self-represented litigants are generally not entitled to an award of attorney fees
How later courts described this case
- self-represented litigants are generally not entitled to an award of attorney fees
- “Where no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.”
- “Constitutionally protected property interests may be created either through (1) contract, (2) common law, or (3) statutes and regulations.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
February 10, 2026
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
JANET LANE, No. 57178-1-II
Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
v.
WASHINGTON STATE HEALTH CARE
AUTHORITY,
Respondent.
PRICE, J. — Janet Lane appeals the superior court’s order that denied her petition for review
of a final order of the Health Care Authority’s (HCA) Board of Appeals. The HCA Board’s order
terminated her Medicaid benefits, required her to reapply to reestablish benefits, and denied her
request to backdate her benefits.1 Lane argues that the superior court erred by denying her motion
to admit additional evidence. Lane also raises various challenges to the Board’s final order. And
Lane requests attorney fees.
The superior court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lane’s motion to admit
additional evidence. Further, there are no grounds for reversing the Board’s final order.
Accordingly, we affirm and deny Lane’s request for attorney fees.
1
The initial administrative action terminated Lane’s food assistance benefits as well. However, it
does not appear that Lane appealed the determination regarding her food assistance benefits, and
she does not address her food assistance benefits in her brief.
No. 57178-1-II
FACTS
Medicaid is a program through which states receive federal funds to provide medical
assistance to individuals needing assistance. States that participate in Medicaid must designate a
state agency to administer the program. In Washington, the HCA is the state agency designated
to administer Medicaid programs. The Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) acts as
the HCA’s designee to make eligibility determinations for Medicaid programs. Although there
are different types of Medicaid programs, Medicaid programs in Washington are collectively
administered under Washington Apple Health (WAH).
Prior to January 2018, Lane received supplemental security income (SSI) from the Social
Security Administration (SSA). She also received WAH benefits, specifically Qualified Medicare
Beneficiary (QMB) Medicare Savings Program (MSP) and SSI categorically needy (CN) medical
assistance.
On January 3, 2018, Lane called DSHS and requested that her Medicaid benefits be
terminated because she was moving out of state. That same day, DSHS issued Lane notices stating
that because Lane would no longer be considered a state resident, her benefits would end on
January 31, 2018. Three months later, on April 5, 2018, Lane submitted a request for a hearing on
the termination of her benefits.
DSHS representative, Leslie Patten, appeared at the administrative hearing. Patten
submitted exhibits supporting DSHS’s position that it had correctly terminated Lane’s benefits per
her request. The exhibits included Lane’s request for a hearing, DSHS’s case narrative, the
termination letters, and records from Oregon related to Lane applying for and receiving benefits
in Oregon.
2
No. 57178-1-II
Patten testified that DSHS terminated Lane’s benefits because Lane, herself, requested
termination because she was moving to Oregon. Patten also presented documents from Oregon
demonstrating that Lane had applied for, and received, benefits in Oregon. Patten explained that
if Lane had reestablished residency in Washington, Lane would have to reapply for benefits.
Patten testified that throughout the case, DSHS had encouraged Lane to reapply for benefits
if she was a Washington resident. However, DSHS had obtained documents from Oregon that
indicated that Lane continued to be a resident of Oregon, including a mailing address for Lane in
Corvalis, Oregon, and confirmation that Lane was receiving benefits in Oregon since March.
Patten explained that DSHS had no information on where Lane was living between January 3,
when she requested termination of her Washington benefits, and March 8, when she applied for
benefits in Oregon because Lane refused to provide information about her current residence.
Patten explained that documents for the hearing had been sent to an address in Normandy Park,
Washington. Patten believed the address was Lane’s mother’s address.
Lane also testified at the hearing and conceded that she had called DSHS on January 3 and
requested that her benefits be cancelled. Lane explained, “I was trying to make a decision about
what I was going to do so I thought I should just stop the Washington benefits, uh, because of
that.” Admin. Rec. Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (AR VRP) at 45.
Lane testified that starting in February, she was “part time in Washington and part time in
Oregon.” AR VRP at 46. When asked for further explanation, Lane stated that it was complicated
and there was not a simple answer. Ultimately, Lane explained,
Um, so, as the record shows I was applying for Oregon benefits in March because
I was going to Oregon. And sometimes I came back to Washington to get medical
3
No. 57178-1-II
care. And then I—I stopped the benefits [in Oregon] on June 30th because I went
to come back to Washington.
AR VRP at 52. On cross-examination, Lane stated she moved back to Washington in July. She
also stated she was “working on” having the SSA update her case to reflect her move back to
Washington.
The hearing examiner issued an initial order ruling that Lane’s benefits were correctly
terminated, Lane’s benefits could not be backdated, and Lane would have to reapply for
Washington benefits if she wanted to receive benefits in Washington. Lane filed a petition for
review of the initial order.
