League of United Latin American Citizens v. Executive Office of the President

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN

CITIZENS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Civil Action No. 25-0946 (CKK)

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE

PRESIDENT, et al.,

Defendants,

and

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE,

Defendant-Intervenor.

DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE,

et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Civil Action No. 25-0952 (CKK)

DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity

as President of the United States, et al.,

Defendants,

and

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE,

Defendant-Intervenor.

LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS

EDUCATION FUND, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Civil Action No. 25-0955 (CKK)

DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity

as President of the United States, et al.,

Defendants,

and

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE,

Defendant-Intervenor.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(January 30, 2026)

1

These consolidated cases are about the limits of the President’s power to dictate the rules

of federal elections. The Framers of our Constitution recognized that power over election rules

could be abused, either to destroy the national government or to disempower the people from

acting as a check on their elected representatives. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 59 (A. Hamilton);

Federal Farmer No. 3. Accordingly, they entrusted this power to the parts of our government

that they believed would be most responsive to the will of the people: first to the States, and then,

in some instances, to Congress. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.

They assigned no role at all to the President. Put simply, our Constitution does not allow the

President to impose unilateral changes to federal election procedures.

Upholding our Constitution’s separation of powers in the election context is a matter of

substantial importance. The Supreme Court long ago recognized that the right to vote is a

“fundamental political right” because it is “preservative of all rights.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118

U.S. 356, 370 (1886). Our Constitution’s careful allocation of power over election regulation

helps to preserve that bedrock right.

Now pending before this Court are several pending cross-motions for summary judgment

implicating these important principles. Plaintiffs mount a variety of challenges to Executive

Order No. 14,248, in which the President has purported to direct several changes to federal

election procedures. Upon consideration of the parties’ submissions,1 the relevant legal

1

The Court’s consideration has focused on the following documents, including the attachments and exhibits thereto:

• The Federal Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“Federal

Defs.’ Mem.”), Dkt. No. 177-1;

• The Republican National Committee’s Cross-Summary Judgment Brief on Remaining Claims (“Def.-

Intervenor’s Mem.”), Dkt. No. 176-1;

• The LULAC Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and

Response in Opposition to Defendants’ and RNC’s Motions for Summary Judgment (“LULAC Pls.’

Mem.”), Dkt. No. 194-1;

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authority, and the entire record, the Court shall GRANT IN PART, DENY IN PART, and

DEFER IN PART each of the parties’ motions and shall DISMISS certain claims in part.

Because the record in these cases continues to evolve, many of these denials and dismissals shall

be without prejudice. The Court shall DECLARE that two provisions of the Executive Order—

both purporting to impose new requirements for verifying the U.S. citizenship of people

registering to vote or applying to receive absentee ballots—are inconsistent with the

constitutional separation of powers and cannot lawfully be implemented. The Court shall

PERMANENTLY ENJOIN the relevant Defendants from taking any action to implement or

give effect to those provisions. The Court shall also DECLARE that, in the course of

implementing provisions of the Executive Order that call for federal agencies to access and share

sensitive personal data, the Federal Defendants must strictly comply with the requirements of the

Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. Finally, the Court shall direct the parties to propose a schedule for

further proceedings.

• The Democratic Party Plaintiffs’ Combined Opposition to Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment on

All Remaining Claims and Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Phase II) (“Dem. Pls.’ Mem.”),

Dkt. No. 196-1, and the accompanying Declaration of Aria C. Branch (“Branch Decl.”), Dkt. No. 198;

• The Federal Defendants’ Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment and

Reply in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“Fed. Defs.’ Reply & Opp’n”),

Dkt. No. 213;

• The Republican National Committee’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Phase II Cross Motions and Reply Brief in

Support of Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Remaining Claims (“Def.-Intervenor’s Reply & Opp’n”),

Dkt. No. 210;

• The LULAC Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum in Support of the LULAC Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for

Summary Judgment (“LULAC Pls.’ Reply”), Dkt. No. 219;

• The Democratic Party Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Phase II Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment

(“Dem. Pls.’ Reply”), Dkt. No. 220;

• The Federal Defendants’ Supplemental Memorandum (“Fed. Defs.’ Suppl.”), Dkt. No. 226; and

• The Democratic Party Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum (“Dem. Pls.’ Suppl.”), Dkt. No. 232.

The Court has also considered the parties’ arguments at the preliminary injunction hearing held on April 17, 2025.

See Tr. of Hr’g on Mots. for Preliminary Injunctions (“Tr. of P.I. Hr’g”), Dkt. No. 100. In an exercise of its

discretion, the Court concludes that an additional oral argument is not necessary to the resolution of the issues

presented in the pending motions. See LCvR 7(f).

