Stinson

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

)

MARK T. STINSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

)

v. ) No. 2:24-cv-02077-SHM-tmp

)

JUDGE JOHN T. FOWLKES, JR., )

DAMON KEITH GRIFFIN, NATHAN )

PATRICK BROOKS, ARTHUR E. )

QUINN, PATRICK E. STEGALL, )

LARRY C. MILLER, CHANCELLOR )

JOEDAE L. JENKINS, RICKY E. )

WILKINS, ARCHIE SANDERS, )

BETTY WILLIAMS, AND NATHAN )

BURTON, )

Defendants.

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS AND DISMISSING CASE

WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Before the Court are three Report and Recommendations issued

by the Magistrate Judge (ECF Nos. 41, 50, 65) recommending that

Plaintiff Mark T. Stinson’s Amended Complaint (the “Complaint”)

(ECF No. 16) be dismissed and that several Motions Plaintiff has

filed (ECF Nos. 38, 48, 59-63) be denied. Also before the Court

are Motions Plaintiff has filed since the last Report. (ECF Nos.

66, 67, 69.) Plaintiff has only filed timely objections (ECF No.

43) to the Report recommending that his Complaint be dismissed

(ECF No. 41).

For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s objections to

the Report recommending that his Complaint be dismissed are

OVERRULED, and the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate

Judge’s Report are ADOPTED, as modified in this Order. This case

is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Plaintiff’s untimely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s

Reports recommending that Plaintiff’s Motions (ECF Nos. 38, 48,

59-63) be denied are deemed WAIVED, the Magistrate Judge’s Reports

are ADOPTED, and the Motions are DENIED. Plaintiff’s remaining

Motions (ECF Nos. 66, 67, 69.) are DENIED AS MOOT.

I. Background

In December 2023, Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, filed

several complaints in the Southern District of Florida. (ECF No.

14.) On January 11, 2024, U.S. District Judge Roy K. Altman

ordered the cases consolidated and directed Plaintiff to file a

single amended complaint.1 (ECF No. 14.) On January 16, 2024,

Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint. (ECF. No 16.) On February

5, 2024, Judge Altman found venue improper in the Southern

District of Florida and ordered Plaintiff’s claims against the

Tennessee Defendants severed and transferred to the Western

District of Tennessee. (ECF No. 28.)

1 Plaintiff paid the filing fee, at minimum, for the Southern District of

Florida case into which his other cases in that District were consolidated. (ECF

No. 5.)

Plaintiff’s instant Complaint is one of many filed in or

transferred to the Western District of Tennessee addressing his

2017 federal criminal trial for various tax crimes, which led to

his conviction and a sentence of imprisonment, and a

contemporaneous 2017 Shelby County Chancery Court proceeding2

affecting the business entity through which Plaintiff was found to

have committed tax crimes in Plaintiff’s federal trial.3 See United

States v. Mark Stinson, No. 2:16-cr-20247-001-JTF (ECF Nos. 83 &

85).

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges, as he has previously,

that many of the individuals in Plaintiff’s federal criminal trial

2 The exact nature of the Chancery Court proceeding (CH-17-0002) is unclear from

the instant Complaint. However, another case Plaintiff has filed suggests that

the proceeding arose from a dispute between Plaintiff and a party from whom

Plaintiff’s business had taken out a loan. The dispute turned on the proper

recipient of the business’s accounts receivable from a client. The Chancellor

ordered the client to pay the monies to the Chancery Court Clerk and Master

until the dispute had been resolved. Ultimately, the Chancellor ordered the

monies paid to the lender rather than to Plaintiff or his business. See 25-2195,

ECF No. 1 at 4, 6,11, 36.

3 Plaintiff’s other cases filed in or transferred to the Western District of

Tennessee arising out of the same set of facts and asserting substantially the

same claims against the same defendants include: (1) 19-2867 (§ 1983 claim

against Defendants Fowlkes, Griffin, Brooks, Quinn, Stegall, and Jenkins); (2)

20-2886 (§ 1983 claim against Defendants Wilkins and Sanders); (3) 21-2128 (§

1983 and Bivens claims against Fowlkes, Griffin, Brooks, Quinn, Stegall,

Jenkins, and Miller); (4) 21-2148 (§ 1983 claim against Fowlkes, Griffin,

Brooks, Quinn, Stegall, and Jenkins, consolidated with 21-2128); (5) 22-2538

(unspecified civil rights claim against Williams); (6) 22-2576 (§ 1983 claim

against Williams and Burton); (7) 22-2694 (§ 1983 claim and construed Bivens

claim against Fowlkes, Griffin, Brooks, Quinn, Stegall, fMiller, Jenkins,

Wilkins, and Sanders); (8) 22-2823 (§ 1983 claim against Williams and Burton,

consolidated with 22-2576); (9) 24-2532 (§ 1983 claim against Fowlkes, Griffin,

and Brooks); (10) 24-2533 (§ 1983 claim against Fowlkes and the Memphis U.S.

Attorney’s Office); (11) 24-2870 (§ 1983 claim Fowlkes, Griffin, Brooks, Quinn,

Stegall, Miller, Jenkins, Wilkins, Sanders, Williams, and Burton); (12) 25-2292

(§ 1983 claim against Brooks and Griffin). Plaintiff has collaterally challenged

his conviction in the following § 2255 and § 2241 cases in the Western District

of Tennessee: 18-2807 (§ 2255), 19-2035 (§ 2241), 21-2605 (§ 2255), 21-2526 (§

2255), and 22-2575 (§ 2255).

violated his federal constitutional and/or statutory rights. (ECF.

No 16.) Plaintiff names as Defendants the federal judge who

sentenced him, Judge John T. Fowlkes, Jr.; the federal prosecutors

who prosecuted him, Damon Keith Griffin and Nathan Patrick Brooks;

the attorneys who represented him, Arthur E. Quinn, Patrick E.

Stegall, and Larry C. Miller; and the witnesses who testified

against him, Betty Williams and Nathan Burton. (ECF. No 16.)

Plaintiff alleges, as he has previously, that individuals

participating in the Chancery Court proceeding violated

Plaintiff’s federal constitutional and/or statutory rights. (ECF.

No 16.) Plaintiff names as Defendants the Chancellor who presided

over the Chancery Court proceedings, Chancellor Joedae L. Jenkins,

and the attorneys who represented Plaintiff, Ricky E. Wilkins and

Archie Sanders. (ECF. No 16.) Plaintiff brings his claims under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents, 403

U.S. 388 (1971) against all Defendants in their official and

individual capacities. (ECF No. 16.)

On August 5, 2025, the Magistrate Judge issued his first

Report recommending that the Complaint be dismissed for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(1). (ECF No.

41.) Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report were due on

August 19, 2025. Plaintiff filed timely objections on August 11,

2025. (ECF No. 43.)

Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on May 19, 2025

(ECF No. 38) and a Motion for Entry of Default Judgment on August

28, 2025 (ECF No. 48). On September 4, 2025, the Magistrate Judge

issued a second Report recommending that both Motions be denied.

(ECF No. 50.) Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report were due

on September 18, 2025. Plaintiff filed untimely objections on

October 14, 2025 (ECF No. 56) and again on December 1, 2025 (ECF

No. 62).

Plaintiff then filed several Motions in November and December

2025 (ECF Nos. 59-63). On December 19, 2025, the Magistrate Judge

issued a third Report recommending that the Motions be denied.