On October 25, 2018, the HCA Board of Appeals issued a lengthy 18-page review decision
and final order. After reviewing the entire administrative record, the Board entered numerous
findings of fact. First, the Board made findings related to the termination of Lane’s Washington
benefits:
1. [Lane]. . .previously received SSI CN WAH coverage, MSP WAH coverage,
and federal SNAP food assistance benefits through the State of Washington. She
has been and is currently a recipient of SSI benefits from the federal Social Security
Administration (SSA).
2. On January 3, 2017, [Lane] contacted DSHS and asked that her benefits be
closed as of January 31, 2018, because she was moving out of state. She was not
sure where she was going and she did not have a forwarding address, but she
advised that she would use her Washington address for mailing until she left.
3. In letters, dated January 3, 2018, DSHS notified [Lane] that her health care
coverage, MSP, and food benefits would end on January 31, 2018, because she was
not considered a resident of Washington and was thus not eligible for assistance.
Each of these termination letters was mailed to Ms. Lane . . . .
AR at 23 (footnotes omitted). The Board also entered findings related to Lane’s time in Oregon
and application for Oregon benefits:
4. The [Lane] started going to Oregon in February 2018.
4
No. 57178-1-II
5. On March 6 and March 8, 2018, [Lane] applied for food and QMB MSP benefits
with Oregon, noting that she had recently moved to Oregon. [Lane] reported that
she had recently moved from Washington and was living in Albany, Oregon.
6. On March 13, 2018, staff at Senior & Disability Services in Oregon contacted
Washington DSHS to ask whether [Lane] had open benefits in Washington State.
[Lane]’s new address was reported as . . . Corvalis, Oregon . . . .
7. On March 13, 2018, staff at Washington DSHS staff informed the Oregon staff
via fax that [Lane]’s federal SNAP food assistance and medical assistance benefits
in Washington had closed on January 31, 2018.
8. [Lane] received QMB MSP coverage in Oregon, effective April 1, 2018, as well
as federal SNAP food assistance benefits in Oregon, effective March 1, 2018.
[Lane] did not apply for CN medical assistance coverage (i.e., Oregon
Supplemental Income Program Medical (OSIPM)) to which she may have been
entitled as an SSI recipient in Oregon because she was concerned it could prevent
her from having a “supplement,” but she did change her address to Oregon with
SSA for SSI purposes.
....
12. In a letter, dated April 27, 2018, Jackie Hoyer of Senior & Disability Services
in Oregon notified DSHS staff about [Lane]’s application and approval for benefits
in Oregon. In answer to a question about whether [Lane] had reported moving from
Oregon, Ms. Hoyer wrote “[n]o, there is no record of the consumer stating verbally
or in writing that she has moved from her listed address of . . . Albany, OR . . . .
....
16. On June 21, 2018, [Lane] contacted Oregon Department of Human Services
again, stating that she should not have terminated her Oregon benefits. She was
informed that she could not have Oregon benefits while living in Washington, but
[Lane] clarified “. . . that she planned to move to WA, but . . . will have to stay in
OR . . .” Since her benefits had not yet been terminated and [Lane] expressed an
intent to stay in Oregon, an Oregon caseworker determined the benefits could be
reopened. [Lane] confirmed that her Oregon address was accurate.
AR at 23-26 (some alterations in original) (footnotes omitted). The Board found that Lane did not
have any contact with DSHS until she requested a hearing on the termination of her benefits in
April 2018. Between April and June, Lane continued to receive benefits in Oregon. Then at the
end of June, Lane requested that her food and medical benefits in Oregon be closed. The Board
entered specific findings regarding her move back to Washington and her Washington residency:
5
No. 57178-1-II
19. On June 29, 2018, [Lane] again asked an Oregon caseworker about ending her
medical benefits in Oregon and was again “. . . [a]dvised . . . that her best option is
to wait until she actually moves and then call us to tell us she moved.” Later that
same day, [Lane] again submitted a withdrawal of benefits form, and her QMB
benefits in Oregon were closed, effective June 30, 2018.
20. Sometime in July 2018, [Lane] moved back to Washington. The undersigned
finds based on a preponderance of the evidence presented that [Lane] did not reside
in Washington State between sometime in February 2018 and sometime in July
2018. As of the date of hearing, [Lane] had not yet reapplied for any benefits in
Washington although the evidence suggests she did so after the hearing.
....
