“There is no requirement that the ALJ discuss in her opinion every tidbit of evidence included in the record.”
How later courts described this case
- “There is no requirement that the ALJ discuss in her opinion every tidbit of evidence included in the record.”
- “[S]omething less than the weight of the evidence, ... does not prevent [it] from being supported by substantial evidence.”
- holding that substantial evidence standard is 17 unmet when ALJ fails to resolve conflicts created by countervailing evidence
- “The ALJ does not need to comment on every piece of evidence, but only must build an accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the final determination.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JAMES ALLAN FRY, JR., : No. 3:23-CV-1561
Plaintiff : (Caraballo, M.J.)
Vv. :
FRANK J. BISIGNANO,}! :
Commissioner of Social :
Security Administration, :
Defendant :
MEMORANDUM
Pending before the Court is the appeal by Plaintiff James Fry, Jr.,
of the decision by the Commissioner of Social Security Administration
(“the Commissioner’) to deny his application for disability benefits. For
the reasons set below, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.
I. Introduction
Fry seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision to
_ deny his application for disability benefits under Title IT of the Social
1 Frank Bisignano was confirmed as the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration on May 6, 2025. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d)
and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Frank Bisignano is substituted as the defendant in this suit.
Security Act. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Title 42, United
States Code, Section 405(g).
Fry challenges three alleged errors that Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) Randy Riley committed when determining that he was
not disabled under the Social Security Act. Namely, Fry claims that the
ALJ: (1) failed to find as persuasive the medical opinions provided by
Fry’s longstanding psychiatrists, Drs. Robert Anderson and Emily
Stetler, and to explain the reasons for deeming certain parts of their
testimonies persuasive or unpersuasive;? (2) lacked substantial evidence
in concluding that Fry can engage in medium work for the durational
period, and thus substantial gainful activity; and (8) failed to account
for the opinions provided by Drs. Anderson and Stetler in the
hypotheticals provided to the vocational expert. Doc. 8 at 3, 16-18. The
matter is fully briefed and ripe for decision.
As explained below, ALJ Riley’s conclusion on each of the
challenged issues was supported by substantial evidence in the record,
2 Two of Fry’s purported challenges involve ALJ Riley’s alleged failures to (1) find
as persuasive the opinions of Drs. Anderson and Stetler, and (2) explain the reasons
for accepting or rejecting certain parts of the two physicians’ opinions. Doc. 8 at 3.
As these two issues involve the same standard and discussion, this Memorandum
addresses them simultaneously.
coupled with sufficient reasoning to permit meaningful judicial review.
Accordingly, the Court affirms the Commissioner’s decision to deny
Fry’s claim for social security disability benefits.
Il. Background
On March 31, 2019, Fry applied for social security disability
benefits, alleging complete disability from his obsessive-compulsive
disorder (“OCD”), depression, and anxiety. Tr.?109. The Social Security
Administration (“SSA”) denied Fry’s application on August 20, 2019.
Id. at 166-69. Fry requested reconsideration, but his application was
denied again on January 29, 2020. Id. at 170-74. Fry accordingly
requested a hearing on February 10, 2020. Jd. at 181-82. The SSA
granted the request and held the first administrative hearing. Id. at
148.
The initial hearing, held on July 28, 2020, concerned whether Fry
was disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act from March
29, 2019, through December 31, 2024— the last date Fry was eligible to
receive social security disability insurance. Jd. at 148, 145. ALJ Riley
3 The administrative record, referred to herein as “Tr.,” encompasses Docs. 7, 7-1,
7-2, 7-3, 7-4, 7-5, 7-6, 7-7.
evaluated clinical records, medical history, medical expert reports,
vocational expert testimony, and Fry’s own testimony. Jd. at 45-73.
Among the received evidence was a record of an internal medicine
examination by Drs. Anderson and Stetler, both dated July 20, 2020.
Id. at 45, 1065-69 (Anderson), 1090-99 (Anderson), 1103—49 (Stetler),
1150-58 (Anderson).
On August 5, 2020, ALJ Riley issued a decision concluding that
Fry was not disabled between the operative dates of March 29, 2019,
through the date of the decision. Jd. at 140-54. Relevantly, in his
discussion of Fry’s residual functional capacity, ALJ Riley failed to
include an adequate discussion of conflicting evidence provided by
Drs. Anderson and Stetler.
On November 4, 2021, the SSA’s Appeals Council granted Fry’s
request for review for two reasons. Jd. at 161-63. First, ALJ Riley
failed to adequately discuss the opinions provided by Drs. Anderson and
Stetler. Id. at 161. Second, while the ALJ relied on the vocational
expert’s testimony to find that Fry was able to work as a cleaner or a
laundry worker, those positions require “constant exposure to
humidity,” which the residual functional capacity, as defined by ALJ
Riley, precluded. Jd. at 162. The Appeals Council thus remanded. Id.
at 163.
The consequent remand hearings, over which ALJ Riley also
presided, took place on March 1, 2022, id. at 77-98, and May 19, 2022.
Id. at 101-08. At the hearing, the ALJ received additional evidence of
record, including Fry’s new clinical records, medical history and expert
reports, and vocational expert testimony. Jd. at 77-98, 101-08. During
the hearing of May 19, 2022, the ALJ, based on Fry’s testimony and
other evidence, asked Sheryl Bustin, another vocational expert, to
assume
a person the Claimant’s age, education, and work experience
is able to do the following. Medium work. Frequent climbing
of ramps, stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl.
Occasional climbing of ladders, ropes, scaffolds. Avoid
exposure to extreme cold, humidity, irritants, hazards such as
heights and machinery. Work is limited to simple, routine,
repetitive tasks involving only simple work-related decisions
with few, if any, workplace changes, and occasional
supervision.
Id. at 103. Bustin confirmed that such an individual could only work as
a warehouse worker—the only unskilled occupation. Jd. Then, ALJ
Riley asked whether there were any positions with medium or light
work that met those limitations. Jd. at 104. Bustin responded that
fre
such a person may perform occupations with medium work
requirements as a machine feeder or a dining room attendant, or with
light work requirements as a small products assembler. Id.
Following the response, the ALJ asked the vocational expert to
also consider a scenario in which the hypothetical individual “cannot
engage in sustained work activity on a regular continuing basis for
eight hours a day, five days a week, for a 40-hour workweek.” Id.
Bustin confirmed that such a person cannot perform any of the past jobs
or any other jobs in the national economy. Jd. at 105.
On June 18, 2022, the ALJ issued his second decision, again
concluding that Fry was not disabled between the operative dates of
March 19, 2019, through December 31, 2024. Id. at 9-34. ALJ Riley
reached that conclusion by employing a five-step analytical process
required under the Social Security Act to evaluate disability insurance
and supplement security income claims. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
The process requires sequential consideration of: (1) whether the
claimant is engaged in substantial gainful work activity; (2) the medical
severity of the claimant's impairments; (8) whether the impairment
meets or equals a defined list of impairments; (4) a comparison between
er
the claimant’s past relevant work and residual functional capacity, i.e.,
the most work that a claimant can perform despite his or his
limitations, see id. § 404.1545(a); and (5) an assessment of the
claimant’s residual functional capacity and his or his age, education,
and work experience. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v). Should a claimant
proceed past the first three steps, the Commissioner will not find the
claimant disabled when he or he can perform past relevant work under
the third step or adjust to other work under the fourth step. Id.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv)—(v), (f), (g).
Applying that analysis, the ALJ first determined that Fry met the
insurance requirements of the Social Security Act, see id. § 404.130,
through December 31, 2024. Tr. 15. ALJ Riley also found that Fry did
not engage in substantial gainful activity since his alleged disability
onset date of March 29, 2019. Jd.
At the second step of the analysis, the ALJ found that Fry suffered
from three severe impairments: asthma, allergic rhinitis, obesity, major
depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, OCD, and post-
trauma stress disorder (“PTSD”). Jd. at 15-16. At the same time, ALJ
Riley determined that hypertension, vertigo, right pulmonary module,
and hepatic steatosis “poses more than a minimal limitation” upon Fry’s
ability to perform basic work activities, and thus found that they were
non-severe. Id.
Moving to the third step of the analysis, the ALJ determined that
Fry’s impairments failed to meet or medically equal one of the
impairments listed in the SSA’s regulations. Id. at 16.
Accordingly, the ALJ proceeded to determine Fry’s residual
functional capacity before addressing the final two steps in the
sequential analysis. ALJ Riley noted that “the statements concerning
the intensity, persistence|,| and limiting effects of these symptoms are
not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in
the record[.]” Tr. 20. Based on the medical evidence of record, the ALJ
concluded that:
the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform
medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) except that he
is capable of frequent climbing of ramps and stairs, balancing,
stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling and occasional
climbing of ladders, ropes and scaffolds. The claimant must
avoid exposure to extreme cold, humidity, irritants and
hazards such as heights and machinery. The claimant retains
the mental capacity to perform simple, routine, repetitive
tasks involving only simple work[-|related decisions with few,
if any, work place changes and to tolerate occasional
supervision.
Id. at 19.
In reaching that residual functional capacity determination, ALJ
Riley considered three bodies of evidence germane to this
Memorandum. First, the ALJ considered Fry’s own statements
provided to various medical provides. Some of the relevant statements
include the following:
At a mental health assessment on November 5, 2019, the
claimant’s memory appeared intact (Exhibit 9F). ... The
claimant’s cognition appeared normal at earlier appointments
with that provider (Exhibit 8F). ... [T]he claimant has his
driver’s license, and he leaves the home to shop, to participate
in the radio club, to go to church and to go to the homes of
family members and friends (Exhibit 3E, 4E). ... On
November 22, 2019, the claimant reported that his wife had
allowed him to go to a radio get together (Exhibit 1OF). The
claimant reported on August 26, 2020 having spoken at a
meeting at church (Exhibit 14F). On June 25, 2021, the
claimant reported having gone to the beach a couple of weeks
before (Exhibit 15F). ...On September 2, 2020, the claimant
reported watching the dogs of his in-laws (Exhibit 14F). On
October 30, 2020, the claimant reported looking forward to
dog sitting for his brother-in-law (Exhibit 14F). The claimant
reported on August 26, 2020 having spoken at a meeting at
church (Exhibit 14F). ... [Bly June 12, 2020, the claimant
reported to his primary care provider that the supplements
suggested by his psychiatric provider seem to help a lot such
that he hardly is using Diazepam at all (Exhibit 8F).
Id. at 17-22.
Second, ALJ Riley evaluated the persuasiveness of the medical
opinion provided by Dr. Anderson in determining the limitations
imposed by F'ry’s mental impairments. He specifically considered the
physician’s assessment that Fry
has no useful ability to function in performing activities
within a schedule, working near others without distraction,
responding appropriately to changes in the work setting and
traveling in unfamiliar places; is able to perform satisfactory
some of the time in remembering locations and work like
procedures, maintaining attention and concentration for
extended periods, sustaining an ordinary routine, making
simple work relate decisions, completing a normal workday or
week, performing at a consistent enough pace and setting
realistic goals; is satisfactory most of the time in
understanding and remembering simple and detailed
instructions, carrying out detailed instructions, interacting
appropriately with the public, asking simple questions,
responding appropriately to criticism from supervisors,
getting along with coworkers and maintaining socially
appropriate behavior; and has no limitation in carrying out
simple instructions or adhering to basic standards of
neatness. This provider indicated that the claimant’s
symptoms would cause him to miss work more than two (2)
days per month (Exhibit 16F). On July 20, 2020, this provider
indicated that the claimant has no useful ability to function
in maintaining attention and concentration for extended
periods, performing activities within a schedule, completing a
normal workday or week, performing at a consistent pace,
responding appropriately to changes in the work setting,
traveling in unfamiliar places and setting realistic goals; is
able to perform satisfactorily some of the time in
understanding and remembering detailed instructions,
working without distraction, making simple work related
decisions and asking simple questions; is able to perform
1h
satisfactorily most of the time in carrying out detailed
instructions, sustaining an ordinary routine, interacting
appropriately with the public, accepting criticism from
supervisors, getting along with coworkers, maintaining
socially appropriate behavior, adhering to basic standards of
neatness and being aware of hazards in the work place; and
no limitation in understanding, remembering or carrying out
instructions (Exhibit 12F). This provider indicated that
symptoms would cause the claimant to miss work more than
two (2) days per month (Exhibit 12F).
Id. at 27-28. At the same time, the ALJ deemed Dr. Anderson’s
conclusions regarding Fry’s “inability to perform ... at a competitive
level” unpersuasive due to lack of “documentation of inpatient
psychiatric hospitalization” or “a partial hospitalization or intensive
outpatient program or emergency treatment”; unwillingness and failure
to “take medications” and “fill prescriptions”; Fry’s admission that “he
hardly has been using Diazepam”; presence of “situational stressors”;
and psychiatric treatment notes observing attention and memory and
improvements. Id. at 28.
Third, ALJ Riley evaluated the persuasiveness of the medical
opinion of Dr. Stetler in determining the limitations imposed by Fry’s
mental impairments. He specifically addressed Dr. Stetler’s indication
that,
17
on February 16, 2022... the claimant has no useful ability to
function in understanding, remembering and carrying out
simple and detailed instructions, maintaining attention and
concentration for extended periods, performing activities
within a schedule, sustaining an ordinary routine, making
simple work related decisions, completing a normal workday
and week, performing at a consistent enough pace, asking
simple questions, responding appropriate to criticism from
supervisors, responding appropriately to changes in the work
setting, traveling in unfamiliar places and setting realistic .
goals; is able to perform satisfactorily some of the time in
remembering locations and work like procedures, working
near others without distraction, getting along with coworkers,
maintaining socially appropriate behavior and being aware of
normal hazards; is able to perform satisfactorily most of the
time in interacting appropriately with the public and
adhering to basic standards of neatness. This provider
indicated that the claimant likely would miss work more than
two (2) times per month due to symptoms and at least weekly
would be required to miss work due to panic attacks (Exhibit
17F). On November 12, 2021, this provider indicated that the
claimant is not able to make decisions or to work (Exhibit
19F). On September 10, 2021, this provider indicated that
OCD prevents the claimant from performing simple
household chores (Exhibit 19F). On March 5, 2021, this
provider indicated that the claimant’s depression renders him
unable to work or to perform tasks (Exhibit 14F). On July 17,
2020, this provider indicated that the claimant has no useful
ability to function in understanding and remembering
detailed instructions, maintaining attention and
concentration for extended periods, sustaining an ordinary
routine, performing activities within a schedule, making
simple work related decisions, completing a normal workday
or week, performing at a consistent pace, accepting criticism
from supervisors, responding appropriately to changes in the
work setting and setting realistic goals; is able to perform
satisfactory some of the time in remembering work like
procedures, understanding, remembering and carrying out
19
simple instructions, working without distraction, asking
simple questions and getting along with coworkers; is able to
perform satisfactorily most of the time in carrying out detailed
instructions, maintaining socially appropriate behavior, being
aware of normal hazards and traveling in unfamiliar places;
and has no limitation in interacting appropriately with the
public or adhering to basic standards of neatness. This
provider indicated that the claimant would miss work more
than two (2) times per month due to symptoms (Exhibit 11F).
On July 17, 2020, this provider indicated that the claimant is
unable to meet the demands of any regular employment at
this time with severely hampered ability to meet productivity
standards, to manage conflict or to accept criticism and to
work collaboratively (Exhibit 10F). On July 17, 2020, this
provider indicated that difficulty regulating would make
employment untenable (Exhibit 14F). On July 1, 2020, this
provider indicated that the claimant could not sustain
attention to perform work related tasks (Exhibit 14F). On
June 26, 2020, this provider indicated that the claimant
would be very suspicious of a supervisor at work (Exhibit
14F). On June 10, 2020, this provider indicated that the
claimant would not be able to perform work duties (Exhibit
10F). On May 27, 2020, this provider indicated that the
claimant would be unable to focus or function at a job (Exhibit
10F). On May 10, 2020, this provider indicated that work
would be nearly impossible (Exhibit 10F). On April 24, 2020,
this provider indicated that work virtually is impossible at
this point (Exhibit 10F). On April 10, 2020, this provider
indicated that depression and anxiety continue severely to
impact the claimant’s functioning (Exhibit 10F). On March 4,
2020, this provider indicated that the claimant would have
extreme difficulty with a job (Exhibit 10F). On October 1,
2019, this provider and David Haynes-Weller, Psy.D.,
Dr. Stetler’s supervisor, indicated that the claimant would be
unable to hold a job due to his mental health symptoms
(Exhibit 5F).
Id. at 29-80.
49
At the same time, ALJ Riley, examining the opinion’s
supportability and consistency, determined that “the severity of
symptoms reported by the claimant to this provider are not entirely
consistent with the claimant’s presentation at appointments during
similar periods of time with his primary care provider.” Jd. at 30.
Based on these medical records, and other things, ALJ Riley
deemed Fry capable of medium work. Id. at 19. Subsequently, having
determined Fry’s residual functional capacity and rejected several
grounds for further limitation, the ALJ proceeded to the fourth step of
the analysis to determine whether he was disabled within the meaning
of the Social Security Act. Jd. at 32-34. Here, ALJ Riley compared
Fry’s past work and residual functional capacity, finding that he was
unable to perform his prior employment as a dispatcher operator, a
store laborer, a delivery driver, and a dump truck driver. Id. at 32.
Finally, in the fifth step of the sequential analysis process, ALJ
Riley considered Fry’s age, education, work experience, and residual
functional capacity to perform medium work, concluding that Fry “was
capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that existed in
significant numbers in the national economy.” J/d. at 32-34. Here, the
44
ALJ leveraged testimony provided by Bustin that a person fitting Fry’s
parameters could meet the requirements of a store laborer, a machine
feeder, a dining room attendant, or a small products assembler. Jd. at
32-33. “Pursuant to SSR 00-4p, ... the vocational expert’s testimony is
consistent with the information contained in the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles.” Jd. at 33.
As a result of this analysis, ALJ Riley determined that Fry was
not disabled and denied his application for disability benefits. Jd. at 9—
11. Fry unsuccessfully appealed the denial to the SSA’s Appeals
Council. Id. at 1-3. The instant appeal to the District Court followed.
Fry initiated this action with the Court on September 19, 2023.
Doc. 1. The Commissioner provided the requisite transcripts from the
disability proceedings on November 15, 2023. Does. 6-7. The parties
then filed their respective briefs. Docs. 8; 12; 16.
Fry alleges three errors warranting remand. Doc. 8 at 3, 16-18.
Namely, Fry alleges that the ALJ: (1) failed to find as persuasive the
medical opinions provided by Drs. Anderson and Stetler, and to explain
the reasons for accepting certain parts of their testimonies and rejecting
others; (2) lacked substantial evidence in concluding that Fry can
46
engage in medium work for the durational period, and thus substantial
gainful activity; and (8) failed to account for the opinions provided by
Drs. Anderson and Stetler in the limitations provided to vocational
expert Bustin. Id.
III. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Review of the Commissioner’s decision denying a claimant’s
application for social security disability benefits is limited to
determining whether the factual findings of the final decisionmaker are
supported by substantial evidence in the record. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Johnson v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (8d Cir. 2008).
Substantial in this context is “more than a mere scintilla of evidence
but may be less than a preponderance.” Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d
1211, 1218 (8d Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Put more pointedly, it is
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)
(quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NERB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). In an
adequately developed record, this can mean “something less than the
weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent
12
conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [ALJ Riley’s decision]
from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Mar.
Comm n., 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966) (citations omitted).
Under this deferential standard, “[f]actual findings which are
supported by substantial evidence must be upheld.” Ficca v. Astrue,
901 F. Supp. 2d 538, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (citations omitted); 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). This court’s role is not to reweigh the evidence and make
factual determinations, but to simply review the record and ensure that
the ALJ provided “a discussion of the evidence and an explanation of
reasoning for his conclusion sufficient to enable meaningful judicial
review.” Diaz v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 (8d Cir. 2009)
(citations and quotations omitted). An ALJ meets that standard by
stating “in his decision which evidence he has rejected and which he is
relying on as the basis for his finding.” Schaudeck v. Comm’ of SSA,
181 F.3d 429, 433 (8d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). Moreover, when
there is countervailing evidence, an ALJ must “give some reason for
discounting the evidence he rejects.” Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422,
429 (8d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058,
1064 (8d Cir. 1998) (holding that substantial evidence standard is
17
unmet when ALJ fails to resolve conflicts created by countervailing
evidence).
Here, ALJ Riley’s factual findings were supported by substantial
evidence in the record, and the reasoning underlying those conclusions
was sufficiently articulated to permit judicial review.
B. Assessment of Treating Source Opinions in the
Formulation of Residual Functional Capacity
Fry first contends that ALJ Riley erred in his evaluation of the
favorable medical opinions provided by treating physicians
Drs. Anderson and Stetler. Fry argues that the ALJ did not provide a
sufficient explanation concerning the supportability and consistency of
these opinions in finding that they were partly persuasive and
unpersuasive, respectively. Doc. 8 at 3-14. As set forth below, the
ALJ’s evaluation of the persuasive value of these two opinions
sufficiently assessed their supportability and consistency, and his
findings regarding each are supported by substantial evidence.
When evaluating a medical opinion, an ALJ is required to assess
the level of support and consistency the opinion has against the record.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c. Supportability “increases as the relevance of the
objective medical evidence and explanations presented by the medical
1Q
source increases.” Vellone v. Saul, 2021 WL 3193854, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 2801138 (S.D.N.Y.
2021) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)). The consistency assessment
is “an all-encompassing inquiry focused on how well a medical source is
supported, or not supported, by the entire record.” Clay v. Kijakazi,
2022 WL 13989015, at *3 (N.D. Miss. 2022) (quoting 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(c)(1)).
Since an ALJ’s duty of articulation requires just “some indication”
of their consideration of probative evidence, Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121,
an ALJ’s assessment of a medical opinion’s consistency and
supportability “need not discuss every piece of evidence in the record,”
and instead simply requires the building of “an accurate and logical
bridge between the evidence and the result.” Gamret v. Colvin, 994 F.
Supp. 2d 695, 698 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (quotation omitted) (citations
omitted). Further, in assessing whether an ALJ has provided an
adequate analysis for rejecting or accepting an opinion, the court must
look to the opinion as a whole, not only the part directly addressing the
particular opinion. See Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (8d Cir.
2004) (“the ALJ’s decision, read as a whole, illustrates that the ALJ
10
considered the appropriate factors in reaching the conclusion that
[claimant] did not meet the requirements for any listing[.]”).
The sufficiency of an evaluation turns on the extent to which its
reasoning is driven by an ALJ’s read of the evidence—and the court’s
ability to discern that evidentiary reasoning. See, e.g., Price v. Astrue,
401 F. App’x 985, 986 (5th Cir. 2010) (“The ALJ does not need to
comment on every piece of evidence, but only must build an accurate
and logical bridge between the evidence and the final determination.”)
(citing Glomski v. Massanari, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1082, (E.D. Wis.
2001)); Acosta Cuevas v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 2021 WL 363682, at *15
(S.D.N.Y. 2021), report and recommendation adopted sub nom.,
2022 WL 717612 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (“[t]he ALJ must provide a reviewing
Court with a sufficient explanation to ensure that they have complied
with the legal procedures controlling their decision and cannot ignore or
mischaracterize evidence.”).
1. Dr. Anderson’s Opinion
Dr. Anderson performed a consultative examination of Fry on
September 9, 2023. Tr. 782. Relevantly, as explained by the ALJ,
Dr. Anderson found that Fry:
on
has no useful ability to function in performing activities
within a schedule, working near others without distraction,
responding appropriately to changes in the work setting and
traveling in unfamiliar places; is able to perform satisfactory
some of the time in remembering locations and work like
procedures, maintaining attention and concentration for
extended periods, sustaining an ordinary routine, making
simple work relate decisions, completing a normal workday or
week, performing at a consistent enough pace and setting
realistic goals; is satisfactory most of the time in
understanding and remembering simple and detailed
instructions, carrying out detailed instructions, interacting
appropriately with the public, asking simple questions,
responding appropriately to criticism from supervisors,
getting along with coworkers and maintaining socially
appropriate behavior; and has no limitation in carrying out
simple instructions or adhering to basic standards of
neatness. This provider indicated that the claimant’s
symptoms would cause him to miss work more than two (2)
days per month (Exhibit 16F). On July 20, 2020, this provider
indicated that the claimant has no useful ability to function
in maintaining attention and concentration for extended
periods, performing activities within a schedule, completing a
normal workday or week, performing at a consistent pace,
responding appropriately to changes in the work setting,
traveling in unfamiliar places and setting realistic goals; is
able to perform satisfactorily some of the time in
understanding and remembering detailed instructions,
working without distraction, making simple work related
decisions and asking simple questions; is able to perform
satisfactorily most of the time in carrying out detailed
instructions, sustaining an ordinary routine, interacting
appropriately with the public, accepting criticism from
supervisors, getting along with coworkers, maintaining
socially appropriate behavior, adhering to basic standards of
neatness and being aware of hazards in the work place; and
no limitation in understanding, remembering or carrying out
instructions (Exhibit 12F). This provider indicated that
91
symptoms would cause the claimant to miss work more than
two (2) days per month (Exhibit 12F).
Id. at 27-28. However, while the ALJ
recognize[d] that these opinions were rendered by the
claimant’s psychiatric provider and agrees with the findings
of ability to perform satisfactorily most of the time and no
limitation, the findings of no useful ability to function and
ability to perform satisfactorily some of the time to the extent
that they are suggestive of an inability to perform that task
at a competitive level and the findings of absences to the
extent that they are suggestive of an inability to perform a
competitive level of work are not supported by the absence of
documentation of inpatient psychiatric hospitalization,
participation in a partial hospitalization or intensive
outpatient program or emergency treatment for uncontrolled
mental health symptoms, the fact that the claimant on several
occasions did not want to take medications recommended by
the psychiatric provider to bring about improvement in his
symptoms and reported failing to fill prescriptions by that
provider, the claimant’s reports to his primary care provider
during the summer of 2020 that supplements recommended
by the psychiatric provider seem to help a lot such that he
hardly has been using Diazepam, the aggravating role that
situational stressors may have played with regard to the
claimant’s symptoms, notes of treatment from the claimant’s
psychiatric provider indicating that the claimant’s attention
has been good, his concentration has been fair or good and his
memory has been intact aside from August 18, 2020 when his
concentration was described as poor and the claimant’s
abilities to attend a gathering with his radio group, to go to
the beach, to care for family members’ dogs and to be active
with the church community. For these reasons, these
opinions are partially persuasive.
Id. at 28 (emphasis added).
99
More specifically, in evaluating Dr. Anderson’s findings, ALJ Riley
concluded that they were “partially persuasive,” specifically crediting
those portions regarding Fry’s “[in]ability to function in performing
activities within a schedule, working near others without distraction,
responding appropriately to changes... and traveling in unfamiliar
places; ... remembering locations and work .. . procedures,
maintaining attention and concentration ..., sustaining an ordinary
routine, making simple work relate decisions, completing a normal
workday or week, [and] performing at a consistent enough pace and
setting realistic goals.” Id. at 27.
At the same time, the ALJ concluded that Dr. Anderson’s
conclusions regarding Fry’s “inability to perform . . . at a competitive
level” unpersuasive due to lack of “documentation of inpatient
psychiatric hospitalization” or “a partial hospitalization or intensive
outpatient program or emergency treatment”; unwillingness and failure
to “take medications” and “fill prescriptions”;4 Fry’s admission that “he
hardly has been using Diazepam”;® presence of “situational stressors’;
4 Based on Exhibit 8F. Id. at 21-22.
5 Based on Exhibit 8F. Id. at 22.
9g
and psychiatric treatment notes observing attention and memory and
improvements.® Jd. at 28. ALJ Riley also noted Fry’s “abilities to
attend a gathering with his radio group, to go to the beach, to care for
family members’ dogs|,| and to be active with the church community.”7
Id. This evaluation of Dr. Anderson’s opinion, challenged by Fry now on
appeal, sufficiently discussed the evidence and was reasonably
articulated to permit meaningful judicial review.
The ALJ set forth his evidence-based reasoning for deeming
unpersuasive those portions of Dr. Anderson’s opinion concerning Fry’s
inability to perform work-related functions competitively. More
specifically, ALJ Riley explained that Fry’s examination and clinical
history did not support Dr. Anderson’s opinions on those factors. Id.
In support of that conclusion, ALJ Riley alluded to several
exhibits, id. at 405, 414-15, 992, 1025, 1075, 1114, 1201, 1205-09, 1301,
without precise details concerning their relevance; an approach that Fry
deems insufficient. Doc. 8 at 12-14. Although those characterizations
bear an element of truth, and the ALJ’s analytical approach does not
6 Based on Exhibit 8F. Id. at 20.
7 Based on Exhibits 3E, 4E, 9F, 10F, 14F, and 15F. Jd. at 17-18, 21.
engender effective judicial review, it does not thwart meaningful judicial
review. “A written evaluation of every piece of evidence is not required,
as long as the ALJ articulates at some minimum level her analysis of a
particular line of evidence. Moreover, the ALJ’s mere failure to cite
specific evidence does not establish that the ALJ failed to consider it.”
Phillips v. Barnhart, 91 F. App’x 775, 780 n.7 (8d Cir. 2004) Gnternal
citation omitted). Here, a review of the cited evidence of record
supports the ALJ’s conclusions on the consistency and supportability of
Dr. Anderson’s opinions.
Dr. Anderson’s mental examination record contains several
observations that Fry uses in asserting that ALJ Riley erred. For
example, on June 9, 2020, the treating physician found that Fry
reported “high depression,” “anxiety,” and “guilt.” Tr. 1167. The
physician consequently contained a “Crisis Plan,” which involved
“de[Jescalation techniques to assist [Fry] in regaining emotional control”
and relevant contacts. Id. at 1168. On December 8, 2020, Dr. Anderson
noted that Fry may be “unable to meet current goal due to an increase
of anxiety.” Jd. at 1172. Further, on April 5, 2021, Fry reported that
Or
his anxiety was “at 7/10 and his depression at 7/10”; and exhibited
“indecisive” speech, depression, and bluntness. Jd. at 1162.
Though ALJ Riley did not address these medical findings in the
section of his opinion deeming a portion of Dr. Anderson’s opinion
unpersuasive, he did review them elsewhere in the opinion. Regarding
the note dated June 9, 2020, Dr. Anderson noted that Fry’s “attention
appeared good and his concentration appeared fair (Exhibit 13F).” Id.
at 18. Dr. Anderson qualified the finding of December 8, 2020, with the
observation that, “although the claimant reported to his psychiatric
provider experiencing increased depression and anxiety, he indicated
that he did not want any medication changes (Exhibit 13F).” Jd. at 22.
As for the record of April 5, 2021, Dr. Anderson noted that, “while the
claimant reported feeling stressed over COVID-19, he reported that
therapy [wa]s helpful (Exhibit 13F).” Jd. at 28. The ALJ further
corroborated his summaries of medical evidence with appropriate
citations. Id. at 18, 22, 23.
As Dr. Anderson’s examination findings contain an evidentiary
basis for concluding that Fry’s mental impairments were not as
deliberating as he claims them to be, and the treatment evidence shows
Qn
that Fry had shown improvements in his mental facilities, ALJ Riley’s
determination that Dr. Anderson’s findings were but partially
unpersuasive was anchored in the record. By citing that record
evidence accordingly, the ALJ sufficiently built a bridge between the
evidence and his result. See Gamret, 994 F. Supp. 2d at 698; Jones,
864 F.3d at 505.
As the Court is obliged to review the totality of the administrative
decision when assessing the adequacy of an ALJ’s analysis, Jones,
364 F.3d at 505, ALJ Riley’s articulation of the medical evidence
throughout the opinion does not warrant remand simply because that
analysis was not reiterated in the specific section of the opinion
deeming Dr. Anderson’s findings partially persuasive.
Fry’s contention that alternative evidence in the record supports
and is consistent with Dr. Anderson’s opinion, and thus undermines
ALJ Riley’s conclusion, is unavailing. “A written evaluation of every
piece of evidence is not required,” Phillips, 91 F. App’x at 780 n.7, “and
the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the
evidence does not prevent [the ALJ’s decision] from being supported by
substantial evidence.” Consolo, 383 U.S. at 620.
97
In essence, Fry asks the Court to reweigh the evidence in his
favor. “Courts are not permitted to re-weigh the evidence or impose
their own factual determinations.” Chandler v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec.,
667 F.3d 356, 359 (8d Cir. 2011). Since ALJ Riley assessed the weight
of the evidence and cited to “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support” his conclusion concerning
Dr. Anderson’s opinion, Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565, Fry’s disagreement with
that determination does not warrant remand. Instead, the ALJ’s
evaluation is supported by substantial evidence in the record and is
sufficiently articulated to permit judicial review, mandating affirmance.
See Gamret, 994 F. Supp. 2d at 698; Ficca, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 536
(“Factual findings which are supported by substantial evidence must be
upheld.”).
2. Dr. Stetler’s Opinion
ALJ Riley’s opinion included an evaluation of assessments that
Dr. Stetler completed concerning Fry’s mental abilities. ALJ Riley
found Dr. Stetler’s opinion partially persuasive. Tr. 29-30. More
specifically, the ALJ observed that Dr. Stetler:
indicated on February 16, 2022 that the claimant has no
useful ability to function in understanding, remembering and
92
carrying out simple and detailed instructions, maintaining
attention and concentration for extended periods, performing
activities within a schedule, sustaining an ordinary routine,
making simple work related decisions, completing a normal
workday and week, performing at a consistent enough pace,
asking simple questions, responding appropriate to criticism
from supervisors, responding appropriately to changes in the
work setting, traveling in unfamiliar places and setting
realistic goals; is able to perform satisfactorily some of the
time in remembering locations and work like procedures,
working near others without distraction, getting along with
coworkers, maintaining socially appropriate behavior and
being aware of normal hazards; is able to perform
satisfactorily most of the time in interacting appropriately
with the public and adhering to basic standards of neatness.
This provider indicated that the claimant likely would miss
work more than two (2) times per month due to symptoms and
at least weekly would be required to miss work due to panic
attacks (Exhibit 17F). On November 12, 2021, this provider
indicated that the claimant is not able to make decisions or to
work (Exhibit 19F). On September 10, 2021, this provider
indicated that OCD prevents the claimant from performing
simple household chores (Exhibit 19F). On March 5, 2021,
this provider indicated that the claimant’s depression renders
him unable to work or to perform tasks (Exhibit 14F). On July
17, 2020, this provider indicated that the claimant has no
useful ability to function in understanding and remembering
detailed instructions, maintaining attention and
concentration for extended periods, sustaining an ordinary
routine, performing activities within a schedule, making
simple work related decisions, completing a normal workday
or week, performing at a consistent pace, accepting criticism
from supervisors, responding appropriately to changes in the
work setting and setting realistic goals; is able to perform
satisfactory some of the time in remembering work like
procedures, understanding, remembering and carrying out
simple instructions, working without distraction, asking
simple questions and getting along with coworkers; is able to
90
perform satisfactorily most of the time in carrying out detailed
instructions, maintaining socially appropriate behavior, being
aware of normal hazards and traveling in unfamiliar places;
and has no limitation in interacting appropriately with the
public or adhering to basic standards of neatness. This
provider indicated that the claimant would miss work more
than two (2) times per month due to symptoms (Exhibit 11F).
On July 17, 2020, this provider indicated that the claimant is
unable to meet the demands of any regular employment at
this time with severely hampered ability to meet productivity
standards, to manage conflict or to accept criticism and to
work collaboratively (Exhibit 10F). On July 17, 2020, this
provider indicated that difficulty regulating would make
employment untenable (Exhibit 14F). On July 1, 2020, this
provider indicated that the claimant could not sustain
attention to perform work related tasks (Exhibit 14F). On
June 26, 2020, this provider indicated that the claimant
would be very suspicious of a supervisor at work (Exhibit
14F). On June 10, 2020, this provider indicated that the
claimant would not be able to perform work duties (Exhibit
10F). On May 27, 2020, this provider indicated that the
claimant would be unable to focus or function at a job (Exhibit
10F). On May 10, 2020, this provider indicated that work
would be nearly impossible (Exhibit 10F). On April 24, 2020,
this provider indicated that work virtually 1s impossible at
this point (Exhibit 10F). On April 10, 2020, this provider
indicated that depression and anxiety continue severely to
impact the claimant’s functioning (Exhibit 10F). On March 4,
2020, this provider indicated that the claimant would have
extreme difficulty with a job (Exhibit 10F). On October 1,
2019, this provider and David Haynes-Weller, Psy.D.,
Dr. Stetler’s supervisor, indicated that the claimant would be
unable to hold a job due to his mental health symptoms
(Exhibit 5F).
Id.
on
At the same time, ALJ Riley, based on supportability and
consistency, determined that “the severity of symptoms reported by the
claimant to this provider are not entirely consistent with the claimant’s
presentation at appointments during similar periods of time with his
primary care provider.” Id. at 30. For example, the ALJ noted that,
while Fry “reported experiencing increased symptoms’ to Dr. Stetler
“during the summer and fall of 2021,” he “appeared with a bright affect
and engaged at appointments with his primary care provider on June
25, 2021 and October 4, 2021,” to the point his “OCD appear[ed] to be
very well controlled[.|” Jd.; see also id. at 23 (citing Exhibit 15F).
Further,
[w]hile the undersigned agrees with the findings of ability to
perform satisfactorily most of the time and no limitation in
functioning, the findings of no useful ability to function and
ability to perform satisfactorily some of the time to the extent
that they are suggestive of an inability to perform the task at
a competitive level and the findings that are consistent with
an inability to perform a competitive level of work are not
supported by the absence of documentation of inpatient
psychiatric hospitalization, participation in a_ partial
hospitalization or intensive outpatient program or emergency
treatment for uncontrolled mental health symptoms, the fact
that the claimant on several occasions did not want to take
medications recommended by the psychiatric provider to
bring about improvement in his symptoms and reported
failing to fill prescriptions by that provider, the claimant’s
reports to his primary care provider during the summer of
□□
2020 that supplements recommended by the psychiatric
provider seem to help a lot such that he hardly has been using
Diazepam, the aggravating role that situational stressors
may have played with regard to the claimant’s symptoms,
notes of treatment from the claimant’s psychiatric provider
indicating that the claimant’s attention has been good, his
concentration has been fair or good and his memory has been
intact aside from August 18, 2020 when his concentration was
described as poor and the claimant’s abilities to attend a
gathering with his radio group, to go to the beach, to care for
family members’ dogs and to be active with the church
community.
Id. at 30.
As was the case for the opinion testimony provided by
Dr. Anderson, these contradictory observations were based on several
documents in the record. Jd. at 17-18, 20-22, 405, 414-15, 992, 1025,
1075, 1114, 1201, 1205-09, 1801. As the ALJ cited the aforementioned
record evidence, which supports his determination of discrepancies
between Dr. Stetler’s mental examination findings and her conclusions,
his opinion contains a logical and accurate bridge between the evidence
and his conclusion. See Gamret, 994 F. Supp. 2d at 698.
Thus, contrary to Fry’s assertion, the administrative decision
shows sufficient supportability and consistency. “A written evaluation
of every piece of evidence is not required,” Phillips, 91 F. App’x at 780
n.7, “and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from
99
the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ’s decision] from being supported
by substantial evidence.” Consolo, 383 U.S. at 620. Thus, because ALJ
Riley assessed the weight of the evidence and cited to “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support|]”
his conclusion concerning the inconsistency of Dr. Stetler’s mental
assessments, Fry’s disagreement with that determination does not
warrant remand. See Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565.
In sum, ALJ Riley reasonably articulated his determination that
Dr. Stetler’s opinions were unpersuasive, on both supportability and
consistency grounds. That conclusion, supported by substantial cited
evidence, permits meaningful judicial review and should be affirmed.
C. Residual Functional Capacity Formation
Fry’s second challenge is that ALJ Riley did not provide sufficient
limitations in his residual functional capacity to account for his mental
impairments. Doc. 8 at 14-15. Fry avers that he lacks “an RFC for
work at any exertional level.” Jd. at 14. The basis for this averment is
that Fry’s own “statements of his limitations due to his mental health
conditions, as well as his treating doctors’ opinions, are well-
supported”—an assessment based on the extensive, unavailing
99 □
discussion of the treating physician opinion evidence discussed above.
Id. Based on a reading of Bustin’s testimony as implying that the
proper residual functional capacity would preclude employment under
any of the employer tolerances regarding being off task or absent, Fry
concludes that he “is incapable of engaging in [substantially gainful
activity]” and is ‘disabled.” Jd. at 15. Put simply, Fry takes issue with
the residual functional capacity defined by the ALJ. See id. Buta
review of the record reveals that those limitations are supported by
substantial evidence, and that his residual functional capacity
determination fully complied with applicable regulations.
| In determining Fry’s residual functional capacity, ALJ Riley
concluded that he was limited to performing “medium work as defined
in 20 CFR 404.1567(c),” save certain limitations. Tr. 19. Those
limitations included the following:
The claimant must avoid exposure to extreme cold, humidity,
irritants and hazards such as heights and machinery. The
claimant retains the mental capacity to perform simple,
routine, repetitive tasks involving only simple work related
decisions with few, if any, work place changes and to tolerate
occasional supervision.
Id. ALJ Riley fashioned these limitations to accommodate Fry’s alleged
symptoms, at least to the extent that he found such alleged symptoms
9A
supported by the evidence of record. Jd. Fry, premising that these
limitations are inadequate because supportability and consistency are
but two of the five factors, essentially asks the Court to reweigh the
evidence based on the other three factors. Doc. 8 at 14—15; Doc. 16 at
1-8.
This alleged administrative error is nonexistent because, to the
extent that Fry argues that the weight of the evidence supports greater
limitations,’ that contention fails under the regulatory framework. If
an ALJ’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, the
Court must uphold them. Ficca, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 536; see also
Consolo, 383 U.S. at 620 (“[S]omething less than the weight of the
evidence, ... does not prevent [it] from being supported by substantial
evidence.”). Thus, if some evidence supports one of ALJ Riley’s findings,
then all he needs do to comply with the substantial evidence standard is
state “which evidence he has rejected and which he is relying on as the
8 Fry, citing Page 105 of the record, asserts that Bustin testified that, “if the
Claimant is off task for more than 10%-15% of the day, or is absent 1.5 days or more
per month from work, or needs to take an unscheduled break (i.e., beyond two 15
minute breaks and a 30 minute break mid-shift), he would be unemployable.” Doc.
8 at 15 (citation and emphases omitted). This contention misreads the record,
which indicates that the vocational expert merely stated that “[e]mployers will
tolerate only up to 10, 15% off task of work time[,] depending on employer and
occupation.” Tr. 105 (emphasis added).
Or
basis for his finding.” See Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at 433. That is precisely
what ALJ Riley did here, when he laid out the objective evidence
relevant to assessing Fry’s statements concerning the limiting effects of
his symptoms, and then assessed the credibility of the statements by
comparing the two.
Although Fry may disagree with the ALJ’s conclusions, his
assessment of his symptoms was supported by a large quantity of
evidence. See Tr. 17-18, 20-22, 405, 414-15, 992, 1025, 1075, 1114,
1201, 1205-09, 1801. In addition, after surveying this evidence, the
ALJ thoroughly explained his reasons for rejecting Fry’s statements
regarding the limiting effects of his symptoms in favor of the relevant
objective evidence in determining his limitations. Id. at 18—18, 20-22.
As such, ALJ Riley’s limitation findings, insofar as they are based on
this comprehensive credibility assessment, must be upheld. See Ficca,
901 F. Supp. 2d at 536; Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at 483; Diaz, 577 F.3d at
506.
Accordingly, as a review of ALJ Riley's opinion shows that his
limitation findings were based on substantial record evidence, and the
reasoning underlying those findings was sufficient to enable judicial
90
review, they will not be disturbed. See Ficca, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 536;
Diaz, 577 F.3d at 506.
D. Assessment of Limitations Provided by Treating
Sources in Step Five Analysis
Fry’s third and final challenge is that ALJ Riley provided to
Bustin improper limitations in his residual functional capacity for his
allegedly severe impairments. Doc. 8 at 16-18. Specifically, Fry avers
that Drs. Anderson and Stetler opined that Fry has several limitations
that would preclude him from substantial gainful activity. Id. at 16-17.
Asserting that these limitations conflict with Bustin’s testimony, Fry
contends that the ALJ neither “clearly indicate[d] whether he credited
such opinions or not,” nor “address[ed] these limitation opinions in any
hypothetical question” to Bustin.? Id. at 17. Citing Cotter v. Harris,
642 F.2d 700 (8d Cir. 1981), which, according to Fry, stands for the
proposition that “[a]n ALJ must explain when s/he rejects certain
evidence or when there are conflicts of interest,” Fry surmises that ALJ
9 Fry contends that the Appeals Council instructed ALJ Riley to address “these
limitation opinions in any hypothetical question to the VE — something the Remand
Order also required.” Doc. 8 at 17. But a review of the remand order, Tr. 161-638,
fails to reveal an instruction requiring the ALJ to address such limitations “in any
hypothetical question” to Bustin.
Qn
Riley’s “failure to articulate” the reasons for accepting or rejecting
certain parts of the treating opinions warrants aremand. Doc. 8 at 17.
In assessing whether the objective medical evidence shows the
existence of an alleged impairment, the ALJ “may properly accept some
parts of the... evidence and reject other parts, but she must consider
all the [probative] evidence and give some reason for discounting the
evidence she rejects.” Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 48 (8d Cir. 1994).
This, importantly, does not mean that the ALJ must undertake an
exhaustive discussion of all of the evidence. See Fargnoli v. Massanari,
247 F.3d 34, 42 (8d Cir. 2001); Hur v. Barnhart, 94 F. App’x 130, 133
(8d Cir. 2004) (“There is no requirement that the ALJ discuss in her
opinion every tidbit of evidence included in the record.”); Beety-
Monticelli v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec. 343 F. App’x 748, 747 (8d Cir. 2009)
(“[The ALJ] need not mention every piece of evidence in the record.”).
A corollary is that a hypothetical submitted to the vocational
expert need not include “every impairment alleged by a claimant.”
Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 554 (8d Cir. 2005) (emphasis
omitted). Instead, “[a] hypothetical question must reflect all of a
claimant’s impairments that are supported by the record.” Chrupcala v.
22
Heckler, 829 F.2d 1269, 121276 (8d Cir. 1987). That is, the conveyed
impairments “encompass only those that are medically established.”
Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 554 (citation and footnote omitted).
Here, ALJ Riley properly discussed the limitations that were
provided by Drs. Anderson and Stetler but discounted by the ALJ before
providing the residual functional capacity to Bustin. Fry cites three
limitations that the ALJ failed to address: (1) the lack of “ability to
sustain an ordinary work routine without special supervision, or
perform work at a consistent pace, but only for 1/3 of the workday’; (2)
“no... ability to accept instructions from and respond appropriately to
criticism from supervisors’; and (8) inability to “get along with co-
workers and peers.” Doc. 8 at 16 (citations omitted).
Though Fry may disagree with ALJ Riley’s conclusions, the ALJ’s
assessment of his symptoms was supported by a substantial quantity of
evidence. See Tr. 17-18, 20-22, 405, 414-15, 992, 1025, 1075, 1114,
1201, 1205-09, 13801. As such, ALJ Riley’s limitation findings, insofar
as they are based on the formidable administrative findings, must be
upheld. See Ficca, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 536; Schaudeck, 181 F.8d at 433;
Diaz, 577 F.3d at 506.
20
Alternatively, to the extent that Fry argues that the weight of the
evidence supports greater limitations, that contention also fails. If an
ALJ’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, the Court
must uphold them. See Ficca, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 586; see also Consolo,
383 U.S. at 620. Thus, assuming some evidence supports one of ALJ
Riley’s findings, then all he need do to comply with the substantial
evidence standard is state “which evidence he has rejected and which he
is relying on as the basis for his finding.” See Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at
438.
_ Accordingly, as a review of ALJ Riley’s opinion shows that his
limitation findings were based on substantial record evidence, and the
reasoning underlying those findings was sufficient to enable judicial
review, they will not be disturbed. Ficca, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 586; Diaz,
577 F.3d at 506.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court affirms the Commissioner’s decision. A
separate order shall be issued.
Date: February 3, 2026 S/ Phillip J. Caraballo
Phillip J. Caraballo
United States Magistrate Judge
At)