Noem

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CARLOS DAVID GUAIRA UTRERA, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Case No. 6:26-cv-3051-MDH

)

JIM ARNOTT, et. al., )

)

Respondents. )

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner has been detained by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and parole

has been terminated without prior written notice. Pending is his Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus in which he argues federal statutes and the Due Process Clause require that he be released

or granted a hearing. The Court agrees with Petitioner’s statutory arguments, and on that basis, it

concludes the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela. Respondent last entered the United States

in July 2022, over 3 years ago. Petitioner does not have a criminal record. Petitioner is currently

in removal proceedings before the Kansas City Immigration Court. He is scheduled for a final

hearing March 2, 2026, before the Immigration Judge. Petitioner was previously in removal

proceedings and had submitted an application for asylum (Form I-589) before the Immigration

Judge.

On October 31, 2025, Petitioner was taken into custody by ICE/ERO officials. He was

working as a landscaper when he was detained. Petitioner is currently detained at Greene County

Jail in Springfield, Missouri.

Petitioner brought this proceeding, seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241, against (1) the acting field office director for ICE Chicago, (2) the Secretary of DHS, and

(3) the Greene County Sheriff, all in their official capacities.1 He asserts his detention violates the

Immigration Nationality Act (INA), and the Due Process Clause. Respondents argue that Petitioner

is not entitled to be considered for release, and the Court resolves the parties’ arguments below.

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Respondents argue that three statutory provisions—8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(e)(3), 1252(g) and

(b)(9) deprive this Court of jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s claims. The Court disagrees.

Section 1252(e)(3), entitled “Challenges on validity of the system,” limits the scope of

judicial review of “orders under Section 1225(b)(1)” and limits venue to the U.S. District Court

for the District of Columbia. Petitioner is “not challenging the lawfulness of any particular statute,

regulation, or written policy or procedure.” Thus, § 1252(e)(3) does not strip this Court of

jurisdiction. See Munoz Materano v. Arteta, 2025 WL 2630826 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2025), at *10.

Further, this statute only bars jurisdiction based on those held under 8 U.S.C. § 1225. However,

the Court adopts its ruling in similar cases2 and finds that Petitioner is being held under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226. Therefore, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3) does not deprive the Court of Jurisdiction.3

1 Petitioner’s Petition lists Sheriff Arnott as a party by virtue of his administration of the Ozark County Jail where

Petitioner is currently detained. While Sheriff Arnott was not served in this case as of the date of this Order, the Court

construes the proper party holding Petitioner in custody as the Department of Homeland Security through Immigration

and Customs Enforcement. As DHS and ICE are utilizing the Greene County Jail to hold Petitioner and other detainees,

the Court expects its ruling to apply to the Government and those aiding the Government regarding this specific case.

2 Andres v. Noem, et al., No. 25-03321-CV-S-MDH, Eshdavlatov v. Olson, et al. No. 25-00844-CV-S-MDH,

Hernandez-Cuevas v. Olson, et al., No. 25-00830-CV-W-BP, Ifante v. Noem, et al., No. 25-03322-CV-S-MDH,

Morales-Rodriguez v. Arnott, et al., No. 25-00836-CV-S-MDH, Pozos-Ramirez v. Noem, et al., No. 25-03316-CV- S-

MDH.

3 As of the date of this Order the Court is not aware of any appellate decisions from this Circuit. The Court however

will highlight cases from District Courts in this Circuit as supporting the analysis in this case: Barrajas v. Noem,

Sections 1252(g) and (b)(9) apply narrowly to systemic challenges to regulations

implementing expedited removal, review of an order of removal, the decision to seek removal, or

the process by which removability will be determined, not to constitutional or statutory claims

which precede and are collateral to that process, including, as relevant here, unlawful arrest or

detention. See Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, No. 25-CV-493-LJV, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135986,

2025 WL 1953796, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. July 16, 2025); see also Hernandez-Cuevas v. Olson, No.

4:25-cv-00830-BP, at 3 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 05, 2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2)); Cifuentes Rivera

v. Arnott, et al, 25-cv-00570-RK1, Doc.19 at 7 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 07, 2025) (“the narrow scope of §

1252(g) does not cover “claims [that] are collateral to the Government’s decision to execute the

final order of removal,” for instance, claims seeking relief based upon the Government’s alleged

failure to comply with its own regulations regarding the required administrative processes after an

alien is detained.”). Petitioner is challenging his unlawful detention, not any removal decisions or

actions, so the above provisions do not deprive the Court of jurisdiction.

For those reasons, this Court concludes it has jurisdiction over Petitioner’s habeas petition.

II. The Due Process Clause

"A procedural due process claim has two elements: (1) a deprivation of a

constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and (2) a denial of adequate procedural

protections." Sanchez v. LaRose, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190593, *6-7 (citing Miranda v. City of

Casa Grande, 15 F4th 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotations and citation omitted)).

2025 WL 2717650, at *3 (S.D. Iowa Sep. 23, 2025); Giron Reyes v. Lyons, 2025 WL 2712427, at *4 (N.D. Iowa

Sept. 23, 2025); Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, 2025 WL 2466670, at *6-7 (D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025). The Court is aware that

the Fifth Circuit issued a 2-1 decision from a 3-judge panel agreeing with the Respondents’ position and rejecting

Petitioner’s arguments and hundreds of district court decisions across the country. See Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi,

Case No. 25-20496 (5th Circuit, 02/06/2026). The Fifth Circuit’s decision does not bind this Court.

"Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of

physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the [Due Process] Clause protects." Sanchez

v. LaRose at *7 (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 690). Although immigration detention is

administrative, it is still subject to due process clause review. Id. (citing Hernandez v. Sessions,

872 F3d at 981 ("the government's discretion to incarcerate noncitizens is always constrained by

the requirements of due process.")). When the government grants an alien parole into the country,

it creates a liberty interest intimately tied to freedom from imprisonment. Id. (citing Alegria Palma

v. LaRose, 25-cv-1942, ECF No.14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2025) (finding that "continued freedom

after release on own recognizance" was a core liberty interest)). Here, Petitioner was deprived of

his liberty interest in his prior parole status when Respondents revoked that parole and placed him

in detention.

Respondents also denied petitioner due process in the revocation of his parole. "The

essence of due process is the requirement that 'a person in jeopardy of a serious loss [be given]

notice of the case against him and the opportunity to meet it." Sanchez at *8 (citing Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist

Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72, 71 S. Ct. 624, 95 L. Ed. 817 (Frankfurter, J.,

concurring)). In the immigration context, "the Constitution requires the government to afford

notice of any action against an alien [and] requires an opportunity for the alien to be heard. [] The

opportunity to be heard must be meaningful, that is, an opportunity granted at a meaningful time

and in a meaningful manner." Id. (citing Ying Fong v. Ashcroft, 317 F.Supp.2d 398, 403 (S.D.N.Y.

2004) (internal quotations and citations omitted)).

An alien's opportunity to be heard regarding the revocation of his parole is only meaningful

if the government comports with its own internal standards regarding parole revocation. DHS has

the authority to revoke an alien's parole "at any time" on a discretionary, but not unlimited, basis.

Id. at *8. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b); Mohammed H. v. Trump, No. 25-1576 (JWB/DTS), 2025 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 117197, 2025 WL 1692739, at *5 (D. Minn. June 17, 2025) ("The Government has

wide—but not unlimited—discretion in the immigration realm.")). The Board of Immigration

Appeals ("BIA") has held that DHS may change the conditions of an alien's parole only when there

is a sufficient change of circumstances to justify that change. Id. (citing Matter of Sugay, 17 I. &

N. Dec. 637, 640 (BIA 1981) (as cited in Alegria Palma, No. 25-cv-1942-BJC-MMP, ECF No.14

at 3)). "In practice, the DHS re-arrests individuals only after a 'material' change in circumstances."

Id. at *9. (citing Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F.Supp.3d 963, 968 (N.D. Cal. 2019)). To satisfy due

process, those changed circumstances must represent individualized legal justification for

detention. Id. at *9 (citing Mohammed H., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117197, 2025 WL 1692739 at

*5 (granting a writ of habeas corpus on due process grounds due to a lack of individualized legal

justification for changing the petitioner's status)).

Here, Respondents revoked Petitioner's parole without a showing of change in

circumstances related to his case. Respondents do not dispute the facts as Petitioner presents them.

They only argue this Court lacks jurisdiction and their interpretation of the relevant statutes is

correct. In their briefing, Respondents do not state a "sufficient change in circumstances" to justify

revoking Petitioner's parole, or any individualized justification at all. Id. at *9 (citing Matter of

Sugay, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 640). Petitioner was previously in removal proceedings and had

submitted an application for asylum before the Immigration Judge, the underlying facts of which

have not changed. At the time of his detainment, he was working as a landscaper and awaiting

further immigration proceedings. There was no evidence from his conduct that he was a flight risk.