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................... 6

I. BACKGROUND...................................................................................................................... 11

A. Constitutional and Statutory Framework .................................................................. 11

1. The Constitution on Voter Qualifications and Election Procedures ....................... 11

a. Voter Qualifications ......................................................................................... 11

b. Election Procedures .......................................................................................... 12

c. Historical Context ............................................................................................ 14

2. The National Voter Registration Act....................................................................... 15

3. The Help America Vote Act.................................................................................... 17

4. The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act ................................. 21

5. The Federal Election Day Statutes .......................................................................... 22

6. The Privacy Act ....................................................................................................... 22

B. Facts and Proceedings .................................................................................................. 24

1. Executive Order No. 14,248 .................................................................................... 24

2. The Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements Program ................................ 26

3. Parties ...................................................................................................................... 27

a. The LULAC Plaintiffs...................................................................................... 28

b. The Democratic Party Plaintiffs ....................................................................... 31

4. Proceedings ............................................................................................................. 33

5. Parallel Proceedings ................................................................................................ 36

II. LEGAL STANDARD ............................................................................................................ 37

III. ANALYSIS............................................................................................................................ 38

A. Threshold Issues ........................................................................................................... 38

1. Standing ................................................................................................................... 38

2. Ripeness .................................................................................................................. 42

3. Mootness ................................................................................................................. 44

4. Statutory and non-statutory rights of action ............................................................ 45

a. Statutory review under the Administrative Procedure Act .............................. 46

b. Non-statutory rights of action .......................................................................... 46

5. The Purcell principle ............................................................................................... 50

B. Section 2(d): Requiring Agencies to “Assess Citizenship” before Providing the

Federal Form to “Enrollees of Public Assistance Programs” .................................. 52

1. The Democratic Party Plaintiffs have standing to challenge Section 2(d). ............. 54

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2. The Democratic Party Plaintiffs have an equitable right of action to challenge

Section 2(d) on constitutional separation-of-powers grounds................................. 58

3. Section 2(d) is inconsistent with the constitutional separation of powers. ............. 59

a. Section 2(d) is contrary to the NVRA. ............................................................. 61

b. The President lacks any constitutional authority to support the directive in

Section 2(d). ..................................................................................................... 63

4. A declaratory judgment and permanent injunction against implementation of

Section 2(d) are appropriate remedies for the constitutional separation-of-powers

violation. .................................................................................................................. 64

5. Because Plaintiffs have not shown final agency action implementing Section

2(d), the Court shall grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on their

APA claims regarding this provision. ..................................................................... 68

6. Further factual development is necessary to resolve the Democratic Party

Plaintiffs’ remaining claims regarding Section 2(d). .............................................. 69

C. Section 3(d): Requiring Documentary Proof of Citizenship on the Federal Post

Card Application .......................................................................................................... 70

1. Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the implementation of Section 3(d). ............. 71

a. The LULAC Plaintiffs have standing. ............................................................. 72

b. The Democratic Party Plaintiffs have standing. ............................................... 73

2. Plaintiffs have an equitable right of action to challenge the implementation of

Section 3(d) on constitutional separation-of-powers grounds................................. 76

3. Section 3(d) is inconsistent with the constitutional separation of powers. ............. 77

a. Section 3(d) is contrary to UOCAVA. ............................................................. 77

b. The President lacks any constitutional authority to support the directive in

Section 3(d). ..................................................................................................... 83

4. A declaratory judgment and permanent injunction against implementation of

Section 3(d) is the appropriate remedy. .................................................................. 84

5. Because Plaintiffs have not shown final agency action implementing Section

3(d), the Court shall grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on their

APA claims regarding this provision. ..................................................................... 86

D. Section 4(a): Conditioning Funding to States on Use of the Federal Form,

Including any Documentary Proof of Citizenship Requirement ............................. 86

E. Section 7(a): Directing the Attorney General to “Enforce” the Election Day

Statutes “Against” States That Count Ballots Received After Election Day .......... 88

F. Section 7(b): Directing the EAC to “Condition” Funding to States on Not

Counting Ballots Received After Election Day .......................................................... 93

G. Sections 2(b) and 3(a): Requiring Agencies to Share Data on Voter Eligibility ..... 94

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1. The Democratic Party Plaintiffs have standing to challenge Sections 2(b) and

3(a). ......................................................................................................................... 96

2. The Democratic Party Plaintiffs may pursue injunctive relief under the APA to

redress prospective violations of the Privacy Act. .................................................. 99

3. The Democratic Party Plaintiffs’ request for an injunction against recent changes

to the SAVE Program is moot, but they are entitled to narrower declaratory

relief. ..................................................................................................................... 102

4. The remaining aspects of the Democratic Party Plaintiffs’ claims regarding

Section 2(b) and 3(a) may proceed........................................................................ 108

IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 108

* * *

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In Executive Order No. 14,248, President Donald J. Trump directed several federal

agencies and officers to make a variety of changes to the administration of federal elections.

Plaintiffs in these consolidated cases challenge many of the President’s directives on

constitutional and statutory grounds, arguing that they exceed his lawful authority. Plaintiffs

also challenge agency actions taken in response to the Executive Order that relate to the

protection and use of sensitive personal information held in federal databases.

This Court recently resolved Plaintiffs’ claims regarding Section 2(a) of the Executive

Order, permanently enjoining certain Defendants from implementing that provision’s instruction

to the Election Assistance Commission (“EAC”) to “take appropriate action” to require

documentary proof of U.S. citizenship on an important federal mail voter registration form (the

“Federal Form”). See Order, Dkt. No. 217.

This Memorandum Opinion and the accompanying Order resolve the parties’ cross-

motions for summary judgment on each of Plaintiffs’ remaining claims, focusing on “purely

6

legal” arguments for which the parties contend further discovery is not necessary. See

Scheduling Order, Dkt. No. 141, at 3.

Section I of this Memorandum Opinion sets out the constitutional and statutory context

for Plaintiffs’ claims, describes the Executive Order and certain actions taken in response to it,

introduces the relevant parties, and recounts the procedural history of these consolidated cases.

Section II states the legal standard for summary judgment and the criteria for granting

declaratory and permanent injunctive relief.

Section III.A introduces several justiciability doctrines that the Court later applies

throughout its analysis: standing, ripeness, mootness, rights (or “causes”) of action, and the

Purcell principle.

Section III.B addresses Plaintiffs’ challenges to Section 2(d) of the Executive Order,

which directs certain heads of federal agencies to “assess citizenship” before providing the

Federal Form to “enrollees of public assistance programs.”

The Court concludes that this instruction exceeds the President’s lawful authority. When

Congress enacted the National Voter Registration Act (“NVRA”), it imposed a mandatory duty

on certain agencies to provide the Federal Form to recipients of their services. Congress also

specified that voter eligibility should be verified by attestation under penalty of perjury on the

Federal Form itself, implicitly rejecting any other form of assessment or “pre-screening.”

Section 2(d)’s directive to “assess citizenship” before providing the Federal Form to certain

people is therefore contrary to the will of Congress as expressed in the NVRA. Accordingly, it

can be sustained only by a strong showing that the President has sufficient constitutional

authority over the subject matter. But the President has no such power; our Constitution vests

the authority to regulate federal elections in Congress and the States alone.

7

The Court therefore concludes that Section 2(d) is inconsistent with the constitutional

separation of powers and cannot lawfully be implemented. Accordingly, the Court shall grant

partial summary judgment to Plaintiffs on their separation-of-powers claims regarding Section

2(d) and award a declaratory judgment and enter a permanent injunction in their favor.

Because Plaintiffs’ parallel APA claims regarding Section 2(d) do not challenge final

agency action, the Court shall grant partial summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on those

claims, without precluding appropriate further action if new facts or circumstances arise that

should alter the Court’s analysis. The Court also defers ruling on Plaintiffs’ undue-burden

challenges to Section 2(d), which would benefit from further factual development.

Section III.C addresses Plaintiffs’ challenges to Section 3(d), which directs the Secretary

of Defense to add a documentary-proof-of-citizenship requirement to the “Federal Post Card

Application,” a voter registration and ballot request form used by military and overseas voters.

The Court concludes that the directive in Section 3(d) exceeds the President’s lawful

authority. Applying the presumption that Congress “intends to make major policy decisions

itself, not leave those decisions to agencies,” the Court concludes that the Uniformed and

Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (“UOCAVA”) does not authorize the Executive Branch

to add a documentary proof of citizenship requirement to the Federal Post Card Application. See

West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 723 (2022). Instead, UOCAVA manifests the contrary

intent of Congress that the Federal Post Card Application should be a straightforward, easy-to-

use form and should not require documentary proof of citizenship. Because the Elections Clause

assigns sole responsibility for election regulation to Congress and the States, and because the

Court cannot assume that Congress has delegated this important power to the Executive Branch

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without a clear statement to that effect, the President lacks the authority to direct the addition of a

documentary-proof-of-citizenship requirement by executive order.

Therefore, the Court concludes that Section 3(d) is inconsistent with the constitutional

separation of powers, that it cannot lawfully be implemented, and that Plaintiffs are entitled to

partial summary judgment, a declaratory judgment, and a permanent injunction.

