Aguilar-Perez

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 ROSA AGUILAR-PEREZ, Case No.: 25cv3409-LL-DDL

12 Petitioner,

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

13 v. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

14 CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Warden of

Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al.,

15 [ECF No. 1]

Respondents.

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This case comes before the Court on Petitioner’s 28 U.S.C. § 2241 Petition. ECF

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No. 1. The Court already granted in part Petitioner’s ex parte motion for a temporary

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restraining order (“TRO”). ECF Nos. 3, 9. Specifically, on December 22, 2025, the Court

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ordered Respondents to arrange an individualized bond hearing for Petitioner before an

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immigration court within seven (7) days of that Order. ECF No. 9. On January 5, 2026, the

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parties filed a Joint Status Update, and informed the Court that the parties “presently

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disagree as to whether the habeas petition is resolved.” ECF No. 10 (hereinafter “Status

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Update”).

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Specifically, Petitioner’s position is:

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Petitioner has been detained for over two months following her arrest at a

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routine ICE check-in, despite having lived openly in the community for more

28 than a decade after being released by DHA on her own recognizance under 8

1 U.S.C. § 1226(a). From 2014 until her re-detention in October 2025,

Petitioner complied perfectly with ICE supervision, appeared at every

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required check-in, maintained stable employment and residence, supported

3 her family, and incurred no additional criminal history.

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After this Court granted limited TRO relief, an Immigration Judge conducted

5 a bond hearing. The Immigration Judge denied bond, relying exclusively on

Petitioner’s 2014 conviction as evidence of dangerousness. That conviction,

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however, is the same incident that first brought Petitioner to the attention of

7 immigration authorities more than ten years ago and was fully known to DHS

at the time it affirmatively released her on her own recognizance. The

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Immigration Judge did not identify any conduct, event, or circumstance

9 occurring after that release that would justify revocation of Petitioner’s

longstanding recognizance or a departure from DHS’s prior determination that

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she did not pose a danger or flight risk.

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Petitioner respectfully submits that the bond denial rests on a legal error: the

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absence of changed circumstances supports continuation of release, not

13 continued detention. The Immigration Judge’s finding that Petitioner failed to

demonstrate changed circumstances improperly inverted the governing

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standard, where DHS bore the burden of identifying new, individualized

15 justification for detention following a decade of compliant release.

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Petitioner therefore maintains that her continued detention remains unlawful

17 under the Due Process Clause and inconsistent with the statutory framework

governing § 1226(a) custody. The habeas petition and TRO motion remain

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pending, and Petitioner continues to seek release or other appropriate relief

19 consistent with the Court’s prior order and constitutional requirements.

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Id. at 1-2.

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Respondent’s position is as follows:

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[The] Court’s order has been complied with, Petitioner’s habeas petition is

23 resolved and that there are no further requests for relief that the Court can

resolve or grant in this matter. See 8 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (An individual may

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seek habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 if he is “in custody” under federal

25 authority “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1252; Pinson v. Carvajal, 69 F.4th 1059, 1072 (9th Cir.

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2023) (“[O]ur review of the history and purpose of habeas leads us to conclude

27 the relevant question is whether, based on the allegations in the petition,

release is legally required irrespective of the relief requested.”); Crawford v.

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1 Bell, 599 F.2d 890, 891 (9th Cir. 1979); Dep’t of Homeland Security v.

Thraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 117 (2020) (The writ of habeas corpus

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historically “provide[s] a means of contesting the lawfulness of restraint and

3 securing release.”). Petitioner was provided with an individualized bond

hearing pursuant to § 1226(a), although it did not result in the outcome

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Petitioner was hoping for. Should Petitioner wish to seek review of the IJ’s

5 bond determination, she should file an appeal with the Board of Immigration

Appeals.

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7 Id. The Court agrees with Respondents that should Petitioner wish to seek review of the

8 IJ’s bond determination, she should file an appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals.

9 However, Respondents fail to address that the Court has not yet ruled on the other issues

10 raised in Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus including her claim that her

11 detention violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and the Administrative

12 Procedures Act. Pet. ¶¶ 79-96. The Court will address these claims herein, and for the

13 reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART Petitioner’s Petition for Habeas

14 Corpus.

15 I. BACKGROUND

16 Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States at or near San

17 Ysidoro, California on or about January 1, 1992, when she was fourteen years old, without

18 being admitted or paroled. Pet. ¶ 19. She is now a 53-year old mother of three U.S. children,

19 and has resided continuously in the U.S. for more than thirty-five years. Id. She has worked

20 both in the family business and as a primary caregiver and homemaker for her three

21 children. Id. ¶¶ 21-23. She has been married to her husband, Miguel A. Perez Gonzalez, a

22 lawful permanent resident, who has a janitorial business. Id. ¶ 23.

