The opinion
Filed 1/30/26 Tarkington v. Cal. Victim Compensation Bd. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
CANELIA TARKINGTON et al., B339185
Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22STCP03783)
v.
CALIFORNIA VICTIM
COMPENSATION BOARD,
Defendant and Respondent;
STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
Real Party in Interest and
Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Stephen I. Goorvitch, and Mitchell Beckloff,
Judges. Affirmed.
Law Office of Tony Su and Tony Su for Plaintiffs and
Appellants Canelia Tarkington and LaMont Tarkington
(Deceased).
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Iveta Ovsepyan, Assistant
Attorney General, Catherine Woodbridge, Molly S. Murphy,
Clair Leonard and Michael Gasbarro, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Defendant and Respondent California Victim Compensation
Board.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant
Attorney General, Kathryn L. Althizer and Dina Petrushenko,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Real Party in Interest and
Respondent State of California.
___________________________________
LaMont Tarkington spent over 12 years in state prison
following convictions for robbery. The Court of Appeal reversed
those convictions on a writ of habeas corpus and, during
retrial, the trial court dismissed all charges for failure to
timely prosecute. Tarkington applied to respondent California
Victim Compensation Board (the Board) seeking Penal Code
section 49001 compensation for his time in custody. The Board
denied the application. Tarkington (now deceased) and his
surviving widow Canelia Tarkington2 filed a petition for
1 Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent statutory
references are to the Penal Code.
2 We use the surname “Tarkington” to refer to LaMont
Tarkington. We refer to Canelia Tarkington by her full name,
and to both LaMont Tarkington and Canelia Tarkington
collectively as “appellants.”
2
administrative writ of mandamus challenging the Board’s
decision. They now appeal the court’s denial of that petition.
We are unpersuaded by appellants’ argument that the
Board applied an incorrect burden of proof. Consistent with the
applicable version of section 4900, before denying Tarkington’s
application, the Board required the Attorney General of the State
of California (the AG) to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that Tarkington had committed the robbery. Substantial
evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that the AG met this
burden. We also reject Tarkington’s assertion that the Board
failed to accept findings from the habeas proceedings that
section 4903 deems binding.
Accordingly, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
A. Trial
In 2007, the People charged Tarkington and his
codefendant, Darris Allen, with robbing a Bank of America
branch located in a grocery store in Palmdale.
1. Prosecution Evidence at Trial
During the jury trial that followed, witnesses testified
that around 10:00 a.m. on December 14, 2005, three masked men
entered the bank. One man’s mask was a nylon stocking covering
his face; all three robbers wore gloves. Two of the men jumped
over the counter and took money from the tellers’ drawers. The
third robber remained in the lobby. One of the robbers used a
walkie-talkie. The robbers took approximately $12,223 in bills
and coins. Some of the bills contained “bank dye packs” that
explode and spray red dye.
3
At approximately 9:00 p.m., following a routine traffic
stop, sheriff ’s department deputies detained Tarkington and
Allen approximately 60 to 70 miles from the bank. Allen was
in the driver’s seat and Tarkington in the front passenger seat.
Tarkington gave deputies a driver’s license with a false name.
The deputies searched the vehicle in the dark using flashlights
and found a bag containing approximately $3,138 in bills that
were moist, red-stained, and smelled like bleach. Inside a jacket
in the backseat, deputies found additional red-stained money
that smelled like bleach. Serial numbers on bills found in
Tarkington’s vehicle matched those on the money stolen from the
bank. Allen initially told the deputies he obtained the money by
selling a stolen car; soon thereafter, Allen told them he obtained
the money by selling marijuana. During subsequent interviews,
he told law enforcement Tarkington had given him the money
and instructed him to lie and say it was from selling a stolen
car. Deputies retrieved $201 in red-stained bills that smelled
like bleach from Tarkington’s front pants pocket. Tarkington told
police Allen had given him this money in exchange for a ride.