(ECF No. 65.) Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report were due

on January 2, 2026. Plaintiff filed untimely objections on January

5, 2025. (ECF No. 68.)

Plaintiff filed several more Motions in December 2025 and

January 2026 (ECF Nos. 66, 67, 69).

Plaintiff has filed timely objections (ECF No. 43) to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report (ECF No. 41) recommending that his

Amended Complaint (ECF No. 16) be dismissed. Because Plaintiff’s

objections (ECF Nos. 56, 62, 68) to the two Report and

Recommendations (ECF Nos. 50, 65) recommending that Plaintiff’s

Motions (ECF Nos. 38, 48, 59-63) be dismissed were untimely, those

objections are deemed waived. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b)(2)

(“Within 14 days after being served with a copy of the recommend

disposition . . . a party may serve and file specific written

objections to the proposed findings and recommendations . . . .

Failure to object in accordance with this rule waives a party’s

right to review.”) (emphasis added)).

II. Standard of Review

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 636 to relieve the burden on the

federal judiciary by permitting the assignment of district court

duties to magistrate judges. See United States v. Curtis, 237 F.3d

598, 602 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S.

858, 869–70 (1989)). For dispositive matters, “[t]he district

judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s

disposition that has been properly objected to.” See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). After reviewing the evidence,

the court is free to accept, reject, or modify the magistrate

judge’s proposed findings or recommendations. 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1). The district court is not required to review—under a de

novo or any other standard—those aspects of the report and

recommendation to which no objection is made. See Thomas v. Arn,

474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). The district court may simply adopt the

magistrate judge’s findings and rulings to which no specific

objection is filed. See id. at 151.

Objections to any part of a magistrate judge’s disposition

“must be clear enough to enable the district court to discern

those issues that are dispositive and contentious.” Miller v.

Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995). Each objection to the

magistrate judge’s recommendation should include how the analysis

is wrong, why it was wrong, and how de novo review will obtain a

different result on that particular issue. See Howard v. Sec’y of

Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). A

general objection, or one that merely restates the arguments

previously presented and addressed by the magistrate judge, does

not sufficiently identify alleged errors in the report and

recommendation. Id.

“Pro se plaintiffs enjoy the benefit of a liberal

construction of their pleadings and filings.” Boswell v. Mayer,

169 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1999). That liberal standard may

require “active interpretation” in some cases. Franklin v. Rose,

765 F.2d 82, 85 (6th Cir. 1985). However, pro se litigants must

adhere to basic pleading standards, and courts are not required to

develop allegations on litigants’ behalf. Martin v. Overton, 391

F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004).

III. Analysis

The Magistrate Judge’s Report recommends that Plaintiff’s

Complaint be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), citing Apple

v. Glenn. (ECF No. 41 at 1.) In Apple v. Glenn, the Sixth Circuit

held that a district court is permitted to “sua sponte dismiss a

[fee-paid] complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) . . . when the allegations of a

complaint are totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial,

frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion.”

Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999) (per curiam),

cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1198 (2000) (citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415

U.S. 528, 536–37 (1974)).

The Magistrate Judge finds that “[Plaintiff’s] complaint

warrants sua sponte dismissal under Apple v. Glenn for at least

two reasons.” (ECF No. 41 at 9.) First, “[Plaintiff’s] allegations

of a broad conspiracy between federal and state court judges,

federal prosecutors, and his attorneys to send him to jail so that

they could steal his business plans for an online food delivery

service are ‘totally implausible’ and thus deprives the court of

subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. Second, “[Plaintiff’s] complaint

is no longer open to discussion because it is barred under the

doctrine of res judicata.” Id.

In his objections, Plaintiff clearly contests the Magistrate

Judge’s determination that his Complaint is barred by the doctrine

of res judicata. (ECF No. 43 at 2.) Plaintiff does not appear to

object specifically to the first ground the Report cites for sua

sponte dismissal of the Complaint – that the factual allegations

in the Complaint are so “totally implausible” that they deprive

the Court of subject matter jurisdiction. However, the Court

liberally construes Plaintiff as objecting to the overarching

power of the Court to raise issues independently that would be

grounds for dismissing his Complaint absent an appearance or

response by Defendants and to dismiss his fee-paid Complaint on

those grounds. (ECF No. 43 at 2.) (“The court is prejudicing

Plaintiff because the Magistrate Judge is making the decisions for

the Defendants which have been SERVE [sic] but have not appeared

or responded.”)

Construing Plaintiff’s objections liberally, they address the

Report’s primary conclusion that the Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Complaint and that the Complaint

must be dismissed sua sponte.

A. The Court Has the Authority to Dismiss Sua Sponte Factually

and Legally Frivolous Complaints Under 12(b)(1)

Under Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent, federal

courts are not only empowered but obligated to dismiss cases sua

sponte when they lack subject matter jurisdiction, irrespective of

whether defendants have appeared, responded, or raised the issue.

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess

only that power authorized by Constitution and statute . . . .”

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377

(1994) (internal citations omitted). “For that reason, courts are

‘obligated’ to assure themselves of subject matter jurisdiction

sua sponte, whether a party raises the issue or not.” Lynch v.

Tennessee, No. 3:16-cv-03034, 2017 WL 6462345, at *3 (M.D. Tenn.

Sept. 25, 2017) (emphasis added) (quoting Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565

U.S. 134, 141 (2012); see Answers in Genesis of Kentucky, Inc. v.

Creation Ministries Int'l, Ltd., 556 F.3d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2009)

(“[F]ederal courts have a duty to consider their subject matter

jurisdiction in regard to every case and may raise the issue sua

sponte.”). Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[i]f the

court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(h)(3) (emphasis added).

When subject matter jurisdiction is based on a federal

question, under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, rather than on diversity of

citizenship, under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the Supreme Court has held

that “‘it is essential to jurisdiction that a substantial federal

question should be presented.’” Hagans, 415 U.S. at 537 (quoting

Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 31(1933)). “[F]ederal courts are

without power to entertain claims otherwise within their

jurisdiction” that present a “plainly unsubstantial” federal

question. Id. at 536-37 (internal quotations and citations

omitted). “Constitutional insubstantiality for this purpose has

been equated with such concepts as essentially fictitious, wholly

insubstantial, obviously frivolous [,] and obviously without

merit.” Id. at 537 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

“[W]hen the allegations of a complaint are totally

implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of

merit, or no longer open to discussion”, the Sixth Circuit has

held that “a district court may, at any time, sua sponte dismiss a

complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule

12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Apple, 183 F.3d

at 479 (citing Hagans, 415 U.S. at 536–37).

The Supreme Court has expanded on what it means for a

complaint to be wholly insubstantial, obviously frivolous, and

devoid of merit warranting sua sponte dismissal.4 Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). “[A] complaint, containing as

it does both factual allegations and legal conclusions, is

frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in

fact.” Id.

A claim that “lacks an arguable basis in law,” meriting sua

sponte dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, is a

“claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id.

(emphasis added). Claims of this type include “claims against which

it is clear that the defendants are immune from suit . . . .” Id.

at 327; see Odom v. Martin, No. 99-6208, 2000 WL 1176883, at *2

(6th Cir. Aug. 11, 2000)(“[T]he district court correctly dismissed

[Plaintiff’s] action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction . . .

4 Although the Supreme Court has defined what it means for a complaint to be

wholly insubstantial, obviously frivolous, and devoid of merit in the context of

sua sponte dismissals of in forma pauperis complaints under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e),

the Sixth Circuit has routinely applied this definition in the context of Rule

12(b)(1) Apple dismissals. See, e.g., Hassink v. Mottl, 47 F. App'x 753, 755

(6th Cir. 2002) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint that “lacked an

arguable basis in law” for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 12(b)(1))

(citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325); Madkins v. City of Memphis, 20 F. App’x 335,

337 (6th Cir. 2001) (same).

. [Plaintiff’s] complaint is frivolous since all of the named

defendants are immune from liability.”) (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S.

at 327–28).

Courts in the Sixth Circuit have found claims barred by claim

preclusion and claims against private actors under § 1983 and

Bivens to be legally frivolous, meriting sua sponte dismissal

under 12(b)(1). See, e.g., Murphy v. United States, No. 05-2407-

B/P, 2005 WL 1923165, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 1, 2005)

(“[Plaintiff’s] contentions are legally frivolous in this Court

because they are based on an ‘indisputably meritless legal theory’

of seeking relief twice on the same claims or issues . . . they

are inadequate to invoke this Court’s subject matter

jurisdiction.”) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327); Liu v. Runyan,

46 F. App’x 253, 254 (6th Cir. 2002) (affirming Apple dismissal of

§ 1983 claim against private actor not alleged to be a state actor

because “[Plaintiff’s] allegations were not sufficient to invoke

jurisdiction”).

Claims that “lack an arguable basis in fact,” meriting sua

sponte dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, are

“claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”5 Neitzke,

5 When evaluating a complaint for factual frivolousness, courts have “the

unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and

dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327.

490 U.S. at 325, 327. Claims of this type include “claims

describing fantastic or delusional scenarios . . . .” Id. at 328.

Courts in the Sixth Circuit have found allegations of “exotic

torture methods,” government surveillance, and “nationwide

conspiracies by federal officials, presidents, or public figures”

to be “quintessential examples of fanciful allegations.” See

Bardes v. Bush, No. 1:22-cv-290, 2023 WL 2364664, at **1, 8 (S.D.

Ohio Mar. 6, 2023), affirmed as modified at 2023 WL 9318039 (6th

Cir. Dec. 4, 2023), cert. denied, 144 S.Ct. 1061 (2024) (finding

fanciful allegations where Plaintiff alleged that “President

George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, and others have used

hypothermic torture . . . on him . . . [and] are in cahoots with

Microsoft, Google, Apple, and the current or former CEOs of those

companies to silence his research and writings, including through

attempts to kill him.”); Bardes v. Cole, No. 1:24 CV 701, 2025 WL

3628215, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 2025) (“Courts routinely

dismiss frivolous complaints like this one, which allege

nationwide conspiracies by federal officials, presidents, or

public figures, but lack any coherent factual basis.”)

Contrary to Plaintiff’s objections, there is considerable

authority for federal courts to screen a fee-paid complaint such as

this sua sponte to determine whether it is based on an indisputably

meritless legal theory or clearly baseless factual contentions,

depriving the court of the subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate

the claims.

B. Plaintiff’s Complaint Should be Dismissed Sua Sponte Under

12(b)(1) as Factually Frivolous

The Magistrate Judge finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint is

factually frivolous, depriving the Court of subject matter

jurisdiction, because “Plaintiff’s allegations of a broad

conspiracy between federal and state court judges, federal

prosecutors, and his attorneys to send him to jail so that they

could steal his business plans for an online food delivery service

are ‘totally implausible[.]’” (ECF No. 41 at 9) (quoting Apple,

183 F.3d at 479).

Plaintiff’s objections do not specifically contest this

finding. In fact, Plaintiff appears to limit his objections to the

finding that his Complaint is barred by claim preclusion. (ECF No.

43 at 1.) (“[T]he Plaintiff . . . respectfully object[s] to the .

. . Report and Recommendation (R&R) insofar as it concludes that

the present complaint is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.”)

The Court has liberally construed Plaintiff’s broader

objection to the Court’s power to raise issues sua sponte that

would constitute grounds for dismissing his Complaint in the

absence of an appearance or response by Defendants as, in part, an

objection to the Magistrate Judge’s factual finding. The Court has

reviewed de novo a federal court’s authority to dismiss a

complaint sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Plaintiff has made no other objection to dismissing his case for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Apple as factually

frivolous.

The Court is not required to review those aspects of the

report to which no objection is made and may simply adopt

unobjected-to findings and conclusions. See Arn, 474 U.S. at 150.

Therefore, the Court adopts the Report’s conclusion that the

factual allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint are so totally

implausible as to deprive the Court of subject matter jurisdiction

over the Complaint, warranting sua sponte dismissal of the

Complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) and Apple.

Because factual frivolousness is an independently sufficient

ground for dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, the Court need not reach the Report’s

conclusions about the application of claim preclusion to

Plaintiff’s Complaint or Plaintiff’s objections to those

conclusions. For the sake of completeness, however, the Court will

address the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s

Complaint separately warrants sua sponte dismissal as legally

frivolous and Plaintiff’s objections to that finding.

C. Plaintiff’s Complaint Should be Dismissed Sua Sponte Under

12(b)(1) as Legally Frivolous

The Magistrate Judge concludes, in effect, that Plaintiff’s

Complaint is legally frivolous, depriving the Court of subject

matter jurisdiction. The Magistrate Judge concludes that

“[Plaintiff’s] complaint is no longer open to discussion because

it is barred under the doctrine of res judicata.” (ECF No. 41 at

9.) Plaintiff contests the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that his

Complaint is barred by res judicata. (ECF No. 43 at 2.)

On de novo review, the Court concludes that claim preclusion

does not render Plaintiff’s Complaint legally frivolous in its

entirety. Only one of Plaintiff’s prior cases has preclusive

effect on Plaintiff’s current claims. That prior case does not

preclude all of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants.

All of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants are nevertheless

legally frivolous because they seek damages from (1) Defendants who

are absolutely immune from civil liability or (2) private parties

who do not act under the color of state or federal law as required

for a § 1983 or Bivens claim.

1. Claim Preclusion Does Not Render Plaintiff’s

Complaint Legally Frivolous in its Entirety

The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, provides

that “[a] final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the

parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or

could have been raised in that action.” Federated Dept. Stores,

Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981).

In the Sixth Circuit, a prior action precludes a subsequent

action when four conditions are met: (1) the prior action resulted

in a final judgment on the merits (“final judgment on the

merits”); (2) the subsequent action is between the same parties or

their “privies” as the first action (“identity of the parties”);

(3) the claim or issue in the subsequent action was actually

litigated or should have been litigated in the prior action

(“issue actually litigated”); and (4) the subsequent action

involves the same causes of action or claims (“identity of the

causes of action”). See Browning v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761, 771–73

(6th Cir. 2002).

The Magistrate Judge concludes that all four elements of

claim preclusion are satisfied and that Plaintiff’s Complaint is

barred in its entirety by Plaintiff’s prior actions. (ECF No. 41

at 10–12.) Plaintiff objects to the conclusion that the “final

decision on the merits” and “identify of claims” elements of claim

preclusion are satisfied. (ECF No. 43 at 2, 4). In reviewing claim

preclusion conclusions de novo, the Court need only address in

detail the first element of claim preclusion: a final judgment on

the merits.

