MCNULTY v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 24-1779V

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LILY McNULTY and CONOR McNULTY, *

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on behalf of their minor child, J.M., *

* Special Master Jennifer A. Shah

Petitioners, *

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v. * Filed: December 31, 2025

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SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND *

HUMAN SERVICES, *

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Respondent. *

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Richard Gage, Richard Gage, P.C., Cheyenne, WY, for Petitioners.

Rachelle Bishop, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

DECISION AWARDING INTERIM ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS1

On October 30, 2024, Lily and Conor McNulty (“Petitioners”) filed a petition for

compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10,

et seq.2 (the “Vaccine Act” or “Program”), alleging that J.M., their minor child, developed

Guillain-Barré syndrome (“GBS”) as a result of the measles, mumps, and rubella (“MMR”),

Hepatitis A, and Varicella vaccinations he received February 17, 2023. ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”) at 1.

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Because this Decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, it must be made publicly

accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims’ website, and/or

at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc, in accordance with the E-Government

Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government

Services). This means the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In

accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioners have 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or

other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon

review, I agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public

access.

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National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease

of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa

(2012).

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After filing the petition, Petitioners filed statements from Ms. McNulty and Mr. Jacob

Strumwasser, medical records, medical literature, and a letter from a treating physician,

Christopher R. Spiekerman, D.O., opining on causation. Exs. 1-24.

On December 28, 2024, Petitioners filed an application for interim attorneys’ fees and

costs, requesting a total of $30,674.05, comprised of $26,157.00 for attorneys’ fees and $4,517.05

for attorneys’ costs. ECF No. 12 (“Fees App.”) at 21; Fees App., Ex. A at 9. Petitioners noted

that their counsel, Mr. Andrew D. Downing, “has had the honor of being vetted for a Presidential

appointment within the U.S. Health and Human Services” and would no longer be able to continue

representing them in the Vaccine Program. Fees App. at 3. This is Petitioner’s first motion for

interim fees and costs. Petitioner has not incurred any personal costs. Fees App. at 1.

Respondent filed a response on January 10, 2025, deferring to me as to whether Petitioners

have met the legal standard for an award of interim attorneys’ fees and costs. ECF No. 14 (“Fees

Resp.”) at 2. Respondent noted, however, that Petitioners had not “filed any reliable and objective

support for their claim.” Id. at n.1. Petitioner did not file a reply brief.

Petitioners was initially represented by Mr. Andrew D. Downing. On February 6 and 7,

2025, Mrs. Nancy Meyers filed motions to substitute as counsel for Petitioners. ECF Nos. 16-17.

On March 18, 2025, Mr. Richard Gage filed a motion to substitute as counsel for Petitioners. ECF

No. 18.

Petitioners then filed additional medical records and a statement of completion. Exs. 25-

29; ECF No. 27. This case was activated on September 8, 2025, and reassigned to me on

September 9, 2025. ECF Nos. 28-29. On September 9, 2025, I issued an initial order. ECF No.

30. Currently, Respondent has until January 12, 2026, to file a status report identifying any missing

records and indicating how he would like to proceed. See Non-PDF Order Granting Motion for

Extension of Time dated 11/12/2025.

I hereby GRANT IN PART Petitioners’ application and award a total of $30,150.91 in

interim attorneys’ fees and costs.

I. Legal Standard

A. Interim Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

The Federal Circuit has held that an award of interim attorneys’ fees and costs is

permissible under the Vaccine Act. Shaw v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 609 F.3d 1372 (Fed.

Cir. 2010); Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 515 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In Cloer, the

Federal Circuit noted that “Congress [has] made clear that denying interim attorneys’ fees under

the Vaccine Act is contrary to an underlying purpose of the Vaccine Act.” Cloer v. Sec’y of Health

& Hum. Servs., 675 F.3d 1358, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

In Avera, the Federal Circuit stated that “[i]nterim fees are particularly appropriate in cases

where proceedings are protracted, and costly experts must be retained.” Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352.

Likewise, in Shaw, the Federal Circuit held that “where the claimant establishes that the cost of

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litigation has imposed an undue hardship and there exists a good faith basis for the claim, it is

proper for the special master to award interim attorneys’ fees.” 609 F.3d at 1375. Avera did not,

however, define when interim fees are appropriate; rather, it has been interpreted to allow special

masters discretion. See Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352; Kirk v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 08-

241V, 2009 WL 775396, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 13, 2009); Bear v. Sec’y of Health &

Hum. Servs., No. 11-362V, 2013 WL 691963, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 4, 2013). Special

masters have viewed the three Avera criteria -- protracted proceedings, costly expert testimony,

and undue hardship -- as factors to consider in a flexible balancing test. Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352;

see Al-Uffi v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 13-956V, 2015 WL 6181669, at *7 (Fed. Cl.

Spec. Mstr. Sept. 30, 2015).

The undue hardship inquiry looks at more than just the financial involvement of a

petitioner; it also takes into account the expenditures of counsel. Kirk, 2009 WL 775396, at *2.

Referring to Avera, former Chief Special Master Golkiewicz in Kirk found that “the general

principle underlying an award of interim fees [is] clear: avoid working a substantial financial

hardship on petitioners and their counsel.” Id.

B. Good Faith

A petitioner is eligible for an interim award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs only if

the special master finds that the petition was brought in good faith and with a reasonable basis.

§15(e)(1); Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352; Shaw, 609 F.3d at 1372; Woods v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.

Servs, 105 Fed. Cl. 148, 154 (2012); Friedman v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 94 Fed. Cl. 323,

334 (2010); Doe 21 v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 89 Fed. Cl. 661, 668 (2009); Bear, 2013

WL 691963, at *5; Lumsden v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 97-588V, 2012 WL 1450520,

at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 28, 2012). The good faith requirement is met through a subjective

inquiry. Di Roma v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 90-3277V, 1993 WL 496981, at *1 (Fed.

Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 18, 1993). It “focuses upon whether [P]etitioner honestly believed he had a

legitimate claim for compensation.” Turner v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-544V, 2007

WL 4410030, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 30, 2007). Without evidence of bad faith,

“petitioners are entitled to a presumption of good faith.” Grice v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,

36 Fed. Cl. 114, 121 (1996). Thus, so long as Petitioners had an honest belief that their claim

could succeed, the good faith requirement is satisfied. See Riley v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,

No. 09-276V, 2011 WL 2036976, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 29, 2011) (citing Di Roma, 1993

WL 496981, at *1); Turner, 2007 WL 4410030, at *5.

C. Reasonable Basis

Unlike the good faith inquiry, an analysis of reasonable basis requires more than just

Petitioners’ belief in their claim. Turner, 2007 WL 4410030, at *6-7. Instead, the claim must be

supported by objective evidence -- medical records or medical opinion. Sharp-Roundtree v. Sec’y

of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 14-804V, 2015 WL 12600336, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 3,

2015).

Although the statute does not define the quantum of proof needed to establish reasonable

basis, it is “something less than the preponderant evidence ultimately required to prevail on one’s

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vaccine-injury claim.” Chuisano v. United States, 116 Fed. Cl. 276, 283 (2014). The Court of

Federal Claims affirmed in Chuisano that “[a]t the most basic level, a petitioner who submits no

evidence would not be found to have reasonable basis . . .” Id. at 286. The Court in Chuisano

found that a petition that relies on temporal proximity and a petitioner’s affidavit is not sufficient

to establish reasonable basis. Id. at 290; see also Turpin v. Sec’y Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-

564V, 2005 WL 1026714, *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 10, 2005) (finding no reasonable basis

when petitioner submitted an affidavit and no other records); Brown v. Sec’y Health & Hum.

Servs., No. 99-539V, 2005 WL 1026713, *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 11, 2005) (finding no

reasonable basis when petitioner presented only e-mails between her and her attorney). The

Federal Circuit has affirmed that “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance of proof

could provide sufficient grounds for a special master to find reasonable basis.” Cottingham v.

Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 2019-1596, 971 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (finding

Petitioner submitted objective evidence supporting causation when she submitted medical records

and a vaccine package insert); see also James-Cornelius v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 984

F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (finding that “the lack of an express medical opinion on causation

did not by itself negate the claim's reasonable basis”).