While taking inventory of Tarkington’s vehicle at the police
impound yard, Detective Lauren Brown found a “nylon stocking
cap tied off at the top” containing about $59 in red-stained
coins, a red-stained shirt and towel, a blue beanie, and photos
of Tarkington “making gang signs.” Forensic testing identified
Allen’s and other individuals’ DNA on the stocking. Allen’s
fingerprints were found on the white Ford in which the robbers
fled.
At both the preliminary hearing and trial, bank teller
Christina Rissling described the robber in the lobby as a light-
skinned black male wearing a dark-colored beanie. She identified
4
Allen as someone in the courtroom consistent with this
description. She described one of the robbers who jumped over
the counter and removed money from her drawer as a darker
skinned black man who was taller and slimmer than the man
in the lobby. She identified Tarkington as someone in the
courtroom consistent with this description. Another teller,
Yessenia Bahena, described the two robbers who jumped over
the counter as black men with dark skin. Tarkington had a dark
complexion, was 5 feet 11 inches tall, and weighed approximately
200 pounds at the time of the robbery.
The trial court admitted evidence of Tarkington’s 1997
conviction for robbing a different Bank of America branch
in Southern California, during which armed robbers used
walkie-talkies and jumped over the counter.
Detective Brown testified that when a dye pack explodes,
it releases both red dye and pepper spray. During his testimony,
while handling the shirt and towel retrieved from Tarkington’s
car, Brown described a strong pepper spray odor emitting from
them. The next day, the judge commented that he “was affected
by” the strong odor as well.
2. Defense Evidence
A defense witness testified that at around 10:30–10:45 a.m.
on the morning of the robbery he saw Tarkington at a recreation
center. It takes at least 75 minutes to drive from the center to
the bank.
Allen testified that he obtained the money found in
Tarkington’s vehicle from selling a stolen car, and that he gave
Tarkington the $201 found in Tarkington’s pants pocket as
payment for Tarkington giving him a ride.
5
3. Judgment and Appeal
The jury convicted Tarkington of robbery and commercial
burglary. The Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions,
concluding that although the trial court erred in permitting
evidence of Tarkington’s prior robbery conviction and gang
affiliation, these errors were not prejudicial.3
B. Habeas Proceedings
In 2017, the Court of Appeal granted Tarkington’s habeas
petition on the ground that his trial counsel had provided
ineffective assistance.4
1. Evidence in Habeas Proceedings
a. Trial counsel’s testimony
During the habeas hearing in the trial court, Tarkington’s
trial counsel testified that she did not have the red-stained shirt
and towel tested for MAAQ, the chemical present in bank dye.
Tarkington told her these items were in a pile of other clothes
in the back of the vehicle and that the stains may have been
3 The court did, however, dismiss the firearm and gang
enhancements.
4 This was Tarkington’s second habeas petition.
Tarkington filed his first petition with the superior court in
2015, arguing trial counsel’s failure to obtain cell phone records
to support his alibi constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
The court denied the petition after hearing. Evidence presented
during the hearing established the red-stained shirt and
towel had never been tested for bank dye. Tarkington filed a
supplemental habeas petition with the Court of Appeal, this time
arguing counsel’s failure to have these items tested constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel.
6
Gatorade. Counsel testified that she “did not smell an
overwhelming odor on [the items] when she handled [them]
during closing argument, but she acknowledged [they] were not
odorless.”
At the superior court hearing, trial counsel testified that
after she could not corroborate the alibi Tarkington first provided
her, Tarkington offered a different alibi, which she presented
on his behalf at trial. Tarkington admitted to her that, the
day before the robbery, he gave Allen a ride to the grocery store
where the robbery took place, and Allen went inside and bought
nylon stockings. Tarkington dissuaded her from obtaining his
cell phone records because he thought they might incriminate
him.
b. Tarkington’s testimony and phone
records
At that same hearing, Tarkington denied much of his trial
counsel’s testimony. He questioned the accuracy of cell phone
records reflecting that Tarkington and Allen were in increasingly
frequent contact leading up to the time of the robbery, and that
neither made any calls during the robbery itself. He maintained
that location information from his cell phone records, had it
been available, would have supported the alibi he presented
at trial. He attributed the stains on the white towel and shirt to
cranberry juice. He claimed he gave police a false name because
he was on federal probation.