The Report states that “[Plaintiff] has filed several

complaints in the Western District of Tennessee, all of which have

resulted in a final judgment on the merits” and cites specific

cases that were “dismiss[ed] . . . on various grounds[.]”6 (ECF No.

6 The Report cites: (1) Stinson v. Fowlkes, No. 2:22-cv-02694-SHM-tmp, 2023 WL

3938880, at *3-6 (W.D. Tenn. June 9, 2023) (dismissing Plaintiff’s amended §

1983 and Bivens claims against Judge Fowlkes, Griffin, Brooks, Quinn, Stegall,

Miller, Wilkins, Sanders, and Chancellor Jenkins on various grounds), appeal

dismissed, No. 23-5869, 2023 WL 9063672 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 2023); (2) Stinson v.

Williams, No. 2:22-cv-02576-SHM-tmp, 2023 WL 146267, at *5-7 (W.D. Tenn. Jan.

10, 2023) (dismissing Plaintiff’s § 1983 and Bivens claims against Williams and

Burton on various grounds; appeal not filed).

41 at 10.) Plaintiff objects that “the R&R may have misapplied the

‘final decision on the merits’ requirement,” although for

inapplicable reasons.7 (ECF No. 43 at 4.)

Only one of Plaintiff’s prior twelve actions8 – one that does

include all the Defendants or claims in the instant case –

resulted in a final judgment on the merits with preclusive effect

on Plaintiff’s current Complaint.

Only One of Plaintiff’s Prior Cases Has Claim

Preclusive Effect on Plaintiff’s Current Claims

In eight of Plaintiff’s twelve prior cases in the Western

District of Tennessee, including the two cases cited in the

Report, Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis

(IFP) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).9 In the instant case,

Plaintiff has paid the filing fee. (ECF No. 5.) The distinction in

paying status matters for application of claim preclusion. Under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), federal courts screen and sua sponte dismiss

complaints filed in forma pauperis under § 1915(a) that are

frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B). Each of Plaintiff’s eight prior IFP cases was

7 Plaintiff argues that the Report may have misapplied the “final decision on

the merits” element because “a dismissal for lack of standing . . . is not a

final decision on the merits for res judicata purposes.” (ECF No. 43 at 4.) None

of Plaintiff’s prior cases was dismissed for lack of standing.

8 See cases cited supra note 2.

9 See 20-2886, ECF No. 4 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 9, 2020); 21-2128, ECF No. 7 (W.D.

Tenn. Apr. 19, 2021); 21-2148, ECF No. 4 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2021); 22-2576,

ECF No. 4 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 1, 2022); 22-2694, ECF No. 7 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 28,

2022); 22-2823, ECF No. 35 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 10, 2023); 24-2870, ECF No. 8 (W.D.

Tenn. Dec. 12, 2024); 25-2292, ECF No. 24 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 4, 2025).

dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).10 However, the dismissal of an action

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “is not a dismissal on the merits, but

rather an exercise of the court’s discretion under the in forma

pauperis statute . . . [and] does not prejudice the filing of a

paid complaint making the same allegations.” Denton v. Hernandez,

504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992)(emphasis added); see also Davis v. Butler

Cty., Ohio, 658 F. App’x 208, 213 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Because the

holding in Denton suggests that dismissal under § 1915(e) operates

as an adjudication on the merits only as to future complaints

filed in forma pauperis, . . ., we have reason to doubt the

soundness of the district court's conclusion that Davis's second,

paid complaint was barred by res judicata.”) Thus, under Denton,

the IFP dismissals, including the two cases the Report cites, do

not operate as final judgments on the merits with preclusive

effect on the instant fee-paid Complaint, although the Complaint

alleges substantially the same claims against substantially the

same Defendants.

Of the remaining four of Plaintiff’s twelve prior cases in

the Western District of Tennessee, one was voluntarily dismissed

10 See 20-2886, ECF No. 7 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 5, 2021); 21-2128 & 21-2148, ECF No.

12 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 9, 2021); 22-2576 & 22-2823, ECF No. 13 (W.D. Tenn. Jan.

10, 2023) (dismissing consolidated case with prejudice for failure to state a

claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)); 22-2694, ECF No. 37 (W.D.

Tenn. June 9, 2023); 24-2870, ECF No. 12 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 11, 2025); 25-2292,

ECF No. 30 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 2, 2025) (recommending dismissal for failure to

on Plaintiff’s motion under FRCP 41(a).11 The other three were

involuntarily dismissed under FRCP 41(b) for failure to prosecute

because Plaintiff had failed to comply with IFP requirements as

ordered.12 An involuntary dismissal for failure to prosecute under

FRCP 41(b) “operates as an adjudication on the merits” with

preclusive effect unless the dismissal order states otherwise.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see Bragg v. Flint Bd. Of Educ., 570 F.3d

775, 777 (6th Cir. 2009) (“By its plain language, an involuntary

dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) constitutes

an adjudication on the merits and carries preclusive effect.”) The

dismissal order in two of the three 41(b) dismissals expressly

states that the dismissal was “without prejudice” and so has no

preclusive effect on the current Complaint. 13

Only one of Plaintiff’s prior cases in the Western District

of Tennessee constitutes a final adjudication on the merits with

preclusive effect on the current Complaint: 19-2867, in which

Plaintiff brought a § 1983 claims against Defendants Fowlkes,

Griffin, Brooks, Quinn, Stegall, and Jenkins in an unspecified

capacity.

11 See 22-2538, ECF No. 8 (W. D. Tenn. Aug. 31, 2022) (dismissing case on

Plaintiff’s Motion).

12 See 19-2867, ECF No. 18 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 19, 2021) (dismissing case with

prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) for failure to comply with Court’s IFP order);

24-2532, ECF No. 8 (Dec. 5, 2024) (dismissing case without prejudice pursuant to

Rule 41(b) for failure to comply with Court’s IFP order); 24-2533, ECF No. 9

(Nov. 15, 2024) (dismissing case without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) for

failure to comply with Court’s IFP order)

13 See supra note 12.

Plaintiff’s Prior Case with Preclusive Effect

Does Not Extend to All Defendants or Claims in

the Current Case

There are numerous obstacles to relying on Case No. 19-2867

to bar the instant Complaint in its entirety.

First, the instant Complaint includes claims against

Defendants who were not parties to the first action and who cannot

be regarded as in privity with parties to the first action. In the

prior action, Plaintiff sued Defendants Fowlkes, Griffin, Brooks,

Quinn, Stegall, and Jenkins, all of whom Plaintiff names as

Defendants in the instant action. In the instant action, however,

Plaintiff also names Miller, Wilkins, Sanders, Williams, and

Burton as Defendants. None of these newly-added parties – three

private attorneys and two testifying witnesses (one a state

employee, one a federal employee) – can be said to share one of

the six narrow categories of privity recognized by the Supreme

Court with the named Defendants in the first action – two judges

(one federal judge, one county judge), two federal prosecutors,

and two private attorneys. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880,

893–95 (2008). The dismissal of the first action does not preclude

any of Plaintiff’s claims against the newly-added Defendants in

the instant action, Miller, Wilkins, Sanders, Williams, and

Burton.

