Curry

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

ASHLEY CURRY,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:25-cv-467

v.

JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE

MAGISTRATE SILVIA BECK, et Magistrate Judge Litkovitz

al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Ashley Curry is a pro se litigant advancing what sounds like a serious claim.

She alleges that the government, specifically, Hamilton County Job and Family

Services (HCJFS), unlawfully took away her infant son. (Compl., Doc. 2, #20–22).

Defendants Magistrate Silvia Beck and Carissa Cook, each government employees,

allegedly participated in the process that wrongfully stripped Curry of custody. (Id.).

But Defendants have since moved to dismiss. (Doc. 4). And Curry, despite being

warned of the consequences of doing so, failed to respond. For the reasons below, the

Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion.

BACKGROUND1

On May 8, 2024, Curry gave birth to a healthy baby boy, T.R., at Bethesda

North Hospital. (Doc. 2, #20). After two days, social workers visited the hospital to

1 Because this matter is before the Court on Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court must

accept the well-pleaded allegations in the Complaint as true. Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate

Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). So while the Court relies on the Complaint’s

allegations to recount the case’s background, it reminds the reader that they are just that—

allegations.

ask Curry if she was homeless and about her history of mental illness. (Id.). On that

same day, HCJFS Child Services’ employee Carissa Cook also visited Curry in the

hospital to “ask a few questions.”2 (Id.). Hospital employees had apparently called

Defendant Cook, claiming that Curry was “neglecting feeding her newborn child” and

that Curry said that she “heard voices in the bathroom.” (Id.). Cook conversed with

Curry and “stated everything seemed fine.” (Id.). But Cook nonetheless asked if she

could go inspect Curry’s home, just to see where Curry and the child would be living.

(Id.). Curry provided her home address and Cook left the hospital to go visit it. (Id.).

The next day, Cook returned to the hospital and told Curry that “she looked at [her]

home, everything seemed great, but something didn’t seem right.” (Id.). Cook then

instructed Curry to cooperate with Child Protective Services (CPS) or the infant

would be removed from her custody. (Id.). In other words, Curry is alleging that Cook,

despite there being “no issue,” forced her to cooperate with CPS. (Id.).

Later that same day, Cook told Curry that T.R. needed to stay with a particular

distant relative. (Id. at #20–21). Further, to get her child back, Curry would need to

satisfy a case plan by doing the following: (1) get a note from a psychiatrist stating

her mental health condition, (2) demonstrate that she could get and maintain a job,

and (3) show that she could get and maintain housing. (Id. at #21). Curry responded

by contacting the FBI and police. (Id.). She complained to both about what she saw

as a kidnapping and abduction of her child. (Id.). But the police allowed Cook to take

2 The Complaint is unclear if Cook was the social worker who “harassed” Curry by asking if

she was homeless and about her history of mental illness, or if there were two separate visits

by government workers on that day.

the infant “through emergency custody” (although Cook does not say exactly what

she means by that phrase). (Id.). A few days later, Defendant Magistrate Silvia Beck

held an emergency custody hearing to see whether the child should be returned. (Id.).

Cook testified. (Id.). At the end of the hearing, Magistrate Beck ruled against Curry

and ordered T.R to remain in state custody. (Id. at #22). According to Curry, during

Cook’s testimony, Cook constantly referred to Curry’s race (white, blonde hair, brown

eyes). (Id. at #21). At one point, Cook yelled out to Magistrate Beck to “think about

it” and “look at [Curry]” before making her decision, which Curry contends was a

reference to her race. (Id. at #22). As of the filing of the Complaint, Curry’s child

remains in the custody of HCJFS Child Services. (Id.).

On June 20, 2025, over a year after losing custody of T.R., Curry initiated this

action, bringing suit in Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, (Doc. 1-3, #13),

(albeit with a complaint captioned with the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Ohio), (id. at #8). By way of relief, Curry asks for “immediate and

emergency custody of [T.R.],” that Defendants be fired and jailed, waiver of fees in

this case, $21 million in punitive damages, and a jury trial. (Doc. 2, #23). On July 8,

2025, Defendants, citing federal question jurisdiction, removed the matter to this

Court. (Doc. 1, #1).

