identifying an explicit cause of action to sue for viola- tions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act
How later courts described this case
- identifying an explicit cause of action to sue for viola- tions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act
- petitioners were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their implied rights claim under 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(1)(A)
- “HAVA creates no private cause of action.”
- dismiss- ing a case that would have addressed a circuit split on certain forms of intangible injuries as moot
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-1279
WISCONSIN VOTER ALLIANCE, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
DON M. MILLIS, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 1:23-cv-01416-WCG — William C. Griesbach, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED SEPTEMBER 11, 2025 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 10, 2026
____________________
Before BRENNAN, Chief Judge, and KIRSCH and JACKSON-
AKIWUMI, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. As with every plaintiff who sues in federal
court, an issue-advocacy group must show it has Article III
standing. That can arise from concrete injuries to its members
or because the defendant “directly affected and interfered”
with the group’s “core business activities.” FDA v. All. for Hip-
pocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 395 (2024). And just like an indi-
vidual plaintiff, an organization must prove its claimed
2 No. 25-1279
injuries amount to more than a “bare procedural violation” of
federal law. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 342 (2016).
The Wisconsin Voter Alliance, an organization dedicated
to advancing election integrity, wants Wisconsin to better ad-
minister federal election law. In the Alliance’s view, the Com-
missioners of the Wisconsin Elections Commission need to
enforce certain voter-ID laws more strictly and alter the way
they manage voter registration lists. So the Alliance filed a
complaint with the Commission, asserting that the Commis-
sioners themselves failed to uphold Congress’s commands.
When the Commissioners declined to review the complaint,
the Alliance and two of its members sued in federal court to
compel a response.
Before reaching the merits, the district court dismissed this
case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that
neither the Alliance nor its members had Article III standing.
Because the district court properly applied the tests for iden-
tifying intangible “injuries in fact” and organizational stand-
ing, we affirm.
I
In 2002, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act
(HAVA or the Act) to “establish minimum election admin-
istration standards for federal elections.” United States v. Town
of Thornapple, 143 F.4th 793, 796 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting
Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666) (citation modified). The
Act required states to standardize voting systems, maintain
computerized voter registration lists, and more—all to mini-
mize the risk of repeating the controversies of the 2000 presi-
dential election. Id. See also 52 U.S.C. §§ 21081–21085.
No. 25-1279 3
HAVA includes two enforcement mechanisms. First, the
Attorney General can institute a civil action against noncom-
pliant states. 52 U.S.C. § 21111. Second, each State that accepts
federal funding under the Act must “establish and maintain
State-based administrative complaint procedures.” 52 U.S.C.
§ 21112(a)(1). “Any person who believes that there is a viola-
tion” of HAVA “may file a complaint” with an authorized
state agency. 52 U.S.C. § 21112(a)(2)(B) (citation modified).
Wisconsin chose to take federal funds, so it designated the
Wisconsin Elections Commission to hear HAVA complaints.
Wis. Stat. § 5.05(1) (2025). The Commission must abide by fed-
eral procedural requirements. For example, the Act outlines a
timeline for resolving complaints and an option for holding
hearings on the record. 52 U.S.C. §§ 21112(a)(2)(E), (H)–(I). It
also explains how States should adjudicate complaints on the
merits. If “there is a violation” of HAVA, the State “shall pro-
vide the appropriate remedy.” § 21112(a)(2)(F). But if “there
is no violation, the State shall dismiss the complaint.”
§ 21112(a)(2)(G). Wisconsin adopted many of these provisions
into its election code. Wis. Stat. §§ 5.061(1)–(4).
The Wisconsin Voter Alliance knows these procedures
well. Since 2020, the Alliance has filed more than ten HAVA
complaints with the Commission, several of which turned
into state-court lawsuits. When the Alliance’s President, Ron
Heuer, describes the group’s “core organizational and advo-
cacy activities,” he highlights the importance of HAVA com-
plaints to their strategy. Without these “governmental tools,”
he contends the Alliance would struggle to educate both its
members and the public on threats to their rights. The Alli-
ance would also lack the information needed to recommend
new laws or agency procedures to ensure election integrity.
4 No. 25-1279
Whenever “government officials, agencies, or departments
fail to cooperate in disclosing facts” under laws like HAVA,
Heuer declares, the Alliance’s mission “is impeded,” which
“require[s] the organization to take action by available
means.”
This case concerns two complaints the Alliance filed
against the Wisconsin Elections Commission. In 2022 and
2023, the Alliance, Heuer, and member Kenneth Brown al-
leged that the Commissioners themselves violated HAVA. In
one complaint, they faulted the Commissioners for sharing
Wisconsin’s statewide voter registration database with other
state actors; in another, they objected to a practice of overseas
voters bypassing voter-ID requirements.
Rather than answering these complaints, however, the
Commissioners announced their “ethical recusal.” Following
the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s lead, they concluded “it
would be nonsensical to have [the Commission] adjudicate a
claim against itself.” Teigen v. Wis. Elections Comm’n, 976
N.W.2d 519, 533 (Wis. 2022) (plurality opinion). Still, the
Commissioners did “not wish to leave” the Alliance “without
a path forward,” so they offered three alternatives. First, the
Commissioners authorized the Alliance to refer the matter to
a district attorney. See Wis. Stat. § 5.05(2m)(c)11. Next, the Al-
liance could “appeal the decision of the commission” to a state
trial court. Wis. Stat. § 5.06(8). Finally, the Commissioners
noted that ordinary administrative review may also be avail-
able. See Wis. Stat. § 227.52.
The Alliance chose another path. Shortly after the Com-
missioners denied their second complaint, the Alliance,
Heuer, and Brown sued the Commissioners in federal court.
In their view, HAVA’s procedural requirements create private
No. 25-1279 5
rights enforceable via 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because the Alliance,
Heuer, and Brown offered only minimal allegations of harm,
though, the Commissioners moved to dismiss the claim for
lack of Article III standing. The district court agreed and
dismissed the case, but it gave the plaintiffs leave to refile “be-
cause of the strong public interests in the integrity of elec-
tions.” After they amended their complaint, the district court
denied their motion for summary judgment and dismissed
the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P.