Second, under “the rule of differing capacities,” the prior

action does not preclude all of the claims brought against

Defendants in the current action who were parties to the first

action. The rule of differing capacities provides that “[a] party

appearing in an action in one capacity, individual or

representative, is not thereby bound by or entitled to the

benefits of the rules of res judicata in a subsequent action in

which he appears in another capacity.” Mitchell v. Chapman, 343

F.3d 811, 823 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Restatement Second of

Judgments § 36(2) (1982)); see also Leirer v. Ohio Bureau of Motor

Vehicles Compliance Unit, 246 F. App'x 372, 375 (6th Cir. 2007)

(“In essence, suing [a party] in her official capacity is not the

same as suing her in her individual capacity.”).

In the instant action, Plaintiff has sued Defendants Fowlkes,

Griffin, Brooks, Quinn, Stegall, and Jenkins in both their

individual and official capacities. (ECF No. 16 at 2-6.) In the

prior action, Plaintiff did not specify the capacity in which he

sued the same Defendants. See No. 19-2867, ECF No. 1 (W.D. Tenn.

Dec. 17, 2019).

Although it is preferable that a plaintiff state explicitly

whether a defendant is sued in his or her “individual capacity,”

the failure to do so is not fatal if the “course of proceedings”

indicates that the defendant received sufficient notice that the

intent was to hold the defendant personally liable. Moore v. City

of Harriman, 272 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc). The

Sixth Circuit has applied a “course of proceedings” test to

determine whether § 1983 defendants have received notice of the

plaintiff’s intent to hold a defendant personally liable. Id. at

773; see Rashada v. Flegel, No. 23-1674, 2024 WL 1367436, at *3

(6th Cir. Apr. 1, 2024); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.

159, 167 n. 14 (1985) (noting that the “course of proceedings” in

unspecified capacity cases typically will indicate the nature of

the liability sought to be imposed). The “course of proceedings”

test considers such factors as the nature of the plaintiff’s

claims, requests for compensatory or punitive damages, the nature

of any defenses raised in response to the complaint, and whether

subsequent filings put the defendant on notice of the capacity in

which he or she is sued. Moore, 272 F.3d at 772 n.1 (citing Biggs

v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 61 (4th Cir. 1995)). In Moore, the Sixth

Circuit found that the “course of proceedings” test satisfied

because the complaint “taken as a whole” likely provided

sufficient notice to the defendants that they were being sued as

individuals because the caption did not list the defendants’

titles, referred to the defendants throughout as the “individual

defendants,” had language indicating the defendants were acting

for themselves, and requested damages against “each of the

defendants.” Id. at 773. The Court also found that the plaintiff's

response to defendants’ motion to dismiss clarified that the

plaintiff was suing the defendants in their individual capacities.

Id. at 773.

Here, unlike Moore, the caption of the Complaint on the Pro

Se Complaint Form in Case No. 19-2867, which only lists Judge

Fowlkes, includes Judge Fowlkes’ official title. See No. 19-2867,

ECF No. 1 at 1 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 17, 2019). The allegations in the

Complaint against Defendants Judge Fowlkes, Griffin, Brooks, and

Chancellor Jenkins primarily or solely refer to them by the office

they held or entity that employed them, not by name. Id. at 5-6.

For example, the allegations against Judge Fowlkes and Chancellor

Jenkins are made in terms of “the court did x.” Id. (“The court

read the instruction wrong.”). The allegations against Griffin and

Brooks are made in terms of “the government did x.” See, e.g., id.

at 5 (“The government failed to summons the petitioner to the

grand jury hearing.”). The allegations against Defendants Quinn

and Stegall are primarily made in terms of the job title of

“attorney,” rather than by name. See, e.g., id. (“The attorney

failed to bring key witnesses to trial.”). The Complaint also

“simply requests damages in general,” rather than against each

individual defendant. Id. at 7-8; see Vittetoe v. Blount County,

Tennessee, 861 F. App’x 843, 851 (6th Cir. 2021).

Unlike Moore, Plaintiff’s subsequent pleadings in Case No.

19-2867 would not have put Defendants on notice that they were

being sued in their individual capacities. Plaintiff’s subsequent

motions repeated the allegations of the complaint in a generalized

format, e.g. “the court did x” and “the government did x.” See,

e.g., No. 19-2867, ECF Nos. 5 at 6, 13 at 1, 15 at 6-7. Plaintiff

attempted to file an amended complaint in No. 19-2867 using an

updated Pro Se Complaint Form that provided a check box stating

whether Plaintiff was suing each defendant in his or her

individual capacity and/or official capacity.14 No. 19-2867, ECF

No. 15 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 12, 2021). On that Form, Plaintiff checked

only “official capacity” for the four Defendants the pro se

complaint form was able to accommodate – Judge Fowlkes, Griffin,

Brooks, and Quinn. Id. at 2-3. On his handwritten “Additional

Defendant Sheet,” Plaintiff again did not specify the capacity in

which he sued Chancellor Jenkins, Stegall, or Miller. Id. at 4.

However, he re-attached the same typed-up pages of allegations

from his initial complaint, which primarily identified Chanceller

Jenkins as “the court” and Stegall and Miller as “the attorney,”

rather than by name. Id. at 6-7.

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the Defendants in the

original action were official capacity claims. The dismissal of

those claims does not have preclusive effect on the individual

capacity claims Plaintiff brings against the same Defendants in

this action. See Leirer, 246 F. App'x at 374-75 (construing claims

dismissed in first action as official capacity claims and

14 The Clerk of the Court opened a new case under Case No. 21-2128 with

the attempted Amended Complaint Plaintiff filed in No. 19-2867.

reversing dismissal on res judicata grounds of individual capacity

claims against same defendants in second action).

Plaintiff’s Complaint cannot be dismissed in its entirety on

res judicata grounds.

2. Plaintiff’s Claims Against Absolutely Immune

Defendants are Legally Frivolous

Plaintiff sues Defendants who are entitled to absolute

immunity from civil liability under well-settled Supreme Court

precedent, including judges carrying out their judicial functions,

prosecutors initiating and pursuing criminal prosecutions, and

witnesses testifying at grand juries and trials. Because

Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants are based on an

“indisputably meritless legal theory,” they warrant sua sponte

dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 325, 327.

a. Absolute Judicial Immunity: Fowlkes and Jenkins

Plaintiff sues United States District Judge Fowlkes for

alleged wrongdoing in presiding over Plaintiff’s 2017 criminal

trial and sentencing.15 Plaintiff also sues Shelby County

15 Seeking $9,000,000 from Judge Fowlkes, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that “the

court” – whom this Court interprets to indicate Judge Fowlkes (all errors in

original):

(a) misread the jury instruction; (b) was given an email during trial but the

email, was Not entered into the trial exhibits; (c) conspiracy; (d) agreed to an

illegal superseded indictment and sealed it after trial; (e) abuse its statutory

discretion; (f) failed to sua sponte a competency hearing; (g) prejudiced the

petitioner; (h) violated the 6th Cir. P.R.1o1(a); (i) did nothing when the trial

attorney told him that he was lying about the expert answer;(j) allowed the

prosecutors two closing remarks and only one for the defense; (k) allowed the

prosecutors to many picks for jurors; (l) misapprehending it statutory

obligation under title 18 U.S.C. § 424(a); (m) failed to get an waiver from

Chancellor Jenkins for alleged wrongdoing in presiding over the

Chancery Court proceeding affecting Plaintiff’s business.16

Judges, in the performance of their judicial functions, are

absolutely immune from civil liability. See Pierson v. Ray, 386

U.S. 547, 554 (1967); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 363-64

(1978). The “touchstone” of a judicial function is the

“performance of the function of resolving disputes between

parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating private rights.”

Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435–36 (1993)

(internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Lucas v.

Holland, No. 16-2309-JDT-cgc, 2017 WL 1088300, at *5 (W.D. Tenn.

Mar. 22, 2017), affirmed at 2017 WL 4764472 (6th Cir. Sept. 26,

2017) (“[A]ctions taken . . . during the course of criminal

proceedings . . . clearly are within . . . the scope of the[]

[judge’s] judicial function”).

abrogated right to effectiveness of counsel, violated petitioner's due-process

rights; (o) denied the petitioner a fair trial; and (p) denying access to

exculpatory testimony.

16 Seeking $2,500,000 from Chancellor Jenkins, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges the

following (all errors in original):

(a) conspiracy to stop the plaintiff from hiring an experience tax attorney for

the federal case (2:16-cr-2o247-JTF), buy issuing and illegally fiat to seizes

seventy-three thousand dollars and eighty nine cents ($73,033.89), from the

plaintiffs business account without cause (Case No. C-17-0002), (b) the Chancery

Court Clerk and Master did not properly deposited the funds through

interpleader, (c) intentionally fraudulent practices, in violation of Tenn. Code

Ann. _ 40-33-204(c)(1); (d) the Court paid $19,000, to the special master

without any notice and without this matter being settled; (e) this was a

government account; (f) Fifth Amendment Right, due process violation; (g)

Chancery Court prejudiced the defendant; (h) violated T.C.A. _ 40-33-201; and

(i) fraud.

A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action

the judge took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in

excess of the judge’s authority. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356. Absolute

judicial immunity cannot be defeated by allegations of bribery or

corruption. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28–29 (1980)

(affirming judicial immunity on allegations “that an official act

of the defendant judge was the product of a corrupt conspiracy

involving bribery of the judge”).

Absolute judicial immunity is abrogated only for non-judicial

acts and acts a judge takes in the complete absence of all

jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991) (per

curiam). “A judge acts in the complete absence of all jurisdiction

only if the matter upon which the judge acts is clearly outside

the subject matter of the court over which the judge presides.”

Wellman v. PNC Bank, 508 F. App'x 440, 443 (6th Cir. 2012) (per

curiam).

Plaintiff’s allegations against Judge Fowlkes arise from

actions that Judge Fowlkes took in his judicial capacity during

Plaintiff’s criminal trial and sentencing. See Lucas, 2017 WL

1088300, at *5. The Complaint contains no facts from which to

infer that Judge Fowlkes lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

trial or sentencing. Presiding over criminal proceedings is within

the scope of Judge Fowlkes’ jurisdiction and is precisely the type

of circumstance to which absolute judicial immunity applies.

Plaintiff’s unsubstantiated allegations that Judge Fowlkes

committed errors during the criminal trial or engaged in

“conspiracy” do not affect his judicial functions or his absolute

immunity from civil liability.

Plaintiff’s allegations against Chancellor Jenkins arise from

actions that Chancellor Jenkins took in his judicial capacity

during a proceeding in the Shelby County Chancery Court when

allocating disputed accounts receivable for Plaintiff’s business.

See Antoine, 508 U.S. at 435–36. The Complaint contains no facts

from which to infer that Chancellor Jenkins lacked jurisdiction

over the Chancery Court proceeding, and Plaintiff’s unsupported

allegations that Chancellor Jenkins committed error, was engaged

in a conspiracy, or engaged in illegal conduct do not abrogate the

Chancellor’s absolute immunity from civil liability.

Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity: Griffin and

Brooks

Plaintiff sues the two prosecutors from his 2017 federal

criminal trial: Griffin, who was an Assistant U.S. Attorney at the

time of the trial, and Brooks who was a Trial Attorney at the

Department of Justice’s Tax Division.17

17 Seeking $10,000,000 from lead prosecutor Griffin and $9,000,000 from Brooks,

the Complaint alleges that “the prosecutors” engaged in the following wrongdoing

(all errors in original):

(a) did Not summons the petitioner to the grand jury hearing; (b) issued a bad

indictment; (c) executed an illegal R.I.C.O.; (d) made too many picks for

jurors; (e) witnesses lied under oath, with bogus evidence; f) witness tampering

and intimidation; (g) Misconduct; (h) conspiracy; (i) fraud; (j)they heard the

defense attorney tell the court that he was lying, and they said or did nothing;

(k) superseded the indictment after trial; (l) gave testimony immunity to their

Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity when initiating

and pursuing criminal prosecutions in their role as advocates for

the government. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427, 430-31

(1976). In that role, “[p]rosecutors . . . are tasked with

equipping judges and juries to accurately determine a defendant's

guilt[,]” and “that task necessarily entails making judgment calls

as to how pre-trial matters are handled, trials are conducted,

witness are used, and evidence is presented.” Price v. Montgomery

Cty., 72 F.4th 711, 719 (6th Cir. 2023).

A prosecutor will not be deprived of immunity for

“‘unquestionably illegal or improper conduct,’ including instances

where a defendant is genuinely wronged.” Price, 72 F.4th at 719

(quoting Cady v. Arenac Cty., 574 F.3d 334, 340 (6th Cir. 2009))

(emphasis added); see. e.g., Imbler, 424 U.S. at 413 (holding that

a prosecutor accused of knowingly presenting false testimony at

trial is protected by absolute immunity); Koubriti v. Convertino,

593 F.3d 459, 467 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[P]rosecutors have absolute

immunity from civil liability for the non-disclosure of

exculpatory information at trial.”).

Prosecutorial immunity is abrogated only when prosecutors’

actions do not stem from the prosecutor’s “role as advocate for

the State” and are not “intimately associated with the judicial

defense witness; (n) brady violation; (o) admitted evidence that was totally

without relevance; p) coerced witnesses to lie under oath; (q) made two closing

remarks and only one for the defense; (r) interference of defendant's compulsory

phase of the criminal process.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S.

259, 273 (1993); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 491 (1991). When

prosecutors perform “administrative duties and those investigatory

functions that do not relate to an advocate's preparation for the

initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings[,]” they

are “not entitled to absolute immunity.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273

(citing Burns, 500 U.S. at 494-96).

Plaintiff’s allegations about Defendants Griffin and Brooks’

conduct relate to the prosecutors’ handling of evidence and

witnesses, their advocacy before the grand jury to secure an

indictment, and their prosecution of claims at trial to secure a

conviction. All of the challenged conduct is “intimately

associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process” and

closely related to the initiation and pursuit of Plaintiff’s

criminal prosecution, for which the Defendants are shielded from

liability by prosecutorial immunity.

The Complaint does not allege any facts that negate Griffins

and Brooks’ absolute immunity. Plaintiff does not allege conduct

by Griffin and Brooks that was outside an “integral part of the

judicial process.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. Plaintiff’s

allegations of “misconduct”, “fraud” and “conspiracy” by Griffin

and Brooks do not deprive them of absolute immunity from civil

liability.

