REIMER

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MIGUEL REIMER,

Petitioner, Civil Action No. 25-13617 (MAS)

‘ OPINION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

SHIPP, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner Miguel Reimer’s amended motion to

vacate sentence brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (ECF No. 4), which also serves as his

response to this Court’s order directing him to show cause as to why his motion to vacate sentence

should not be dismissed as time barred. As Petitioner has filed his amended motion in accordance

with this Court’s prior Order (ECF No. 4), the Court is required by Rule 4 of the Rules Governing

Section 2255 Proceedings to preliminarily review Petitioner’s motion to vacate and “dismiss the

motion” if it “plainly appears from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior

proceedings that the moving party is not entitled to relief.” For the following reasons, Petitioner’s

motion is dismissed with prejudice as time barred and Petitioner is denied a certificate of

appealability.

1 BACKGROUND

In May 2022, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute

heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1). (See United States v. Reimer, Docket No.

20-730 at ECF Nos. 41-42.) In August 2022, Probation produced Petitioner’s final presentence

report, which recommended that Petitioner receive a career offender enhancement to his sentence

in light of Petitioner’s prior convictions for the manufacture and distribution of heroin in state

court. (Docket No. 20-730 at 7-12.) This resulted in a recommended sentencing range of between

151 and 188 months. Ud. at 20.) The Court thereafter sentenced Petitioner to a term of 110

months’ imprisonment on June 9, 2023. (Docket No. 20-730 at ECF Nos. 54-55.) Petitioner did

not appeal his sentence.

Over two years later, in early July 2025, Petitioner filed a motion to vacate sentence

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (ECF No. 1.) On September 3, 2025, the Court issued an order

which directed Petitioner to refile his petition on the form required by the local rules and to show

cause within forty-five days as to why his petition should not be dismissed with prejudice as time

barred. (ECF No. 3.) In his newly filed amended motion, Petitioner now contends that his motion

should be considered timely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(£)(4) because he did not discover the

basis for his claims—that Probation did not consider the categorical approach in reviewing

Petitioner’s career offender status—-until he performed further research long after his conviction.

(ECF No. 4.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A prisoner in federal custody may file a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 challenging

the validity of his sentence. Section 2255 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act

of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that

the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to

impose such a sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the

maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral

attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate,

set aside or correct the sentence.

28 U.S.C. § 2255. Unless the moving party claims a jurisdictional defect or a constitutional

violation, to be entitled to relief the moving party must show that an error of law or fact constitutes

“a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice, [or] an

omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.” United States v. Horsley,

599 F.2d 1265, 1268 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 429 (1962)), cert.

denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979); see also Morelli v. United States, 285 F. Supp. 2d 454, 458-59 (D.N.J.

2003).

Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, district courts are

required to screen all § 2255 motions and dismiss any motion if it “plainly appears from the motion,

any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving party is not entitled to

relief.” Pursuant to this rule, a district court is “authorized to dismiss summarily any habeas

petition that appears legally insufficient on its face.” McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856

(1994).

Uf. DISCUSSION

A. No hearing is needed to resolve Petitioner’s claim

A district court need not hold an evidentary hearing on a motion to vacate where “the

motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.”

28 U.S.C. § 2255(b); United States vy. Booth, 432 F.3d 542, 545-56 (3d Cir. 2005); United States

v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 41-42 (3d Cir. 1992). “Where the record, supplemented by the trial judge’s

personal knowledge, conclusively negates the factual predicates asserted by the petitioner or

indicate[s] that petitioner is not entitled to relief as a matter of law, no hearing is required.” Judge

v. United States, 119 F. Supp. 3d 270, 280 (D.N.J. 2015); see also Gov't of VI. v. Nicholas, 759

F.2d 1073, 1075 (3d Cir. 1985); see also United States v. Tuyen Quang Pham, 587 F. App’x 6, 8

(3d Cir. 2014); Booth, 432 F.3d at 546. As Petitioner’s motion to vacate sentence is clearly time

barred for the reasons expressed below, no hearing is needed in this matter.

B. Petitioner’s amended motion to vacate sentence is time barred

As this Court previously explained,

Petitioner’s current motion to vacate sentence appears to be

untimely filed. Motions to vacate sentence are subject to a one-year

statute of limitations which generally begins to run on the date when

the petitioner’s conviction becomes final, which occurs either upon

the denial of a petition of certiorari or upon the expiry of the

petitioner’s time to appeal if he does not file an appeal following the

entry of judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f); Dedd v,. United States,

545 U.S. 353, 357 (2005) (“In most cases, the operative date from

which the limitation period is measured will be... the date on which

the judgment of conviction becomes final”); Kapral v. United

States, 166 F. 3d 565, 577 (3d Cir. 1999). As Petitioner’s judgment

of conviction was entered on June 9, 2023, and he did not file an

appeal, his conviction became final fourteen days later when his

time to appeal expired, or on June 23, 2023. (See Docket No. 20-730

at ECF No. 55.) His current motion to vacate sentence was not filed

until two years later, on or about July 1, 2025, the date on which

Petitioner certifies he first mailed out his motion. (See ECF No. 1

at 4.) Thus, absent a basis for a later starting date for the statute of

limitations or a basis for the tolling of the statute, Petitioner’s motion

to vacate sentence is untimely on its face.

In his motion, Petitioner first invokes 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3)

for the proposition that he should be permitted a later starting date

for his limitations period based on the issuance of United States vy.

Nasir, 17 F.4th 459 (3d Cir. 2021), and several other circuit and

Supreme Court decisions on the categorical approach which predate

Nasir. Section 2255(4)(3), however, only provides for a later

starting date for the habeas limitations period where a right has

“been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” In such

cases, the limitations period will run from the date of recognition.

Nasir, however, was not a Supreme Court decision, and did not

recognize a new right, and instead merely recognized that the

guidelines did not include inchoate crimes in their definition of

controlled substance offenses. See 17 F.4th at 471-72. Nasir thus

does not support a later starting date for Petitioner’s claims, indeed,

it doesn’t actually cover the specific issue Petitioner is now raising

— that his New Jersey convictions were under a statute too broad to

be considered controlled substance offenses. That aside, even if

Nasir or any of the other cases Petitioner references did fit the

requirements of § 2255(1)(3), none would actually provide for a later

starting date for Petitioner because all of those cases were issued

before Petitioner’s judgment of conviction. Indeed, Petitioner

admits that his “sentencing counsel raised the issue at the original

hearing,” (ECF No. 1 at 3), and that he therefore should have been

aware of the issue, at the latest, at his sentencing in June 2023.

Section 2255(f)(3) thus does not provide any aid to the timeliness of

Petitioner’s motion.

Petitioner also suggests that he should be provided with

equitable tolling because he “was incarcerated and lacked access to

counsel or timely legal research tools.” (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Although

the § 2255 limitations period is subject to equitable tolling where the

facts of the matter so warrant, such tolling “is a remedy which

should be invoked ‘only sparingly.’” United States v. Bass, 268 F.

App’x 196, 199 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Midgley,

142 F.3d 174, 179 (3d Cir. 1998)). Tolling therefore only applies

where a petitioner shows “(1) that he faced ‘extraordinary

circumstances that stood in the way of timely filing,’ and (2) that he

exercised reasonable diligence.” Johnson, 590 F. App’x at 179

(quoting Pabon v. Mahanoy, 654 F.3d 385, 399 (Gd Cir. 2011)).

Excusable neglect is insufficient to establish a basis for equitable

tolling. United States v. Thomas, 713 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 2013).

As Petitioner has no right to counsel in a habeas proceeding,

that he lacked access to counsel is not an extraordinary circumstance

warranting tolling. Likewise, that Petitioner was incarcerated — the

expected outcome of a felony conviction — and thus did not have

free reign to conduct legal research at his leisure, is not an

extraordinary circumstance warranting tolling of the habeas

limitations period. Likewise, Petitioner has made no effort to show

that he was in any way diligent over the last two years, and thus

would not be entitled to tolling in any event. Petitioner has thus not

shown a basis for tolling in his motion, and his motion thus appears

well and truly time barred.

(ECF No. 3 at 1-4.)