22. [Patten] further argued that because [Lane] subsequently applied for and
received medical benefits in Oregon between April 1, 2018, and June 30, 2018, and
food assistance benefits in Oregon between March 1, 2018 and June 30, 2018, she
was ineligible to receive comparable benefits in Washington during this same
period of time. Ms. Patten also noted that although [Lane] receives SSI and is thus
automatically entitled to CN WAH benefits in Washington, her address with SSA
must [be] located in Washington in order for that to happen—that is, she must be a
Washington resident in order to receive CN medical assistance benefits based on
her status as an SSI recipient. [Lane] admitted at the hearing that she was “working
on” contacting SSA to update her address from Oregon to Washington; she
apparently successfully did so by August 3, 2018.
AR at 27-28 (some alterations in original) (footnotes omitted).
The Board concluded that DSHS correctly terminated Lane’s benefits:
9. Termination of Benefits. WAC 182-518-0025(2)(a) states:
We send written notice to you at least five days before taking action to terminate,
suspend or reduce your medicaid eligibility or authorization for a covered service
if:
(i) You requested the action . . .
Both [Lane]’s SSI CN and QMB MSP eligibility are “Medicaid” and thus this WAC
provision applies to [Lane]’s case. Based on the facts of this case in which [Lane]
explicitly asked DSHS on January 3, 2018, to discontinue her SSI CN and QMB
MSP Medicaid eligibility after January 2018 because she was moving out of state,
DSHS correctly terminated those benefits per WAC 182-518-0025(2)(a)(i) and
promptly notified her of the termination.
AR at 33 (first alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
6
No. 57178-1-II
The Board concluded that WAC 182-503-0505(3)(b) required a person to be a Washington
resident to be eligible for WAH programs, including SSI CN and QMB MSP. The Board then
concluded that Lane was not a Washington resident between February 2018 and July 2018:
11. [Lane]’s Residency. WAC 182-503-0520 states:
(1) A resident is a person . . . who currently lives in Washington and:
(a) Intends to reside here, including persons without a fixed address; or
(b) Entered the state looking for a job; or
(c) Entered the state with a job commitment.
(2) A person does not need to live in the state for a specific period of time prior to
meeting the requirements in subsection (1) of this section before being considered
a resident.
....
(4) A resident applying for or receiving health care coverage can temporarily be
out of state for more than one month without their health care coverage being
denied or terminated, if the person:
(a) Intends to return to the state once the purpose of his or her absence has been
accomplished and provides adequate information of this intent after a request
by the agency or its designee; and
(b) Has not been determined eligible for medicaid or state-funded health care
coverage in another state (other than coverage in another state for incidental or
emergency health care).
(5) A person who enters Washington state only for health care is not a resident and
is not eligible for any medical program. . . .
....
(8) In a dispute between states, the state of residence is the state in which the person
is physically located.
[Lane] did not intend to reside in Washington State after January 31, 2018, as she
specifically told DSHS staff on January 3, 2018. Additional evidence that [Lane]
did not intend to reside in Washington from February through July 2018 include:
• Her move to Oregon in February or March 2018;
• The change of her address to an Oregon address for SSA purposes and
receipt of Oregon benefits;
7
No. 57178-1-II
• Her March 2018 application for food and medical assistance benefits from
Oregon;
• Her receipt of food and medical assistance benefits from Oregon from
March 1, 2018, through June 30, 2018, and April 1, 2018, through June 30,
2018, respectively;
• Her communications with Oregon caseworkers that she intended to move
back to Washington sometime after June 30, 2018;
• Her own testimony that she did not move back to Washington State until
sometime in July 2018; and
• Her testimony at the hearing on July 23, 2018, that she had not yet changed
her address to a Washinton address for SSA purposes.
There is no evidence in the hearing record that the Appellant entered Washington
looking for a job or with a job commitment as requirement [sic] by WAC 182-503-
0520(1)(b) and (c). [Lane] thus did not meet the definition of a resident set forth at
WAC 182-503-0520(1), as required by WAC 182-503-0505[(]3)(b) to be eligible
for WAH SSI CN and MSP coverage from February through July 2018, based on
a preponderance of the evidence presented.
AR at 34-36 (footnotes omitted).
The Board rejected Lane’s arguments that she should be considered a resident under WAC
182-503-0520(4) because Lane was not currently receiving benefits and had not presented any
evidence on her intent to return to Washington state. Further, the Board concluded that Lane was
not a resident because it appeared from the record that she primarily returned to Washington to
receive medical care (WAC 182-503-0520(5)) and that if there was any dispute as to her residency,
her address history showed she was physically located in Oregon (WAC 182-503-05201(8)).
