered M.L.V.'s history to support his opinion that M.L.V. would likely

reoffend. Dr. Harris opined that M.L.V. is at a high risk of reoffending in the

foreseeable future if he was placed in a less restrictive setting than the STU. Dr.

Harris cited M.L.V.'s multiple sexual offenses, various treatment placements,

and repeated bad conduct, paired with his non-compliant behavior on parole in

1994, 1995, and 1997 to support his opinion that M.L.V. has problems regulating

his behaviors.

Dr. Harris opined that M.L.V.'s 2016 offense constituted a sexually based

offense. To support his opinion, Dr. Harris pointed to similarities between the

A-0228-24

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2016 offense and M.L.V.'s prior offenses. Dr. Harris further opined that the

2016 offense, which he concluded involved coercion and violence against a

woman who agreed to M.L.V.'s sexual demands, followed M.L.V.'s pattern of

sexual offending. Dr. Harris noticed M.L.V.'s long history of sexual offenses,

including a 1995 offense involving M.L.V. tying up a prostitute and threatening

her with a knife and a 1997 offense violating his parole, where he patronized a

prostitute that turned out to be an undercover officer. Based upon the

information provided, Dr. Harris gave M.L.V. a Static-99R2 score of five. Dr.

Harris stated this score "places [M.L.V.] in a category of men who were at above

average risk to sexually reoffend when released from a prison."

Dr. Canataro was then called to testify for the State. Dr. Canataro was a

member of the Treatment Progress Review Committee at the STU. Dr. Canataro

diagnosed M.L.V. with "other" specified paraphilic disorder (non-consent with

elements of sexual sadism and telephone scatalogia), antisocial personality

disorder, alcohol use disorder, and borderline intellectual functioning. Dr.

Canataro opined that M.L.V. was "at high risk to engage in future acts of deviant

2

The Static-99R is an actuarial predictor used to determine sexually violent

recidivism in adult males previously convicted of sexually violent offenses. See

M.L.V., 388 N.J. Super. at 460 n.1; Andrew Harris, et al., Static-99 Coding

Rules Revised-2003 5 (2003).

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sexual behavior" if released into community and recommended his

recommitment to the STU.

Dr. Canataro relied in substantial part on M.L.V.'s pattern of behaviors

stretching back fifty years. Dr. Canataro opined M.L.V.'s offenses in 1973,

1995, and the most current offense in 2016 all shared similar traits. According

to Dr. Canataro, all three of the offenses involved M.L.V. identifying vulnerable

females, abducting them, isolating them to put them under his control, bringing

his own weapon which suggests forethought of the action, sexually assaulting

them, and ultimately leaving them naked. Even though Dr. Canataro stated the

2016 offense was not sexual in nature, he still opined it to be a sexual offense

due to "common practice at the STU." Dr. Canataro testified that at the STU it

was common to find offenses sexual in nature when a committee's "behaviors

fit into their overall offending dynamics . . . considering[ing] that part of their

sexual offending history."

The court found the two experts credible. It further found M.L.V. met the

criteria for civil commitment under the SVPA. The court noted that while

M.L.V. wasn't convicted of a statutory enumerated crime, it was still a crime of

significant violence committed under circumstances of significant sexual

conduct, which was substantially equivalent conduct of an offense listed under

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N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26(a). Ultimately, the judge granted the State's petition for

M.L.V. to be recommitted to the STU and rescinded M.L.V.'s conditional

discharge from 2015. On appeal, M.L.V. argues:

I. THE ORDER CIVILLY COMMITTING

APPELLANT TO THE SPECIAL TREATMENT

UNIT FOLLOWING A CONDITIONAL

DISCHARGE SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE

THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER WHETHER

LESS SEVERE MEASURES – SUCH AS

ADDITIONAL TERMS BY WHICH HE MUST

ABIDE – WOULD PROPERLY BALANCE

COMPETING INTERESTS.

II.