Absolute Witness Immunity: Williams and Burton

Plaintiff sues two of the prosecution witnesses from his 2017

criminal trial: Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agent Betty

Williams and State Department of Tennessee employee Nathan

Burton.18

Witnesses who testify at trial are entitled to absolute

immunity from suit based on that testimony. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460

U.S. 325, 330–34 (1983); Spurlock v. Satterfield, 167 F.3d 995,

1001 (6th Cir. 1999) (“It is well-settled that witnesses are

granted absolute immunity from suit for all testimony provided in

judicial proceedings.”). Government officials and employees who

testify as part of their official duties are afforded absolute

testimonial immunity like any private witness. See Briscoe, 460

U.S. at 342-43.

18 Seeking $8,000,000 from Williams, the Complaint alleges that Williams engaged

in the following wrongdoing at the federal criminal trial (all errors in

original):

17. On or about December 4-8, 2017, during the Plaintiff Federal trial,

(No.2:16-cr-24207MTF) Betty Williams, Revenue Agent a government witness from

Internal Revenue Service, (IRS) in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1621 and 18 U.S.C.

1001, when she gave false statement under oath.

18. Williams told the court and the jury that the business was behind in

business taxes and therefore didn't qualify for an offer in compromise (OIC)

from IRS.

19. Williams also had bogus evidence (941's forms) that had the Plaintiff

signature on them but wasn't signed by the Plaintiff. The signatures were copied

and pasted on those forms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519.

Seeking $6,000,000 from Burton, the Complaint alleges that Burton engaged in the

following wrongdoing at the federal criminal trial (all errors in original):

20. Nathan Burton, Tennessee State Department Employee also a government witness

from Tennessee State Department, told the court and the jury that the Plaintiff

applied for an LLC from the Tenn. State Dept. in 2007 and 2008, which was a

false statement in violated of 18 U.S.C. § 1621 and 18 U.S.C. § 1001.

21. Burton had LLC forms from 2007 and 2008 with the Plaintiff signature on them

but the Plaintiff didn't sign them. The signatures were copied and pasted on

§

A witness is “insulated from liability for any testimony that

he provided at trial, no matter how egregious or perjurious that

testimony [is] alleged to have been.” Spurlock, 167 F.3d at 1001

(affirming absolute immunity for law enforcement officer witness

who gave false testimony at criminal trial); see also Briscoe, 460

U.S. at 340, 345-46 (government official alleged to have falsely

testified against criminal defendant leading to unjust conviction

entitled to absolute immunity for his testimony).

Absolute witness immunity is abrogated only for non-

testimonial acts. Spurlock, 167 F.3d at 1004 (holding that

“[defendant] is not entitled to absolute testimonial immunity for

the alleged non-testimonial acts that occurred outside the

judicial proceeding”).

Plaintiff’s allegations against Williams and Burton are based

on the testimony they gave at Plaintiff’s criminal trial for which

they are absolutely immune as witnesses engaged in testimonial

acts. The Complaint alleges no non-testimonial acts by the

Defendants to which witness immunity would not extend. Plaintiff’s

allegations that Williams and Burton made “false statements under

oath” and gave “bogus evidence” on the stand do not abrogate their

immunity.

Even if Plaintiff were able to establish irrefutably that the

judge, prosecutor, and witness Defendants he names in his

Complaint violated federal constitutional and statutory rights

that could normally be vindicated under § 1983 or Bivens,

Plaintiff still could not sue those Defendants for damages because

they are absolutely immune from suit under well-settled Supreme

Court precedent.

All of Plaintiff’s claims against all the immune Defendants

are legally frivolous. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

over them. See Odom, 2000 WL 1176883, at *2 (“[T]he district court

correctly dismissed [Plaintiff’s] action for lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction . . . [Plaintiff’s] complaint is frivolous

since all of the named defendants are immune from liability.”)

3. Plaintiff’s § 1983 and Bivens Claims Against Private

Parties are Legally Frivolous

Plaintiff’s remaining claims are against the attorneys who

represented him at the federal trial and associated proceedings

(including an appeal and a habeas petition), Quinn, Stegall, and

Miller,19 and the attorneys who represented him in the Shelby

County Chancery proceeding, Wilkins and Sanders.20

19 Seeking $8,000,000 from Quinn, the Complaint alleges that Quinn (all errors in

original):

(a) was ineffective and a conflict of interest arose; (b) conspiracy; (c) fraud;

(d) failed to argue PTSD at pre-trail; (e) failed to use subpoena power; (f)

told the Court that he lied about the handwriting expert answer; (g) received

funds to hire the expert but did Not hire him theft of government funds; (h)

continue to say to defendant they are going to bury you and there is nothing we

can do about it; (i) failed to call the U.S. Veteran Affairs Doctor to give

testimony at trial; (j) did Not appeal the trial after he was instructed to by

the petitioner several times; (k) failed to investigate, collect vital evidence,

and interview vital witnesses; (l) knew government witnesses were lying under

oath with bogus evidence and said nothing; (m) continue to hound defendant to

accept plead deal and avoid trial; (n) knew defendant was innocent and wanted to

maintain his innocence's; (o) he got upset when defendant refuse to accept a

plea and begin to badger the defendant; (p) drove the defendant out of his mind

with the harassment and pressure to take a plea deal; (q) did Not asks certain

question of government witnesses after defendant begged him to; (r) failed to

address government interference of defendant's compulsory process rights; (s)

did Not know tax laws; (t) submitted documents to Sixth Circuit Appeals without

defendant knowledge or approval; (u) knew about the illegal superseded

indictment and said nothing; (v) did Not protect defendant's mental status; (w)

prejudice the defendant; (x) breach of fiduciary duty; and (y) breach of

contract.

Seeking $7,000,000 from Stegall, the Complaint alleges that Stegall (all errors

in original):

(a) filed documents to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals without defendant

knowledge nor his approval; (b) did Not give defendant copies of what was filed;

(c) did Not return any of the defendant's phone calls, emails nor letter for

months when the defendant was incarcerated; (d) was ineffective and a conflict

of interest arose; (e) conspiracy; (f) submitted a brief to 6th Cir. that was

Not fully developed; (g) also knew about the illegally superseded and sealed

indictment; and (h) did Not give the defendant a copy of the indictment nor the

conviction; (i) fraud, (j) breach of fiduciary duty; and (k) due process

violation.

Seeking $2,500,000 from Miller, the Complaint alleges that Miller (all errors in

original):

(a) submitted the § 2241 motion (wrong motion) but did Not give defendant copies

of the complete file; (b) was ineffective, and a conflict of interest arose; (c)

conspiracy; (d) did Not petition for an evidentiary hearing; (e) did Not perfect

the appeal before withdrawal; (f) did Not give defendant copies of the

indictment nor the conviction; (g) also knew about the illegal superseded and

sealed indictment after trial, (h) fraud, (i) breach of fiduciary duty; (j) due

process violation; and (k) breach of contract.

20 Seeking $6,000,000 from Wilkins and $2,500,000 from Sanders, the Complaint

makes the following identical allegations as to each Defendant (all errors in

original):

(a) conspiracy to stop the plaintiff from hiring an experience tax attorney for

the federal case, (b) did Not try to stop the Chancery Court Judge from seizing

the plaintiff funds, (c) did Not try to get the funds back after the special

Plaintiff brings his claims against these Defendants under §

1983 and Bivens. The Court need not address whether Plaintiff has

successfully established that the attorney Defendants violated

constitutional or federal statutory rights that might be

vindicated through a damages suit under § 1983 or a Bivens claim.