Because Lane was not a Washington resident from February to July 2018, the Board
concluded her benefits could not be back-dated to February 2018:
14. Back-Dating WAH Benefits. Given that [Lane] was not eligible for any WAH
programs from February 2018 through July 2018 because she did not satisfy the
necessary residency requirement, back-dating her WAH benefits to February 1,
2018, is not permitted. Further, WAH coverage in general “. . . starts on the first
day of the month you applied for and we decided you are eligible to receive
coverage . . .” This means that one must first apply for benefits before they may be
8
No. 57178-1-II
approved and, if WAC 182-503-0070(2) or (4) applies, possibly back-dated. [Lane]
did not reapply for benefits prior to the hearing in this matter and any evidence
about an application she may have submitted after that time is not part of the hearing
record. Finally, the QMB program does not have a retroactive eligibility period;
instead, benefits begin on the first day of the month following QMB eligibility
determination. DSHS could not determine [Lane]’s eligibility for QMB until after
receiving her completed application.
AR at 37 (some alterations in original) (footnotes omitted).
Finally, the Board concluded that Lane was required to reapply to receive Washington
benefits:
15. Reapplication. As noted above, DSHS correctly terminated [Lane]’s WAH
SSI CN and QMB MSP benefits, effective January 31, 2018, and she did not
reapply for WAH benefits until sometime after July 23, 2018. An application is a
condition precedent to determining eligibility and, if approved, receiving benefits.
It was therefore necessary for [Lane] to reapply for benefits before DSHS could
approve them.
AR at 37-38 (footnotes omitted).
At the end of its lengthy findings and conclusions, the Board affirmed the initial order and
entered a final order:
1. The Initial Order is affirmed.
2. DSHS correctly terminated [Lane’s] Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
Categorically Needy (CN) and Qualified Medicare Beneficiary (QMB) Medicare
Savings Program (MSP) Washington Apple Health (WAH) benefits, effective
January 31, 2018.
3. [Lane] needed to be a Washington resident in order to receive SSI CN and QMB
MSP WAH benefits from February 2018 through July 2018. [Lane] was not a
resident of Washington State from February 2018 through July 2018. [Lane]’s
WAH benefits could not be back-dated to February 1, 2018, because she was
required to be a Washington resident from February 2018 through July 2018 and
she was not.
4. [Lane] was required to reapply for WAH benefits.
AR at 38.
9
No. 57178-1-II
Lane filed a request for reconsideration, which was denied.
Lane filed a petition for review at the superior court. Lane also filed a motion to admit
additional evidence. Lane primarily sought to admit various medical records showing that she
received health care in Washington between February and July 2018. She also submitted records
showing regular SSI deposits into her bank account. And she provided letters from the HCA
related to the creation of the administrative record in the case.
On March 4, 2022, the superior court entered an order denying the motion to admit
additional evidence and denying the petition for review. As to the motion to admit additional
evidence, the superior court explained,
Ms. Lane offers the proposed additional evidence to demonstrate that she traveled
back and forth between Oregon and Washington at times during 2018; that she
received medical care in Washington in 2018; and that she received SSI in 2018.
The Court finds that the proposed additional evidence does not satisfy the
requirements of RCW 34.05.562(1) for the Court to receive evidence in addition to
that contained in the agency record for judicial review. First, the proposed
additional evidence does not relate to the validity of the agency action at the time
it was taken. Second, the proposed additional evidence is not needed to decide a
disputed issue regarding any of the topics identified in RCW 34.05.562(1)(a), (b),
or (c).
Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 475.
The superior court, without making any independent findings of fact, concluded that there
was no statutory basis for reversing the Board’s final order and affirmed.
Lane appeals.
ANALYSIS
Lane’s appeal can be divided into two parts. First, she argues that the superior court erred
by denying her motion to admit additional evidence. Second, she argues that the Board’s final
10
No. 57178-1-II
order was invalid based on a number of statutory grounds, including that it was unconstitutional,
arbitrary and capricious, an erroneous interpretation or application of the law, based on unlawful
procedure, and unsupported by substantial evidence.
We affirm.
I. MOTION TO ADMIT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE
Lane argues that her motion to admit evidence should have been granted because the
additional evidence showed that she received medical care in Washington and received SSI in
2018; this evidence, she contends, was critical to her case.
RCW 34.05.562 governs when the superior court may take new evidence in addition to the
administrative record:
(1) The court may receive evidence in addition to that contained in the agency
record for judicial review, only if it relates to the validity of the agency action at
the time it was taken and is needed to decide disputed issues regarding:
(a) Improper constitution as a decision-making body or grounds for
disqualification of those taking the agency action;
(b) Unlawfulness of procedure or of decision-making process; or
(c) Material facts in rule making, brief adjudications, or other proceedings not
required to be determined on the agency record.