12(h)(3) & 56(f)(1). Again, neither the Alliance nor the individ-
ual plaintiffs offered enough evidence of harm to establish
standing. They timely appeal.
II
This case hinges on whether the Alliance, Heuer, and
Brown have suffered an “injury in fact” sufficient to confer
Article III standing. They do not, however, allege anything re-
sembling a traditional tangible injury, financial or physical.
Instead, they claim to have been injured by the Commission-
ers’ decision to return their complaint without a decision on
the merits.
To allege injury in fact, the plaintiffs invoke two distinct,
evolving strands of the Supreme Court’s standing jurispru-
dence: intangible injuries and organizational standing. Over
the last five years, the Supreme Court has revisited the tests
for both subjects. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413,
424–30 (2021) (intangible injury); FDA v. All. for Hippocratic
Med., 602 U.S. 367, 393–96 (2024) (organizational standing).
Though the federal courts of appeals have debated the mean-
ing of these cases, the Supreme Court has yet to resolve any
6 No. 25-1279
resulting disputes. 1 Accordingly, we first address the intangi-
ble injury theories before turning to organizational standing.
“We review a decision to dismiss for lack of standing de
novo.” In re Recalled Abbott Infant Formula Prods. Liab. Litig., 97
F.4th 525, 528 (7th Cir. 2024). A plaintiff’s “burden to demon-
strate standing changes as the procedural posture of the liti-
gation changes.” Persinger v. Sw. Credit Sys., L.P., 20 F.4th
1184, 1189 (7th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). “Where, as here,
the procedural posture is summary judgment,” the plaintiff
must provide “specific facts” supporting standing—a higher
burden than at the pleading stage. Id. at 1189–90 (quoting
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)).
III
All three plaintiffs assert intangible injuries. They argue
that any time a state agency does not follow 52 U.S.C.
§ 21112(a) to the letter, they have an injury in fact—without
showing additional harm. In the alternative, they characterize
failures to abide by these procedures as violations of the Peti-
tion Clause of the First Amendment.
A. Intangible Injury Framework
Article III standing is a “bedrock constitutional require-
ment,” and we cannot reach the merits of a case without it.
Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 378 (quoting United States v. Texas,
599 U.S. 670, 675 (2023)). To establish Article III standing,
plaintiffs must show they suffered an “injury in fact” that was
“caused by the defendant and redressable by the court.”
1 See, e.g., Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer, 601 U.S. 1, 3–5 (2023) (dismiss-
ing a case that would have addressed a circuit split on certain forms of
intangible injuries as moot).
No. 25-1279 7
TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 423. When seeking prospective relief,
like a declaratory judgment or an injunction, plaintiffs also
“must establish a sufficient likelihood of future injury” to se-
cure standing. Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 381; Simic v. City of
Chicago, 851 F.3d 734, 738–39 (7th Cir. 2017).
An injury in fact must be “concrete, particularized, and ac-
tual or imminent.” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 423. A “concrete”
injury has a “close relationship to a harm traditionally recog-
nized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts.”
Pierre v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 29 F.4th 934, 938 (7th Cir.
2022) (quoting TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 425) (citation modi-
fied). Without such an injury, “there is no case or controversy
for the federal court to resolve.” Wood v. Sec. Credit Servs., LLC,
126 F.4th 1303, 1308 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting Casillas v. Madison
Ave. Assocs., Inc., 926 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 2019)).
Concrete injuries come in two varieties: tangible and in-
tangible. Tangible injuries, like monetary and physical harms,
“readily qualify as concrete injuries.” Freeman v. Ocwen Loan
Servicing, LLC, 113 F.4th 701, 708 (7th Cir. 2024) (citation omit-
ted). Intangible harms can also be concrete if they have a “his-
torical or common-law analog” that is “tortious.” Baysal v.
Midvale Indem. Co., 78 F.4th 976, 979 (7th Cir. 2023). Examples
include harms resembling defamation, false light, disclosure
of private information, intrusion upon seclusion, and abuse of
process. Freeman, 113 F.4th at 708; TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 425.
Violations of some constitutional rights also qualify as intan-
gible injuries. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 340.
A “bare procedural violation” of a federal statute, how-
ever, does not count as an intangible injury. Id. at 342. That
means Congress cannot “enact an injury into existence”
simply by creating a private right of action. TransUnion, 594
8 No. 25-1279
U.S. at 426. “[D]eprivation of a procedural right,” without
showing “some concrete interest that is affected by the depri-
vation,” does not establish Article III standing. Summers v.
Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009).
At the same time, “both history and the judgment of Con-
gress play important roles” for the standing inquiry because
“Congress is well positioned to identify intangible harms that
meet minimum Article III requirements.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at
340. The Supreme Court has long recognized that Congress
can “elevat[e] … concrete, de facto injuries that were previ-
ously inadequate in law” to “the status of legally cognizable
injuries” by creating a private right of action. Lujan, 504 U.S.
at 578. Intangible injury cases based on violations of federal
law, then, direct us to examine the text of the underlying stat-
ute—even though standing is a “threshold question that must
be resolved … before proceeding to the merits.” Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 88–89 (1998).
B. Injuries for Procedural Violations under HAVA
The Alliance, Heuer, and Brown cannot satisfy TransUn-
ion’s intangible injury test. If an asserted injury has no
common-law analog, raises no constitutional concerns, and
cannot be enforced through an express right of action, a plain-
tiff does not have standing. Neither of their theories clears this
bar.
1. Implied Rights Theory
To start, the plaintiffs have not shown that violations of
HAVA’s procedural requirements are injuries per se. They do
not point to any historic form of action, in tort or otherwise,
permitting citizens to sue the government for failing to follow
statutory procedures without some additional concrete
No. 25-1279 9
injury. Indeed, they cannot: Spokeo and TransUnion identify
private injuries, like defamation or invasion of privacy, as
characteristic intangible injuries—not public-oriented griev-
ances about government policies. TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 425.
To the extent the plaintiffs think the Commissioners de-
nied access to something tangible (a “response” on the merits
of their specific complaint), they merely redefine procedural
concerns as substantive. The Supreme Court narrowly con-
strains the tangible injury category to “physical or monetary”
harms. Id. Without proof of financial losses or bodily harm,
plaintiffs must allege intangible injuries that pass muster un-
der the Supreme Court’s historical analog test. 2
The plaintiffs believe, however, that they can bypass the
normal standing inquiry in this case. So long as a federal stat-
ute creates a private right, they contend, a plaintiff can estab-
lish standing just by pointing to that statutory violation (if the
relevant agency action impacts them directly). This argument
follows from their merits theory: HAVA’s procedural provi-
sions create a private right to receive an adjudication on the
merits of their complaint, enforceable via 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At
oral argument before us, they asserted, “Congress deter-
mined the harm was the state officials … violating HAVA,”
and that “harm” could establish standing without showing
anything more. Oral Arg. at 27:19–27:31.
2 At best, this argument characterizes the relevant harm as an “infor-
mational injury.” See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20–21 (1998). But there is
no informational injury here, because there has been no “denial of infor-
mation subject to public disclosure” under a sunshine law, like the Freedom
of Information Act. Casillas, 926 F.3d at 338 (emphasis original). The Alli-
ance, Heuer, and Brown do not seek information at all; they want legal
remedies to resolve the concerns raised in their complaints.
10 No. 25-1279
TransUnion forecloses this argument. Congress cannot use
“its lawmaking power to transform something that is not re-
motely harmful into something that is.” TransUnion, 594 U.S.
at 426 (quoting Hagy v. Demers & Adams, 882 F.3d 616, 622 (6th
Cir. 2018)). Of course, the judgment of Congress matters for
standing. But it cannot make a state official’s failure to abide
by the law “harmful” unless that action maps onto a historical
tort analog. The Alliance, Heuer, and Brown, then, make an
argument that looks more like the TransUnion dissent than its
majority opinion.
Even if we adopted this theory, the Alliance, Heuer, and
Brown would lack standing. Congress has not created a pri-
vate right of action for individuals to enforce HAVA in federal
court. Bellitto v. Snipes, 935 F.3d 1192, 1199 (11th Cir. 2019)
(“HAVA creates no private cause of action.”). “By its text, the
HAVA only allows enforcement via attorney general suits or
administrative complaint.” Am. C. R. Union v. Phila. City
Comm’rs, 872 F.3d 175, 184–85 (3d Cir. 2017). The judgment of
Congress, therefore, is not relevant to analyzing standing in
this case because Congress has not weighed in on the matter.
Plaintiffs cannot escape these difficulties by claiming
HAVA creates implied rights enforceable through § 1983. In
almost every Supreme Court case on intangible injuries aris-
ing under federal law (not involving a constitutional viola-
tion), there has been an express private right of action in the
statute. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571–72 (“citizen-suit provi-
sion” of the Endangered Species Act of 1973); Spokeo, 578 U.S.
at 335 (identifying an explicit cause of action to sue for viola-
tions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act); TransUnion, 594 U.S.
at 419 (same); Summers, 555 U.S. at 500 (Administrative Pro-
cedure Act); Akins, 524 U.S. at 19 (federal district court review
No. 25-1279 11
of FEC decisions under the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971). Against such guidance, we should not leap to include
§ 1983 implied rights cases.
More to the point, these HAVA procedural provisions fail
the Supreme Court’s test for determining whether a Spending
Clause statute creates private rights. “To prove that a statute
secures an enforceable right, privilege, or immunity” under
§ 1983, “a plaintiff must show that the law in question
‘clear[ly] and unambiguous[ly]’ uses ‘rights-creating terms.’”
Medina v. Planned Parenthood S. Atl., 606 U.S. 357, 368 (2025)
(quoting Gonzaga v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290 (2002)). The “rare
statute” with rights-creating language can be enforced
through private suits only if “Congress has [not] displaced
§ 1983’s general cause of action with a more specific remedy.”
Id.; see also St. Anthony Hosp. v. Whitehorn, 132 F.4th 962, 971–
72 (7th Cir. 2025) (en banc), cert. denied, 2025 WL 2949556.
This statute, by contrast, does not include rights-creating
language. See 52 U.S.C. § 21112(a). It neither describes these
procedures as “rights” nor speaks about a discrete class of
protected individuals. See Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty.
v. Talevski, 599 U.S. 166, 183–86 (2023). And HAVA lays out a
comprehensive, two-pronged remedial scheme directing in-
dividuals to air their grievances with state agencies, not fed-
eral courts. See id. at 186–91. It is no wonder that the Supreme
Court, even before it restricted the implied rights doctrine in
Medina v. Planned Parenthood, disfavored § 1983 claims de-
signed to enforce HAVA. See Brunner v. Ohio Republican Party,
555 U.S. 5, 6 (2008) (petitioners were unlikely to succeed on
the merits of their implied rights claim under 52 U.S.C.
§ 21083(a)(1)(A)). And pre-Medina cases finding private rights
for certain HAVA provisions never did so for § 21112. See, e.g.,
12 No. 25-1279
Colon-Marrero v. Velez, 813 F.3d 1, 9–22 (1st Cir. 2016) (finding
a private right in § 21083(a)(4)(A)); Sandusky Cnty. Democratic
Party v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565, 572–73 (6th Cir. 2004) (same
for § 21082(a)). When a plaintiff alleges an intangible injury
and implied rights at the same time, a weak merits theory will
counsel against finding standing. Procedural injuries cannot
survive Article III scrutiny when Congress has not granted a
procedural right. Cf. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7. 3
Whether or not this “‘history-and-judgment-of-Congress’
standard for assessing Article III ‘injury in fact’ … has raised
more questions than it answered” is a question for the Su-
preme Court, not us. Laufer v. Arpan LLC, 29 F.4th 1268, 1284
(11th Cir. 2022) (Newsom, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
But this case is straightforward, even under TransUnion. Both
“history and the judgment of Congress” tell us not to treat this
alleged violation of HAVA as an intangible harm. Spokeo, 578
U.S. at 340. Without further evidence of concrete injury, the
plaintiffs’ claim is not cognizable in federal court.
2. Petition Clause Theory
The Alliance, Heuer, and Brown fare no better on their
claim of constitutional harm. They believe the Commissioners
violated their First Amendment rights under the Petition
3 The Supreme Court’s cases about implied rights under § 1983 do not
normally discuss standing. At first, the claims in these cases may resemble
procedural violations. Yet many involve tangible injuries in fact. See, e.g.,
Maine v. Thiboutot, 488 U.S. 1, 3 (1980) (recovering welfare benefits
promised by statute, a financial harm); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Hal-
derman, 451 U.S. 1, 15 (1981) (remedying deprivations of medical care, a
physical harm). And other cases involve intangible harms analogous to
common-law actions. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 277 (disclosure of false sex-
ual assault allegation in violation of FERPA, analogous to defamation).
No. 25-1279 13
Clause, which states, “Congress shall make no law … abridg-
ing … the right of the people … to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. Refusing to
adjudicate their dispute on the merits, they argue, counts as a
deprivation of their right to petition the Government.
The Supreme Court has not analyzed whether plaintiffs
can show standing based on a violation of the Petition Clause.
But “traditional [intangible] harms may also include harms
specified by the Constitution itself.” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at
425. First Amendment violations are quintessential examples
of constitutional harms giving rise to intangible injuries.
Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 340. Moreover, both the Supreme Court and
this court have suggested that the Petition Clause should be
treated the same as the Speech Clause. See McDonald v. Smith,
472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985) (“The right to petition is cut from the
same cloth as the other guarantees of [the First] Amend-
ment.”); Gray v. Lacke, 885 F.2d 399, 412 (7th Cir. 1989) (we
“analyze an alleged violation of the [P]etition [C]lause in the
same manner as any other alleged violation of the right to en-
gage in free speech.”). So this court does not treat the Petition
Clause differently for standing purposes. Int’l Union of Oper-
ating Eng’rs v. Daley, 983 F.3d 287, 297 (7th Cir. 2020) (uphold-
ing a dismissal for lack of standing when plaintiffs “suffered
no invasion” of “First Amendment petition clause rights”).
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has foreclosed this argu-
ment. As then-Judge Kavanaugh summarized, “the Petition
Clause does not provide a right to a response or official con-
sideration” when people submit “petitions to state agencies.”
We the People Found., Inc. v. United States, 485 F.3d 140, 143
(D.C. Cir. 2007). He drew that conclusion from two cases
confirming that “the First Amendment does not impose any
14 No. 25-1279
affirmative obligation on the government to listen, [or] to re-
spond.” Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emps., 441 U.S. 465 (1979);
see also Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271,
285 (1984). We recently reaffirmed that holding. See Int’l Union
of Operating Eng’rs, 983 F.3d at 298 (quoting Smith and Knight).
The Petition Clause protects the “right of access” to courts and
government forums. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S.
379, 387 (2011) (quoting Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883,
896 (1984)). It does not go further.
The plaintiffs have not alleged a colorable Petition Clause
injury. The Commissioners responded to the complaint and
offered several pathways to petition the government for re-
dress of grievances. 4 And even if they had not suggested these
alternatives, there would still be no Petition Clause problem.
The Commissioners did not owe a response, so they could not
create a constitutional injury.
4 The plaintiffs understood Wisconsin state law to foreclose these rem-
edies. They argue Wis. Stat. § 5.05(2m)(c)11 covers only criminal prosecu-
tions, not civil actions, while Wis. Stat. § 5.06(8) and Wis. Stat. § 227.52(6)
both preclude judicial review of an agency “non-decision.”
But the plaintiffs do not point to any judicial opinions interpreting
those state laws, instead citing only federal administrative law cases. We
could find no state appellate cases interpreting § 227.52(6), and just one
considering § 5.05(2m)(c)11 in passing. See State v. Jensen, 782 N.W.2d 415,
425 (Wis. 2010). The scope of judicial review under § 5.06(8) also appears
to be contested. See Brown v. Wis. Elections Comm’n, 16 N.W.3d 619, 623–27
(Wis. 2025) (Kenneth Brown, from this case, was not “aggrieved” by a
merits order; no mention of non-decisions). Plaintiffs cannot allege an in-
jury under the Petition Clause if these paths are viable.
No. 25-1279 15
IV
Organizations, not just individuals, can establish standing
to sue in federal court. Sometimes, organizations invoke “as-
sociational standing,” or the ability to sue on behalf of their
members. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S.
333, 343 (1977). But organizations can also “sue on their own
behalf for injuries they have sustained.” Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 n.19 (1982). To establish “organiza-
tional standing,” a plaintiff “must satisfy the usual standards
for injury in fact, causation, and redressability that apply to
individuals.” Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 393–94. An advo-
cacy group cannot conjure up standing because of the “inten-
sity of the litigant’s interest.” Valley Forge Christian Coll. v.
Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 486
(1982). It must have an actual injury.
The Alliance argues it has organizational and associational
standing. Both standing theories fail, though, because any
claim of such harm cannot survive at the summary judgment
stage.
A. Organizational Standing
The Alliance draws its organizational standing theory
from the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hippocratic Med-
icine. There, the Court stated that organizations can establish
standing when a defendant’s actions “directly affected and in-
terfered with [the organization’s] core business activities.”
Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 395. Echoing this language, the
Alliance argues that the Commissioners interfered with their
“core political activities” by declining to adjudicate their
HAVA complaints. In declarations submitted at the summary
judgment stage, it affirmed that all its core activities revolve
16 No. 25-1279
around using governmental processes “to investigate or com-
plain[] about governmental misdoings” and educate its
“membership” and “governmental officials” on its findings.
The Alliance believes these declarations are enough to secure
standing under the Supreme Court’s test.
This approach misses the point of Hippocratic Medicine. An
organization does not have standing when a government en-
tity frustrates its “abstract social interests” without a cogniza-
ble Article III injury. Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 394 (citation
omitted). The Commissioners’ decision to decline reviewing
this complaint was not an injury, and it does not become one
just because an advocacy group asserts that HAVA com-
plaints are important to its mission. That approach would
make organizational standing more lenient than the bar for
individuals. Cf. id. at 393–94 (“[O]rganizations must satisfy
the usual standards for injury in fact, causation, and redress-
ability that apply to individuals.”). And it would turn
organizational standing into “nothing more than a game of
semantics,” in which advocacy organizations can simply de-
clare that disfavored government conduct impedes their
“core business activities” without further evidence of harm.
Tenn. Conf. of the NAACP v. Lee, 139 F.4th 557, 566 (6th Cir.
2025). Organizations must point to more evidence of concrete
disruptions to mission-critical business operations.
Even if it is assumed that filing HAVA complaints counts
as a “core” activity, moreover, this case does not involve a “di-
rect[] … interfere[nce].” Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 395. As
the Alliance argued in its summary judgment motion, it still
can (and does) file HAVA complaints against other parties.
The Commissioners declined to respond to two complaints
out of many, and they offered several alternative channels for
No. 25-1279 17
redressing the Alliance’s concerns. 5 Nothing prevents the Al-
liance from educating voters, raising public concern about the
Commission’s tactics, or putting pressure on the legislature to
reform the law governing election disputes. There is no evi-
dence that the Commissioners’ actions threaten the integrity
of this group’s “advocacy business[],” so the Alliance cannot
establish organizational standing. Id.
B. Associational Standing
Just as the Alliance cannot establish standing for its own
injuries, it cannot do so in its representative capacity either.
For associational standing, an organization must show “at
least one of its members would ‘have standing to sue in their
own right,’” the lawsuit protects interests “germane to the or-
ganization’s purpose,” and the “participation of individual
members” is not necessary. Prairie Rivers Network v. Dynegy
Midwest Generation, LLC, 2 F.4th 1002, 1008 (7th Cir. 2021)
(quoting Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343) (citation modified).
This claim fails at step one. Heuer and Brown do not “have
standing to sue in their own right” because they have not
5 If the Alliance had incurred (or planned to incur) costs pursuing the
alternative remedies the Commissioners identified, it might prove organ-
izational standing. But such costs do not amount to imminent injuries in
this case. First, the Alliance has averred it will not be pursuing any of these
remedies, in part because it does not believe they are available under Wis-
consin state law. Supra n.4. Second, assuming these pathways are viable,
there is still one option that does not incur additional costs—referring the
matter to a district attorney under Wis. Stat. § 5.05(2m)(c)11. So long as
this cost-free alternative exists, any other potential costs are just “allega-
tions of possible future injury,” and not so pressing as to be “certainly
impending.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (quoting
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)) (citation modified).
18 No. 25-1279
suffered an injury in fact. As discussed in Part III.B, they can-
not claim an intangible injury because the Commission’s de-
cision not to adjudicate the HAVA complaint on the merits
fails the TransUnion standing test. And they have not pro-
vided enough information to show an actual or imminent fi-
nancial injury cognizable under Article III.
V
Cases involving advocacy groups and intangible injuries
are particularly prone to “manufacture[d]” theories of Arti-
cle III standing. Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 395. The Supreme
Court has cautioned us to guard the courthouse gates against
procedural injuries masquerading as direct harm. TransUn-
ion, 594 U.S. at 440. Permitting standing for these plaintiffs
would ignore this instruction.
The district court, then, correctly dismissed this case for
lack of standing. The Alliance, Heuer, and Brown have not
suffered an intangible injury based on a violation of HAVA’s
procedural requirements. And the Alliance cannot establish
organizational or associational standing based on the record
it has developed in this case. 6
AFFIRMED
6 Because the Alliance, Heuer, and Brown moved for summary judg-
ment, they had the burden of providing facts sufficient for finding Arti-
cle III standing at a post-discovery stage. Persinger, 20 F.4th 1189. They
failed to do so here, even after the district court had dismissed for lack of
standing. Accordingly, we decline to return this case to the district court
for further factfinding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2106.
No. 25-1279 19
BRENNAN, Chief Judge, concurring. I join the per curiam
opinion in full. I write separately to note that this court’s or-
ganizational standing precedent has been rendered largely
obsolete. In FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U.S.
367 (2024), the Supreme Court supplied a new reading of its
organizational standing holding from Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982). Our court’s caselaw expressly re-
lies on a now-incorrect understanding of Havens, seen most
clearly in Common Cause Indiana v. Lawson, 937 F.3d 944 (7th
Cir. 2019). Our precedent should be conformed to the Su-
preme Court’s latest guidance.
The per curiam opinion correctly applies the “core busi-
ness activities” test outlined in Hippocratic Medicine. Given the
confusion these parties and district courts have evinced about
the governing standard, though, we should clarify the law of
Article III standing for this circuit. To do this, I briefly outline
the evolution of the Supreme Court’s organizational standing
caselaw. Then, I examine how Common Cause contradicts the
new standard. Some questions remain as to the scope of Hip-
pocratic Medicine’s holding on organizational standing, but
Common Cause and its progeny no longer control.
I
A. The Supreme Court Modifies the Test
For years, Havens Realty was the primary Supreme Court
precedent for organizational standing claims. The Court con-
cluded in Havens that a group dedicated to housing advocacy
activities (HOME) had standing to sue a property manage-
ment company that engaged in racially discriminatory prac-
tices. 455 U.S. at 378–79. HOME adequately alleged an injury
in fact to its own interests because it “devote[d] significant
20 No. 25-1279
resources to identify and counteract the defendant’s” discrim-
ination. Id. at 379. The Court found this combination to be “far
more than simply a setback to the organization’s abstract so-
cial interests.” Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
739 (1972)). “Such concrete and demonstrable injury to the or-
ganization’s activities—with the consequent drain on the or-
ganization’s resources—constitutes” an injury in fact. Id.
Recently, though, the Supreme Court tightened the organ-
izational standing test for public interest groups. In Hippo-
cratic Medicine, the Supreme Court cabined Havens to its
unique facts. 602 U.S. at 394–96. When a group of advocacy
organizations challenged the FDA’s new rules on mifepris-
tone (an abortifacient pill), they claimed to have standing be-
cause they were “incurring costs to oppose FDA’s actions.” Id.
at 394. Specifically, they spent money to “conduct their own
studies on mifepristone” so they could “better inform their
members and the public about mifepristone’s risks.” Id. They
also “expend[ed] considerable time, energy, and resources
drafting citizen petitions to FDA, as well as engaging in public
advocacy and public education.” Id. (citation modified).
The Court rejected these arguments. An organization
“cannot spend its way into standing simply by expending
money to gather information and advocate against the de-
fendant’s action.” Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 394. Rather, it
must show how a defendant “directly affected and interfered
with [its] core business activities.” Id. at 395.
To distance itself from the “drain on resources” language
in Havens, the Court redefined the injury in that case as an in-
formational, rather than a financial, harm. It first emphasized
that HOME engaged in more than just issue advocacy—it
No. 25-1279 21
“operated a housing counseling service.” Id. 1 The relevant
harm arose when “Havens gave HOME’s employees false in-
formation about apartment availability.” Id. Just like a “re-
tailer who sues a manufacturer for selling defective goods to
the retailer,” Havens Realty “sold” the housing counseling or-
ganization defective information, which incidentally incurred
costs. Id. Ultimately, HOME could not carry out its core busi-
ness activities under these conditions.
The Court, then, altered the Havens organizational stand-
ing test in two ways. First, two kinds of spending now qualify
as “manufacture[d]” standing after Hippocratic Medicine. 602
U.S. at 394. Costs incurred through an organization’s “public
advocacy” against government action, like “drafting citizen
petitions” to an agency, cannot confer standing. Id. Nor does
standing exist when costs are incurred as part of “public
education” efforts, including collecting and distributing in-
formation “so that the associations can better inform their
members and the public about … risks” of a challenged gov-
ernment action. Id. Second, the paradigmatic Havens injury is
now a direct, non-financial injury to the organization’s “core
business activities” (like lying to a plaintiff)—not a self-in-
flicted harm caused by redirecting resources. Id. at 395.
Left unanswered in the Supreme Court’s opinion is how
to tell when a defendant “directly affect[s] and interfere[s]”
with an organization’s “core business activities.” Hippocratic
Med., 602 U.S. at 395. As appellate courts face this question,
1 In fact, Havens does not describe HOME as a traditional issue-advo-
cacy organization at all: “Its activities included the operation of a housing
counseling service, and the investigation and referral of complaints con-
cerning housing discrimination.” 455 U.S. at 368.
22 No. 25-1279
they should heed the Supreme Court’s warning that “Havens
was an unusual case, and this Court has been careful not to
extend the Havens holding beyond its context.” Id. at 396.
B. This Court’s Precedent
Hippocratic Medicine does not fit with our precedent, so the
law of this circuit should be clarified. We have noted that this
court’s decision in Common Cause is “arguably in tension”
with Hippocratic Medicine. See Reporters Comm. for Freedom of
the Press v. Rokita, 147 F.4th 720, 729 n.3 (7th Cir. 2025). Com-
mon Cause explicitly relies on Havens, applying it because
“[n]othing in the Supreme Court’s … standing jurisprudence
… undermined” its organizational standing holding at the
time. 937 F.3d at 950. Now that the Supreme Court has revised
the test from Havens, that conclusion should be reconsidered.
1. The Common Cause Approach
Taken as a whole, Common Cause promotes the “expansive
theory of standing” that Hippocratic Medicine curtailed. 602
U.S. at 395. In Common Cause, this court concluded that several
voting rights organizations had standing to challenge an In-
diana law revamping that State’s procedures for cleaning up
its voter rolls. 937 F.3d at 948. In reaching that conclusion,
though, it accepted allegations of financial “injuries” that Hip-
pocratic Medicine now forecloses.
Most notably, the court credited claims of financial injuries
based on “public education” expenses. Each organization said
that it “expended resources educating voters and community
activists” about the challenged law, including by “chang[ing]
[their] curriculum” and reaching out to voters directly. Id. at
951–52. One group “created a poster” that informed members
of the risk of de-registration. Id. at 952. Even at the time, these
No. 25-1279 23
alleged costs were “rather thin gruel” for standing purposes.
Id. at 964 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Supreme Court has
now declared them insufficient.
Common Cause also relied on diversion of resources lan-
guage that no longer fits with Hippocratic Medicine. The organ-
izations in Common Cause believed the Act would force them
“to expend … limited financial resources on rolling back the
effects of the bill.” 937 F.3d at 951. Sometimes, the “effects of
the bill” are presented as “concrete work” supporting voters
and poll workers; at other points, the opinion shades over into
public advocacy more broadly. But see id. at 956 (“ruling out
standing for lobbying efforts in Indiana’s legislature”). Either
way, more than once the opinion entangles direct advocacy
with voter education. See id. at 952 (Common Cause Indiana
“devoted additional time and resources to ameliorating the …
effects of this law, including conducting … training sessions
aimed at educating voters and community activists”).
