Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION - CINCINNATI

SPECTRUM LABORATORIES, LLC, : Case No. 1:24-cv-29

Plaintiff, Judge Matthew W. McFarland

QUICK FIX PLUS, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER AND OPINION

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment against

Defendant Fire On Location Corporation (“FOLC”) (Docs. 23, 26). After Defendant FOLC

failed to timely respond to the Amended Complaint or appear in this matter, Plaintiff

applied for an entry of default against Defendant FOLC pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 55(a). (Doc. 21.) The Clerk of Court properly docketed an entry of default

against Defendant FOLC on April 30, 2025. (Doc. 22.) Plaintiff thereafter filed a sealed

and unsealed Motion for Default Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

55(b). (Docs. 23, 26.) Defendant FOLC failed to timely respond to the Motion. See S.D.

Ohio Civ. R. 7.2(a)(2). Thus, this matter is ripe for review. For the reasons stated below,

Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment (Docs. 23, 26) is GRANTED IN PART.

FACTS

Plaintiff Spectrum Laboratories, LLC (“Spectrum”) owns the trademark

containing or comprising the words “Quick Fix.” (Am. Compl., Doc. 6, J 18.)

Additionally, Spectrum owns the trademark rights to its Q-Clock logo, for which it also

holds a registered copyright. (Id. at ]] 19-20.) The Quick Fix and Q-Clock marks are used

by Spectrum in connection with its patented synthetic urine products. (Id. at 18-19.)

Both marks are valid and legally enforceable, and Spectrum has sold its Quick Fix

products continuously since at least 1999. (Id. at 15, 31.)

Defendant FOLC operates the QuickFix.Plus and FakeUrine.co websites, which it

uses to market and sell synthetic urine products. (Am. Compl., Doc. 6, 9 23-26.) The

QuickFix.Plus and FakeUrine.co websites display both the Quick Fix mark and the Q-

Clock logo. (Id.) The QuickFix.Plus website in particular offers Quick Fix and Quick Fix

Plus brand synthetic urine— products which are sold by Spectrum. (Id. at 4 23.) FOLC

created and uses a Quick Fix Plus logo that incorporates both the Quick Fix mark and the

Q-Clock logo. (Id.) FOLC refers to the Quick Fix product as “our proven formula” on the

QuickFix.Plus website, and it uses email addresses that include the QuickFix.Plus domain

name. (Id.) FOLC also sells its U-Pass brand synthetic urine product, which is not a

Spectrum product, on its websites. (Id. at §] 27.) FOLC launched these websites and used

the Quick Fix mark and Q-Clock logo without Spectrum’s permission. (Id. at § 22.)

Spectrum alleges that FOLC’s use of the Quick Fix and Q-Clock marks likely

caused consumer confusion. (Am. Compl., Doc. 6, {J 22-29.) Specifically, Spectrum

alleges that FOLC sought to “deceive and confuse customers into believing that [FOLC

is] Spectrum and the source of Quick Fix products.” ([d. at § 22.) Spectrum also notes that

FOLC’s use of the Quick Fix and Q-Clock marks to sell the U-Pass products “further

confuses customers into believing that U-Pass is a Spectrum product.” (Id. at J 27.)

Spectrum filed this action on January 23, 2024. (See Compl., Doc. 1.) It amended its

Complaint to include FOLC as a defendant on May 9, 2024. (See Am. Compl., Doc. 6, 9

22-29.) FOLC waived service on May 16, 2024. (See Waiver of Service Returned Executed,

Doc. 8.) FOLC failed to answer or otherwise respond to the Amended Complaint within

the time required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (See Application for Entry of

Default, Doc. 21.) The Clerk, therefore, entered default against FOLC on April 30, 2025.

(See Entry of Default, Doc. 22.) Spectrum now seeks a default judgment by the Court

against FOLC. (Motion for Default Judgment, Doc. 26.)

LAW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 governs entries of default and default

judgments. A plaintiff seeking entry of default against a defendant must first show, “by

affidavit or otherwise,” that the defendant “has failed to plead or otherwise defend.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 55(a). Upon such showing, the clerk must enter default. Id. Next, the plaintiff

must apply to the court for a default judgment, except in cases where the claim “is for a

sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by computation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b).

Once default is entered against a defendant, that party is deemed to have admitted

all the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint, except those related to damages. Antoine

v. Atlas Turner, Inc., 66 F.3d 105, 110-11 (6th Cir. 1995). A court deciding whether to grant

a motion for a default judgment must still satisfy itself that the facts in the complaint state

a claim for relief against the defendant. Kuhlman v. McDonnel, No. 1:20-CV-510, 2022 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 23846, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 10, 2022) (citation omitted). “When an application

is made to the court under Rule 55(b)(2) for the entry of a judgment by default, the district

judge is required to exercise sound judicial discretion in determining whether the

judgment should be entered.” 10A Wright & Miller Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2685 (3d ed.

2013).

ANALYSIS

In its Motion, Spectrum seeks an order: (1) entering default judgment against

FOLC, (2) ordering disgorgement damages against FOLC, (3) enjoining FOLC from

continuing to infringe upon the Quick Fix mark and the Q-Clock logo, (4) ordering FOLC

to transfer the QuickFix.Plus domain name to Spectrum, and (5) finding that Spectrum is

entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs. (Motion for Default Judgment, Doc. 26.) Spectrum

seeks a declaration of liability and relief only as to Counts One and Six of the Amended

Complaint. (Id. at Pg. ID 233.) The Court will take each issue in turn.

I. Trademark Infringement Claim

Spectrum’s first claim relates to FOLC’s unauthorized use of the Quick Fix mark

and the Q-Clock logo. Spectrum alleges that FOLC engaged in federal trademark

infringement in violation of the Lanham Act. (See Am. Compl., Doc. 6, at 30-39.) “A

party proves trademark infringement by showing (1) that it owns a trademark, (2) that

the infringer used the mark in commerce without authorization, and (3) that the use of

the alleged infringing trademark ‘is likely to cause confusion among consumers

regarding the origin of the goods offered by the parties.’” AWGI, LLC v. Atlas Trucking

Co., LLC, 998 F.3d 258, 264 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Coach, Inc. v. Goodfellow, 717 F.3d 498,

502 (6th Cir. 2013)); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1). The test for trademark infringement thus

examines “the likelihood of confusion between the two marks.” Audi AG v. D’Amato, 469

F.3d 534, 542 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. 763, 780 (1992)).

Factors impacting the likelihood of confusion include: (1) the strength of the

plaintiff's mark, (2) the relatedness of the goods sold under the mark, (3) the similarity of

the marks, (4) evidence of actual confusion, (5) the marketing channels used, (6) the likely

degree of purchaser care, (7) the defendant's intent in selecting the mark, and (8) the

likelihood of expansion of the product lines. AutoZone, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 373 F.3d 786,

792-93 (6th Cir. 2004). “These factors imply no mathematical precision, but are simply a

guide to help determine whether confusion is likely.” Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home

Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1107 (6th Cir. 1991). “Each case presents its own

complex set of circumstances and not all of these factors may be particularly helpful in

any given case.” Id. “The ultimate question remains whether relevant consumers are

likely to believe that the products or services offered by the parties are affiliated in some

way.” Id.

In its Amended Complaint, Spectrum alleges that it has valid and enforceable

trademark rights to the Quick Fix mark and the Q-Clock logo. (Am. Compl., Doc. 6, □□□

18-19, 31.) It also alleges that FOLC intentionally used both the Quick Fix mark and the

Q-Clock logo without Spectrum’s authorization. (Id. at 22, 28.) Finally, Spectrum

alleges that FOLC’s unauthorized use of its trademarks creates a strong likelihood of

consumer confusion, especially because both Spectrum and FOLC sell synthetic urine

products. (Id. at J 15, 18, 23, 27.)

Deeming these allegations as admitted, the Court finds that Spectrum has

established that FOLC infringed upon the Quick Fix mark and the Q-Clock logo.

Therefore, Spectrum is entitled to an entry of default judgment on its trademark

infringement claim.

II. Cyberpiracy Claim

Spectrum's next claim relates to FOLC’s unauthorized use of the Quick Fix mark

in the QuickFix.Plus website domain name. Spectrum alleges that FOLC engaged in

cyberpiracy in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). (See Am. Compl., Doc. 6, 9] 53-57.)

Cyberpiracy, or “cybersquatting” as it is often called, “occurs when a person other than

the trademark holder registers the domain name of a well[-]known trademark and then

attempts to profit from this by either ransoming the domain name back to the trademark

holder or by using the domain name to divert business from the trademark holder to the

domain name holder.” DaimlerChrysler v. Net Inc., 388 F.3d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 2004). To

establish a cyberpiracy claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), a party must show that: “(1) it

has a valid trademark entitled to protection; (2) its mark is distinctive or famous; (3) the

defendant’s domain name is identical or confusingly similar to, or in the case of famous

marks, dilutive of, plaintiff's mark; and (4) defendant used, registered, or trafficked in the

domain name (5) with a bad faith intent to profit.” Id. (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Catalanotte,

342 F.3d 543, 546 (6th Cir. 2003)). To determine whether a party registered a domain name

with “a bad faith intent to profit,” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B) provides a non-exhaustive list

of nine factors that a court may consider.

Taking the relevant factors in turn, Spectrum first asserts that it has valid and

enforceable trademark rights to the Quick Fix mark. (Am. Compl., Doc. 6, 18-19, 31.)

Second, Spectrum’s federal registration of the Quick Fix mark entitles the mark to a

presumption of distinctiveness. AutoZone, 373 F.3d at 792-93. Third, the QuickFix.Plus

domain name is identical to the Quick Fix mark, as it consists of the mark with only the

“plus” domain suffix added, and the addition of domain suffix to a protected mark does

not factor into the Court’s analysis as to whether the domain name is identical or

confusingly similar to the mark. Diners Club Int'l Ltd. v. Privatedinersclubportal.co.uk, No.

24-CV-1559, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32168, at *12 (D. Ariz. Feb. 21, 2025). Fourth, FOLC

uses the Quick Fix mark in the QuickFix.Plus domain name to host a website that sells

synthetic urine. (Am. Compl., Doc. 6, 23-26.) Fifth and finally, FOLC acted with a bad

faith intent to profit because: (1) FOLC has no intellectual property rights in the Quick

Fix mark; (2) the domain name does not consist of FOLC’s legal or commonly used name;

(3) there is nothing to suggest that FOLC used the QuickFix.Plus domain to engage in the

bona fide offering of goods or services, and (4) FOLC used the QuickFix.Plus website in

an attempt to divert buyers of synthetic urine products away from Spectrum’s sales

platforms. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(1), (ID, (IV), (V).

Based on this analysis, the Court finds that Spectrum has established that FOLC

engaged in cyberpiracy in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). Therefore, Spectrum is entitled

to an entry of default judgment on its cyberpiracy claim.

Ili. Disgorgement Damages

Next, the Court will consider Spectrum’s request for disgorgement damages under

the Lanham Act. “[S]ubject to the principles of equity,” a plaintiff may recover

“defendant’s profits.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). “In assessing profits the plaintiff shall be

required to prove defendant's sales only; defendant must prove all elements of cost or

deduction claimed.” Id. Thus, a court must “assume that the defendant's profits equal his

gross sales unless he presents evidence of his costs.” Taylor v. Thomas, 624 F. App’x 322,

328 (6th Cir. 2015). “The Court may rely on affidavits submitted on the issue of damages.”

P&G Health & Longterm Disability Plan v. Molinary, No. 1:18-CV-283, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

13667, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 29, 2019).

Here, Spectrum need only show FOLC’s sales. To that end, it requests $202,351.61.

(Motion for Default Judgment, Doc. 23, Pg. ID 143; see also Motion for Default Judgment,

Doc. 26, Pg. ID 239-40; Ex. C-1, Doc. 26-2, Pg. ID 254.) FOLC has the burden to prove any

costs or deductions from its demonstrated sales figure, but it has not done so. Thus, the

Court awards Spectrum damages in the amount of $202,351.61.

IV. Permanent Injunction

Based on FOLC’s violation of the Lanham Act, Spectrum requests that this Court

enter a permanent injunction enjoining FOLC from further infringement of the Quick Fix

and Q-Clock marks. (Am. Compl., Doc. 6, Pg. ID 71.) Courts may issue permanent

injunctions “according to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may

deem reasonable” to prevent violations of the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a). Given that

Spectrum has shown success on the merits above, it must demonstrate the following: (1)

it has suffered irreparable injury; (2) there is no adequate remedy at law; (3) “that,

considering the balance of the hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy

in equity is warranted”; and (4) it is in the public’s interest to issue the injunction. Audi,

469 F.3d at 550. “The decision to grant or deny permanent injunctive relief is an act of

equitable discretion by the district court.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388,

391 (2006).

In trademark cases, a plaintiff establishes the first factor of the permanent

injunction analysis by showing that the defendant's use of the trademark is likely to cause

confusion. Cardinal Servs. v. Cardinal Staffing Sols., Inc., No. 2:19-CV-1743, 2019 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 208873, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 4, 2019) (citing Wynn Oil Co. v. American Way Serv.

Corp., 943 F.2d 595, 608 (6th Cir. 1991)). As outlined above, FOLC’s use of the Quick Fix

and Q-Clock marks is likely to cause consumer confusion. Thus, the first factor weighs in

favor of a permanent injunction.

As to the second factor, there is no adequate remedy at law if infringement could

potentially occur in the future. Microsoft Corp. v. McGee, 490 F. Supp. 2d 874, 883 (S.D.

Ohio 2007). The potential for future infringement by FOLC is evident here. Thus, the

second factor weighs in favor of a permanent injunction.

In analyzing the third factor, the Court weighs the balance of hardships between

the parties. A permanent injunction will result in no harm to FOLC because “an

injunction will merely require [FOLC] to comply with the .. . Lanham Act.” Microsoft

Corp., 490 F. Supp. 2d at 883. In contrast, Spectrum faces extensive hardship from FOLC’s

infringing activity, including a loss of the goodwill and reputation associated with the

Quick Fix and Q-Clock marks. Therefore, the third factor weighs in favor of a permanent

injunction.

Finally, this Court must determine whether a permanent injunction is in the public

interest. Enforcing trademarks and preventing consumer confusion inherently serve the

public interest. Cardinal Servs., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 208873, at *7 (citing Park’N Fly, Inc.

v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985)). Indeed, a permanent injunction in cases

involving the Lanham Act effectuates “two fundamental purposes of trademark law:

preventing consumer confusion and deception in the marketplace and protecting the

trademark holder’s property interest in the mark.” Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Amouri’s Grand

Foods, Inc., 453 F.3d 377, 383 (6th Cir. 2006). Because a permanent injunction here would

prevent consumer confusion and would protect Spectrum’s interest in its trademarks, the

fourth factor weighs in favor of a permanent injunction.

In light of the foregoing analysis, the Court finds a permanent injunction

restraining FOLC from its continued infringement of the Quick Fix and Q-Clock marks

appropriate.

V. Transfer of Infringing Domain Name

Spectrum requests that this Court order the transfer of the QuickFix.Plus website

from FOLC to Spectrum. (Am. Complaint, Doc. 6, Pg. ID 71.) “In any civil action involving

the registration, trafficking, or use of a domain name under [15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)], a court

may order the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of the domain

name to the owner of the mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(C). In consideration of the

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cyberpiracy analysis above, the Court orders the transfer of the QuickFix.Plus website

from FOLC to Spectrum.

VI. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Finally, Spectrum requests that the Court award attorneys’ fees in the amount of

$51,179.80 and costs in the amount of $405. (Motion for Default Judgment, Doc. 26, Pg.

ID 240-42.) The Lanham Act authorizes this Court to award reasonable attorneys’ fees

and costs in exceptional cases. 15 U.S.C. § 117(a). “Such an award is available in

trademark infringement cases where the acts of infringement can be characterized as

malicious, fraudulent, deliberate, or willful.” Microsoft Corp., 490 F. Supp. 2d at 883. A

defendant's “non-responsiveness and complete failure to address [its] case in Court

renders [a] case exceptional and merits an award of attorney’s fees.” Gillette Co. v. Save &

Disc. LLC, No. 1:15-CV-636, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90925, at *10 (S.D. Ohio July 13, 2016).

Here, Spectrum alleged in its Amended Complaint that FOLC’s infringing conduct

was willful and intentional. (Am. Compl., Doc. 6, J 38.) FOLC also failed to defend itself

against Spectrum's allegations and has not appeared in this matter. Given these facts,

Spectrum is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs.

A. Attorneys’ Fees

To determine an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees, courts look to the “lodestar”

amount, “which is calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended

on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d

531, 551 (6th Cir. 2008). “The key requirement for an award of attorney’s fees is that the

documentation offered in support of the hours charged must be of sufficient detail and

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probative value to enable the court to determine with a high degree of certainty that such

hours were actually and reasonably expended in the prosecution of the litigation.” Id. at

553. “[T]he district court is required to give a clear explanation” for its award calculation.

Moore v. Freeman, 355 F.3d 558, 566 (6th Cir. 2004).

1. Reasonable Hourly Rate

The Court has broad discretion in determining what constitutes a reasonable

hourly rate. Hudson v. Reno, 130 F.3d 1193, 1208 (6th Cir. 1997). The reasonable hourly

rate is generally the prevailing market rate in the relevant community. Blum v. Stenson,

465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984). The prevailing market rate is the rate that lawyers of comparable

skill and experience can reasonably expect to command in the venue of the court of

record. Geer v. Sundquist, 372 F.3d 784,791 (6th Cir. 2004). Courts may also look to other

markets, such as a national market, an area of specialization, or any other appropriate

market for a prevailing market rate. Louisville Black Police Officers Org. v. City of Louisville,

700 F.2d 268, 278 (6th Cir. 1983). Additionally, “[t]he Court may also consider an

attorney’s own normal billing rates to help calculate a reasonable fee.” MCP IP, LLC v.

.30-06 Outdoors, LLC, No. 2:21-CV-581, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59691, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Apr.

4, 2023).

Here, Spectrum seeks a rate of $526 per hour for a partner-level attorney with

twenty years of experience. (Motion for Default Judgment, Doc. 15, Pg. ID 241-42;

Cavanagh Decl., Doc. 26-1, 2, 11-13.) Spectrum’s counsel notes that his rate is

consistent with the rates of other Cincinnati intellectual property lawyers who have

comparable levels of experience. (Cavanagh Decl., Doc. 26-1, {J 14-15.) Spectrum's

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counsel also highlights that the $526 rate is over $100 less than the $635 hourly rate he

normally charges. (Motion for Default Judgment, Doc. 15, Pg. ID 242.) Further, this Court

has found similar rates for intellectual property attorneys with comparable experience to

be reasonable. See, e.g., RAK Trademarks, LLC v. Comfort Dental Mason, LLC, No. 1:22-CV-

137, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94248, at *4-5 (S.D. Ohio May 30, 2023) (finding a $600 rate

reasonable for a partner with 28 years of intellectual property experience and a $435 rate

reasonable for a partner with 19 years of experience). Accordingly, the Court finds

Spectrum's counsel’s hourly rate to be reasonable.

ii. Reasonable Number of Hours

When determining the reasonable number of hours worked, “the standard is

whether a reasonable attorney would have believed the work to be reasonably expended

in pursuit of success at the point in time when the work was performed.” Wooldridge v.