23 In 2014, Petitioner was served with a Notice to Appear following a traffic-related

24 incident, which she alleges she accepted responsibility in the California-court system. Id.

25 ¶ 24. Although DHS executed an arrest warrant on December 10, 2014, the agency issued

26 a Notice of Custody Determination releasing her on her own recognizance, without bond.

27 Id. ¶ 25. Petitioner has had no other criminal or other incidents during her time in the U.S.

28 Id. ¶ 26. Also, for the past six years, Petitioner has maintained steady, long-term

1 employment with DMSD Foods, which allows her to contribute materially to her household

2 and to support her three children. Id. In October 2025, at her routine ICE check-in,

3 Petitioner was arrested and taken into custody where she remains today. Id. ¶¶ 27-28. She

4 received no warning or indication that she would be taken into custody. Id. Petitioner now

5 argues her detention without notice or an opportunity to be heard violates the Due Process

6 Clause and the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at ¶¶ 56-73.

7 II. LEGAL STANDARD

8 A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the

9 legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of

10 his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial

11 body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the

12 court of appeals. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales,

13 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat.

14 231, § 106(a)). However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising

15 independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention—

16 federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. Nadarajah v. Gonzales,

17 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez,

18 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal.

19 2018) (citations omitted).

20 III. DISCUSSION

21 A. Jurisdiction

22 Respondents argue that this Court lacks jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).

23 Response at 7-10. Section 1252(g) provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear

24 any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the

25 Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders

26 against any alien under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Respondents argue that

27 Petitioner’s claims arise from DHS’s decision to commence removal proceedings.

28 Response at 10. The Court disagrees.

1 Section 1252(g) should be read “narrowly” as to apply “only to three discrete actions

2 that the Attorney General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings,

3 adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” Ibarra-Perez v. United States, No. 24-631,

4 2025 WL 2461663, at *6 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2025) (quoting Reno v. American-Arab Anti-

5 Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 482, 487 (1999)). Section 1252(g) “does not

6 prohibit challenges to unlawful practices merely because they are in some fashion

7 connected to removal orders.” Id. at *7. Section 1252(g) does not bar due process claims.

8 Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1052–53 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that the petitioners’

9 objective was not to review the merits of their proceeding, but rather “to enforce their

10 constitutional rights to due process in the context of those proceedings”).

11 Section 1252(b)(9) provides that “[j]udicial review of all questions of law and fact,

12 including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising

13 from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United

14 States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under

15 this section.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (emphasis added). Respondents argue that the Court

16 lacks jurisdiction under § 1252(b)(9) because “[t]hese provisions divest district courts of

17 jurisdiction to review both direct and indirect challenges to removal orders, including

18 decisions to detain for purposes of removal or for proceedings.” Response at 9

19 (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. 294–95). Again, the Court disagrees.

20 Section 1252(b)(9) “has built-in limits, specifically, claims that are independent of

21 or collateral to the removal process do not fall within the scope” of § 1252(b)(9). Gonzalez

22 v. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 975 F.3d 788, 810 (9th Cir.

23 2020) (citing J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1032 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation

24 marks omitted)). “[C]laims challenging the legality of detention pursuant to an immigration

25 detainer are independent of the removal process.” Id.; see also Garcia v. Noem, 2025 WL

26 2549431, at *3–4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025); Nielson v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 402

27 (2019) (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 294) (finding § 1252(b)(9) did not strip the court of

28 jurisdiction because the petitioners were “not asking for review of an order of removal;

1 they [were] not challenging the decision to detain them in the first place or to seek removal

2 (as opposed to decision to deny them bond hearings); and they [were] not even challenging

3 any part of the process by which their removability w[ould] be determined”).