Finally, Common Cause did not consider the organizations’
“core business activities.” Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 395. In-
stead, this court used a far more elastic concept, “core mis-
sion,” which more easily justified standing. Common Cause,
937 F.3d at 956. The “specific mission[s]” of the organizations
were described as multifaceted, including “educating
potential voters, helping them to fulfill whatever legal re-
quirements their state has legitimately imposed as a condition
of voting, and opposing any improper voter-suppression
measures that may exist.” Id. at 954. Moreover, Common Cause
calls voter registration “core” to the organizations, but it sup-
plied no evidence of how central these activities were to their
day-to-day operations. For example, this court states that
Common Cause Indiana’s “advocacy agenda … extends far
24 No. 25-1279
beyond voter registration.” Id. at 952. Yet it conflates “voter
registration,” “voter education,” “voter programs,” and
“voter advocacy,” calling them all part of the “core mission”
of the organizations at various points. Id. at 954. Hippocratic
Medicine requires more specificity than Common Cause pro-
vided. Cf. Fair Hous. Ctr. of Metro. Detroit v. Singh Senior Living,
LLC, 124 F.4th 990, 992–93 (6th Cir. 2025) (remanding for more
evidence showing “that the conduct challenged in the suit in-
terfered with the organization’s ‘core business activities.’”).
Reading Common Cause on its own terms, nearly every
large, well-funded advocacy organization could establish
standing in its own right. It would just have to point to a
portion of its operations and call them “core.” That fully rec-
ognizes the fears in Hippocratic Medicine of granting “all the
organizations in America … standing to challenge almost
every … policy that they dislike, provided they spend a single
dollar opposing those policies.” 602 U.S. at 395. As noted in
the per curiam, this approach would turn organizational
standing into “nothing more than a game of semantics,”
where organizations redefine their “missions” at higher levels
of generality to secure standing. Tenn. Conf. of the NAACP v.
Lee, 139 F.4th 557, 566 (6th Cir. 2025).
Hippocratic Medicine encourages courts to avoid these
games. Instead, they should employ a more objective inquiry,
looking to both the organization’s actual “activities” and the
way the defendant’s actions impact them. Courts in this cir-
cuit, therefore, should no longer follow Common Cause’s ap-
proach to organizational standing in light of the Supreme
Court’s latest guidance.
No. 25-1279 25
2. Applying Hippocratic Medicine
The Supreme Court has not explicitly overruled Havens.
Nor did the Court explain what to do with the discussion of
financial injury in that case. It may be that all “diversion of
resources” theories of organizational standing are on their
way out after Hippocratic Medicine, but that is not yet clear.
How, then, should organizational standing disputes be han-
dled under this modified precedent?
After Hippocratic Medicine, it seems that courts are to first
look for instances in which the defendant directly injured the
plaintiff organization. Consonant with Article III, these harms
could be either tangible or intangible. In Havens, the primary
injury HOME alleged was an intangible injury. The housing
corporation “provided … black employees false information
about apartment availability.” Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U.S.
at 395 (citing Havens, 455 U.S. at 366 and n.1, 368). Under the
TransUnion test, this kind of racial discrimination resembles
actions for fraud and tortious interference at common law,
both harmful to HOME’s “housing counseling” business. Id.
at 395. This falsehood, not any financial harm, constitutes the
paradigmatic Havens injury. Accordingly, an organization
would have standing to sue for an intangible injury if an
agency defrauded the organization, violated its constitutional
rights, or committed something resembling a privacy tort di-
rectly against the organization.
This inquiry may be more difficult when a plaintiff asserts
that the government caused financial harms. Almost inevita-
bly, a plaintiffs’ concerns will look more like a taxpayer suit
or “generalized grievance.” Carney v. Adams, 592 U.S. 53, 58–
59 (2020). But if a government entity issued a fine or withheld
26 No. 25-1279
grant funding, the organization would likely have a direct
tangible financial injury. TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 424–25. 2
If the organization cannot show that a defendant’s actions
constitute direct concrete harm, whether tangible or intangi-
ble, the “core business activities” test takes center stage. Alt-
hough not crystal clear, Hippocratic Medicine does not ex-
pressly forbid all financial organizational injury claims. Cf.
Lee, 139 F.4th at 564–65 (highlighting conflict with normal
standing rules if financial harms were not injuries in fact). So,
courts would then have to ask whether a defendant “directly
affected and interfered with [the plaintiff’s] core business ac-
tivities,” causing the plaintiff to incur a financial injury.
Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 395. Of course, an advocacy or-
ganization still “cannot spend its way into standing simply by
expending money to gather information and advocate against
the defendant’s action.” Id. at 394. Thus, issue-advocacy
groups would only satisfy Article III scrutiny when they al-
lege genuine financial harms caused by the defendant, as the
Supreme Court ruled in Havens. Hippocratic Medicine tells us
that these situations will be exceedingly rare. 602 U.S. at 396.3
2 It is unclear whether the “core business activities” test should be ap-
plied to instances of direct, cognizable harm. Doing so would risk violat-
ing the maxim that “organizations must satisfy the usual standards” for
standing because it may require organizations to provide more proof of
harm than individuals. Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 393–94.
3 The language about financial injuries cannot be read out of Havens
so easily, even if that case is limited to “its context.” Hippocratic Med., 602
U.S. at 396. Havens involved a claim for damages, not injunctive relief. 455
U.S. at 378. The Court made clear that these tangible financial injuries (“the
consequent drain on the organization’s resources”) justified Article III
standing. Id. at 379. After all, the measure of HOME’s recovery would be
based on its administrative costs, not the falsity of the defendant’s
No. 25-1279 27
Until the Supreme Court clarifies whether Havens is still
good law, though, this court must raise the bar for alleging
standing in these cases. Organizations must provide more ev-
idence of harm in their pleadings and through discovery.
They must point to facts allowing a reasonable factfinder to
conclude that the defendant interfered with a core business
activity, not just a vaguely defined core mission. And they
cannot rely on any costs pertaining to educating the public or
issue advocacy. Without meaningful evidence of how an or-
ganization spends its time and money, organizations could
redefine their purpose to plead standing. And without show-
ing that the financial injuries are not advocacy costs, organi-
zations could spend their way into court as they wished.