Private parties, including attorneys, do not act under the color

of state or federal law, as required to sustain either cause of

action. Plaintiff’s claims against the attorney Defendants, like

Plaintiff’s claims against the absolutely immune Defendants, are

based on an “indisputably meritless legal theory” and warrant sua

sponte dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See

Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.

§ 1983 Claims Against Private Parties

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against state and

local officials for violations of federal constitutional and

statutory rights. Under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the

plaintiff’s rights were violated by a person “acting under color

of state law.” Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150

(1970).

“[T]he under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes

from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how

discriminatory or wrongful [.]” American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.

duty, (f) ineffective assistance of counsel, (g) conflict of interest, (h)

violation of Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, (i) quantum meruit; (j) due

Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (quotation marks and citations

omitted); see Brotherton v. Cleveland, 173 F.3d 552, 567 (6th Cir.

1999) (“A § 1983 plaintiff may not sue purely private parties.”);

Krukemyer v. Forcum, 475 F. App’x 563, 566 (6th Cir. 2012)

(“[T]here is no constitutional right to be free from harm

inflicted by private actors.”).

For purposes of § 1983, it is well-established that private

attorneys are not state or local officials and that their actions

in representing private clients in state and local courts do not

constitute state action. See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,

318 (1981) (“[A] lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue of

being an officer of the court, a state actor ‘under color of state

law’ within the meaning of § 1983.”); Krukemyer, 475 F. App’x at

566 (“It is well-settled that a lawyer representing a private

client is not a state actor acting ‘under color of state law.’”).

That attorneys are licensed by states does not transform them

into government officials. Dodson, 454 U.S. at 319 n.9 (“Although

lawyers are generally licensed by the States, ‘they are not

officials of government by virtue of being lawyers.’”) (quoting In

re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 729 (1973)). Attorneys who are court-

appointed or public defenders, rather than privately retained, are

not transformed into state actors who act under the color of state

law while performing their traditional function of representing a

client. See Dodson, 454 U.S. at 325 (“[A] public defender does not

act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's

traditional function as counsel to a defendant in a criminal

proceeding.”); Floyd v. Cnty. of Kent, 454 F. App'x 493, 497 (6th

Cir. 2012) (“Defense attorneys, whether compensated by the State

or retained by a client, do not act under color of state law when

they perform a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to the

accused in a criminal proceeding.”)

Here, the attorney Defendants are private actors and their

conduct – and their alleged misdeeds – in representing Plaintiff

in federal and state court is private conduct for which Plaintiff

may not sue them under § 1983. Plaintiff has not alleged that any

of the attorney Defendants acted under the color of state law.

Defendants Wilkins and Sanders represented Plaintiff in Shelby

County Chancery Court. They are not transformed from private

actors to state or local officials because they were licensed by

the state or represented Plaintiff in state court. There is not

even a remotely plausible case that Defendants Quinn, Stegall, and

Miller, who represented Plaintiff in the federal court, acted

under the color of state law.

Bivens Claims Against Private Parties

For largely analogous reasons, Plaintiff may not sue any of

the attorney Defendants under Bivens.

A Bivens claim is a limited cause of action against

individual federal officers or agents for violations of certain

constitutional rights. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S.

471, 484-86 (1994); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61,

66-70 (2001) (“The purpose of Bivens is to deter individual

federal officers from committing constitutional violations.”).

Under Bivens, a plaintiff must allege that his rights were

violated by a person “acting under color of federal law.” Left

Fork Min. Co., Inc. v. Hooker, 775 F.3d 768, 774 (6th Cir. 2014).

Just as a § 1983 claim is not intended to reach private conduct by

private parties, a Bivens claim is not intended to reach private

conduct by private parties.

Just as a private attorney representing a client in state or

local court does not act under the color of state law for purposes

of a civil rights action under § 1983, “a private attorney

[representing a client in federal court] . . . do[es] not act

under color of federal law for purposes of a Bivens action.”

Bradford v. Shankman, No. 85-5150, 1985 WL 13659, at *1 (6th Cir.

Aug. 12, 1985) (citation omitted); see Willhite v. Arrants, No.

2:23-CV-95-TAV-JEM, 2023 WL 11915398, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 8,

2023) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that the attorney defendants

became federal actors by representing her in federal court).

Just as an attorney appointed to represent a client in state

or local court is not transformed into a state official for

purposes of § 1983, “an attorney is not transformed into a federal

official for purposes of a Bivens action merely because he is

appointed by a federal court pursuant to federal law.” Pagani-

Gallego v. Escobedo, No. 97-1640, 1998 WL 381562, at *1 (6th Cir.

June 23, 1998); see Bradford 1985 WL 13659, at *1 (“[A] federal

public defender do[es] not act under color of federal law for

purposes of a Bivens action.”).

As explained above, the attorney Defendants are private

actors and their representation of Plaintiff is private conduct

for which Plaintiff may not seek damages under Bivens. Plaintiff

has not alleged – nor could he convincingly do so – that

Defendants Quinn, Stegall, and Miller acted under color of federal

law by representing Plaintiff in federal proceedings or, in the

case of Quinn and Stegall, by being appointed to represent

Plaintiff. Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants Wilkins and

Sanders, who represented him in state court, acted under color of

federal law, nor is there a remotely plausible case for doing so.

Plaintiff’s § 1983 and Bivens claims against the attorney

Defendants, who are private parties and did not act under color of

state or federal law, are legally frivolous and merit dismissal

under 12(b)(1). See, e.g., Hall v. Board, No. 24-3797, 2025 WL

2639656, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 17, 2025) (“Because [attorney

defendants] are not ‘state actors’ capable of being sued under §

1983, [plaintiff’s] claims against these defendants are patently

meritless and therefore subject to dismissal under Apple.”); Hamp

v Craig, No. 89-6193, 1990 WL 47533, at *1 (6th Cir 1990)

(affirming dismissal of Bivens claim against attorney as lacking

an arguable basis in law because there was no federal action).

IV. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s Complaint is both factually frivolous, relying on

implausible factual allegations, and legally frivolous, comprising

claims against judges, prosecutors, and witnesses who are

absolutely immune from suit and claims against private parties who

do not act under the color of state or federal law as required for

a § 1983 or Bivens claim.

The Complaint is so devoid of merit that it fails to invoke

this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore, must be

dismissed under 12(b)(1). See Apple, 183 F.3d at 479–80.

Plaintiff’s objections (ECF No. 43.) to the Magistrate

Judge’s Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 41) recommending that

Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 16) be dismissed are OVERRULED and

the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge’s Report are

ADOPTED, as modified in this Order. The Court DISMISSES this

matter WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Plaintiff’s untimely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s

Reports (ECF Nos. 50, 65) recommending that Plaintiff’s Motions (ECF

Nos. 38, 48, 59-63) be denied are deemed WAIVED, the Magistrate

Judge’s Reports are ADOPTED, and the Motions are DENIED. Plaintiff’s

remaining Motions (ECF Nos. 66, 67, 69.) are DENIED AS MOOT.

SO ORDERED this 10th day of February, 2026.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.Saays, Jr.

SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE