recognizing a judge is immune from suit for all judicial actions – including those taken “in error,” “in excess of his authority,” or “done maliciously” – except those taken in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction”
How later courts described this case
- recognizing a judge is immune from suit for all judicial actions – including those taken “in error,” “in excess of his authority,” or “done maliciously” – except those taken in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction”
- noting that pro se litigants “must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants”
- explaining that judicial employees acting as intermediaries for judges or “functioning as an arm of the court” are protected by judicial immunity
- recognizing that Title II applies to the class of cases implicating the right of access to the courts
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 24-2826
__________
HILDA T. KENNEDY,
Appellant
v.
THE NEW JERSEY COURT SYSTEM
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 1:22-cv-05797)
District Judge: Honorable Karen M. Williams
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 17, 2025
Before: HARDIMAN, FREEMAN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 6, 2026)
___________
OPINION *
___________
PER CURIAM
Hilda Kennedy appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing her amended
complaint with prejudice. For the following reasons, we will affirm.
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Kennedy brought suit against the “New Jersey Court System,” properly known as
the State of New Jersey Judiciary, for violations of Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., and the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination (NJLAD), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-1 et seq. She maintained that she is
legally blind and physically impaired, and alleged that the New Jersey Judiciary and its
employees discriminated against her based on her disabilities during litigation of four
state court actions in the New Jersey Superior Court in Atlantic County. 1 Kennedy
sought compensatory damages and injunctive relief.
The New Jersey Judiciary moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (b)(6). The District Court granted the motion in
part, concluding that Eleventh Amendment immunity barred Kennedy’s NJLAD claims
and that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 2 barred her ADA claims with respect to the two
state court suits that had concluded. Kennedy was given leave to amend her complaint to
clarify the remaining two ADA claims.
In her amended complaint, Kennedy alleged claims against the New Jersey
1
Kennedy’s four state court suits include (1) Kennedy, et al. v. Mohammad, ATL-L-
2208-16; (2) Kennedy v. Pollock, et al., ATL-L-1167-15; (3) Kennedy, et al. v. ESQ
Capital III, LLC, ATL-924-22 (see also ESQ Capital III LLC v. Kennedy, ATL-L-1366-
22); and (4) Kennedy v. Cooper Levenson Law Firm, ATL-L-3744-21. The first suit
ended in a settlement, the second in a jury verdict against Kennedy that was affirmed on
appeal, and the last two suits were ongoing when the initial complaint here was filed.
2
See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413 (1923).
2
Judiciary for violations of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights “through the non-
compliance of ADA Title II,” and for intentional infliction of emotional distress. ECF
No. 30. In addition to damages, Kennedy sought declaratory and injunctive relief. She
also filed a motion to amend the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15(a) to include “new relevant information.” See ECF No. 43.
The New Jersey Judiciary again filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules
12(b)(1) and (b)(6), arguing that the complaint failed to state a claim for relief and that
the claims were barred by either Eleventh Amendment immunity or judicial immunity.
The District Court denied the request to amend the complaint, granted the New Jersey
Judiciary’s motion to dismiss, and dismissed all claims with prejudice. The District
Court also denied Kennedy’s motion for appointment of counsel. Kennedy timely
appealed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review
over the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). See Free
Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 677 F.3d 519, 529-30 (3d Cir. 2012). To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). We
construe Kennedy’s pro se pleadings liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (per curiam).
At the outset, we note that Kennedy devotes much of her appellate brief to raising
new claims; indeed, she requests to amend the complaint to add new defendants. We will
3
consider only those issues that Kennedy raises in her brief and that were before the
District Court. See Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Dominick D’Andrea, Inc., 150 F.3d 245, 251 (3d
Cir. 1998) (recognizing that, “[a]s a general rule, we do not consider on appeal issues that
were not raised before the district court in the absence of exceptional circumstances”);
see also M.S. ex rel. Hall v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist., 969 F.3d 120, 124 n.2 (3d Cir.
2020) (explaining that parties forfeit any argument that they do not raise in their opening
brief); Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that
pro se litigants “must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants”).
We understand Kennedy to raise two issues on appeal, neither of which has merit
for substantially the reasons provided by the District Court. First, she appeals from the
denial of her First Amendment retaliation claim, which required Kennedy to allege “(1)
that [s]he engaged in constitutionally-protected activity; (2) that the government
responded with retaliation; and (3) that the protected activity caused the retaliation.”
George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562, 585 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). We agree with the
District Court that Kennedy failed to sufficiently allege facts to satisfy the second and
third requirements. Even assuming, as Kennedy claimed, that the “filing of a state case
for [Fair Housing Act violations] and a federal complaint” was constitutionally protected
activity, ECF No. 30 at 13, she did not allege how the New Jersey Judiciary retaliated
against her for her lawsuits. As the District Court observed, Kennedy’s ability to litigate
her cases in state court “demonstrate[es] that her access to the court system itself is
unobstructed.” ECF No. 49 at 12.
4
To the extent Kennedy contended that actions or rulings taken by the state court
judges (as “defendant’s agent[s]”) during the course of her litigation were retaliatory,
such as the denial of a fee waiver application or the dismissal of a case, the District Court
correctly determined that the claims were barred by judicial immunity. See Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (recognizing a judge is immune from suit for all
judicial actions – including those taken “in error,” “in excess of his authority,” or “done
maliciously” – except those taken in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction”). And insofar
as Kennedy attributed judicial actions to court employees or the court system, her claims
were not actionable because the Superior Court and “judicial employees” are part of the
unified state-based court system, see N.J. Const. Art. VI §§ III, VIII, which, as an “arm of
the state,” is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail
Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 658 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc) (recognizing that a state
agency or department is an “arm of the state” when a judgment against it “would have
had essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself”
(citation omitted)); see also Gallas v. Supreme Ct., 211 F.3d 760, 772-73 (3d Cir. 2000)
(explaining that judicial employees acting as intermediaries for judges or “functioning as
an arm of the court” are protected by judicial immunity); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (recognizing that Eleventh Amendment immunity
protects a state or a state agency from suit unless Congress has specifically abrogated the
state’s immunity or the state has waived its immunity).
5
Second, Kennedy challenges the denial of her claim for violations of the ADA.
Title II of the ADA forbids public entities, including state court systems, from
discriminating on the basis of disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132; Tennessee v. Lane, 541
U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004) (recognizing that Title II applies to the class of cases implicating
the right of access to the courts). The New Jersey Judiciary acknowledged that its
Eleventh Amendment immunity from this claim is not absolute. “[I]nsofar as Title II
creates a private cause of action for damages against the States for conduct that actually
violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity.”
United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006) (emphasis in original). Thus, courts
must determine “on a claim-by-claim basis” whether Congress has abrogated immunity
for the alleged conduct. Id. Here, the first step in determining whether the New Jersey
Judiciary is immune to Kennedy’s ADA claim is to determine “if any aspect of [its]
alleged conduct forms the basis for a Title II claim.” Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 475 F.3d 524, 553 (3d Cir. 2007). We agree with the District Court that
Kennedy’s allegations failed to make that threshold showing.
To state a claim for relief under Title II, “a party must sufficiently plead that ‘(1)
[s]he is a qualified individual; (2) with a disability; (3) who was excluded from
participation in or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
entity, or was subjected to discrimination by any such entity; (4) by reason of h[er]
disability.’” Geness v. Admin. Office of Pa. Courts, 974 F.3d 263, 273 (3d Cir. 2020)
(citation omitted). “[T]he phrase ‘service, program, or activity’ under Title II . . . is
6
‘extremely broad in scope and includes anything a public entity does.’” Id. at 275
(citation omitted).
Kennedy alleged that “defendant’s agent,” which, as previously noted, is an
apparent reference to a New Jersey Superior Court judge who presided over her state
court proceedings, “denied me access to the court and the appellate court made it too
difficult to access court (sic) by not implementing ADA . . . measures.” ECF No. 30 at
10, ⁋31. As for how she was denied access, Kennedy provided few specifics. She
alleged that the judge failed to comply with her request for “extra assistance” and to
“please speak slowly, loudly, and clearly.” Id. at ⁋32. However, she did not allege that
she was denied such assistance on the basis on her disability. Kennedy also cited the
judge’s adverse rulings as a basis for her ADA claim, including, inter alia, the dismissal
of her complaint, the denial of a stay, and the denial of eight fee waiver applications.
Beyond conclusory allegations, such as her assertion that “my pronounced rights [under
Title II] were blatantly ignored,” Kennedy did not allege facts to suggest that the judicial
rulings were the result of intentional discrimination. 3 Id. at 17, ⁋62; see Durham v.
Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 225 (3d Cir. 2023) (recognizing “[w]here compensatory damages
3
The ADA prohibits discrimination based on disability, but does not provide relief based
on disagreement with judicial rulings. In that regard, Kennedy’s arguments on appeal
underscore the failure to plead a viable Title II claim. For example, she maintains that (1)
the “ADA claims should have a lower threshold to support disabled litigants, ensuring
fairness”; and (2) the judges “violated New Jersey Judiciary ADA rules by pursuing
summary judgment, which is not in accordance with ADA requirements.” Br. at 7, 9 of
25.
7
are sought, a plaintiff must also show intentional discrimination under a deliberate
indifference standard”).
Kennedy further alleged that the New Jersey Judiciary denied her access to the
courts “by not implementing any ADA Title II measures.” ECF No. 30 at 10, ⁋31. In
particular, she stated that it failed to provide services similar to those adopted by “[m]ost
colleges,” such as “special offices” like a “Center for Disability Services” Id. at ⁋36.
Kennedy also stated that the New Jersey Judiciary did not make available resources that
“schools” offer to “protect[ ] people with disabilities from discrimination,” such as
“[a]ssistive listening systems” and “Braille materials.” Id. at 11, ⁋40. She asserted
generally the need for “cost reduction[s], ease of filing . . . complaint[s] . . . [and] real-
time solutions for . . . rapidly changing barriers . . . [to] compliance [with] ADA Title II
. . . .” Id. at 12, ⁋42. However, Kennedy did not state how the lack of resources or
services, or the failure to make accommodations, interfered with her ability to access the
courts or meaningfully participate in the state court proceedings. Moreover, she wholly
failed to allege that the New Jersey Judiciary acted or discriminated against her based on
her disability. We thus agree with the District Court that Kennedy did not plausibly plead
a Title II ADA claim and that the New Jersey Judiciary is entitled to immunity from the
claim.
8
Based on the foregoing, the amended complaint was properly dismissed with
prejudice. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 4
4
Kennedy’s motion to expedite the appeal is denied.
9