c. Federal Bureau of Investigation
evidence
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (the FBI) as well
as the Los Angeles County Sheriff ’s Department (sheriff ’s
7
department) investigated the robbery. Neither agency made
witness statements from the FBI’s investigation available to
Tarkington until the habeas proceedings. In these statements,
admitted into evidence at the habeas hearing, bank tellers’
descriptions of the robbers were inconsistent with Tarkington’s
appearance in some respects. Teller Yolanda Moore said the
robber who took money from her and Rissling’s drawers was
a black male with a dark complexion, like Tarkington’s, but
that he was approximately 5 feet 5 inches tall and weighed
approximately 150 pounds with a medium build. Tarkington,
however, stood “about 5 feet 11 inches tall,” “[did] not have a
medium build,” and “weigh[ed] about 200 pounds” at the time
of the robbery. Teller Bahena reported that one of the robbers
who jumped over the counter had a dark complexion, but was
5 feet 8 inches to 5 feet 9 inches tall with a medium to thin build,
weighing approximately 170 pounds.5 Also, Rissling reported
that the robbers who jumped over the counter were black men
of medium build and complexion, approximately 5 feet 9 inches
to 5 feet 10 inches tall, weighing 170 to 180 pounds.
The FBI agent in charge of investigating the robbery
testified that “witnesses’ descriptions can differ at bank robberies
and often vary from reality due to the witnesses’ perception . . .
and the stress of the situation.”
d. Forensic expert testimony
Both the People and Tarkington commissioned expert
forensic testing of the red-stained shirt and towel. The People’s
5 She did not specifically recall the other two men’s
appearance, except that they were black men who looked similar
to the one she identified.
8
forensic expert testified that, although some of the currency
found in the vehicle was exposed to MAAQ, he did not find
MAAQ on the shirt or towel. He further testified that washing
fabric with water or bleach can remove any MAAQ.
Tarkington’s expert likewise concluded there was no MAAQ
on the towel and shirt. He acknowledged he had not attempted
to ascertain whether the currency may have been washed to
remove any MAAQ.
2. Decision Granting Habeas Petition
(2017 Habeas Decision)
The Court of Appeal granted the supplemental petition
on the ground that Tarkington’s trial counsel had provided
ineffective assistance by failing to have the shirt and towel tested
for MAAQ. Given the “paucity of evidence” against Tarkington,
because such testing could have undermined Brown’s “greatly
exaggerated” testimony regarding the smell of pepper spray,
trial counsel’s representation was ineffective and prejudicial.
The court, however, did not conclude Tarkington was innocent.
It remanded for a new trial at the district attorney’s election.
C. Retrial and Dismissal
On remand, the district attorney elected to retry
Tarkington. At the retrial, the court found that, in violation
of a court order, the sheriff ’s department had failed to preserve
three cell phones, transcripts of 911 calls, sheriff ’s department
radio transmissions, three disposable cameras, and investigating
detectives’ “case file.” The court approved a jury instruction
permitting the jury to assume the missing evidence would have
favored Tarkington. The court also approved an instruction
requiring the jury to “reject” the sheriff ’s department’s claim
9
that it had “released this evidence to the superior court,” and
to “consider this fact . . . in evaluating [Brown’s] credibility.”
After the ruling, the prosecution informed the court it
was unable to proceed in light of the “potentially . . . fatal” jury
instructions and Brown’s unavailability to testify when the
prosecution ran out of other witnesses. The court dismissed the
case under section 1382 for failure to timely prosecute.
D. Application for Section 4900 Compensation
1. Legal Background
When a “court has granted a writ of habeas corpus . . .
and the charges were subsequently dismissed” (§ 4900, subd. (b)),
the previously incarcerated writ petitioner may apply to receive
compensation at a rate of $140 per day spent in custody (id.,
§ 4904, subd. (a)). Before 2022, section 4900 placed the burden
on the petitioner to prove his entitlement thereto. (See former
§ 4900, subd. (b); Stats. 2021, ch. 490, § 3; § 4902, subd. (d);
Stats. 2021, ch. 490, § 4.) As of January 1, 2022, however,
section 4900 requires the Board to grant compensation “unless
the [AG] [objects and] establishes” (§ 4900, subd. (b)) “by clear
and convincing evidence that the claimant committed the acts
constituting the offense”6 (§ 4903, subd. (b); see § 4902, subd. (d)).
The Board may only deny a section 4900, subdivision (b) claim
if “the overall weight of evidence, which may include the trial
record only in combination with other admissible evidence,
satisfies the [AG’s] burden of proof.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2,
6 Tarkington’s section 4900 claim was still pending in 2022
when these amendments took effect. In early 2022, all parties
and the Board agreed that the newly amended version of the law
applied to Tarkington’s application.
10
§ 645, subd. (c); see § 4903, subd. (d) [the AG “may not rely solely
on the trial record to establish” claimant’s ineligibility].)
At a section 4900 hearing, the Board may consider all
reasonably reliable evidence it deems relevant, even if that
evidence would not have been admissible at trial. (Cal. Code
Regs., tit. 2, § 641, subds. (c)–(f).) The Board enjoys broad
discretion to evaluate the entire administrative record and
draw its own conclusions about the relative weight of the
evidence. (See § 4904; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 641, subd. (f);
see also Gonzales v. California Victim Compensation Bd. (2023)
98 Cal.App.5th 427, 445 (Gonzales).) In exercising its discretion,
“factual findings and credibility determinations” of a court in
granting the underlying writ of habeas corpus (the habeas court)
are binding on the AG and the Board. (§ 4903, subd. (c).)
2. Hearing on Tarkington’s Section 4900
Application
The AG supported its objection to Tarkington’s section 4900
petition with 50 exhibits, “including the trial record and
transcripts from the habeas proceedings.” Tarkington submitted
a declaration in which Allen admits—contrary to his trial
testimony—that he committed the robbery and denies Tarkington
was involved. Tarkington also submitted expert testimony
opining that shoe impressions at the bank from the time of the
robbery did not match the shoes Tarkington and Allen wore when
arrested. Tarkington did not testify.
On July 25, 2022, the Board denied Tarkington’s claim.
In an over 70-page decision, the Board expressly acknowledged
that the current version of section 4900 applied and accepted as
binding several conclusions in the 2017 habeas decision favorable
11
to Tarkington. It nonetheless concluded the AG had met its
burden under section 4900. We agree.
The Board explained its decision as follows:
Law enforcement found red-stained bills in Tarkington’s
vehicle 11 hours after the robbery. Some of these bore serial
numbers directly linking them to the robbery and/or tested
positive for bank dye. The condition of the currency also
suggested it had been washed in an attempt to remove the dye.
Tarkington had red-stained bills on his person that likewise
appeared to have been washed. A nylon stocking containing red-
stained coins was found in Tarkington’s car. According to trial
counsel’s testimony and cell phone records, Tarkington engaged
in suspicious behavior consistent with his involvement in the
robbery. This behavior included Tarkington changing his alibi,
driving to the bank with Allen the day before the robbery, and
the timing of phone contact between Allen and Tarkington on the
day of the robbery. During a search at the impounding facility,
Brown found a beanie in Tarkington’s car. Although the Board
acknowledged that nothing directly tied this particular beanie
to the robbery, it was nevertheless a “striking coincidence” that a
robber had worn a beanie and that one was found in Tarkington’s
car. Finally, “an eyewitness described and identified Tarkington
as one of the robbers.”
The Board discussed in detail, and ultimately found
unpersuasive, the evidence Tarkington deemed exculpatory.
In so doing, the Board acknowledged inconsistencies between
Tarkington’s appearance and tellers’ descriptions of the robbers
in FBI witness statements but concluded they were not so “stark
as to raise a serious concern [the robber] must be a different
person.” The Board found unpersuasive Tarkington’s arguments
12
that Brown had planted items in his car after the sheriff ’s
department impounded it. The Board deemed it more likely the
deputies did not find these items earlier because they performed
their initial search in the dark and did not necessarily know what
to look for. The Board likewise rejected the lack of Tarkington’s
DNA on the nylon stocking as a basis for skepticism, given
that the robbers wore gloves, and thus may have handled the
stockings without depositing DNA.
Finally, the Board questioned Tarkington’s and Allen’s
credibility as witnesses. The Board cited Allen’s “multiple
different accounts of how he obtained the money, his contrary
trial testimony, and demonstrated willingness to lie.” It noted
Tarkington had a prior conviction involving moral turpitude,
had made numerous inconsistent statements to law enforcement,
and offered testimony during the habeas proceedings that was
internally inconsistent. The Board also concluded Tarkington’s
“failure to take the stand, subject to cross examination [at the
section 4900 hearing] . . . raises questions as to his veracity.”
Given these credibility assessments, the Board found Allen’s
declaration and Tarkington’s testimony during the habeas
proceedings did not explain away the red-stained bills or
otherwise meaningfully undermine the AG’s evidence.
E. Administrative Writ and Instant Appeal
Appellants filed a petition for writ of administrative
mandamus challenging the Board’s denial. The superior court
denied the petition. Appellants timely appealed. We affirm.
13
DISCUSSION
The instant appeal does not affect a fundamental right.
(See Tennison v. California Victim Compensation & Government
Claims Board (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1164, 1181–1182
(Tennison).) Therefore, in reviewing the denial of the writ, we
“step into the trial court’s shoes” and scrutinize the Board’s
decision using the same criteria a trial court must apply.
(Gonzales, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 441.) We reverse where
the agency decision reflects a “prejudicial abuse of discretion.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).) This occurs when the
agency “has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the . . .
decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not
supported by the evidence.” (Ibid.)
Appellants challenge the Board’s decision on two of
these grounds. First, they argue the Board did not proceed in
the manner sections 4900 and 4903 require, because it did not
apply the correct burden of proof and did not give the requisite
deference to the 2017 habeas decision. Second, they argue
substantial evidence does not support the Board’s findings.
Whether the agency proceeded as the law requires is
a question of law we review de novo. (See Gonzales, supra,
98 Cal.App.5th at p. 441.) In reviewing a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence, our task is to “deferentially evaluate
whether the agency’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence.” (Ibid.; see Holmes v. California Victim Comp. &
Government Claims Bd. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1406
(Holmes); Tennison, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1182.)
14
A. The Board Applied the Correct Burden of Proof
Appellants argue that, contrary to the 2022 amendments to
section 4900, the Board “required Tarkington to carry the burden
of proof.” We disagree.
The Board expressly recognized the AG had the burden
of proof, and the Board’s analysis reflects its application of
this burden. After evaluating the AG’s evidence and concluding
it supported Tarkington’s guilt, the Board assessed whether
Tarkington had presented evidence warranting a contrary
conclusion. The Board decided he had not. In this context,
the Board noted weaknesses and deficiencies in Tarkington’s
evidence. Such assessment does not reflect that the Board placed
the burden of proof on Tarkington. Rather, it reflects the Board’s
weighing the totality of the evidence, as it must.
Appellants also incorrectly assert the AG’s burden of
proof required the Board to resolve conflicts in the evidence
in Tarkington’s favor and view the evidence in the light most
favorable to Tarkington.7 This argument confuses two distinct
issues: how the Board chooses to weigh the evidence, and who
has the burden of proof. How much weight to give evidence
7 For example, appellants argue that because the Board
relied on one teller’s testimony that Tarkington looked like one
of the robbers, but disregarded other tellers’ statements to the
FBI that he did not, it must have been placing the burden on
Tarkington to prove his own innocence. Appellants similarly
argue that the Board relied on the “striking coincidence” that
police found a beanie in Tarkington’s car, ignoring that no
forensic evidence connected it to the robber’s beanie, and that
the color of the beanie may not exactly match the robber’s.
15
was entirely in the Board’s discretion as the trier of fact, as we
discuss post. The Board applied the correct standard.