“[I]n deciding reasonable basis the [s]pecial [m]aster needs to focus on the requirements

for a petition under the Vaccine Act to determine if the elements have been asserted with sufficient

evidence to make a feasible claim for recovery.” Santacroce v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,

No. 15-555V, 2018 WL 405121, at *7 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 5, 2018). Special masters cannot award

compensation “based on the claims of petitioner alone, unsubstantiated by medical records or by

medical opinion.” 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13(a)(1). Special masters and judges of the Court of Federal

Claims have interpreted this provision to mean that petitioners must submit medical records or

expert medical opinion in support of causation-in-fact claims. See Waterman v. Sec’y of Health &

Hum. Servs., 123 Fed. Cl. 564, 574 (2015) (citing Dickerson v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 35

Fed. Cl. 593, 599 (1996) (stating that medical opinion evidence is required to support an on-Table

theory where medical records fail to establish a Table injury)).

When determining if a reasonable basis exists, a special master may consider a myriad of

factors, including “the factual basis of the claim, the medical and scientific support for the claim,

the novelty of the vaccine, and the novelty of the theory of causation.” Amankwaa, 138 Fed. Cl.

at 289. This approach allows the special master to look at each application for attorneys’ fees and

costs on a case-by-case basis. Hamrick v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-683V, 2007 WL

4793152, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 19, 2007).

II. Discussion

A. Undue Financial Hardship

The Federal Circuit has noted that interim fees “are particularly appropriate in cases where

proceedings are protracted, and costly experts must be retained.” Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352 (Fed.

Cir. 2008). Although this case is in its early stages and has been pending for just over a year, under

the circumstances, interim fees are warranted. Petitioners’ fees request is on behalf of their former

counsel, Mr. Downing, who has wound down his Vaccine Program practice after receiving a

Presidential appointment. Fees App. at 3. Other special masters have granted Mr. Downing fees

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under these circumstances. See Newey v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 22-494V, 2025 WL

463256, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 16, 2025); see also Lucas v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.

Servs., No. 19-1525V, 2025 WL 1158901, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 25, 2025); Fiorello v.

Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 17-1869V, 2025 WL 785004, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb.

11, 2025). Moreover, Mr. Downing filed statements from Ms. McNulty and Mr. Strumwasser,

medical records, medical literature, and a letter from Dr. Spiekerman opining on causation. See

Exs. 1-24. I find that, under the circumstances, Petitioners would suffer undue hardship without

an award of interim fees and costs.

B. Good Faith and Reasonable Basis

Although Respondent argued that Petitioners have not filed any reliable and objective

support for their claim, he has not raised any specific objection to Petitioners’ good faith or

reasonable basis for this claim, and he leaves the determination to my discretion. Fees Resp. at 2;

n.1. I find that the petition was filed in good faith.

As discussed above, the threshold for reasonable basis is much lower than the burden to

prove entitlement to compensation, which requires preponderant evidence. Based on the materials

filed by Petitioners thus far, I find that they have maintained a reasonable basis for their claim.

As there is no other reason to deny an award of interim attorneys’ fees and costs, I will

award interim fees and costs as described below.

C. Attorneys’ Fees

Petitioners request a total of $30,674.05 in attorneys’ fees for Downing, Allison &

Jorgenson, LLC (“Downing, Allison & Jorgenson”). Fees App. at 21. Petitioners bear the burden

of establishing that the rates charged, hours expended, and costs incurred are reasonable. Wasson

v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 24 Cl. Ct. 482, 484 (1993).

1. Reasonable Hourly Rate

A reasonable hourly rate is defined as the rate “prevailing in the community for similar

services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Avera, 515 F.3d

at 1348 (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n.11). In general, this rate is based on “the forum rate for

the District of Columbia” rather than “the rate in the geographic area of the practice of

[P]etitioner’s attorney.” Rodriguez v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 632 F.3d 1381, 1384 (Fed.

Cir. 2011) (citing Avera, 515 F. 3d at 1349).

McCulloch provides the framework for determining the appropriate compensation for

attorneys’ fees based upon the attorneys’ experience. See McCulloch v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.

Servs., No. 09–293V, 2015 WL 5634323 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 1, 2015). The Office of

Special Masters has accepted the decision in McCulloch and has issued a Fee Schedule for

subsequent years.3

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The Office of Special Masters Attorneys’ Forum Hourly Rate Fee Schedule for 2015 through 2025 can be

accessed at: https://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/osm-attorneys-forum-hourly-rate-fee-schedules.

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Petitioners request compensation for Mr. Downing at a rate of $485.00 per hour for work

performed in 2024. Fees App. at 24. Petitioners request compensation for Ms. Ann Allison,

counsel, at a rate of $435.00 per hour for work performed in 2024. Id. Petitioners request

compensation for Ms. Courtney Jorgenson, counsel, at a rate of $375.00 per hour for work

performed in 2024. Id.

Petitioners also request compensation for paralegal work. Fees App. at 24. Petitioners

request compensation for Ms. Danielle Avery, Mr. Alex Malvick, and Ms. Samantha Perez,

paralegals, at a rate of $175.00 per hour for work performed in 2024. Id.

The requested 2024 rates for Mr. Downing, Ms. Allison, and Ms. Jorgenson are consistent

with what they have previously been awarded and are in accordance with the Office of Special

Masters’ Fee Schedule. See Lizalde v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 21-1791V, 2025 WL

2223405, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 8, 2025); Coons v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No.

20-1067V, 2025 WL 1011347, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 17, 2025). Accordingly, I find the

requested rates are reasonable and that no adjustment is warranted.

Additionally, I find the requested paralegal rates are reasonable, based on the Office of

Special Masters’ Fee Schedule and what Mr. Downing’s staff have previously been awarded. See

Martin v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 22-384V, 2025 WL 996725 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr.

Feb. 27, 2025); Lizalde, 2025 WL 2223405, at *4.

2. Hours Reasonably Expended

Attorneys’ fees are awarded for the “number of hours reasonably expended on the

litigation.” Avera, 515 F.3d at 1348. Ultimately, it is “well within the Special Master’s discretion

to reduce the hours to a number that, in [her] experience and judgment, [is] reasonable for the work

done.” Saxton ex rel. Saxton v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1522 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

In exercising that discretion, special masters may reduce the number of hours submitted by a

percentage of the amount charged. See Broekelschen v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 102 Fed.

Cl. 719, 728-29 (2011) (affirming the special master's reduction of attorney and paralegal hours);

Guy v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 38 Fed. Cl. 403, 406 (1997) (affirming the special master’s

reduction of attorney and paralegal hours). Further, special masters may reduce awards sua sponte,

independent of enumerated objections from the respondent. Sabella v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.

Servs., 86 Fed. Cl. 201, 208-09 (Fed. Cl. 2009); Savin v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 85 Fed.

Cl. 313, 318 (Fed. Cl. 2008), aff’d, No. 99-573V, 2008 WL 2066611 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr.

22, 2008).

A special master need not engage in a line-by-line analysis of a petitioner’s fee application

when reducing fees. Broekelschen v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 102 Fed. Cl. 719, 729 (Fed.

Cl. 2011). Special masters may look to their experience and judgment to reduce an award of fees

and costs to a level they find reasonable for the work performed. Saxton v. Sec’y of Health &

Hum. Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1993). It is within a special master’s discretion to make

a global reduction to the total amount of fees requested. See Hines v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.

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Servs., 22 Cl. Ct. 750, 753 (1991) (“special masters have wide latitude in determining the

reasonableness of both attorneys’ fees and costs”); Hocraffer v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,

No. 99-533V, 2011 WL 3705153 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 25, 2011), mot. for rev. denied, 2011

WL 6292218, at *13 (Fed. Cl. 2011) (denying review of the special master’s decision and

endorsing “a global – rather than line-by-line – approach to determine the reasonable number of

hours expended in this case”).

While attorneys may be compensated for non-attorney-level work, the rate must be

comparable to what would be paid for a paralegal or secretary. See O’Neill v. Sec’y of Health &

Hum. Servs., No. 08–243V, 2015 WL 2399211, at *9 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 28, 2015). Clerical

and secretarial tasks should not be billed at all, regardless of who performs them. See, e.g.,

McCulloch, 2015 WL 5634323, at *26. It is well-established that billing for administrative and

clerical tasks is not permitted in the Vaccine Program. Rochester v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 379,

387 (1989).

The overall hours spent on this matter appear to be largely reasonable; however, a minor

reduction is necessary due to paralegal time billed for administrative and clerical tasks and

excessive paralegal time billed for review of filings. Most of these entries bill between 0.2 and

0.3 hours for receiving and reviewing filing notifications. See Fees App., Ex. A. Some entries

also constitute block billing, where non-compensable administrative tasks are indistinguishably

billed together with compensable tasks. Id. Examples include (but are not limited to):

• October 31, 2024: 0.3 hours billed by Ms. Perez to “Receive and review Court’s

ECF notification re: filed Petition; receive and review Court’s Notice re: ECF,

Order Directing appearance and Notice of Assignment to Special Master; brief

memo to file re: same.”

