TALBERT

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ERIE DIVISION

)

CHARLES TALBERT, 1:25-CV-00084-RAL

Plaintiff Chicf United States Magistrate Judge

vs. OPINION ON DEFENDANTS’

JOSH SHAPIRO, et al., MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants ECF NO. 32

)

I, Introduction

Plaintiff Charles Talbert, an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania

Department of Corrections (DOC), initiated this pro se civil rights action seeking

monetary and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his Amended

Complaint — the currently operative pleading — Talbert accuses Pennsylvania

Governor Josh Shapiro and DOC Secretary Laurel Harry of mismanaging federal

funds and taxpayer dollars by failing to use those funds to supply adequate services

and comfortable conditions to Pennsylvania inmates. ECF No. 12. Talbert does not

identify any particularized injury stemming from his allegations.

Presently pending is a motion to dismiss filed by Shapiro and Harry. ECF No.

32. Talbert, in response, requests leave to file a second amended pleading. ECF No.

36. This matter is ripe for adjudication.!

II. Factual Background

As Defendants accurately note, Talbert’s pleading “stems not from any

identifiable particularized injury, but rather appears to be a general complaint

against the Governor of the Commonwealth and the Secretary of the Department of

Corrections for unspecified conditions of his confinement.” ECF No. 32 at p. 1.

Talbert alleges that, for the fiscal years 2023-2025, the DOC had an operating budget

of $2.9 billion dollars — approximately $183.00 per inmate per day. ECF No. 12 5.

He maintains that Shapiro and Harry, as the officials exercising budgetary authority

over these funds, have “willfully and unlawfully converted [those funds] for the

Defendants and third parties benefit while only providing Plaintiff inadequate and

unhealthy meals; inadequate and substandard healthcare; and indefinite placement

in solitary confinement without any programming or academic and vocational

training.” Id. § 16.

Talbert asserts four causes of action. He first accuses Defendants of violating

the Eighth Amendment because, “as a proximate result of Defendants’

mismanagement of Plaintiff's worth of $183.00 per day,” he was “isolated indefinitely

in solitary confinement” and denied adequate medical and mental health care. ECF

| The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all

proceedings in this case, including the entry of final judgment, as authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 636.

No. 12 § 31. His second claim — titled “Fourth Amendment Bodily Privacy Right” —

alleges that Defendants’ refusal to spend more money on food services forced him to

“consume food that he doesn’t want to consume, thus, becoming subjected to an

unreasonable intrusion of unwanted food into his body.” Id. § 33. Count three

attempts to state a due process claim based on a perceived liberty and property

interest in “his $183.00 per day.” Id. §{§ 35-36. Finally, he asserts a Sherman

Antitrust Act claim based on Defendants’ decision to sign exclusive contracts with

outside entities to provide healthcare and food services to Pennsylvania inmates. Id.

{{ 37-44. Notably, Talbert does not connect these allegations to any dates, times,

specific incidents, or particularized injuries.

III. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests

the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (8d Cir.

1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether the

plaintiff will be likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present

factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A.

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)). See also

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). A complaint should only be dismissed

pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional 12

(b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). In making this

determination, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the

complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. U. S. Express

Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002).

While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a

motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a

court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the

facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The

Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 148 (8d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch.

Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions

disguised as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan, 478 U.S.

at 286). See also McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (8d Cir.

2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in

a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”).

Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has

articulated the following three-step approach:

First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must

plead to state a claim.” Second, the court should identify _

allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are

not entitled to the assumption of truth.’ Finally, ‘where there

are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to

an entitlement for relief’?

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v.

Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (8d Cir. 2010)). This determination is “a context-

specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

Finally, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the allegations in the complaint

must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read a

pro se litigant’s pleadings to state a valid claim upon which relief could be granted, it

should do so despite the litigant’s failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of

legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading

requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel.

Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (petition prepared by a

prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read “with a measure of tolerance”).

IV. Analysis

Talbert’s claims must be dismissed for several reasons. Initially, he has failed

to identify any particularized injury. His broad allegation that Defendants

mismanaged the DOC’s budget to the detriment of all Pennsylvania inmates is

insufficient to state a claim for relief. See, e.g., Arrington v. Shouppe, 2021 WL

12314222, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 2021) (“Plaintiff must state as specifically as

possible the actual injury suffered from the action of the defendants that resulted in

the alleged civil rights violation.”); Calipo v. Wolf, 2019 WL 6879570, at *11 (W.D.

Pa. Nov. 15, 2019) (noting that a plaintiff cannot assert a claim for relief based on

injuries suffered by “the prison population at large”).