He was simply performing his duties as a landscaper. Thus, Respondents did not satisfy the

requirement of due process in revoking Petitioner's parole.

III. Temporary Restraining Order

In the Petition, Petitioner seeks an order enjoining Respondents’ continued detention of

Petitioner or a temporary restraining order directing Respondents to conduct a bond hearing to

ensure his due process rights. Petitioner also requests this Court grant any further relief this Court

deems just and proper.

The Court below orders release and will not issue a TRO or permanent injunction

specifically for those matters. However, under similar circumstances, this Court has granted

temporary injunctive relief to habeas petitioners to enjoin Respondents from relocating petitioners

outside the jurisdiction of this Court prior to compliance with this Order. The Courts finds that

such relief is just and proper in this case.

In analyzing a request for a TRO, the Court weighs: 1) probability movant will succeed on

the merits; 2) threat of irreparable harm to the movant absent injunction; 3) balance between

threatened harm to the movant and harm the injunction would inflict on other interested parties;

and 4) the public interest. Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Syst., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir.1981)

(en banc). “No single factor is dispositive;” rather, the court must consider all factors to determine

whether on balance they weigh towards granting the remedy. Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v.

Lenox Labs., Inc., 815 F.2d 500, 503 (8th Cir. 1987).

The Court finds that a TRO in this case is appropriate. As discussed above, the Court has

already found that movant will succeed on his Petition for Habeas Corpus by virtue of his Due

Process argument. Further, the threat of irreparable harm to the movant absent injunction is high

as any move from this district prior to a bond hearing would render this Order and Petitioner right

to a hearing as meaningless. As to the balance between the threatened harm to the movant and the

harm the injunction would inflict on other interested parties, the balance tips in favor of Petitioner.

Respondents and other interested parties would not suffer by allowing Petitioner to have a hearing.

Lastly, there is a public interest in allowing those who are detained in violation of the Due Process

Clause to be released and given hearing as expressed and determined by Congress. For these

reasons, the Court finds a TRO is appropriate.

IV. Attorneys’ Fees

Petitioner requests an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Pursuant to the EAJA,

a court shall award to a prevailing party fees and other expenses incurred by that party in any civil

action, brought by or against the United States, unless the court finds that the position of the United

States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust. 28 U.S.C §

2412(d)(1)(A). To be eligible for fees under the EAJA, a petitioner must submit an application

within thirty days of final judgment, and the petitioner's net worth must be less than two million

dollars at the time the civil action was filed. See id. §§ (d)(1)(B), (d)(2)(B)(i). The EAJA was

enacted with the purpose of removing the financial disincentive for individuals challenging or

defending against government action and encouraging challenges to improper government action

as a means of helping formulate better public policy. See, e.g., Comm'r, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S.

154, 163 (1990) (“[T]he specific purpose of the EAJA is to eliminate for the average person the

financial disincentive to challenge unreasonable governmental actions.” (citation omitted));

Boudin v. Thomas, 732 F.2d 1107, 1114 (2d Cir. 1984) (“The EAJA was passed partly to encourage

challenges to improper actions by government agencies. The drafters perceived legal actions as

helping to formulate public policy.” (citations omitted)).

As explained throughout, the Court finds the position of the United States is not

substantially justified. Respondents revoked Petitioner's parole without a showing of change in

circumstances related to his case. Respondents do not dispute the facts of Petitioner’s status, arrest,

or detainment. Yet, Respondents revoked Petitioner’s parole without prior written notice. Thus,

Petitioner may pursue an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to the Equal

Access to Justice Act.

CONCLUSION

The Court concludes Respondents revoked Petitioner's parole without a showing of change

in circumstances, his right to procedural due process has been violated, and he is entitled to

immediate release. Accordingly, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED as follows.

1. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody, subject to

the conditions of his preexisting parole.

2. Petitioner must be immediately released from detention and returned to a reasonable

proximity of the geographical location of his residence.

3. All property must be returned to him (including his ID, work permit, or any other

documentation that was in his possession when he was detained by ICE).

4. Petitioner shall promptly report to the Court any failure to comply with this Order by

Respondent.

5. Petitioner may submit an application for fees under the EAJA within thirty days of the

entry of final judgment.

6. It is FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents are enjoined from relocating Petitioner

outside the jurisdiction of this Court prior to compliance with this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 10, 2026

/s/ Douglas Harpool

DOUGLAS HARPOOL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE