STATE OF TENNESSEE v. TERESA SHINPAUGH

02/04/2026

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs November 18, 2025

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. TERESA SHINPAUGH

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County

No. 124794 G. Scott Green, Judge

No. E2025-00300-CCA-R3-CD

In 2023, the Defendant, Teresa Shinpaugh, pleaded guilty to one count of criminally

negligent homicide and one count of aggravated neglect of an elderly or vulnerable adult,

in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining counts of her indictment and pursuant to the

agreement that the trial court would determine the length and manner of service of her

sentence. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent sentences

of two and eight years with one year to serve in confinement and the remainder to be served

on probation. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it sentenced

her to one year of confinement. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm

the trial court’s judgments.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, P.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which CAMILLE R.

MCMULLEN and MATTHEW J. WILSON, JJ., joined.

Mary Ward (at sentencing and on appeal) and Daniel Bell (at sentencing), Knoxville,

Tennessee, for the appellant, Teresa Shinpaugh.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Park Huff, Assistant Attorney General;

Charme P. Allen, District Attorney General; and Tammy H. Hicks, Assistant District

Attorney General for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Background and Facts

This case arises from the death of the elderly victim, Brenda Crutchfield. The

Defendant and three co-defendants, one of whom was the Defendant’s sister-in-law, were

entrusted with the physical care of the victim who, while in the Defendant’s care, “die[d]

in her own feces.” On May 18, 2023, a Knox County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant

for two counts of first-degree murder, four counts of aggravated neglect of an elderly or

vulnerable adult, and one count of tampering with the evidence.

A. Guilty Plea

The record does not contain the guilty plea hearing transcript, and thus we must

deduce the facts that served as the basis of the Defendant’s plea from the statements made

at sentencing and in the parties’ briefs, which are summarized as follows: The victim, who

was bedridden, offered the Defendant and her husband the job of caring for her daily needs

in exchange for them living in her home rent free. At some point, the Defendant and her

husband ceased caring for the victim and abandoned her in the basement of her home with

one of their relatives, Randy Shinpaugh, who was very ill and unable to care for the victim.

The Defendant and her husband found the victim in the basement, starved to death and

covered in her urine and feces. The victim’s body had mummified. The Defendant and

her husband cleaned the victim’s body, the bed, and the basement and then called the

police. The medical examiner ruled that the victim’s cause of death was starvation, noting

her malnourishment and dehydration. The medical examiner determined that the victim’s

time of death had been three days prior to the Defendant’s call to the police.

On this basis, the Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of the lesser-included

offense of criminally negligent homicide and one count of aggravated neglect of an elderly

or vulnerable adult. In exchange for her guilty plea, the State dismissed the remaining

counts. The agreement entailed that the trial court would determine the length and manner

of service of the sentence.

B. Sentencing

The Defendant requested a sentence alternative to confinement. At the sentencing

hearing, a Knox County Sheriff’s Deputy testified that elder abuse was on the rise and

being reported to law enforcement more frequently. The Defendant’s presentence report

was admitted as evidence into the record. No other evidence was presented. At the

conclusion of the hearing, the trial court made the following statements:

I’m looking at [the Defendant’s] presentence investigation reports that

each state that [the Defendant does not have] any criminal history at all.

Never even a speeding ticket. [The Defendant is] rated low risk for

probation. But the facts of this case just bother me. I don’t know how else

to say it. It’s just troubling and strikes me at the very core of my being that

[the Defendant] made the agreement with [the victim] that in exchange for

getting free room and board you were going to take care of her. And then

she was allowed to die in her own feces under that very same roof. And it []

bothers me to my very core.

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....

I find the facts of this case to be shocking and reprehensible.

At the conclusion of the hearing, sentencing the Defendant as a Range I, Standard

offender, for the aggravated neglect of an elderly or vulnerable adult resulting in serious

bodily injury conviction (Count 4), a Class B felony, the trial court imposed a sentence of

eight years with one year of incarceration and the remainder of the term suspended to

probation. For the criminally negligent homicide conviction (Count 1), a Class E felony,

the trial court imposed a concurrent sentence of two years on probation.

It is from these judgments that the Defendant now appeals.

II. Analysis

The Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it imposed a sentence of split

confinement with one year of incarceration. The State responds that the Defendant has

waived this issue because she failed to provide an adequate record for this court to review.

A. Waiver

The standard of review for within-range sentences accompanied by questions

related to probation or other alternative sentences is for an abuse of discretion,

accompanied by a presumption of reasonableness. State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273, 278-

79 (Tenn. 2012). In the instance of a guilty plea where the manner of service or length of

a sentence is challenged by a defendant who fails to include a transcript of the guilty plea

hearing, as is the case here, this court is instructed to, rather than automatically waive the

issue, “determine on a case-by-case basis whether the record is sufficient for a meaningful

review under the standard adopted in Bise” (an abuse of discretion standard with a

presumption of reasonableness when the record establishes that the trial court imposed a

sentence that is within the appropriate range and that reflects a proper application of the

purposes and principles of sentencing). Id. (citing State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 707

(Tenn. 2012)). We note that it is the duty of an appellant to prepare a record as necessary

to convey the issues on appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b) (“the appellant shall have prepared

a transcript of such part of the evidence or proceedings as is necessary to convey a fair,

accurate and complete account of what transpired with respect to those issues that are the

bases of appeal”); see State v. Taylor, 992 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Tenn. 1999). Finally, an order

of supplementation may be an appropriate remedy for any deficiencies in the record.

Caudle, 388 S.W.3d at 279-80.

If the record is adequate for a meaningful review, the appellate court may review

the merits of the sentencing decision with a presumption that the missing transcript would

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support the ruling of the trial court. Id. (citing State v. Oody, 823 S.W.2d 554, 559 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 1991). “In any event, the mere fact that the transcript of the submission hearing

was not made a part of the record on appeal should not preclude review under the standard

adopted in Bise.” Id.

The Defendant has failed to include a transcript of the guilty plea hearing in this

case. The State maintains that this constitutes waiver; however, as instructed by our

supreme court in Caudle to approach waiver on a case by case basis, we conclude, as the

court did in Caudle, that the pre-sentence report, the transcript of the sentencing hearing,

and the exhibits in the record are adequate to conduct a meaningful appellate review. Id.

at 279.

B. Alternative Sentencing

“[T]he abuse of discretion standard, accompanied by a presumption of

reasonableness, applies to within-range sentences that reflect a decision based upon the

purposes and principles of sentencing, including the questions related to probation or any

other alternative sentence.” Id. at 278-79. The defendant bears “the burden of showing

that the sentence is improper.” State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). A trial

court’s decision regarding probation will only be invalidated if the court “wholly departed

from the relevant statutory considerations in reaching its determination.” State v.

Sihapanya, 516 S.W.3d 473, 476 (Tenn. 2014). Under an abuse of discretion standard, an

appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Id. at 475.

A defendant shall be eligible for probation, subject to certain exceptions, if the

sentence imposed on the defendant is ten years or less. T.C.A. § 40-35-303(a) (2018). A

defendant is not, however, automatically entitled to probation as a matter of law. The

burden is upon the defendant to show that he or she is a suitable candidate for probation.

T.C.A. § 40-35-303(b) (2018); State v. Goode, 956 S.W.2d 521, 527 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1997); State v. Boggs, 932 S.W.2d 467, 477 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). In order to meet

this burden, the defendant “must demonstrate that probation will ‘subserve the ends of

justice and the best interest of both the public and the defendant.’” State v. Bingham, 910

S.W.2d 448, 456 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (quoting State v. Dykes, 803 S.W.2d 250, 259

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)).

Regarding alternative sentencing, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-102(5)

provides as follows:

In recognition that state prison capacities and the funds to build and maintain

them are limited, convicted felons committing the most severe offenses,

possessing criminal histories evincing a clear disregard for the laws and

morals of society, and evincing failure of past efforts at rehabilitation shall

be given first priority regarding sentencing involving incarceration.

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There is no bright line rule for determining when a defendant should be granted probation.

Bingham, 910 S.W.2d at 456. Every sentencing decision necessarily requires a case-by-

case analysis considering “the nature of the offense and the totality of the circumstances ...

including a defendant’s background.” Ashby, 823 S.W.2d at 168 (quoting State v. Moss,

727 S.W.2d 229, 235 (Tenn. 1986)). In determining if incarceration is appropriate in a

given case, a trial court should consider whether:

(A) Confinement is necessary to protect society by restraining a defendant

who has a long history of criminal conduct;

(B) Confinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the

offense or confinement is particularly suited to provide an effective

deterrence to others likely to commit similar offenses; or

(C) Measures less restrictive than confinement have frequently or recently

been applied unsuccessfully to the defendant.

T.C.A. § 40-35-103(1) (2018). “When considering probation, the trial court should

consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s criminal record, the

defendant’s background and social history, the defendant’s present condition, including

physical and mental condition, the deterrent effect on the defendant, and the best interests

of the defendant and the public.” State v. Cathey, No. E2015-01284-CCA-R3-CD, 2016

WL 2641766, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., May 6, 2016) (citations omitted). The court should

also consider the defendant’s truthfulness. State v. Bunch, 646 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tenn.

1983). The trial court must also consider the potential or lack of potential for rehabilitation

or treatment of the defendant in determining the sentence alternative or length of a term to

be imposed. T.C.A. § 40-35-103.

In this case, the trial court granted, in part, the Defendant’s request for an alternative

sentence, but ordered the Defendant to serve a portion of her sentence in confinement. The

trial court did this based on the facts surrounding the case, namely that the Defendant

entered into a financial agreement for care with the victim and had allowed her to die in

such a manner. The trial court placed great weight on the circumstances of the victim’s

death and the way the Defendant acted after the victim was deceased. Based on these

multiple factors, and in light of its consideration of the required factors when determining

the need for confinement, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when

it ordered the Defendant to serve one year of her eight-year sentence in incarceration. The

Defendant is not entitled to relief as to this issue.

In ordering the Defendant to serve one year of her eight-year sentence in

confinement, the trial court noted the shocking circumstances of the victim’s death. The

trial court was particularly concerned that the victim had made financial arrangements to

be cared for and instead was left to die by the Defendant.

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The Defendant acknowledged in her statement to the trial court at the sentencing

hearing that she had been employed to care for the victim. The Defendant admitted that,

when present at the victim’s home prior to her death, she did not go “down there” to the

basement to check on the victim. The Defendant acknowledged that she was in the room

when the victim was cleaned up before the police were contacted about the victim’s death.

The Defendant stated that she was aware that the police were not immediately contacted

after the victim’s death. We conclude that the circumstances of the abuse suffered by the

victim were egregious and vile, showing little regard for human life. The conduct of the

Defendant and her relatives, in all likelihood, cost the victim her life. The trial court

considered the evidence and the purposes and principles of sentencing before ordering the

Defendant to serve one year of her eight-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant

has, therefore, failed to establish either an abuse of discretion or otherwise overcome the

presumption of reasonableness afforded sentences which reflect a proper application of the

purposes and principles of our statutory scheme.

III. Conclusion

In accordance with the aforementioned reasoning and authorities, we affirm the trial

court’s judgments.

_s/ Robert W. Wedemeyer___________

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE

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