Second, Talbert has failed to allege the personal involvement of either

Defendant. To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff “must show that each and every

defendant was ‘personal[ly] involve[d]’ in depriving him of his rights.” Kirk v. Roan,

2006 WL 2645154, at *3 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (quoting Evancho v. Fischer, 423 F.3d 347,

353 (3d Cir. 2006)). This means that each defendant must have played an

“affirmative part” in the complained-of misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“In a §

1988 suit ... [a]bsent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title

notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”); Oliver v. Beard, 358

Fed. Appx. 297, 300 (3d Cir. 2009). In the absence of specific allegations that a

defendant played a role in depriving the plaintiff of a constitutional right, dismissal

is appropriate. See, e.g., Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776, 781-82 (W.D. Pa. 2013)

(dismissing claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because the plaintiffs had failed to set

forth sufficient facts to establish that certain defendants had played an affirmative

part in the alleged Eighth Amendment violation).

These principles apply with equal force where the defendants are supervising

prison officials. See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998)

(noting that liability for supervisory officials must still be based on “personal

involvement in the alleged wrongs”); Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (8d Cir.

2005) (“{Lhiability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat

superior.”). Although a supervisor cannot encourage constitutional violations, “a

supervising public official has [no] affirmative constitutional duty to supervise and

discipline so as to prevent violations of constitutional rights by his or her

subordinates.” Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 183 (3d Cir. 1986); Brown v.

Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1120 (3d Cir. 1990). Rather, a supervisor-defendant may

only be liable for unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates if the supervisor

either: (1) with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and

maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional

harm; or (2) participated in violating the plaintiffs rights, directed others to violate

them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the

subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct. A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile

Det. Ctr., 8372 F.3d 572, 586 (38d Cir. 2004).

In the instant case, Talbert alleges only that Shapiro and Harry failed to utilize

the DOC’s budget for the maximum benefit of Pennsylvania inmates. There is

nothing to suggest that Shapiro or Harry played any direct role in an injury sustained

by Talbert or any other inmate. As such, it is abundantly clear that Talbert is

attempting to hold these Defendants responsible for hypothetical injuries based

entirely upon their supervisory role in the Commonwealth and its prison system.

This type of averment is insufficient to establish personal involvement in the

deprivation of a constitutional right. See, e.g., Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.

Finally, the Court notes that Talbert has already challenged many of the

policies at issue here in numerous other lawsuits. See, e.g., Talbert v. Pennsylvania,

2025 WL 984394 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2025) (alleging that the DOC confines inmates

with mental health conditions in long-term solitary confinement rather than provide

mental health treatment); Talbert v. Department of Corrections, 2023 WL 4873643

(E.D. Pa. July 31, 2023) (challenging, inter alia, adequacy of prison diet); Talbert v.

Biden, No. 1:23-cv-00260 (W.D. Pa. 2028) (asserting claims based on allegedly

inadequate medical care, excessive confinement in solitary housing, sexual

harassment, retaliation, and religious discrimination). The instant case appears to

be nothing more than a quixotic attempt to impute liability to high-ranking state

officials for those same grievances under a frivolous “mismanagement of funds”

theory. The Court has already twice rejected a similar legal theory from this same

plaintiff. See Talbert v. Biden, 2024 WL 3445749, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2024)

(rejecting claims against Shapiro and other Commonwealth officials and agencies

based on allegation that they “received federal financial assistance for their program

and activities, to which they have failed to carry out, to which caused, and still causes,

the Plaintiff detriment to his health, safety, and general well-being.”); Talbert v.

Irwin, 2025 WL 863382, at *3 n. 9 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2025) (same). His latest attempt

fares no better. .

V. Leave to amend

In response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Talbert filed a motion for leave

to amend his pleading and submitted a proposed Second Amended Complaint. That

document adds only two additional facts: that Shapiro declined assistance after

Talbert sent him a complaint letter on May 8, 2024, and that the DOC operates only

one prison — SCI-Waymart — with a dedicated mental health unit. ECF No. 36-1

15. As with his other pleadings, Talbert alleges that this represents a misuse of DOC

funds. Id. at §§ 5-6. Neither of these additional facts is enough to cure the

deficiencies outlined above. .

The Third Circuit has instructed that if a civil rights complaint is vulnerable

to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the Court should permit a curative

amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson uv.

Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). However, the court “need not

provide endless opportunities for amendment, especially where such opportunity

already has been enjoyed.” Baker v. Moon Area Sch. Dist., 2018 WL 40571719, at *8

(W.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2018) (quoting Taylor v. Pilewski, 2008 WL 4861446, at *3 (W.D.

Pa. Nov. 7, 2008)). As outlined above, Talbert has already had two opportunities to

amend his complaint. He has failed, on each occasion, to state a cognizable injury or

cure the defects in his prior pleadings. Further leave to amend would plainly be

futile.

VI. Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ motion to dismiss [ECF No. 32] will

be granted and Talbert’s motion for leave to amend [ECF No. 36] will be denied. An

appropriate order will follow.

Dated this 29t day of January, 2026.

BY THE COURT:

Chief United States Magistrate Judge