Marlene Indus. Corp., 898 F.2d 1169, 1177 (6th Cir. 1990). In addition, “the documentation

provided in support of the hours charged must be sufficiently detailed to enable the court

to determine, with a high degree of certainty, that such hours were actually and

reasonably expended.” Brown v. Halsted Fin. Servs., LLC, No. 3:12-CV-308, 2013 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 26144, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2013) (citing Bench Billboard Co. v. City of Toledo, 759

F. Supp. 2d 905, 913 (N.D Ohio 2010)). “Where the documentation is inadequate, a court

may reduce the award accordingly.” Id.

Here, Spectrum’s counsel billed 97.3 hours. (Cavanagh Decl., Doc. 26-1, { 16.)

Counsel submitted an itemized pro forma invoice detailing the time billed and tasks

performed. (Pro Forma Invoice, Doc. 26-3, Pg. ID 168.) The pro forma invoice details

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actions performed by counsel, such as drafting, editing, revising, and reviewing the

various documents that have come before this Court, as well as communicating with

opposing counsel to discuss settlement. (Id.) A reasonable attorney would have believed

that these hours needed to be reasonably expended in pursuit of default judgment related

to a case involving trademark infringement and cyberpiracy. Additionally, the pro forma

invoice provided in support of the hours expended is sufficiently detailed to support a

conclusion that these hours were actually and reasonably expended. (See id.) Accordingly,

the hours expended by Spectrum’s counsel are reasonable.

iii. |The Lodestar Amount

The lodestar method results in a finding that the rate sought and hours expended

by Spectrum’s counsel are reasonable. Accordingly, Spectrum is awarded a total of

$51,179.80 in attorneys’ fees.

B. Costs

Next, Spectrum seeks an award of costs in the amount of $405. (Motion for Default

Judgment, Doc. 15, Pg. ID 143.) However, “[c]osts are taxed against [a defendant] as a

matter of course fourteen days after [a plaintiff] files a notice of costs with the Clerk of

Court’s Office.” GS Holistic, LLC v. Mr. Puff Kenard LLC, No. 1:23-CV-709, 2025 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 176757, at *6 n.2 (S.D. Ohio Sep. 10, 2025) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1)); see also

S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 54.1. As such, the Court need not award costs at this time.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Spectrum’s Motion for Default Judgment (Docs. 23, 26)

is GRANTED IN PART. The Court hereby ORDERS that:

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1. Spectrum is AWARDED $202,351.61 in disgorgement damages under 15

U.S.C. § 1117(a);

2. Spectrum is AWARDED $51,179.80 in attorneys’ fees;

3. Spectrum’s request for costs is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE at this

time;

4. FOLC SHALL TRANSFER ownership and_ registration of the

<quickfix.plus> domain name to Spectrum;

5. FOLC and its officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and any

persons in active concert or participation with FOLC or those persons are

PERMANENTLY RESTRAINED AND ENJOINED from:

a. using the Quick Fix or Q-Clock marks, or anything confusingly

similar to those marks in commerce, including (without limitation)

on or in connection with websites, email addresses, domain names,

products, offerings of services or products, or any digital or print

advertising materials; and

b. otherwise infringing upon the Quick Fix and Q-Clock marks.

6. This matter is TERMINATED from the Court's docket.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

Hah WU

By:

JUDGE MATTHEW W. McFARLAND

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