4 Here, as discussed above, Petitioner is not challenging the Department of Homeland

5 Security’s decision to commence removal proceedings or to adjudicate

6 removability. Petitioner is instead challenging the ICE’s abrupt re-detention “without

7 notice, explanation, and without identifying a single changed circumstance,” which she

8 alleges violates her due process rights and the Administrative Procedures Act as a

9 parolee. Pet. ¶¶ 2, 4, 5. Therefore, § 1252(b)(9) also does not strip the Court of jurisdiction.

10 B. Due Process

11 Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of her parole without notice or a

12 hearing violates the Due Process Clause. Pet. ¶¶ 27, 57, 79-85. The Court agrees.

13 The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life,

14 liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “[T]he Due

15 Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether

16 their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533

17 U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles

18 aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,

19 306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing before the

20 State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127

21 (1990). “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over whose

22 liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their

23 liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-5632-PCP, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July

24 25, 2025) (citations omitted). Although the initial decision to detain or release an

25 individual may be within the government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to

26 release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that

27 individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the

28 . . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)).

1 “Thus, even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending

2 removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody [he] has a protected

3 liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (citing

4 Romero v. Kaiser, No. 22-cv-20508, 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)).

5 Respondents originally filed a Response in opposition to the Petition on December

6 15, 2025, and then on December 19, 2025, Respondents filed a Supplemental Response

7 conceding that in light of Maldonado Bautista, Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. §

8 1226(a) and is entitled to a bond hearing. See ECF Nos. 7, 8. On December 22, 2025, the

9 Court granted in Part Petitioner’s Ex Parte Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, and

10 ordered Respondents to arrange an individualized bond hearing for Petitioner within seven

11 days of the Court’s Order. ECF No. 9. Based on the parties’ Joint Status Update, a bond

12 hearing was held pursuant to the Court’s Order on the TRO, but bond was denied. ECF No.

13 10. However, in now ruling herein on the Petition and the remaining claims for due process

14 and the Administrative Procedures Act, the Court finds that the relief Petitioner is entitled

15 to is not limited to a bond hearing. Prior to Petitioner being granted parole, she was

16 determined to not be a danger to the community or a flight risk and was released. Pet. ¶¶

17 39, 51. Petitioner has complied with all conditions of her release. Id. Petitioner has

18 maintained steady employment and developed community ties including three U.S. citizen

19 children and a legal permanent resident husband. Id. Accordingly, Petitioner has a

20 protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody. See, e.g., Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921,

21 at *4 (“[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after her initial apprehension reflected a

22 determination by the government that she was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the

23 community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining at liberty unless she no

24 longer meets those criteria.”); Noori v. LaRose, 2025 WL 2800149, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Oct.

25 1, 2025) (“Petitioner is not an ‘arriving’ noncitizen but one that has [been] present in our

26 country for over a year. This substantial amount of time indicates he is afforded the Fifth

27 Amendment’s guaranteed due process before removal.”); Matute v. Wofford, No. 25-cv-

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1 1206-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2817795, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2025) (finding petitioner

2 had a protected liberty interest in his release).

3 As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires

4 procedural protections before she can be deprived of that interest. See Matthews v.

5 Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally

6 sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Matthews factors.

7 See Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. Courts must consider: (1) “the private interest that will be

8 affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest

9 through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute

10 procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the [g]overnment’s interest, including the function

11 involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute

12 procedural requirement would entail.” Id.

13 The Court finds that all three factors support a finding that the government’s

14 revocation of Petitioner’s parole without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be

15 heard, denied Petitioner of her due process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has

16 a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to her parole. “Freedom

17 from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical

18 restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas, 533

19 U.S. at 690. Petitioner has an interest in remaining with her community, working, and

20 continuing to provide for her three U.S. citizen children. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 at

21 482 (“Subject to the conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free to

22 be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life.”).

23 Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as Petitioner’s

24 parole was revoked without providing her a reason for revocation or giving her an

25 opportunity to be heard. Pet. ¶¶ 39, 51. Since the initial determination that Petitioner

26 should be paroled because she posed no danger to the community and was not a flight risk,

27 there is no evidence that these findings have changed. See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F.

28 Supp. 3d 1168, 1760 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“Release reflects a determination by the

1 government that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.”).

2 Petitioner has no criminal record, has not been arrested or otherwise in criminal trouble,

3 has an established community, and is working in gainful employment. Pet. ¶¶ 21-23, 26.

4 “Once a noncitizen has been released, the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him

5 merely because he is subject to removal proceedings.” Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 1760.