• December 2, 2024: 0.3 hours billed by Ms. Perez to “Finalize and file Motion for

Extension of Time; receive and review Court’s ECF notification; memo to file re:

completion.”

• December 23, 2024: 1.4 hours billed by Ms. Perez to “Initial drafting work re

Motion for Interim Fees and Expenses; to ADD for final drafting; compile interim

invoice with expenses and exhibits and ensure no duplicative entries; finalize and

file Motion; receive and review Court’s ECF Notification; memo to file re

completeness.”

Id. (emphases added). These issues have previously been raised with Mr. Downing and his

colleagues. See Coons, 2025 WL 1011347 at *3 (reducing fees by $1,000.00 for excessive billing

for paralegal time); Pearce v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 22-1362V, 2025 WL 2306298,

at *3-6 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 15, 2025) (reducing fees by 5% for billing for non-compensable

administrative tasks, block billing, excessive billing, and duplicative billing). Because it is

impossible to determine how much time was expended to each individual task in such entries, I

will apply a 2% deduction from the requested attorneys’ fees. This results in a deduction of

$523.14.

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Accordingly, Petitioners are awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of $25,633.86.4

D. Reasonable Costs

Petitioners request a total of $4,517.05 for attorneys’ costs, consisting of $330.59 for

medical record requests; $1.46 for postage; $405.00 for the petition filing fee; and $3,780.00 for a

letter from Dr. Spiekerman. Fees App., Ex. A at 9.

Petitioners provided documentation for the costs associated with the medical record

requests, postage costs, and filing expenses. Fees App., Ex. A at 10-38. I find the costs for these

items to be reasonable and award them in full. I discuss Petitioners’ expert costs below.

1. Petitioners’ Expert Costs for Christopher R. Spiekerman, D.O.

Petitioners request $3,780.00 for a letter from Dr. Spiekerman opining on causation. Fees

App. at 24-25; Fees App., Ex. A at 39-40; see Ex. 24. Dr. Spiekerman billed 10.8 hours at $350.00

per hour. Fees App. at 25; Fees App., Ex. A at 40. Dr. Spiekerman has not been awarded an expert

rate.

Dr. Spiekerman’s nine-page letter provides a timeline of J.M.’s medical history, discusses

“[k]ey [f]acts” and “[b]iological [j]ustifications,” and opines on causation. See Ex. 24. His invoice

indicates that he reviewed J.M.’s medical history, records, and lab data, met with counsel, and

researched and reviewed medical literature. Fees App., Ex. A at 40. He also cross-referenced

medical literature data with his interpretation and fact-checked the data. Id. I find that Dr.

Spiekerman’s hourly rate and the number of hours billed are reasonable.5 I will therefore award his

expert costs in full.

I award Petitioners a total of $4,517.05 in attorneys’ costs.6

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, in the exercise of the discretion afforded to me in determining the propriety of

awards of interim attorneys’ fees and costs, and based on the foregoing, I GRANT IN PART

Petitioners’ application. Petitioners are awarded interim attorneys’ fees and costs in the total

amount of $30,150.91 as follows:

4

This total reflects Petitioners’ $26,157.00 request for attorneys’ fees minus the $523.14 reduction for

paralegal billings. ($26,157.00 - $523.14 = 25,633.86).

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I decline to set Dr. Spiekerman’s expert rate at this time. I am merely determining that the overall hours

and amount requested in this motion are reasonable.

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Petitioners are awarded $330.59 for medical record requests; $1.46 for postage; $405.00 for the petition

filing fee; and $3,780.00 for Dr. Spiekerman’s work; totaling $4,517.05.

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• A lump sum in the amount of $30,150.91, representing reimbursement of

Petitioners’ interim attorneys’ fees and costs, to be paid through an ACH deposit to

Petitioners’ former counsel’s IOLTA account for prompt disbursement.

In the absence of a motion for review filed pursuant to RCFC Appendix B, the Clerk of

Court SHALL ENTER JUDGMENT in accordance with this decision.7

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Jennifer A. Shah

Jennifer A. Shah

Special Master

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Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), the parties may expedite entry of judgment by filing a joint notice

renouncing their right to seek review.

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