Our review of a trial court's determination for civil commitment under the

SVPA is "extremely narrow." In re Civ. Commitment of R.F., 217 N.J. 152, 174

(2014) (quoting In re D.C., 146 N.J. 31, 58 (1996)). We "should not modify a

trial court's determination either to commit or release an individual unless 'the

record reveals a clear mistake,'" and there is a clear abuse of discretion. R.F.,

217 N.J. at 174-75 (quoting D.C., 146 N.J. at 58). See also In re Civ.

Commitment of A.Y., 458 N.J. Super. 147, 166 (App. Div. 2019). Judges who

hear civil commitment cases are considered "specialists," finding "their

expertise in the subject" is entitled to a "special deference." R.F., 217 N.J. at

A-0228-24

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174. See also In re Civ. Commitment of J.S., 467 N.J. Super. 291, 303 (App.

Div. 2021).

We "should not modify a trial court's determination either to commit or

release an individual unless 'the record reveals a clear mistake.'" R.F., 217 N.J.

at 175 (quoting D.C., 146 N.J. at 58). "The appropriate inquiry is to canvass the

significant amount of expert testimony in the record and determine whether the

lower courts' findings were clearly erroneous." D.C., 146 N.J. at 58-59. If a

"trial court's findings are supported by 'sufficient credible evidence present in

the record,' those findings should not be disturbed." R.F., 217 N.J. at 175

(quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)).

The SVPA was enacted "to protect other members of society from the

danger posed by sexually violent predators." In re Civ. Commitment of J.M.B.,

197 N.J. 563, 570-71 (2009). Thus, the SVPA allows the State to involuntarily

commit an individual convicted of a sexually violent offense "who 'suffers from

a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to

engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for control,

care and treatment.'" R.F., 217 N.J. at 173 (quoting N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26). For

involuntary commitment, the State is required to establish that

(1) that the individual has been convicted of a sexually

violent offense; (2) that he suffers from a mental

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abnormality or personality disorder; and (3) that as a

result of his psychiatric abnormality or disorder, "it is

highly likely that the individual will not control his or

her sexually violent behavior and will reoffend."

[In re Civ. Commitment of W.W., 245 N.J. 438, 450

(2021) (quoting In re Civ. Commitment of D.Y., 218

N.J. 359, 380-81 (2014)).]

The State must prove all three elements by clear and convincing evidence. Ibid.

"Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that produces 'a firm belief or

conviction' that the allegations are true; it is evidence that is 'so clear, direct and

weighty and convincing' that the factfinder can 'come to a clear conviction' of

the truth without hesitancy." Ibid. (quoting R.F., 217 N.J. at 173).

The SVPA defines a mental abnormality as "a mental condition that

affects a person's emotional, cognitive or volitional capacity in a manner that

predisposes that person to commit acts of sexual violence." N.J.S.A. 30:4 -

27.26. The SVPA requires that "the mental condition must affect an individual's

ability to control his or her sexually harmful conduct." In re Civ. Commitment

of A.H.B., 386 N.J. Super. 16, 24 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting In re Civ.

Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 127 (2002)). Thus, "the State must prove

that the alleged predator's 'propensity to commit acts of sexual violence is of

such a degree as to pose a threat to the health and safety of others.'" Ibid.

(quoting N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26).

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The SVPA further requires that a person must be likely to "engage in acts

of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for control, care and

treatment," due to mental abnormality or personality disorder. W.Z., 173 N.J.

at 120 (quoting N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26). Under element three of the statutory

requirement, the State must show "a person is 'highly likely,' not just 'likely,' to

sexually reoffend." R.F., 217 N.J. at 173 (quoting W.Z., 173 N.J. at 130).

We apply the same standard for initial involuntary commitment to a

committee who has allegedly violated their conditional discharge. In re Civ.

Commitment of E.D., 183 N.J. 536, 551 (2005) ("[I]n order for the State to cause

the recommitment of a committee who has been conditionally discharged, the

State must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the committee is

highly likely not to control his or her sexually violent behavior and will

reoffend.").