II
As the per curiam opinion notes, the Wisconsin Voter Al-
liance provided little evidence in support of its “core business
activities” argument. This is because the Alliance changed its
standing theory halfway through the litigation. At first, the
Alliance argued it had standing because the Commissioners’
“non-decision” forced it “to divert resources to education and
other non-litigation methods to enjoin the HAVA violations.”
It also had to “pursue judicial remedies,” which “diverts mon-
etary resources away from its core mission and objectives.”
After Hippocratic Medicine, though, the Alliance tried to re-
statements. This meant that there was a fit between the asserted injury and
the claimed remedy—in other words, the harm was redressable. But read-
ing Hippocratic Medicine literally, we might conclude that organizations
have standing under Havens only when they have an intangible injury, not
a tangible financial injury. That would invert the Supreme Court’s normal
presumptions about standing. Cf. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 340
(2016) (tangible harms are presumed “synonymous” with concreteness).
28 No. 25-1279
frame its standing argument in terms of its “core political ac-
tivities.” On appeal, it reiterates only the new arguments.
Federal appellate courts have an independent obligation
to assure themselves that standing exists. Prairie Rivers Net-
work v. Dynegy Midwest Generation, LLC, 2 F.4th 1002, 1010 (7th
Cir. 2021). We should therefore carefully consider any argu-
ments for standing supported by the record—even those the
plaintiffs downplay before this court.
In its reply brief, the Alliance correctly recognized that its
reliance on a diversion of resources theory was a “bad fact” in
the record pointing against standing. It saw that the old way
of establishing standing—pointing to de minimis costs in-
curred in response to the defendant’s disfavored actions, as
this court permitted in Common Cause—no longer fit with the
Supreme Court’s modified approach. Rightly so. The bare re-
citals of public education expenses offered in the Alliance’s
amended complaint run afoul of Hippocratic Medicine’s prohi-
bition on “manufacture[d]” standing. 602 U.S. at 394.
Other litigants have not picked up on this change so
quickly. In several recent district court opinions from this cir-
cuit, the litigants expressly relied on a diversion of resources
theory to establish organizational standing. Many of these
courts have applied Common Cause, even after Hippocratic
Medicine, because “[t]he Seventh Circuit has not yet consid-
ered what effect Hippocratic Medicine has on Havens and its
precedents.” Kidd v. Pappas, No. 1:22-cv-07061, 2025 WL
3507374, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 2025). 4 Other cases have
4 See, e.g., Nat’l Fair Housing All. v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr., No. 1:18-cv-
00839, 2025 WL 975967, at *6–7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2025); Jud. Watch, Inc. v.
Ill. State Bd. of Elections, No. 1:24-cv-01867, 2025 WL 2712209, at *7 n.5 (N.D.
No. 25-1279 29
conflated the diversion of resources test with the “core busi-
ness activities” standard in ways that are not faithful to either
approach. 5 This uncertainty about our circuit precedent, not-
withstanding the ruling in Hippocratic Medicine, shows the
need for clarity.
Though the Alliance tried to disregard its erroneous “di-
version of resources” theory on appeal, it also misunderstood
the “core business activities” test. It thought the best way to
satisfy Hippocratic Medicine would be to strip out all references
to financial injuries from the record and its briefing. By doing
so, it assumed the new standard could be satisfied without
pointing to any injury at all, whether direct harms cognizable
under Article III or downstream monetary consequences.
That is not correct. When an organization’s intangible in-
jury arguments fail, it does not escape the strictures of Arti-
cle III. Instead, Hippocratic Medicine shows that these organi-
zations must allege a direct injury in fact or else risk dismissal
for lack of standing. Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 393–94. The
Ill. Sept. 23, 2025). See also Fair Hous. Ctr. of Cent. Ind., Inc. v. M&J Mgmt.
Co., LLC, No. 1:11-cv-00612-TAB-JPH, 2024 WL 3859997, at *2–3 (S.D. Ind.
Aug. 19, 2024); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. Rokita, 751 F.
Supp. 3d 931, 940–42 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 27, 2024); Access Living of Metro. Chi.,
Inc. v. City of Chicago, 752 F. Supp. 3d 922, 928 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2024); Ill.
Nurses Ass’n v. Rosenblatt, No. 1:24-cv-12379, 2025 WL 2430571, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 22, 2025).
One district court applied Common Cause with trepidation, recogniz-
ing that Hippocratic Medicine may unsettle this court’s precedent. See Legal
Aid Chi. v. Hunter Props., No. 1:23-cv-04809, 2024 WL 4346615, at *5–14
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2024) (Seeger, J.).
5 See Chi. Headline Club v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-12173, 2025 WL 3240782,
at *74–75 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 2025).
30 No. 25-1279
“core business activities” test does not stand apart from the
“usual standards for injury in fact, causation, and redressabil-
ity that apply to individuals.” Id. at 394. Rather, the test fits
into the framework by delineating the circumstances in which
a defendant does (and does not) cause a tangible financial in-
jury to an organization. Cf. Lee, 139 F.4th at 564–65 (discussing
causation). Of course, the Alliance must show a real injury to
establish this kind of harm—not just self-inflicted financial in-
convenience. Without an intangible injury, it must identify a
financial harm to even enter Article III’s ambit.
Because the district court dealt with the Alliance’s diver-
sion of resources theory and the defendant litigated it before
this court, this topic—including resetting the applicable law—
was properly presented for our review and clarification of the
law of this circuit.
III
The Supreme Court has warned to be “careful not to ex-
tend the Havens holding” on organizational standing “beyond
its context.” Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 395. The per curiam
opinion correctly replaces the old test with the new when it
applies the “core business activities” standard. Before Hippo-
cratic Medicine, parties and courts were not required to ask
about core activities, so the per curiam opinion takes a step in
the right direction. At some point the Supreme Court may
give further guidance about how the “core business activi-
ties” standard fits with the ordinary Article III analysis for
tangible and intangible injuries. Until then, parties and dis-
trict courts should acknowledge this change in the law and
adjust their approach to organizational standing.