We review the superior court’s decision regarding supplementing the appellate record under RCW
34.05.562 for an abuse of discretion. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife,
14 Wn. App. 2d 945, 964, 474 P.3d 1107 (2020).
Here, the superior court denied the motion because the additional evidence did not comply
with the requirements of RCW 34.05.562(1)(a)-(c). Evidence related to whether Lane was
physically in Washington, received medical care in Washington, and received SSI in 2018 does
not relate to any of the issues mentioned in the rule. The evidence does not relate to the constitution
11
No. 57178-1-II
of the Board, grounds for disqualification of the Board, or any unlawful procedure or decision-
making process. Further, this administrative action is not rule-making, brief adjudication, or some
other proceeding that is not required to be determined on the agency record. Thus, because the
evidence Lane presented does not meet the requirements of RCW 34.05.562(1)(a)-(c), the superior
court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lane’s motion to admit additional evidence.
II. REVIEW OF BOARD’S FINAL ORDER
Our review of an agency decision is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).2 RCW 34.05.570(3). When conducting judicial review under the APA, we review the
agency’s order based on the administrative record. Pac. Coast Shredding, LLC v. Port of
Vancouver, 14 Wn. App. 2d 484, 501, 471 P.3d 934 (2020).
We can grant relief from an agency’s order in an adjudicative proceeding based on one of
the nine reasons listed in RCW 34.05.570(3):
(a) The order, or the statute or rule on which the order is based, is in violation of
constitutional provisions on its face or as applied;
....
(c) The agency has engaged in unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or
has failed to follow a prescribed procedure;
(d) The agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) The order is not supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light
of the whole record before the court, which includes the agency record for judicial
review, supplemented by any additional evidence received by the court under this
chapter;
....
(i) The order is arbitrary or capricious.
2
Ch. 34.05 RCW.
12
No. 57178-1-II
“The burden of demonstrating the invalidity of agency action is on the party asserting invalidity.”
RCW 34.05.570(1)(a).
A. THE WACS ARE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
First, Lane argues that the Board’s final order is based on WACs that are unconstitutional.
We disagree because Lane has failed to demonstrate the WACs violate any constitutional right.
Under RCW 34.05.570(3)(a), we will grant relief from an agency order if the rule on which
the order is based is in violation of constitutional provisions.
Lane offers extensive argument regarding how, in her view, the WAC’s residency
requirements violate federal statutory and regulatory provisions that she claims provide a right to
continuous Medicaid benefits for SSI recipients. Even assuming, without deciding, that federal
statutes did impose such a requirement, federal statutes do not create constitutional rights. 3
Because Lane has failed to identify a constitutional provision or right that is violated by the WACs
relied on by the Board’s order, she has failed to meet her burden to show she is entitled to relief
under RCW 34.05.570(3)(a).
B. THE BOARD’S FINAL ORDER IS NOT ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS
Lane argues that the Board’s final order was arbitrary and capricious. We disagree.
Under RCW 34.05.570(3)(i), we will grant relief from an agency order if the order is
arbitrary and capricious. “An agency decision is arbitrary or capricious if it is ‘willful and
3
We note that, in certain circumstances, statutes may create a property interest, the deprivation of
which may implicate procedural due process concerns. See Durland v. San Juan County,
182 Wn.2d 55, 71-72, 340 P.3d 191 (2014) (“Constitutionally protected property interests may be
created either through (1) contract, (2) common law, or (3) statutes and regulations.”). However,
Lane presents no procedural due process argument, only her argument that the WACs are
unconstitutional because they violate federal statutes.
13
No. 57178-1-II
unreasoning action in disregard of facts and circumstances.’ ” Aponte v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health
Servs., 92 Wn. App. 604, 621, 965 P.2d 626 (1998) (quoting Wash. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Clark
County, 115 Wn.2d 74, 81, 794 P.2d 508 (1990)), review denied, 137 Wn.2d 1028 (1999). When
there are multiple reasonable opinions, an agency action “ ‘is not arbitrary and capricious even
though one may believe an erroneous conclusion has been reached.’ ” Heinmiller v. Dep’t of
Health, 127 Wn.2d 595, 609, 903 P.2d 433 (1995) (quoting Pierce County Sheriff v. Civil Serv.
Comm’n, 98 Wn.2d 690, 695, 658 P.2d 648 (1983)), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1006 (1996).
Here, the Board considered the relevant WACs and made a reasoned decision applying
those WACs to the established facts of this case. The Board amply explained its reasoning and its
decisions in a lengthy, 18-page order. Even if reasonable minds could differ on whether Lane was
entitled to benefits, Lane fails to show that the Board’s order was arbitrary and capricious.
Accordingly, Lane has failed to show that the Board’s final order is invalid under RCW
34.05.570(3)(i).
C. THE BOARD DID NOT ERRONEOUSLY INTERPRET OR APPLY THE LAW
Lane argues that the Board erroneously interpreted and applied the law by concluding that
Lane was not a Washington resident from February 2018 through July 2018.4 We disagree.
4
To the extent Lane argues that the Board misapplied federal law, this argument is misplaced. The
DSHS and the HCA Board are Washington agencies tasked with applying Washington law and
Lane has failed to provide authority requiring the Board to separately apply federal regulations to
its determination. See DeHeer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126, 372 P.2d 193
(1962) (“Where no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required to
search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.”).
Accordingly, we do not address Lane’s proposed application of federal regulations.
14
No. 57178-1-II
Under RCW 34.05.570(3)(d), we may reverse an agency order if it is based on an error of
law. We review errors of law de novo. Southwick, Inc. v. State, 191 Wn.2d 689, 695, 426 P.3d
693 (2018). “However, we give substantial weight to an agency’s interpretation of the law it
administers, especially when the issue falls within the agency’s expertise.” Id. at 696.
“We review questions of law de novo and interpret agency regulations as if they were
statutes.” Schimmick Constr. Co. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 12 Wn. App. 2d 770, 778, 460 P.3d
192 (2020). The goal of statutory interpretation is to carry out the legislature’s intent. Leishman
v. Ogden Murphy Wallace, PLLC, 196 Wn.2d 898, 904, 479 P.3d 688 (2021). We must give effect
to the plain meaning of a statute as an expression of legislative intent where possible. Id. “A
statute is ambiguous if there is more than one reasonable interpretation.” State v. Elwell, 17 Wn.
App. 2d 367, 370, 486 P.3d 152 (2021).
WAC 182-503-0505 establishes eligibility requirements for WAH programs, including
being a resident of Washington state. WAC 182-503-0505(3)(b). WAC 182-503-0520 defines
resident for the purposes of determining eligibility for WAH programs:
(1) A resident is a person . . . who currently lives in Washington and:
(a) Intends to reside here, including persons without a fixed address; or
(b) Entered the state looking for a job; or
(c) Entered the state with a job commitment
(2) A person does not need to live in the state for a specified period of time prior to
meeting the requirements in subsection (1) of this section before being considered
a resident.
....
(4) A resident applying for or receiving health care coverage can temporarily be out
of the state for more than one month without their health care coverage being denied
or terminated, if the person:
15
No. 57178-1-II
(a) Intends to return to the state once the purpose of his or her absence has been
accomplished and provides adequate information of this intent after a request
by the agency or its designee; and
(b) Has not been determined eligible for medical or state-funded health care
coverage in another state (other than coverage in another state for incidental or
emergency health care).
(5) A person who enters Washington state only for health care is not a resident and
is not eligible for any medical program. The only exception is for a person who
moves from another state directly into an institution in Washington state.
Residency rules for institutionalized persons are described in WAC 182-503-0525.
Lane argues that the Board erroneously interpreted the WACs because they are ambiguous
“in Ms. Lane’s situation.” Br. of Appellant at 37. And she claims that the Board did not properly
apply the plain language of the statutes “to determine Ms. Lane’s residency status when she was
physically located in two states.” Br. of Appellant at 38. We disagree.
Here, the plain language of WAC 182-503-0505(3)(b) clearly imposes a residency
requirement to be eligible for WAH programs. And WAC 182-503-0520 sets out in detail the
definition of a resident for WAH eligibility purposes. Although WAC 182-503-0520(2) provides
that a person does not need to live in Washington for a specified period of time, this provision does
not create ambiguity in Lane’s “situation.” Under WAC 182-503-0520(1), (4), and (5), there are
ample additional residency criteria to determine whether a person who is only in the State briefly
is considered a resident. By using the plain language of these criteria in its decision, the Board did
not erroneously interpret the law.
Further, the Board correctly applied the plain language of WAC 182-503-0520 to this case.
Regardless of Lane’s assertion that she was regularly traveling back and forth to Washington,
WAC 182-503-0520 requires more than being “physically located” in the state to establish
residency. There is no evidence in the record that Lane was in Washington with the intent to reside
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No. 57178-1-II
here as required to establish residency under WAC 182-503-0520(1)(a). And there is no evidence
that Lane was physically located in Washington looking for a job or with a job commitment as
required to establish residency under WAC 182-503-0520(1)(b)-(c). Thus, the Board properly
applied the WAC to determine that Lane was not a resident of Washington.
Further, as noted by the Board, all of the evidence presented at the hearing, including the
evidence presented by Lane herself, established only that Lane was physically located in
Washington to receive medical care. The plain language of WAC 182-503-0520(5) explicitly
states that “[a] person who enters Washington state only for health care is not a resident and is not
eligible for any medical program.” Because Lane has established, at best, that she was regularly
entering Washington state to obtain medical care, the Board properly applied WAC 182-503-
0520(5) to determine that Lane was not a Washington resident.
Finally, the Board properly applied WAC 182-503-0520(4) and determined that it did not
apply to Lane. The plain language of WAC 182-503-0520(4) allows a resident applying for or
receiving health care coverage to be out of the state temporarily without interfering with their
benefits. But the exception did not apply because Lane was not a resident and her benefits had
been terminated at her request. And the plain language of WAC 182-503-0520(4)(b) excludes any
person who has been determined eligible for Medicaid or state-funded health care coverage in
another state—this exclusion would have applied to Lane because she had been approved for at
least one Medicaid or state-funded health care program in Oregon (despite her contention that she
did not receive the same programs or benefits in Oregon as she had in Washington). The Board
properly applied WAC 182-503-0520(4) and determined that it did not apply to Lane.
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No. 57178-1-II
Lane has failed to show that the Board erroneously interpreted or applied the law.
Accordingly, she fails to establish that we should grant relief under RCW 34.05.570(3)(d).
D. THE BOARD DID NOT ENGAGE IN UNLAWFUL PROCEDURE OR DECISION-MAKING PROCESS OR
FAIL TO FOLLOW PROCEDURES
Lane contends that the DSHS engaged in unlawful procedures by requiring her to reapply
for SSI CN WAH benefits when no additional application is necessary if the recipient is receiving
SSI.5 Lane also argues that the DSHS failed to follow its own procedures for backdating WAH
benefits. And Lane argues that the DSHS failed to follow its own procedures authorizing medical
benefits in more than one state. We disagree.
RCW 34.05.570(3)(c) provides that we will grant relief if “[t]he agency has engaged in
unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to follow a prescribed procedure.”
First, Lane contends she should not have been required to reapply for SSI CN WAH
benefits because SSI recipients are automatically enrolled in SSI CN WAH. The HCA concedes
that there is not a specific application process for SSI CN WAH coverage when a person receiving
SSI has a Washington address listed as their address with the SSA—DSHS will then automatically
enroll them in SSI CN WAH coverage. But Lane was still required to establish eligibility for
enrollment in SSI CN WAH benefits, including residency requirements, which she failed to do.
Because Lane had failed to meet the requirements for SSI CN WAH coverage, DSHS did not
5
In her brief, Lane refers to HCA rather than DSHS. However, HCA is not the administrative
agency that took the administrative actions or that is governed by the rules or procedures Lane
cites in her arguments. Accordingly, we address Lane’s arguments as directed to DSHS rather
than HCA.
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No. 57178-1-II
engage in an unlawful procedure by failing to provide SSI CN WAH coverage until Lane properly
updated her address with SSA to reflect her eligibility for SSI CN WAH.
Second, Lane argues that DSHS failed to follow its own procedures for providing
backdated WAH benefits. WAC 182-504-0005 provides for backdated WAH benefits in certain
circumstances:
(1) The medicaid agency approves a retroactive Washington apple health (WAH)
certification period for the three months immediately before the month of
application when an individual:
(a) Requests retroactive WAH on his or her application, within the certification
period following the retroactive period, or before the determination of benefits
and any appeal process is final;
(b) Would have been eligible for WAH for any or all of the three months if he
or she had applied during the retroactive period; and
(c) The individual received covered medical services as described in WAC 182-
501-0060 and 182-501-0065.
Putting aside the fact that Lane could not have requested retroactive WAH benefits “on . . . her
application” under WAC 182-504-0005(1)(a) because she had not applied for benefits, for the
reasons explained above, Lane was not a Washington resident prior to July 2018. Therefore, Lane
was not eligible for WAH during the period of time she sought to have her benefits backdated as
required by WAC 182-504-0005(1)(b). Accordingly, DSHS did not fail to follow its procedures
by refusing to backdate Lane’s WAH benefits.
Third, Lane argues that DSHS’s eligibility manual provides that “when an eligible
Medicaid recipient moves to WA and is receiving Medicaid in another state, the appropriate
Medicaid program can be authorized for the same month.” Br. of Appellant at 49. Even assuming,
without deciding, that failure to follow a procedure in DSHS’s eligibility manual would invalidate
the Board’s final order, Lane fails to establish that DSHS failed to follow this procedure. As
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No. 57178-1-II
explained above, Lane did not move to Washington, rather she was, at best, coming to Washington
regularly to receive medical care. Therefore, the procedure in the eligibility manual does not apply
to her.
Lane has failed to establish that the Board’s final order is invalid under RCW
34.05.570(3)(c).6
E. SUFFICIENCY OF FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Finally, Lane specifically identifies numerous findings of fact and conclusions of law in
the Board’s final order which she contends are erroneous.7 We disagree.