III.

A.

M.L.V. first argues that his conviction for aggravated assault, N.J.S.A.

2C:12-1(b)(1), does not qualify as a predicate offense under the SVPA since it

did not contain a sexual element. Further, M.L.V. asserts his conviction does

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not act as a predicate offense since his own account of the event does not include

a "suggestion of sexual conduct." We are unpersuaded.

The SVPA provides that:

"Sexually violent offense" means:

....

(b) any offense for which the court makes

a specific finding on the record that, based

on the circumstances of the case, the

person's offense should be considered a

sexually violent offense.

[N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26.]

Under this "catch-all" provision, "a court may consider the circumstances that

led to the qualifying prior conviction. When that conduct is substantially

equivalent to the sexually violent conduct encompassed by the offenses listed in

subsection (a), then that prior conviction may provide the predicate for a

commitment application under subsection (b)." J.M.B., 197 N.J. at 577

(emphasis added).

M.L.V.'s 2016 conviction was not one of the enumerated sexually violent

offenses under N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26. However, the State provided two credible

and unrebutted expert opinions from Drs. Harris and Canataro. Dr. Harris

opined that M.L.V.'s 2016 offense constituted a sexually based offense, pointing

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to its similarities with M.L.V.'s prior offenses. Dr. Canataro also found a

common pattern between the 2016 offense and M.L.V.'s other, older offenses.

Dr. Canataro found all three offenses involved M.L.V. identifying, abducting

and isolating vulnerable females, bringing his own weapon, sexually assaulting

them, and ultimately leaving them naked. From Dr. Canataro's experience at the

STU, he stated that finding these offenses sexual in nature based on the

committee's prior history was common practice.

Considering the experts' testimony and the remainder of the record, the

trial court found that M.L.V.'s 2016 offense was one of significant violence and

involved significant sexual conduct. Our careful review of the record reveals

that there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the court's

findings. We discern nothing in the court's findings or analysis to be clearly

erroneous.

B.

We next turn to M.L.V.'s contention that the trial court erred by not

considering less restrictive alternatives to recommitment in its analysis.

M.L.V. asserts the trial court committed error by "skipping over

intermediate measures and failing to properly weigh M.L.V.'s liberty interest."

He contends this failure was a violation of his due process. Instead of being

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recommitted to the STU, M.L.V. contends the court could have placed him on

conditional discharge with orders specifying "he must avoid certain designated

areas and that he refrain from exchanging money for sex." Further, M.L.V.

asserts that a proposed conditional discharge could order him to "[m]aintain[]

steady employment, attending regular meetings with the specialized parole unit,

and continuing out-patient treatment . . . ." We are unconvinced.

Our Supreme Court has long held "it is the role of the trial court 'to "mold"

an appropriate order based upon' the court's evaluation of the evidence." E.D.,

183 N.J. at 551 (quoting State v. Fields, 77 N.J. 282, 302 (1978)). "The

determination of the suitable level of restraint is a matter entrusted to the sound

discretion of the reviewing judge based on his first-hand evaluation of the

particular case and is one as to which he must be accorded a wide range of

flexibility." Fields, 77 N.J. at 302.

Here, the trial court found, using a clear and convincing evidence

standard, that M.L.V. violated his conditional release. The ample record shows

that M.L.V. was a "sexually violent predator in need of civil commitment" to

the STU and that no other terms of conditional discharge would be appropriate.

See E.D., 183 N.J. at 551; N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.32(c)(3). Additionally, Dr. Harris

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and Dr. Canataro both opined that if not committed to the STU, M.L.V. would

be highly likely to engage in future acts of deviant sexual behavior.

We conclude that the trial court's finding that the State met its burden, by

clear and convincing evidence, to support M.L.V.'s recommitment is well

supported. Alternatives to recommitment, including added or supplemental

terms for another conditional discharge, are not appropriate for M.L.V., given

his well-documented, lengthy, and concerning history.

Affirmed.

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