Sainiak

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GARRETT RAYMOND SAINIAK, Civil No. 3:24-cv-538

Plaintiff (Judge Mariani)

v. .

SECURITY LT. NEWBERRY, et al.,

Defendants

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Garrett Sainiak (“Sainiak”), an inmate housed, at all relevant times, at the

State Correctional Institution, Frackville, Pennsylvania (“SCl-Frackville”), commenced this

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). The remaining Defendants are

Lieutenant Newberry, Lieutenant Rainer, Lieutenant Maul, Correctional Officer Storm,

Correctional Officer Forte, Correctional Officer Kimmel, and Sergeant Walter.

Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (Doc. 38). The motion is ripe for resolution. For the

reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the motion.

I. Statement of Undisputed Facts‘

A. Facts Related to Placement in the Dry Cell

On September 13, 2022, Sainiak was transferred from SCl-Benner to SCI-Frackville.

(Doc. 51 J 1). During his deposition, Sainiak testified that, while at SCl-Benner and

preparing for transport, he was told that a drug sniffing dog “hit on” him, indicating the

possible presence of contraband. (Id. 73). Sainiak “acknowledge[d] and complied with the

Officers’ directions.” (/d. {| 4).

Upon arrival at SCl-Frackville, Sainiak was subjected to a body cavity search and

was passed through a body scanner by corrections officers. (/d. 5). Sainiak was informed

that he was being placed in a dry cell because he was suspected of having contraband on

his person due to the results of the body scan. (Id. { 2).

1 Local Rule 56.1 requires that a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56 be supported “by a separate, short, and concise statement of the material facts, in numbered

paragraphs, as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” M.D. Pa. LOCAL

OF Court 56.1. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must file a separate statement of

material facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the moving party's statement and

identifying genuine issues to be tried. /d. Unless otherwise noted, the factual background herein derives

from Defendants’ Rule 56.1 statement of material facts. (Doc. 51). Although Sainiak filed a brief (Docs. 55,

57) in opposition to Defendants’ motion, he failed to file a response to Defendants’ statement of material

facts. Therefore, as authorized by Local Rule 56.1, the Court will admit as uncontroverted the statement of

facts submitted by Defendants. See M.D. Pa. LOCAL RULE OF CouRT 56.1 (“All material facts set forth in the

statement required to be served by the moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by

the statement recjuired to be served by the opposing party.”); see also Rau v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co.,

793 F. App’x 84, 87 (3d Cir. 2019) (upholding this Court's decision to strike non-movant’s non-responsive

counterstatement of facts under Local Rule 56.1); Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 613 (3d

Cir. 2018) (finding that “the District Court is in the best position to determine the extent of a party's

noncompliance with Local Rule 56.1, as well as the appropriate sanction for such noncompliance’); see

also Doc. 40 § 3; Doc. 43 J 3; Doc. 45 ] 3; Doc. 48 J 3; Doc. 54 J 3 (advising Sainiak that failure to file a

responsive statement of material facts would result in the facts set forth in Defendants’ statement of

material facts being deemed admitted).

Sainiak was placed in a dry cell for monitoring and was provided a paper smock to

wear. (/d. 6). The purpose of the dry cell was to monitor Sainiak’s bodily waste to

determine if he would pass any contraband. (/d. 7). Sainiak remained in the dry cell from

September 13, 2022 to September 16, 2022. (/d. $8). At the conclusion of the monitoring

period, contraband was not discovered. (/d. {| 9).

In his complaint, Sainiak alleged that while in the dry cell, he was not allowed to

clean himself or the cell, he had inadequate toilet paper and inadequate food and water, he

was exposed to pepper spray and was subjected to constant illumination. (/d. 11; Doc. 1,

at 7-9, 12).

Upon release from the dry cell, Sainiak was transferred to the Restrictive Housing

Unit (“RHU"). (Doc. 51 ¥ 10).

Defendants maintain that Sainiak has not produced medical records or other

evidence demonstrating any physical injury. (/d. 12).

B. Facts Regarding Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (the “DOC” or the “Department’) has a

formal policy and procedures manual for inmates, which must be followed by inmates who

file grievances while incarcerated at state correctional institutions operated by the

Department. (/d. 13). The purpose of a grievance is to allow an inmate to bring concerns

and complaints to the attention of prison officials. (/d.). The grievance procedures are set

forth in the Department’s Administrative Directive 804 ("DC-ADM 804’), titled Inmate

Grievance System. (/d.).

Pursuant to DC-ADM 804, the DOC has the following three-tiered grievance system

which serves as an inmate’s administrative remedy: (1) an initial review by a Grievance

Officer; (2) appeal to the Facility Manager or designee; and (3) appeal to the Secretary's

Office of Inmate Grievance and Appeals (“SOIGA’) for final review. (Id. J 14).

A grievance must be submitted in writing, using the grievance form available on all

housing units or blocks, within 15 working days after the events noted in the grievance. (Id.

q 15). A grievance must include the following: a statement of facts relevant to the claim

including the date and approximate time and location of the event(s) giving rise to the

grievance; the identity of any individuals who were directly involved in the event(s); any

claims the inmate wishes to make concerning violations of DOC directives, regulations,

court orders, or other law; and any compensation or legal relief desired. (/d. 16).

Upon receipt on the inmate's grievance, the Facility Grievance Coordinator assigns

each grievance (even a rejected grievance) a tracking number and enters it into the

Automated Inmate Grievance Tracking System. (/d. J 17).

The inmate then receives an initial review response. (See id. J 18). Ifthe inmate is

dissatisfied with the initial response, he or she may appeal that decision to the Facility

Manager. (/d.). The Facility Manager then provides a written response to the grievance.

(/d. | 19). The Facility Manager may uphold the response, uphold the inmate, dismiss the

grievance (either as untimely or on the merits), or uphold in part and deny in part. (/d.). The

Facility Manager may also remand the initial review response for further investigation or

consideration. (/d.).

If an inmate is not satisfied with the decision of the Facility Manager, he or she may

submit an appeal to SOIGA. (/d. § 20). Only issues raised in both the original grievance

and the appeal to the Facility Manager may be appealed to this level. (/d.). SOIGA reviews

the original grievance, the initial review response, the appeal to the Facility Manager. the

Facility Manager's response, and the appeal to final review. (/d. □ 21). SOIGA may uphold

the response, uphold the inmate, dismiss, or uphold in part and deny in part. (/d. J 22).

Alternatively, the Chief Grievance Officer may remand the grievance to the facility for further

investigation or reconsideration or may refer the appeal to a different bureau. (/d.).

Defendants assert that Sainiak filed grievance number 999897, pertaining to the

claims raised in this matter. (/d. ] 23). Defendants maintain that grievance number 999897

was not appropriately exhausted to final review. (/d.).

Il. Legal Standard

Through summary adjudication, the court may dispose of those claims that do not

present a “genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Feb. R Civ.P. 56(a). “As to materiality,

... [o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence

of a genuine issue as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106

S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once such a showing has been made, the non-moving

party must offer specific facts contradicting those averred by the movant to establish a

genuine issue of material fact. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).

Therefore, the non-moving party may not oppose summary judgment simply on the basis of

the pleadings, or on conclusory statements that a factual issue exists. Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 248. “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the

assertion by citing to particular parts of materials in the record...or showing that the

materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an

adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Feb. R. Civ. P.

56(c)(1)(A)-(B). In evaluating whether summary judgment should be granted, “[t]ne court

need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.”

FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). “Inferences should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party, and where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant’s, then

the non-movant’s must be taken as true.” Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974

F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir.1992), cert. denied 507 U.S. 912 (1993).

However, “facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party

only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scoff v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127

S. Ct. 1769, 1776, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007). If a party has carried its burden under the

summary judgment rule,

its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken as a whole could not

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine

issue for trial. The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between

the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for

summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of

material fact. When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is

blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe

it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a

motion for summary judgment.

Id. (internal quotations, citations, and alterations omitted).

lll. Discussion

Defendants seek summary judgment on the following grounds: (1) Sainiak failed to

establish an Eighth Amendment violation; (2) Sainiak failed to establish a Fourth

Amendment violation; (3) Sainiak’s Fourteenth Amendment claim is barred by the more-

specific-provision rule; (4) Sainiak failed to establish a First Amendment violation; (5)

Sainiak failed to establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress; (6) Sainiak’s

state law claims are barred by sovereign immunity; and (7) Sainiak failed to properly

exhaust his administrative remedies. (Doc. 52). The Court begins its analysis with the

threshold question of whether Sainiak has exhausted his administrative remedies.

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Review2

Defendants contend that Sainiak failed to properly exhaust any grievances against

them in the prison’s administrative review process prior to proceeding to federal court.

(Doc. 52, at 21-24).

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e ef seq.,

requires prisoners to exhaust available administrative remedies before suing prison officials

for alleged constitutional violations. See id. § 1997e(a); Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 639,

642 (2016) (explaining that only “available” remedies must be exhausted). The PLRA

“exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve

general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or

some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussile, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). It has been made clear

that the exhaustion requirement is mandatory. See Williams v. Beard, 482 F.3d 637, 639

(3d Cir. 2007); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (holding that the

exhaustion requirement of the PLRA applies to grievance procedures “regardless of the

relief offered through administrative procedures”); Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 67 (3d Cir.

2000) (same). “[I]t is beyond the power of [any] court...to excuse compliance with the

2 Because Defendants raised the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies, the Court

issued an Order notifying the parties that it would consider exhaustion in its role as factfinder in accordance

with Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2018) and Small v. Camden Cnty., 728 F.3d 265 (3d Cir.

2013), and afforded the parties the opportunity to supplement the record with any additional evidence

relevant to exhaustion of administrative remedies. (Doc. 58).

exhaustion requirement.” Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 73 (quoting Beeson v. Fishkill Corr. Facility,

28 F. Supp.2d 884, 894-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)).

To exhaust administrative remedies an inmate must comply with all applicable

grievance procedures and rules. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 231 (3d Cir. 2004). The

PLRA requires not only technical exhaustion of the administrative remedies, but also

substantial compliance with procedural requirements. Spruill, 372 F.3d at 227-32; see also

Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 77-78. A procedural default by the prisoner, either through late or

improper filings, bars the prisoner from bringing a claim in federal court unless equitable

considerations warrant review of the claim. Spruill, 372 F.3d at 227-32; see also Camp v.

Brennan, 219 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 2000). A procedural default may be excused, however, if

the prisoner can show that the administrative remedies were unavailable to him. See

Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 266 (3d Cir. 2018) (stating that “[tlhe PLRA requires

only ‘proper exhaustion,’ meaning exhaustion of those administrative remedies that are

‘available’ (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006)). “An administrative remedy

is unavailable when it “operates as a simple dead endj,]...is so opaque that it becomes,

practically speaking, incapable of use, or when prison administrators thwart inmates from

taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or

intimidation.” Downey v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 305 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting

Shifflett v. Korszniak, 934 F.3d 356, 365 (3d Cir. 2019)).

As stated, the DOC employs a three-step grievance process that must be completed

to properly exhaust administrative remedies in most cases. See Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d

289, 292 n.2 (3d Cir. 2002); Commonwealth of Pa., Dep’t of Corr., Inmate Grievance Sys.,

Policy No. DC-ADM 804 (“DC-ADM 804”). If informal resolution attempts do not resolve the

problem, the first step is to file a written grievance (using form DC-804, Part 1) with the

Facility Grievance Coordinator within 15 working days after “the event upon which the claim

is based.” DC-ADM 804 § 1(A)(3)-(5). An adverse decision by the Grievance Coordinator

may be appealed to the Facility Manager within 15 working days of the initial-review

response or rejection. /d. § 2(A)(1). Finally, the decision of the Facility Manager may be

appealed to “Final Review’ with the Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals,

and again must be submitted within 15 working days of the date of the Facility Manager's

decision. Id. § 2(B)(1).

The DOC has specific requirements for grievances submitted by inmates. Those

requirements include, among other things, that the grievance “be legible [and]

understandable”; “include a statement of the facts relevant to the claim” as well as “the date,

approximate time, and location of the event(s) that gave rise to the grievance”; that the

prisoner “identify individuals directly involved in the event(s)”; and that the grievance include

“the specific relief sought,” including “compensation or other legal relief normally available

from a court.” Id. § 1(A)(11).

10

Defendants assert that Sainiak filed one relevant grievance—number 999897. (Doc.

52, at 21-24: Doc. 51 J 23; Doc. 51-5). On September 23, 2022, Sainiak filed grievance

999897 with respect to his placement in the dry cell from September 13, 2022 to September

16, 2022. (Doc. 51-5, at 8-11).

On October 19, 2022, the grievance officer issued an initial review response and

denied the grievance. (/d. at 12). The grievance officer found as follows:

| have reviewed your grievance and all matters pertinent to your claim. On

9/13/2022, you were transferred to SCI Frackville from SCI Huntingdon.s

Upon your transfer, an air scan of your person was completed via a drug

detection canine, and during this process the canine alerted to the presence

of drugs contained on or in your person. Once received at SCI Frackville, a

body scan was completed that also detected the presence of a foreign object

inside your body. You were then, within DOC Policy 6.3.1 Section 47, placed

in a dry cell under observation. As part of this policy, you were also placed in

a Secure Cuff Mitt restraint and ankle shackles. During this process,

[mledical staff were present and conducted an examination of the restraints to

ensure they were not too restrictive to cut off circulation or cause bodily

distress. In addition, while placed in a dry cell status, you were offered an

opportunity to exercise/use the bathroom every two hours along with the

ability to use the bathroom upon request to staff. As such, your grievance

and any relief sought is denied.

(Id.).

Sainiak appealed the first-level denial to the Facility Manager. (Id. at 13). On

November 29, 2022, the Facility Manager upheld the initial response that denied the

grievance, and reasoned as follows:

3 The Court notes that other evidence of record reveals that Sainiak arrived at SCI-Frackville

from SCl-Benner, and not from SCl-Huntingdon. (See Doc. 51-2, at 3). This discrepancy is immaterial to

the resolution of the issues before the Court.

11

| have reviewed your appeal and initial review response by UM

Wegrzynowicz, while reviewing relevant records. | write at this time to advise

you that | concur with his initial review response, as he addressed all

concerns at the initial level. At my level, you provide nothing further to

warrant a different response.

Based upon what is reference above, the Facility Manager upholds the initial

review response. As a result, all relief sought is denied.

(Id. at 14).

On December 8, 2022, Sainiak filed an appeal to SOIGA. (/d. at 4, 15-23). On

February 2, 2023, SOIGA remanded the matter to the institution for further review, finding

that the institution did not address all of Sainiak’s allegations. (/d. at 5-7).

On rernand, the institution again denied the grievance. (See id. at 3). Therefore, on

March 20, 2023, Sainiak filed his second appeal to SOIGA. (/d. at 3). On May 11, 2023,

SOIGA dismissed the appeal on procedural grounds “due to a failure to comply with the

provisions of the DC-ADM 804” noting that “[a]n appeal to final review is not permitted when

[Sainiak] fail[ed] to comply with submissions procedures” and Sainiak “[has] not provided

[SOIGA] with required and/or legible documentation for review.” (Id. at 2). More

specifically, SOIGA found that Sainiak “failed to provide a copy of the facility's remanded

response. Additionally, in [his] appeal, [he] failed to provide reason(s) for appealing the

facility's remanded response.” (/d.). Therefore, SOIGA dismissed the grievance appeal.

(Id.).

This grievance history confirms that Sainiak failed to properly exhaust grievance

number 999897. DC-ADM 804 makes it clear that an inmate appealing a grievance to final

12

review must provide SOIGA with all required documentation relevant to the appeal and that

his failure to do so may result in the dismissal of the appeal. As stated, the DOC’s

grievance policy consists of three steps. The final step involves an appeal to the SOIGA

within 15 working days of the Facility Manager's Appeal Response. A proper appeal to final

review must include: “(1) a legible copy of the Initial Grievance; (2) a copy of the initial

review response/rejection and/or remanded initial review response/rejection; (3) a legible

copy of the Inmate Appeal to the Facility Manager; (4) a copy of the Facility

Manager/designee’s decision and/or remanded Facility Manager/designee's decision; (5) a

written appeal to the SOIGA...” DC-ADM 804 § 2(B)(1)(j). “[FJailure to provide any of the

documentation noted above may result in the appeal being dismissed.” Id. § 2(B)(1)(j)(6).

The evidence confirms that Sainiak failed to comply with these requirements. A prisoner's

failure to comply with the procedural and substantive requirements of the DOC’s grievance

policy, as set forth in DC-ADM 804, results in procedural default, thereby precluding an

action in federal court. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 84, 90-91; Spruill, 372 F.3d at 227-32.

By failing to give SOIGA the required! documentation for his grievance appeal,

Sainiak has not followed the applicable procedures outlined in DC-ADDM 804, which “supply

the yardstick for measuring procedural default.” Spruill, 372 F.3d ai 231. An inmate's

failure to suomit the required documents to SOIGA results in the inmate failing to exhaust

administrative remedies. See, e.g., Mack v. Klopotoski, 540 F. App’x 108, 113 (3d Cir.

2013) (affirming dismissal for inmate's failure to properly exhaust because inmate had falec!

13

to include photocopies of his appeals to the Facility Manager and rejecting substantial

compliance argument that inmate filed handwritten copies since DC-ADM 804 specifically

required photocopies).

As the remaining Defendants have provided evidence to support their failure to

exhaust defense, the burden shifts to Sainiak to produce evidence that the DOC grievance

remedies were not available to him. Sainiak has failed to meet this burden.

Sainiak has not provided any basis to excuse his procedural default of grievance

number 999897. Instead, Sainiak simply argues that he exhausted his administrative

remedies by filing a final appeal to SOIGA and receiving its decision on May 11, 2023.

(Doc. 57, at 11-15). Sainiak’s argument misses the mark. Sainiak has not presented any

evidence that he complied with the requirements of Section 2 of DC-ADM 804 regarding

appeals to Final Review. It is thus undisputed that Sainiak failed to comply with the

requirements of DC-ADM 804 for filing a proper appeal to final review.

Under certain circumstances, administrative remedies may not be effectively

available to an inmate, preventing a timely pursuit of the prison grievance process. See,

e.g., Camp, 219 F.3d at 281; Shifflett, 934 F.3d at 359 (“a prisoner exhausts his

administrative remedies as soon as the prison fails to respond to a properly submitted

grievance in a timely fashion”); Robinson v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 831 F.3d 148,

154 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that prison officials rendered plaintiffs administrative remedies

unavailable when they failed to timely respond to his grievance and ignored his follow-up

14

requests for a decision). The record does not support a finding that the administrative

process was unavailable to Sainiak, nor does Sainiak set forth any argument that the

grievance process was unavailable to him or that Defendants obstructed his access to the

prison grievance system. (See Doc. 57). To the contrary, the record establishes that

Sainiak had full and ready access to the administrative remedy process.

In sum, grievance number 999897 was not properly exhausted. Sainiak has not

provided any basis to excuse his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Under Rule 56,

Sainiak was required to establish the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact. See

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. He has failed to do so. Consequently, the Court concludes

that Sainiak has not properly exhausted the claims in this action, and Defendants are

entitled to an entry of summary judgment in their favor. See Spruill, 372 F.3d at 222, 230.

Even had Sainiak properly exhausted, Defendants are also entitled to summary

judgment on the merits of the claims, as set forth below.

B. Eighth Amendment Claim

The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment imposes

constitutional limitations on a prisoner's conditions of confinement. See Graham v. Connor,

490 U.S. 386 (1989): Rhodes v. Chaprnan, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). “[A] prison official violates

the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met.” Gilblom v. Gillipsie, 425 □ □

App’x 165, 168 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)).

15

First, the plaintiff must allege a deprivation that is “objectively, sufficiently serious.”

Gilblom, 435 F. App’x at 168 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). The objective component

is narrowly defined: only “extreme deprivations” suffice to make out an Eighth Amendment

claim. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). A prisoner must show that the condition,

either alone or in combination with other conditions, deprived him of “the minimal civilized

measure Of life’s necessities,” or at least a “single, identifiable human need.” Wilson v.

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991) (citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). These needs include

“food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care and personal safety.” Griffin v. Vaughn, 112

F.3d 703, 709 (3d Cir. 1997). “[A] totality of the circumstances test must be applied to

determine whether the conditions of confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment.”

Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418, 427 (3d Cir. 1990).

Second, the plaintiff must show that the prison official “subjectively acted with a

sufficiently culpable state of mind, i.e., deliberate indifference.” Tillman v. Lebanon County

Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 418 (3d Cir. 2000). Serious hardship to the prisoner is required

to satisfy the Eighth Amendment's objective component. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298.

Sainiak maintains that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by placing

him in the dry cell, and he challenges the various conditions and deprivations he allegedly

suffered during his confinement therein. (Doc. 1, at 12). Sainiak asserts that his Eighth

Amendment rights were violated when he was forced to spend time in the dry cell in a paper

gown, having his private parts exposed, in restraints, without adequate toilet paper, without

16

the ability to clean himself or the cell, without adequate food and water, and while being

exposed to pepper spray, and being under constant lighting. (/d. at 7-9, 12).

As the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit have explained,

when considering whether conditions of confinement violated the Eighth Amendment, “the

Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons.” Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 139

(3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349). “To the extent that such conditions are

restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their

offenses against society.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. Courts consider “the length of

confinement, the amount of time prisoners must spend in their cells each day, the

opportunities for activities outside the cells, and the repair and functioning of basic physical

facilities such as plumbing, ventilation, and showers.” Tillery, 907 F.2d at 427. With respect

to a dry cell, the Third Circuit has explained:

A ‘dry cell’ is a cell that lacks water—all standing water has been drained from

the toilet, the room's water supply has been shut off, and the sink and toilet

have been capped to prevent inmate access. An inmate may be placed in a

dry cell when prison staff have observed the inmate attempt to ingest an item

of contraband or they learn that the inmate is attempting to introduce

contraband into the prison. Dry cells are used to closely observe the inmate

until natural processes allow for the ingested contraband to be retrieved. To

this end, dry cells lack all linens and moveable items other than a mattress,

inmates’ clothes are exchanged for a simple smock, and their movements are

carefully controlled to prevent them from concealing or disposing of any

retrievable contraband.

Thomas, 948 F.3d at 137.

17

While “administrative confinement in a dry cell is unpleasant and often unsanitary, so

long as the conditions of that confinement are not foul or inhuman, and are supported by

some penological justification, they will not violate the Eighth Amendment.” Thomas, 948

F.3d at 138-39 (citing Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 364-65 (3d Cir. 1992)); see also

Gilblom, 435 F. App’x at 169 (explaining that “[mJaintaining institutional security and

preserving internal order and discipline are essential goals that may require limitation or

retraction of the retained constitutional rights of both convicted prisoners and pretrial

detainees” and holding that “the need to ensure that contraband would not be brought into

the prison certainly justified [the plaintiff's] placement in a dry cell”) (citing Bell v. Wolfish,

441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979).

The Court recognizes that the “duration and conditions of...confinement cannot be

ignored in deciding whether such confinement meets constitutional standards|;]” however,

[t]he touchstone is the health of the inmate.” Young, 960 F.2d at 364.

Sainiak sets forth specific deprivations he allegedly suffered during his confinement

in the dry cell for approximately three days after he was suspected of ingesting contraband.

(Doc. 1, at 7-9, 12). As stated, Sainiak asserts that he was not able to clean himself or the

cell, he was provided inadequate toilet paper, food, and water, his paper gown ripped on

one occasion and his private parts were exposed before he was provided a new gown, his

restraints were too tight, and he was exposed to pepper spray and constant light. (/d.).

18

Upon consideration of the record, the Court finds that the conditions of which Sainiak

complains, while certainly unpleasant, do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment

violation. There is no evidence that Defendants knew of and disregarded a substantial risk

of harm caused by the conditions Sainiak asserts. The Third Circuit has noted that the

temporary denial of soap or toilet paper does not violate the Eighth Amendment. See

Brooks v. Bledsoe, 682 F. App’x 164, 170 (3d Cir. 2017) (prisoner denied sheets, blankets,

and toilet paper); Freeman v. Miller, 615 F. App’x 72, 77 (3d Cir. 2015) (prisoner denied

soap for 7 days). Further, while Sainiak complains of inadequate food and water, the denial

of a meal on one occasion does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See

Lindsey v. O’Connor, 327 F. App’x 319, 321 (3d Cir. 2009) (prisoner denied one meal).

Moreover, the record is replete with evidence that Sainiak was regularly offered food and

water, which he refused to accept on some occasions. (Doc. 51-2, at 5-100). In addition,

the constant lighting does not violate the Eighth Amendment because Sainiak does not

indicate that he suffered any medical issue due to the three-day period of constant

illumination. See Stewart v. Beard, 417 F. App’x 117, 118 (3d Cir. 2011) (24-hour

illumination in the RHU). While Sainiak asserts that his restraints caused numbness in his

hands, the undisputed evidence reflects that he received medical attention for this condition

and staff exercised his hands every day that he was in the dry cell, assessed his restraints

and adjusted them as needed. (Doc. 51-2, at 5-6, 19-20, 25-100). Whether examined

19

separately or collectively, the evidence does not support a finding that the conditions of

Sainiak’s confinement in the dry cell amounted to a constitutional violation.

With respect to the duration of confinement in the dry cell, the record reflects that

Sainiak was in the dry cell from September 13, 2022 to September 16, 2022. (Doc. 51-2, at

4,10). Sainiak does not challenge the duration of his time in the dry cell. (See Doc. 1).

The Court will nonetheless address the duration of Sainiak’s confinement in the dry cell.

In Thomas v. Tice, a prisoner was placed in a dry cell after a guard in the visitation

room saw the prisoner ingest what the guard suspected may have been contraband.

Thomas, 948 F.3d at 139. After four days of his confinement, the prisoner's stool was

examined and an x-ray was taken of the prisoner's abdominal cavity, which both showed no

evidence of contraband. /d. at 137. Nevertheless, the prison decided to continue the

prisoner's confinement in the dry cell for five more days. /d. The prisoner-plaintiff asserted

two Eighth Amendment challenges to his confinement in a dry cell: (1) specific deprivations

he allegedly suffered during his confinement; and (2) the duration of that confinement. /d. at

139. Specifically, the prisoner argued that he should have been released from the dry cell

when the guard's initial suspicion that the prisoner ingested contraband was dispelled when

an x-ray revealed that his abdominal cavity was clean. /d. at 140.

Initially, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

granted summary judgment, finding that the prisoner’s conditions of confinement claim

failed because the prisoner did not produce evidence to provide a sufficient basis upon

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which a reasonable jury could conclude that the individual defendants had knowledge of the

prisoner's conditions of confinement. Id. at 139. However, on appeal, the Third Circuit

found that summary judgment was inappropriate on the duration of the prisoner's

confinement issue. /d. at 140. The Court reiterated “that when administrative confinement

in a dry cell is not foul or inhuman, and serves a legitimate penological interest, it will not

violate the Eighth Amendment.” Id. However, the Third Circuit found that there was a

disputed issue of material fact as to whether there was a penological justification to continue

the prisoner's administrative confinement in the dry cell after the x-ray revealed that his

abdominal cavity was empty. /d. Therefore, the Third Circuit reversed, in part, the order

granting summary judgment on the issue of the prisoner's duration of confinement issue. /d.

Here, the undisputed evidence reflects that a drug sniffing dog alerted prison officials

to the presence of contraband on Sainiak. Once Sainiak arrived at SCl-Frackville on

September 13, 2022, he underwent an initial body scan at 18:30:00 hours and a body cavity

search at 18:47:00. (Doc. 1, at 6; Doc. 51-2, at 3-5). The scan “produced images of

unknown objects or stool inside the inmate[']s abdominal area.” (Doc. 51-2, at 3). On

September 13, 2022 at 19:02:00 hours, Sainiak emptied his bowels and no contraband was

found. (Doc. 51-2, at 5). On September 13, 2022 at 19:10:00 hours, Sainiak underwent

another scan. (Doc. 51-2, at 5). The second scan “appear[ed] to show some of the objects/

stool gone but the possibility of a left over object or possibly left over stool in the same

area.” (Doc. 51-2, at 3) (sic). Sainiak was then placed back in the dry cell. (/d.). On

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September 13, 2022 at 19:25:00 hours, Sainiak underwent another scan, which appeared to

show something in his abdominal area. (Doc. 51-2, at 3, 5). On September 14, 2022 at

21:00:00 hours, another body scan was conducted.* (Doc. 51-2, at 5, 53-54, 59). On

September 15, 2022 at 13:00:00 hours, Sainiak emptied his bowels and no contraband was

found. (Doc. 51-2, at 6). On September 16, 2022 at 7:00:00, Sainiak underwent an x-ray in

the medical department, which did not show anything inside Sainiak. (/d.; Doc. 1, at 8). On

September 16, 2022, at 16:29:00 hours Sainiak emptied his bowels a third time.5 (Doc. 51-

2, at 6). On September 16, 2022, around 16:53 hours, Sainiak was a placed through a body

scanner and “[t]he scan was clear.” (Doc. 51-2, at 99). Sainiak was then released from the

dry cell on September 16, 2022. (Doc. 51-2, at 6).

There is no evidence that Sainiak went through a body scanner after the results were

clear. Sainiak was a placed through his final body scan on September 16, 2022 around

16:53 hours, which revealed no contraband within his person. (Doc. 51-2, at 99).

Afterward, staff terminated Sainiak’s confinement in the dry cell. (Doc. 51-2, at 6).

Defendants have established a legitimate penological justification for confining

Sainiak in a dry cell and evidence in the record confirms that Defendants terminated that

confinement once it was established that Sainiak’s scan and x-ray were clear. Sainiak does

54,59) 4 The record does not appear to contain the results of this body scan. (See Doc. 51-2, at 5, 53-

5 At his deposition, Sainiak testified that he was told he must remain in the cell “until [he]

defecate|s] three times.” (Doc. 51-3, at 16, Deposition of Garrett Sainiak, Notes of Transcript 15:22-23).

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not proffer evidence to establish that Defendants continued his confinement in violation of

the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the

duration of confinement issue.

C. Fourth Amendment Claim

Sainiak asserts a Fourth Amendment claim arising from the body cavity search and

the body scans. (Doc. 1, at 12). He claims that he endured “unreasonable searches” by

being forced to undergo a body cavity search and go through the body scans. (/d.).

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons. ..against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Inmates

do not have a Fourth Amendment right to be free of strip searches under all circumstances.

See Bell, 441 U.S. 520. Although strip searches constitute a “significant intrusion on an

individual's privacy,” United States v. Whitted, 541 F.3d 480, 486 (3d Cir. 2008), where

prison officials conduct such searches in a reasonable manner to maintain security and to

prevent the introduction of contraband or weapons in the facility, strip searches do not

violate the Fourth Amendment. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of

Burlington, 621 F.3d 296, 309-11 (3d Cir. 2010), affirmed, 566 U.S. 318 (2012).

When determining the reasonableness of a strip search, courts must balance “the

need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails”

and consider “the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the

justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.” Bel, 441 U.S. at 558-59

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(holding that the prison’s policy of strip and visual body cavity searches, requiring inmates to

stand naked, lift their genitals and bend over and spread their buttocks for visual inspection,

did not violate an inmate’s Fourth Amendment rights); see also Brown v. Blaine, 185 F.

App’x 166, 169-70 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding no constitutional violation where inmate was

required to lift his genitals, spread his buttocks, and then place his hands on his head and

sweep his mouth with his fingers).

The Supreme Court also held that it is constitutional to conduct a full strip search of

an individual detained in the general population of a jail, regardless of the reason for

detention or the existence of reasonable suspicion that the individual is concealing

something. Florence, 566 U.S. at 328 (explaining that “correctional officials must be

permitted to devise reasonable search policies to detect and deter the possession of

contraband in their facilities”); see also Small v. Wetzel, 528 F. App'x 202, 207 (3d Cir.

2013) (holding that it is constitutional to conduct a full strip search of an inmate in general

population, “regardless of the reason for detention or the existence of reasonable suspicion

that the individual is concealing something’) (citing Florence, 566 U.S. 318).

Moreover, there is no violation of an inmate's constitutional rights by conducting the

strip search, including a visual body cavity search, in front of other inmates. See /lles v.

Beard, No. 1:12-cv-964, 2013 WL 2285565, at *5 (M.D. Pa. May 23, 2013); Eby v. Karnes,

No. 1:19-cv-2069, 2020 WL 1550634 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 2020) (where the search was

performed in front of other inmates and included a visual cavity search).

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Sainiak has failed to set forth any facts or present any evidence demonstrating that

the body cavity search and body scans were unreasonable. As outlined above, the

undisputed record reveals that a drug sniffing dog alerted prison officials to the presence of

contraband on Sainiak. Therefore, when Sainiak arrived at SCl-Frackville on September

13, 2022, he underwent a body cavity search and was placed through a body scanner.

(Doc. 1, at 6; Doc. 51-2, at 3-5). He underwent more body scans and an x-ray of his

abdominal area. Once the body scan was clear and the x-ray showed no signs of anything

inside Sainiak, he was released from the dry cell and the searches ceased. (Doc. 51-2, at

3-5, 8, 99).

With respect to his Fourth Amendment unreasonable search claim, Sainiak failed to

provide specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. It is undisputed that the

drug sniffing dog alerted prison officials to the presence of contraband on Sainiak, and that

the first two body scans showed something inside Sainiak’s person. Sainiak failed to

establish that there was no legitimate penological justification for the searches or that the

searches took on an unreasonable scope and manner. Therefore, the Court will grant

Defendants’ motion with respect to the Fourth Amendment claim.

D. Fourteenth Amendment Ciaim

Sainiak asserts 2 Fourteenth Amendment due procesis claim arising out of his

placement in the dry cell. (Doc. 1, at 12). The conduct Sainiak alleges in support of his

Fourteenth Amendment claim is based on the same conduct he alleges in support of his

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Eighth Amendment claim. (/d.). Sainiak does not indicate if he is asserting a Fourteenth

Amendment procedural due process claim or a substantive due process claim. (See id.,

stating that Sainiak is alleging “the violation of [his] due process rights”). The Court

interprets Sainiak’s complaint as raising a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process

claim concerning his placement in the dry cell. To the extent that Sainiak is attempting to

assert a substantive due process claim regarding his placement in the dry cell, such a claim

is barred by the more-specific-provision rule.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution contains both procedural and substantive protections. See U.S. Const. amend.

XIV, § 1. The substantive component of the Due Process Clause safeguards against

certain deprivations of individuals’ “life, liberty, and property” by state actors “regardless of

the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” L.R. v. Sch. Dist. Of Phila., 836

F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125

(1992)). A substantive due process claim, however, cannot be maintained when the alleged

constitutional violation is “covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth

or Eighth Amendment.” Porter v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 974 F.3d 431, 447 (3d Cir. 2020)

(quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997)). In such situations, the

claim must be analyzed under the rubric of the more specific constitutional provision rather

than substantive due process, see id., as substantive due process is an “unchartered area”

with “scarce and open-ended” guideposts, Collins, 503 U.S. at 125. The “more-specific-

26

provision rule” will often apply when the challenged conduct underlying the substantive due

process claim is the same conduct that implicates a more explicit constitutional provision.

See Porter, 974 F.3d at 448.

Insofar as Sainiak is asserting a substantive due process claim for his placement in

the dry cell, that claim is barred by the more-specific-provision rule. The Court will grant

summary judgment to Defendants with respect to Sainiak’s Fourteenth Amendment

substantive due process claim.

E. First Amendment Claim

Sainiak also sets forth a First Amendment retaliation claim. (Doc. 1, at 6, 12).

Sainiak asserts that Defendant Newberry retaliated against him for being a drug dealer. (/d.

at 6; see also Doc. 57, at 9). He asserts that Defendant Newberry retaliated by placing him

in the dry cell. (/d.).

To state a retaliation claim under the First Amendment, a plaintiff bears the burden of

Satisfying three elements. First, a plaintiff must prove that he was engaged in

constitutionally protected activity. See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001).

Second, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he “suffered some ‘adverse action’ at the hands of

prison officials.” Id. (quoting Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000)). This

requirement is satisfied by showing adverse action “sufficient ‘to deter a person of ordinary

firmness’ from exercising his First Amendment rights.” /d. (quoting Suppon v. Dadonna,

2013 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000)). Third, a prisoner must prove that “his constitutionally

27

protected conduct was ‘a substantial or motivating factor’ in the decision to discipline him."

Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333-34 (quoting Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,

429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).

The mere fact that an adverse action occurs after either a complaint or grievance is

filed is relevant, but not dispositive, for the purpose of establishing a causal link between the

two events. See Lape v. Pennsylvania, 157 F. App’x 491, 498 (3d Cir. 2005). Only when

the facts of a particular case are “unusually suggestive” of a retaliatory motive will temporal

proximity, on its own, support an inference of causation. See Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co.,

126 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir. 1997). The Third Circuit has noted that an inmate can satisfy

this burden “with evidence of either (1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between

the protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory action or (2) a pattern of antagonism

coupled with timing that suggests a causal link.” Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3c

Cir. 2002).

If a prisoner establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to prison

officials to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “they would have made the

same decision absent the protected conduct for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate

penological interest.” Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334. “This is often referred to as the ‘same

decision defense.” Watson, 834 F.3d at 422. If the prison officials cari make this showing, it

defeats the retaliation claim. See Carter v. McGrady, 292 F.3d 152, 159 (3d Cir. 2002).

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In the instant case, there is no evidence that Sainiak engaged in constitutionally

protected activity. Sainiak avers as follows: “Security Lt. Newberry told me that | was being

placed in a dry-cell. When | asked why, he told me he knows I’m a drug dealer and have

drugs.” (Doc. 1, at 6). While Sainiak believes the Defendant Newberry’s action was

retaliatory, he does not set forth a legal claim of retaliation. As stated, Sainiak asserts that

Defendant Newberry retaliated against him because he was a drug dealer. However, it is

implausible that Sainiak’s alleged criminal activity, which he asserts triggered the retaliation,

was a constitutionally protected activity. See, e.g., Timmons v. Issac, No. 1:20-cv-2035,

2023 WL 348992, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 2023), appeal dismissed, No. 23-1344, 2023 WL

5521065 (3d Cir. Apr. 25, 2023) (explaining that “[c]ommitting homicide is not protected by

the First Amendment.”). Sainiak failed to present any evidence that Defendant Newberry’s

action was taken due to Sainiak’s participation in a constitutionally protected activity.

Sainiak has thus failed to meet the first prong of a retaliation claim.

In any event, nothing in the record suggests that Defendant Newberry took action

solely based upon his alleged belief that Sainiak was a drug dealer. Accordingly, the Court

will grant summary judgment to Defendant Newberry with respec:t to the retaliation claim.

F. State Law Clain

Sainiak asserts that Defendants intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon him.

(Doc. 1, at 12). He appears to assert that his placement in the dry cell, the inability to clean

himself or the cell, the loss of feelings in his hands, being escotteci through the srison with a

29

ripped smock, the exposure to pepper spray, and the exposure to constant illumination,

caused him emotional distress. (See generally Doc. 1).

To maintain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Pennsylvania

law, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) extreme or outrageous conduct [that] (2) intentionally

or recklessly causes (3) severe emotional distress to another.” Manley v. Fitzgerald, 997

A.2d 1235, 1241 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010) (citing Carson v. City of Phila., 574 A.2d 1184,

1187 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990)). Nothing in the record, however, establishes that Defendants

acted intentionally or recklessly to cause Sainiak severe emotional distress. (See Doc. 51-

2).

Moreover, in Pennsylvania, sovereign immunity applies to intentional torts committed

by Commonwealth defendants acting in their individual capacities. See Sears v. Mooney,

No. 1:17-cv-50, 2019 WL 6726839, at *47 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2019) (citation omitted).

Sovereign immunity “applies to Commonwealth employees in both their official and

individual capacities, so long as the employees are ‘acting within the scope of their duties.”

Larsen v. State Emps’ Ret. Sys., 553 F. Supp. 2d 403, 420 (M.D. Pa. 2008). As a general

matter, subject only to ten specific statutory exceptions not applicable here, this sovereicn

immunity bars state law tort claims like the one alleged here, since Commonwealth

30

employees are immune from liability for either negligence or intentional torts.6 McGrath v.

Johnson, 67 F.Supp.2d 499, 511 (E.D. Pa. 1999), aff'd, 35 F. App’x 357 (3d Cir. 2002).

Here, the evidence of record demonstrates that Defendants were acting within the scope of

their employment. Accordingly, they are entitled to sovereign immunity as well. Thus, the

Court will grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to Sainiak’s claim

for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ Rule 56 motion and enter

judgment in their favor. (Doc. 38). A separate Order shall issue.

a Ct1ty Te

7 ca.

Robert D. Mariani

United States District Judge

Dated: February 4 , 2026

6 The ten categories for which sovereign imnnunity will not apply are: (1) vehicles in the

possession or control of a Commonwealth party; (2) acts of health care employees of Commonwealth

agency medical facilities or institutions; (3) the care, custody, or control of personal property; (4) a

dangerous condition of Commonwealth agency real estate and sidewalks; (5) dangerous conditions of

highways created by potholes or sinkholes; (6) the care, custody, or control of animals; (7) liquor store

sales; (8) National Guard activities; (9) toxoids and vaccines; and (10) sexual abuse. See 42 Pa. CONS.

STAT. ANN. § 8522(b).

31