B. The Board’s Decision Is Consistent with the
2017 Habeas Decision
Appellants argue the Board violated section 4903
subdivision (c), because its analysis contradicted several
conclusions in the 2017 habeas decision. We disagree.
The Board’s decision states it is accepting these
conclusions. Specifically, the decision identifies as binding the
habeas court’s conclusions that: (1) “ ‘[t]he only item found on
[Tarkington] that tied him to the robbery was $200 in cash’ ”
(italics added); (2) “ ‘the shirt and towel were not merely
cumulative pieces of evidence that tied Tarkington to the
robbery without viable explanation as to how they came into
his possession; they were the only items that do so’ ”; (3) “ ‘no
DNA or other physical evidence put Tarkington either in the
bank or getaway car; that the DNA of two other people—but not
Tarkington—were [sic] found on the nylon stocking containing
the $59 in coins found in the back of his car’ ”; (4) “ ‘the case
against Tarkington has been reduced to the false name he gave
to law enforcement when pulled over—unsurprising given he was
still on federal supervised release—and the alleged similarities
between Tarkington’s height, build, and skin color to one of
the robbers’ ”; (5) “ ‘Tarkington has a dark complexion, is about
5 feet 11 inches tall, does not have a medium build, weighing
about 200 pounds in late 2005’ ”; and (6) “ ‘Detective Brown’s
testimony was “greatly exaggerated.” ’ ” (Quoting 2017 habeas
decision.)
Nothing in the Board’s decision is inconsistent with these
conclusions. Appellants argue the Board ignored a finding that
16
Tarkington did not match the bank tellers’ descriptions of
the robbers. But the habeas court made no such broad finding.
Rather, it concluded that the admissible inculpatory evidence
at trial included “the alleged similarities between Tarkington’s
height, build, and skin color to one of the robbers.” The court
added a footnote contrasting Tarkington’s appearance with
certain tellers’ descriptions of the robbers to the FBI. But the
2017 habeas decision does not conclude that none of the tellers’
descriptions in the record match Tarkington. Indeed, it stops
short of expressly concluding the FBI witnesses’ identifying
statements do not match Tarkington.
Appellants argue that the 2017 habeas decision also
required the Board to “acknowledge Detective Brown’s
misconduct.” But the habeas court did not find Brown engaged
in misconduct. Nor did it make any adverse credibility finding
about him. Rather, it concluded that his testimony regarding
the smell of pepper spray on the shirt and towel was “greatly
exaggerated.” But Tarkington’s trial counsel and the trial judge
both stated that these items exuded an odor. In any case, the
Board did not rely on Brown’s testimony regarding the smell on
the shirt and towel.
Appellants argue the 2017 habeas decision’s reference
to Tarkington having a “viable” explanation for the red-stained
money in his pants and car—that Allen obtained the money by
selling a stolen car and gave Tarkington $200 in exchange for
a ride—required the Board to accept that explanation as true.
But describing an explanation as “viable” is not tantamount to
finding it true. Moreover, the habeas court based its comment
on the evidence before it during the habeas proceedings. The
Board was assessing a different, larger body of evidence at the
17
section 4900 hearing, including a new declaration from Allen in
which he claims to have obtained the red-stained money in an
entirely different way than what he testified to at trial. (See
Gonzales, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 444.)
Appellants also argue the Board violated section 4903
by considering Tarkington’s prior conviction. The 2017 habeas
decision does not reach any conclusions about the prior conviction
evidence. It does, however, reference the holding in the 2008
direct appeal that the lower court erred by admitting the
evidence at trial. Because Tarkington did not testify at trial, this
2008 holding does not speak to whether the trial court could have
properly admitted the prior conviction to impeach Tarkington’s
credibility as a witness. By contrast, Tarkington’s credibility
as a witness was at issue before the Board, because Tarkington’s
habeas testimony was in evidence at the section 4900 hearing.
The Evidence Code permits evidence of a felony conviction “[f]or
the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness.” (See Evid.