Curry’s exact causes of action are a bit difficult to identify. She brings a claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleged deprivation of her rights, but declines to explain

exactly what rights, although she does cite to three sections of the Ohio criminal code

which criminalize kidnapping, abducting, and unlawful restraint, Ohio Revised Code

§§ 2905.01–3. (Doc. 2, #19–20). Defendants responded by filing a joint Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. 4). There, they argue that Curry fails to plausibly allege any claims,

and that in any event, both Cook and Magistrate Beck have various forms of

immunity to Curry’s suit. (Id.). Separately, while Defendants do not argue res

judicata as a defense, they highlight that this appears to be Curry’s second attempt

to bring a claim based on this set of facts. (Docs. 4-1, 4-2 (attaching complaint and

Report and Recommendations from the previous matter)). They also note that the

previous matter was dismissed with prejudice. (Order Adopting R. & R., Curry v. Fed.

Gov’t, No. 1:24-cv-299 (S.D. Ohio July 2, 2024), Doc. 7). As is the Court’s practice with

pro se litigants, the Clerk sent notice to Curry of her need to respond to the motion

or face potential dismissal. (See Doc. 5). But Curry nonetheless failed to oppose the

Motion to Dismiss.

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

a “complaint must present sufficient facts to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’” Robbins v. New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC, 854 F.3d 315, 319 (6th Cir.

2017) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In assessing plausibility, the

Court “construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Bassett,

528 F.3d at 430 (cleaned up).

A court analyzing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) generally must

confine its review to the pleadings. Armengau v. Cline, 7 F. App’x 336, 343 (6th Cir.

2001). That said, the Sixth Circuit has “taken a liberal view of what matters fall

within the pleadings for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6). If referred to in a complaint and

central to the claim, documents attached to a motion to dismiss form part of the

pleadings.” Id. at 344.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. The Motion to Dismiss is Unopposed.

At the outset, the Court notes that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is

unopposed. Defendants moved to dismiss on July 10, 2025. (Doc. 4). That means

Curry’s response was due August 4, 2025.3 See S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 7.2(a)(2); Fed. R. Civ.

P. 6(d). Curry, however, did not file one. True, she is proceeding pro se, so one could

perhaps argue she did not realize that the rules required a response by that date.

Layne v. Thouroughman, No. 1:23-cv-702, 2024 WL 3068872, at *3 (S.D. Ohio June

20, 2024). But the Clerk mailed notice of the Motion to Dismiss on July 21, 2025, and

that notice included an express warning that a failure to respond to the Motion to

Dismiss within twenty-one days could lead the Court to dismiss the case for failure

to prosecute. (Doc. 5). Six months have now passed since the Defendants filed their

Motion to Dismiss. Yet, despite the clear warning, Curry has still neglected to

respond.

3 Under Local Rule 7.2(a)(2), Curry had twenty-one days to respond. But Defendants served

their motion to dismiss on Curry by first class mail. (See Doc. 4, #33). So under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 6(d), Curry had three additional days to file a response, which fell on

August 3, 2025, a Sunday. Meaning, the deadline was the next day, August 4, 2025.

By failing to respond, Curry has “waived opposition to the motion,” Humphrey

v. U.S. Att’y Gen.’s Off., 279 F. App’x 328, 331 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Scott v. Tenn.,

878 F.2d 382, 1989 WL 72470, at *2 (6th Cir. 1989) (Table)). While the Court could

perhaps grant the Motion to Dismiss based on that alone, see Layne, 2024 WL

3068872, at *3–4, that would be a harsh sanction, see Schreiber v. Moe, 320 F. App’x

312, 317–18 (6th Cir. 2008). And so, especially considering Curry’s pro se status, the

Court will briefly review Defendants’ arguments.

B. The Court Grants the Motion to Dismiss as to All of Curry’s Claims.

Defendants begin their Motion to Dismiss by arguing that the Court should

dismiss Curry’s claims because her conclusory allegations fail to survive Rule

12(b)(6). (Doc. 4, #27). Defendants also argue that absolute immunity, state statutory

immunity, and federal qualified immunity shield Magistrate Beck and Cook from

Curry’s claims. (Id. at #28–32). The Court largely agrees. First, the Court dismisses

Curry’s claims under the three Ohio criminal statutes for failure to state a claim. See

infra Part B.1. Then, the Court addresses each Defendant’s immunity. See infra Part

B.2 (Magistrate Beck) and B.3 (Cook).

1. Curry’s Claims for Kidnapping, Abducting, and Unlawful

Restraint Fail as a Matter of Law.

As noted above, Curry’s claims are not easy to decipher. She asserts a claim

under § 1983 for “deprivation of rights” but does not state the rights at issue; at the

same time, she cites three Ohio criminal statutes she contends Defendants violated.