We review findings of fact using the substantial evidence test to determine “whether the
record contains ‘a sufficient quantity of evidence to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth or
correctness of that order.’ ” Port of Seattle v. Pollution Control Hr’gs Bd., 151 Wn.2d 568, 588,
90 P.3d 659 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting King County v. Cent. Puget Sound
Growth Mgmt. Hr’gs Bd., 142 Wn.2d 543, 553, 14 P.3d 133 (2000)). We review conclusions of
law de novo. Raven v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 177 Wn.2d 804, 817, 306 P.3d 920 (2013).
Lane argues that findings of fact 3, 5, 8, 12, 16, 19, 20, and 22 are not supported by
substantial evidence. Lane argues that findings 3, 5, 12, and 16 do not accurately reflect her
6
To the extent that Lane argues that the HCA Board improperly applied these DSHS rules and
policies when affirming DSHS’s administrative action, this argument would also fail. For the
reasons explained above, DSHS followed its rules and procedures. Accordingly, the Board also
properly applied the rules and procedures in affirming DSHS’s administrative actions.
7
Lane also challenges numerous findings and conclusions in the initial order issued by the hearing
examiner. However, we review the Board’s final order, not the hearing examiner’s initial order.
Accordingly, we decline to address Lane’s challenges to any findings of fact or conclusions of law
in the hearing examiner’s initial order.
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No. 57178-1-II
addresses or the fact that she was living in two places at one time. However, from our review of
the record, these findings accurately reflect the information contained in the testimony and
documentary evidence and Lane did not provide any additional or contrary testimony about her
addresses or living arrangements. Thus, these findings are supported by substantial evidence.
Lane challenges finding of fact 8 because it was based on the supplemental exhibit of case
notes. She had objected to the exhibit because it had “very confusing conversations that she had
with OR’s benefit office that were not always accurate, as she was trying to decide what to do.”
Br. of Appellant at 65. Lane contends the exhibit should not have been considered and does not
provide substantial evidence supporting the finding. However, Lane presents no argument or
authority which would support excluding the exhibit, and the finding accurately reflects the
information contained in the exhibit. Thus, finding of fact 8 is supported by substantial evidence
in the administrative record.
Lane challenges finding of fact 19 because it noted that Oregon received a form to close
her QMB and food benefits. This finding of fact accurately reflects the case notes from Oregon.
It appears that Lane claims that the Board inferred something about OSIPM benefits, which she
was not receiving, but the finding does not reference OSIPM benefits. Thus, this finding is
supported by substantial evidence.
Lane challenges finding of fact 20 finding that Lane was not a resident of Washington
between February 2018 and July 2018, arguing that her medical records show “she was in two
states at once.” Br. of Appellant at 67. As explained above, simply physically being in
Washington state does not establish residency and the Board properly found that Lane was not a
Washington resident. This finding is supported by substantial evidence.
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No. 57178-1-II
Finally, Lane challenges finding of fact 22 regarding when she updated her SSA file to
reflect her WA address by August 3. Lane claims this is inaccurate because she received food
benefits in July. But receiving food benefits in July would still be by August 3, so there is no
inaccuracy. Further, this does not affect the Board’s finding that Lane did not reside in Washington
until she moved back in July 2018. This finding is supported by substantial evidence.
Lane also challenges conclusions of law 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, and 15. All of these challenges
are based on Lane’s arguments that the Board misapplied the law regarding residency requirements
and reapplication. As explained above, the Board properly interpreted and applied the law
regarding residency, and DSHS properly followed procedures regarding reapplication.
Accordingly, Lane’s challenges to the sufficiency of numerous findings of fact and
conclusions of law all fail.
III. REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES
Assuming that she will prevail in this appeal, Lane requests attorney fees under RAP 18.1
and RCW 4.84.350.8 Setting aside the issue of whether Lane would ever be entitled to an award
of attorney fees as a self-represented party,9 she is not the prevailing party and, therefore, is not
entitled to attorney fees under RCW 4.84.350.10 We deny Lane’s request for attorney fees.
8
Lane also requests attorney fees under RCW 11.96A.150 (costs and attorney fees under the Trust
and Estates Dispute Resolution Act, chapter 11.96A RCW) and the Civil Rights Attorney Fees Act
of 1976, 18 U.S.C. § 1988, neither of which are applicable to this judicial review of an agency
action.
9
See In re Marriage of Brown, 159 Wn. App. 931, 938-39, 247 P.3d 466 (2011) (self-represented
litigants are generally not entitled to an award of attorney fees).
10
RCW 4.84.350 provides for an award of attorney fees to “a qualified party that prevails in a
judicial review of an agency action.”
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No. 57178-1-II
CONCLUSION
The superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to admit additional
evidence. And there are no grounds for reversing the Board’s final order. Accordingly, we affirm
and deny Lane’s request for attorney fees.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
PRICE, J.
We concur:
CRUSER, C.J.
VELJACIC, J.
23