Code, § 788; People v. Mendoza (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 918, 925
[“California courts have repeatedly held that prior convictions
for burglary, robbery, and other various theft-related crimes are
probative on the issue of the defendant’s credibility”].) Thus,
the Board did not violate section 4903 or otherwise abuse its
discretion by considering Tarkington’s prior conviction as
relevant to his credibility as a witness.
Finally, appellants imply the Board may not rely on
evidence from the trial record because the 2017 habeas decision
characterizes the admissible evidence against Tarkington at
trial as a “paucity” and “scant.” But when “a habeas corpus
court summarizes the trial evidence or otherwise comments that
some or all of the evidence is ‘weak’ as part of its rationale for
18
concluding that the evidence was insufficient,” “that summary or
commentary itself [is not] a ‘factual finding’ ” under section 4903.
(Gonzales, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 447.) Moreover, the court’s
view that the admissible evidence at trial was insufficient to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt does not preclude the
conclusion that a different and larger body of evidence at the
section 4900 hearing established Tarkington’s involvement in the
robbery by a lower standard of proof.
The Board’s decision is consistent with the 2017 habeas
decision.8
C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Board’s
Decision
Appellants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the Board’s findings and decision. Because our review is
for substantial evidence, “we do not ‘weigh the evidence, consider
the credibility of witnesses, or resolve conflicts in the evidence.’ ”
(Doe v. Regents of University of California (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th
1055, 1073 (Doe).) “ ‘[The administrative agency’s] findings
come before us “with a strong presumption as to their correctness
and regularity.” [Citation.] . . . [¶] We are required to accept
all evidence which supports the successful party, disregard the
8 We thus need not and do not address respondents’
argument that these conclusions are not findings of fact or
credibility determinations of the type section 4903, subdivision (c)
requires the Board to accept. (Gonzales, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th
at p. 447 [section 4903, subdivision (c) does not require the Board
to accept the habeas court’s “summar[ies] of, observations about,
and characterizations of the trial record when the habeas court
is . . . making a legal assessment, after reviewing the static
record from the trial proceedings, about whether that record
contains sufficient evidence to support a conviction”].)
19
contrary evidence, and draw all reasonable inferences to uphold
the verdict.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1073-1074.) “ ‘Inferences may constitute
substantial evidence as long as they are the product of logic and
reason rather than speculation or conjecture.’ ” (Holmes, supra,
239 Cal.App.4th at p. 1406.)
Appellants address several items of evidence the Board
cited as supporting that Tarkington committed the robbery,
arguing each individually does not constitute substantial
evidence of that conclusion. But we do not assess each item
of evidence individually. Our task is to determine whether
a reasonable factfinder could conclude the complete body of
evidence supports the Board’s findings. (See Do v. Regents of
University of California (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1490 (Do).)
Appellants’ arguments against specific evidence on which
the Board relied do not establish error under the substantial
evidence standard for other reasons as well. Appellants argue
that Tarkington’s trial counsel’s testimony is not credible because
Tarkington’s ineffective assistance allegations gave her a motive
to lie. But all information suggesting this possible ulterior
motive was before the Board when it deemed her testimony
credible.
Appellants argue the Board “cherry-picked favorable facts”
and evidence to incriminate Tarkington while “ignoring” those
tending to exonerate him. For example, they argue it relied on
certain teller descriptions of the robbers while ignoring others,
ignored the forensic expert testimony that the shirt and towel did
not contain MAAQ, and disregarded evidence appellants contend
establishes Brown framed Tarkington. The record, however, also
contains evidence explaining, contradicting, or undermining the
credibility of the exculpatory evidence appellants claim the Board
20
ignored. We do not reverse a decision because the factfinder
could have reasonably weighed the evidence in a different way.
Rather, “[o]nly if no reasonable person could reach the conclusion
reached by the administrative agency, based on the entire
record before it, will a court conclude that the agency’s findings
are not supported by substantial evidence.” (Do, supra, 216
Cal.App.4th at p. 1490.) In the context of the entire record,
the Board was not unreasonable in concluding the exculpatory
evidence appellants identify did not outweigh the clear and
convincing evidence the AG presented.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs
on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
WEINGART, J.
M. KIM, J.
21