In his amended Petition, Petitioner acknowledges that Nasir does not provide a valid basis

for finding his petition timely. Instead of pursuing his § 2255(f)(3) argument further, Petitioner

presents an alternative argument: that his claim should be considered timely because he did not

discover the basis for his categorical approach claim until relatively recently after he performed

further research. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(£)(4), a motion to vacate sentence will be provided

a later starting date for the statute of limitations where the petitioner can show that the basis for

his claim could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence. Where

such a showing is made, the statute of limitations will run from “the date on which the facts

supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.” Jd; see also United States v. Johnson, 590 F. App’x 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2014). The

statute would thus run from the date when the petitioner should have discovered the facts which

underly his claim had he been acting with reasonable diligence. Johnson, 590 F. App’x at 179.

Section 2255(f)(4) is concerned with the discovery of the relevant facts, not the legal consequences

or arguments which apply those facts. See Cox v. United States, No. 22-5112, 2024 WL 5198917

at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 13, 2024). New judicial decisions or interpretations do not qualify as “facts” to

be discovered under the statute. Jd.

Here, Petitioner asserts that he did not discover the alleged issue with the presentence report

and his sentencing until well after sentencing when he did further /egal research regarding his

career offender enhancement. Such legal research is largely irrelevant to § 2255(f)(4). The alleged

factual fault in Petitioner’s claim is that the Probation Office, and thereafter this Court, did not

perform a full and on the record categorical consideration of Petitioner’s prior convictions to

determine if they were overbroad prior to finding that Petitioner qualified for a career offender

enhancement. The alleged facts underlying this claim were clear from the record of Petitioner’s

Pre-Sentence Report and sentencing at the time they were issued — August 2022 for the PSR, and

June 2023 for the sentencing, both of which fall during time periods when Petitioner was

represented by counsel. A criminal defendant acting with reasonable diligence — especially one

who was represented — could have discovered these alleged deficiencies by the time of Petitioner’s

sentencing, or certainly shortly thereafter within the time to file an appeal, and could have raised

the alleged faults on direct appeal.' Thus, even if the Court were to consider § 2255(f)(4),

Petitioner’s one-year limitations period still began to run in June 2023, and expired a year later in

June 2024, more than a year before Petitioner filed his motion to vacate sentence in this matter.

Absent equitable tolling, Petitioner’s amended motion to vacate sentence remains clearly time

barred.

In his amended motion, Petitioner argues that equitable tolling is appropriate because

Petitioner was incarcerated, “lacked consistent access to legal materials,” and lacked counsel. As

the Court previously explained to Petitioner, he has no right to counsel in a habeas proceeding,

and the fact of his incarceration is not an extraordinary circumstance warranting tolling. That

Petitioner did not have constant access to legal materials and research, or that he was occasionally

without such access is also not an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.

Even if Petitioner had shown an extraordinary circumstance, he would still not be entitled

to equitable tolling because he has completely failed to show that he acted with any form of

reasonable diligence. By his own admission, Petitioner did not begin looking into his sentence

and the issues in question until some time “in 2024-2025.” (ECF No. 4 at 3.) Indeed, Petitioner

does not even claim to have “acted diligently” until “discovering [the issues raised in his motion]

in 2025.” (Ud. at 4.) Petitioner does not detail any actions he took to discover his claims in a timely

fashion. Petitioner also does not elaborate on how he acted diligently when he did not begin to

look into his conviction until at the earliest 2024, more than six months after his conviction, and

did not take any concrete steps until he filed his initial motion to vacate sentence in July 2025,

more than two years after his conviction. Petitioner has thus failed to show that he acted with

' As Petitioner admits (see ECF No. 4-4 at 13), his sentencing counsel did object to the career

offender designation, suggesting that Petitioner and his counsel were aware of their ability to

challenge the designation, and little if any further factual information is required for Petitioner’s

current claims.

reasonable diligence, and he is not entitled to equitable tolling. Petitioner’s amended motion to

vacate is clearly time barred and is dismissed with prejudice as such.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), the petitioner in a § 2255 proceeding may not appeal from

the final order in that proceeding unless he makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” “A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason

could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could

conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-

El y. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003) (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)).

Because Petitioner’s amended motion to vacate sentence is clearly time barred, Petitioner has

failed to make a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right. This Court therefore

denies Petitioner a certificate of appealability.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner’s amended motion to vacate sentence (ECF No.

4) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as time barred, and Petitioner is DENIED a certificate

of appealability. An appropriate order follows.

s/ Michael A. Shipp

MICHAEL A. SHIPP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: January 20, 2026