(Doc. 2, #19–20). So it is not entirely clear if she is alleging that the actionable

deprivation resulted from Defendants committing these crimes against her, or if

instead she means to advance claims under these criminal statutes in addition to a

claim under § 1983 based on some other (unalleged) right. The Court concludes it

need not get to the bottom of that quandary, though, as either approach fails. As to

the first, Curry cannot rely on an alleged state law violation as the basis for a § 1983

claim. Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995). As to the second, Curry

cannot directly assert a claim under a criminal statute, at least not without asserting

some other proper cause of action. Henderson v. Parin, No. 3:22-cv-228, 2023 WL

369954, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 24, 2023) (“Courts in Ohio have held that a plaintiff

cannot assert a claim predicated upon an alleged violation of a criminal statute.”)

(citing Biomedical Innovations, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 658 N.E.2d 1084, 1086 (Ohio

1995)); but see Jacobsen v. Kaforey, 75 N.E.3d 203, 204–05 (Ohio 2016) (holding that

Ohio Revised Code § 2307.60 independently authorizes civil actions under that

statute for damages caused by criminal violations, including violations of §§ 2905.01

and 2905.03). Accordingly, the Court (1) dismisses the § 1983 claim to the extent that

it relies on these three criminal statutes, and (2) dismisses Curry’s claims brought

under these Ohio criminal statutes, if she is indeed advancing such claims.

2. Magistrate Beck is Entitled to Absolute Immunity.

To the extent that her § 1983 claim is based on some other alleged violation of

her rights, it runs into additional shortcomings. To start, the only factual allegation

Curry makes as to Magistrate Beck is that Beck “ruled in Defendant, HCJFS Child

Services’ Carissa Cook’s favor and kept [her] child in … custody.” (Doc. 2, #22). Curry

claims that by doing so, Magistrate Beck “help[ed] commit a felony” and “took part in

the kidnapping, abducting[,] and unlawful[] restraint” of Curry’s child. (Id.). But

ruling in a suit is an official action that Magistrate Beck took as a judge. That poses

a problem for Curry. “Judicial immunity is a long-recognized common-law doctrine

shielding judges from collateral attacks challenging a judge's actions taken in her

official judicial capacity.” Morgan v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn., 63 F.4th

510, 518 (6th Cir. 2023) (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988)). “This

immunity is absolute: all of a judge’s actions taken in an official judicial capacity are

immune from suit.” Id. Because Curry does not allege any facts that allow the Court

to plausibly infer that Magistrate Beck acted outside her role as a judicial

decisionmaker, Magistrate Beck is immune from Curry’s claims. And while

Defendants argue that Magistrate Beck also enjoys various other types of immunity,

the Court declines to reach them because it is clear that she enjoys judicial immunity.

3. Cook is Immune for Her Statements as a Witness, and the

Remainder of Curry’s Claims Fail.

That leaves Cook. According to Curry, Cook conducted a child services

investigation shortly after Curry gave birth. (Doc. 2, #20). Although Curry does not

say exactly why, it appears that investigation led to the state assuming custody of

T.R. until Curry fulfilled a case plan. (Id. at #21). Two days later, Magistrate Beck

conducted “Court for Emergency Custody,” where Cook testified, and the judge ruled

against Curry. (Id. at #21–22). As that description makes clear, Cook took all of these

actions within the scope of her employment at HCJFS Child Services. As best as the

Court can tell, Curry’s allegations of improper conduct by Cook consist of the fact that

Cook investigated her home and “forced her to cooperate with CPS” despite there

being “no issue,” (id. at #20), and that Cook’s actions were motivated by race as

“Curry’s race (white, blonde hair, brown eyes) was constantly the topic of discussion

in the court room by … Cook,” (id. at #21).

At this point, Curry’s only potential remaining claim is the (vaguely asserted)

federal § 1983 claim against Cook. So, Ohio statutory immunity, of course, would not

apply.4 Two Bridges, LLC v. City of Youngstown, Ohio, No. 22-3506, 2023 WL

4030071, at *3 (6th Cir. June 15, 2023) (explaining that Ohio Revised Code

§ 2744.09(E)’s federal claims carve-out applies to § 1983 claims).

But other forms of immunity may be available, depending on the nature of

Curry’s claim. That is where the problem lies, though. The Court cannot identify

exactly what that claim might be. That said, applying a generous construction to the

Complaint (in light of Curry’s pro se status), the Court sees two possibilities. Neither

works.