6 “Rather, the federal agents must be able to present evidence of materially changed

7 circumstances—namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in fact dangerous or has become a

8 flight risk. . . .” Id. Respondents fail to address Petitioner’s Due Process argument in their

9 Response, and do not point to any material circumstances that have changed that would

10 warrant reconsideration of her parole. See generally Response.

11 Third, the government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning,

12 and a hearing is “low.” See Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *5; Matute, 2025 WL 2817795,

13 at *6; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (“If the

14 government wishes to re-arrest [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps

15 toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.”). Respondents fail

16 to point to any burdens on the government if it were to have provided proper notice,

17 reasoning, and a pre-deprivation hearing. See generally Response.

18 Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking her parole in

19 violation of the Due Process Clause, her detention is unlawful. See, e.g., Alegria Palma v.

20 Larose et al., No. 25-cv-1942 BJC (MMP), slip op. at 14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2025)

21 (granting a TRO based on a procedural due process challenge to a revocation of parole

22 without a pre-deprivation hearing); Navarro Sanchez v. LaRose, 2025 WL 2770629, at *5

23 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025) (granting a writ of habeas corpus releasing petitioner from

24 custody to the conditions of her preexisting parole on due process grounds).

25 C. Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)

26 Petitioner argues that Respondents’ conduct also violates the APA. Pet. ¶¶ 86-96.

27 The Court agrees.

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1 The APA requires courts to hold challenged final agency actions unlawful when the

2 actions are “arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance

3 with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Agency action is arbitrary and capricious when the

4 agency fails to “examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its

5 action including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice

6 made.’” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S.

7 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).

8 When an agency changes its policies, it also “must be cognizant that longstanding policies

9 may have engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account.” Dept. of

10 Homeland Security v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 591 U.S. 1, 30 (2020) (internal

11 quotations and citations omitted). A government agency terminating an alien’s status is

12 subject to review under the APA as a final agency action when the termination has lasting

13 consequences that would not be cured even if the agency reinstated status through its

14 internal processes. Jie Fang v. Dir. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 935 F.3d 172,183 (3rd

15 Cir. 2019); Doe v. Noem, 778 F.Supp.3d 1151, 1159 (W.D. Wash. April 17, 2025).

16 Here, given Respondent’s position that Petitioner is inadmissible and in removal

17 proceedings (ECF No. 7 at 2), their termination of her parole status is reviewable as a final

18 agency action that will have lasting incurable consequences. The record here shows that

19 before Petitioner was arrested and detained in October 2025, DHS did not articulate a

20 satisfactory explanation including a “rational connection between the facts found and

21 choice made” for the change to Petitioner’s status. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n., 463

22 U.S. at 43. In fact, Respondents do not state any reasons for the revocation of Petitioner’s

23 parole based on any individualized facts about her case in their Response at all. See

24 Response. Because Respondents revoked Petitioner’s parole and detained her without any

25 rational individualized fact-finding, Respondents acted arbitrarily and capriciously in

26 violation of the APA. See, e.g., Navarro Sanchez, 2025 WL 2770629, at *4 (finding

27 revocation of petitioner’s parole arbitrary and capricious because respondents did not state

28 any reasons for the revocation); Noori, 2025 WL 2800149, at *3 (“Petitioner’s parole was

| |}revoked without an individualized determination or provided reasoning, which violated the

2 || APA.”).

3 Respondents’ violation of the APA in their decision to revoke Petitioner’s parole

4 ||and detain her with no notice or reasoning constitutes adequate and independent grounds

5 || by which her confinement is unlawful. This Court also GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition on

6 || this basis.

7 IV. CONCLUSION

8 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART Petitioner’s Petition for Writ

9 Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1), and ORDERS Respondents to immediately release

10 || Petitioner from custody subject to the conditions of her preexisting parole. The Court

11 ||} ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner is entitled to notice of the

12 ||reasons for revocation of her parole and a hearing before a neutral decision maker to

13 ||determine whether detention is warranted. The government shall bear the burden of

14 || establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the

15 ||community or a risk of flight. The Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by

16 || January 16, 2026, confirming that Petitioner has been released.

17 || IT IS SO ORDERED.

18 Dated: January 13, 2026 NO

19 DE |

20 Honorable Linda Lopez

51 United States District Judge

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