First, Curry may be alleging that Cook violated her right to equal protection

under the Fourteenth Amendment, as Curry alleges that her race was a recurring

topic of discussion in the courtroom. (Doc. 2, #21–22). Certainly, Curry does possess

a constitutional right to not have the state take custody of her child based on her race.

But the only facts she alleges about Cook regarding Cook’s reliance on Curry’s race

are Cook’s statements during the courtroom proceedings. (Id.). And as Defendants

point out, “all witnesses … are absolutely immune from civil liability based on their

4 The Court declines to rule on the separate Ohio state law question of whether Ohio statutory

immunity applies to Curry’s claims for state criminal violations as those claims are dismissed

for other reasons. See supra Part B.1.

trial testimony in judicial proceedings.” Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351,

390 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 328 (1983)). So, Cook, as

a witness at the trial, is immune from liability for her testimony there.

That said, those statements perhaps could still serve as evidence that Cook

took other actions outside the courtroom because of some racial animus, and Cook

would not have testimonial immunity for those actions (if they happened). But Curry

offers no allegations or arguments on that front, and the courtroom statements that

she does allege are simply not enough for the Court to reasonably infer that Cook was

investigating or initiating proceedings against Curry based on her race. That Curry’s

race was a “topic of discussion” in the courtroom, or that Cook told the judge to “look

at [Curry],” are insufficient facts to plausibly allege that Cook violated Curry’s right

to equal protection (Doc. 2, #21–22). Nor, in any event, does Curry anywhere allege

that Cook’s investigation or the demand that Curry cooperate with CPS were

motivated by race. (Id. at #20–21). So, this claim fails.

Second, Curry may be attempting to bring a claim for deprivation of her due

process right to “care, custody, and control of [her] child[] … perhaps the oldest of the

fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.” Siefert v. Hamilton Cnty.,

951 F.3d 753, 762 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65

(2000) (plurality opinion)). Such a claim can be substantive or procedural. See id. at

762, 765. Start with the latter. From what the Court can tell, the state provided Curry

procedural due process. Cook conducted an investigation; CPS gave Curry a case

plan; and most importantly, Magistrate Beck conducted a judicial hearing for

custody. (Doc. 2, #21–22). See Eidson v. State of Tenn. Dep’t of Child.’s Servs., 510

F.3d 631, 635 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that a deprivation of physical custody requires

a hearing within a reasonable time). So, if that is the claim Curry is pleading, it fails.

Separately, a substantive due process claim requires—alongside a deprivation

of a liberty interest—government conduct that shocks the conscience. Siefert, 951

F.3d at 765–66. But all that Curry alleges about Cook is that she inspected Curry’s

home despite there being “no issue,” and “forced her to cooperate with CPS”—

presumably referring to the “case plan.” (Doc. 2, #20–21). This does not allow the

Court to infer that Cook acted “with deliberately indifferent conduct that shocks the

conscience” as Cook appeared to be “pursuing a legitimate governmental purpose.”

Siefert, 951 F.3d at 767. True, if those same actions were motivated by a desire to

racially discriminate against Curry, that would shock the conscience. But this runs

into the same problems as the equal protection claim above—the only facts

supporting that theory come from Cook’s alleged statements at the judicial

proceeding. Cook cannot be directly liable on those statements. And if the alleged

statements instead are meant to serve as evidence of underlying racial animus, they

fall short of plausibly alleging its existence.

And finally, because the Court has dismissed all of Curry’s claims, the Court

declines to wade into a qualified immunity analysis for either Defendant.

CONCLUSION

Again, the Court notes that Curry failed to respond to the Motion to Dismiss,

despite a warning from the Clerk. (See Doc. 5). Separately, her prior suit based on

largely the same facts—her loss of custody of T.R.—was dismissed with prejudice.®

The Court cautions Curry from bringing further actions when her claim has now been

adjudicated twice on the merits or risk more serious sanctions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.

That said, Curry’s alleged harm is a very serious one: the deprivation of custody of

her newborn child. But the better forum for Curry to seek relief, if those allegations

have any merit, is through the appeal of Magistrate Beck’s decision instead of

bringing new lawsuits. For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 4) and DISMISSES Curry’s Complaint (Doc. 2) WITH

PREJUDICE. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to enter judgment and to

TERMINATE this case on its docket.

SO ORDERED. he

January 20, 2026 — \

DATE DOUGLAS R. COLE \

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

5 Because the Defendants did not raise res judicata as a defense (beyond attaching the

previous case as exhibits), the Court did not address it substantively. But that prior dismissal

alone likely warranted dismissal.

12