Finally, because Plaintiffs’ parallel APA claims regarding Section 3(d) do not challenge

final agency action, the Court shall grant partial summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on

those claims, without precluding appropriate further action if new facts or circumstances arise.

Section III.D addresses Section 4(a) of the Executive Order, which directs the Election

Assistance Commission (“EAC”) to condition certain funding to States on their acceptance and

use of an important federal mail voter registration form, “including any requirement for

documentary proof of United States citizenship adopted pursuant to” Section 2(a) of the

Executive Order. Because the EAC is permanently enjoined from implementing Section 2(a)’s

directive to add a documentary-proof-of-citizenship requirement and Plaintiffs have not shown

that the remainder of Section 4(a) presents any imminent risk of harm to their interests, their

claims regarding Section 4(a) are not ripe. Therefore, on the present record and without

precluding further action if an imminent risk of harm should arise, the Court shall grant partial

summary judgment in Defendant’s favor on Plaintiffs’ claims regarding this provision.

Sections III.E and III.F address Sections 7(a) and 7(b) of the Executive Order, which

purport to direct the Attorney General and the EAC to take certain actions against States that

count mail-in ballots that are received after Election Day. Because any harm to Plaintiffs’

interest in these provisions depends either on how States respond to future action by the Attorney

General or the EAC or on the indirect effects of a legal uncertainty that this Court cannot resolve,

9

Plaintiffs have not established an imminent injury that is redressable by a favorable decision

from this Court. Plaintiffs therefore lack standing and a ripe claim to challenge these provisions.

Accordingly, on the present record and without precluding further action if an imminent risk of

redressable harm should arise, Court shall grant partial summary judgment in Defendant’s favor

on Plaintiffs’ claims regarding Sections 7(a) and 7(b), without reaching the merits of the parties’

arguments about whether the federal Election Day Statutes, 2 U.S.C. § 7 and 3 U.S.C. § 1, allow

the counting of mail-in ballots received after Election Day. Cf. Watson v. Republican Nat’l

Comm., No. 24-1260, 146 S. Ct. 355 (2025) (mem.) (granting certiorari to decide this issue).

Section III.G addresses Plaintiffs’ claims regarding Sections 2(b) and 3(a) of the

Executive Order, both of which relate to data sharing among Federal and State agencies. The

Court focuses primarily on Plaintiffs’ Privacy Act challenge to recent actions that the

Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and the Social Security Administration (“SSA”)

have taken to implement those provisions. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ request for

injunctive relief in connection with this challenge is moot because DHS and SSA have now

complied with the Privacy Act procedure for establishing a new “routine use” that covers the

data sharing at issue, leaving Plaintiffs without any forward-looking injury that would be

redressable by an injunction. However, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs are entitled to limited

declaratory relief in connection with their claims regarding Sections 2(b) and 3(a), and the

remainder of Plaintiffs’ claims would benefit from further factual development. Accordingly,

the Court shall award limited declaratory relief, grant partial summary judgment in Defendants’

favor on Plaintiffs’ claims regarding DHS and SSA’s recent actions to implement Sections 2(b)

and 3(a), and defer ruling on the remainder of Plaintiffs’ challenges. The Court shall direct the

parties to propose a schedule for further proceedings on the remaining challenges.

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I. BACKGROUND

A. Constitutional and Statutory Framework

In two prior opinions in these consolidated cases, the Court set out the details of the

constitutional and statutory framework underlying Plaintiffs’ various claims. See League of

United Latin Am. Citizens v. Exec. Off. of the President (“LULAC I”), 780 F. Supp. 3d 135, 156–

66 (D.D.C. 2025) (CKK) (resolving motions for preliminary injunctions); League of United

Latin Am. Citizens v. Exec. Off. of the President (“LULAC II”), Nos. 25-cv-0946, 25-cv-0952,

25-cv-0955 (consolidated), --- F. Supp. 3d. ----, 2025 WL 3042704, at *2–7 (D.D.C. Oct. 31,

2025) (resolving cross-motions for summary judgment regarding Section 2(a)). Here, the Court

summarizes the aspects of that framework that are most relevant to the resolution of the

remaining cross-motions for summary judgment.

1. The Constitution on Voter Qualifications and Election Procedures

The Constitution addresses two types of power over federal elections: first, the power to

determine who is qualified to vote, and second, the power to regulate federal election procedures.

In both spheres, the Constitution vests authority first in the States. In matters of election

procedures, the Constitution assigns Congress the power to preempt State regulations. The

Constitution assigns no direct role to the President in either domain.

a. Voter Qualifications

The Constitution empowers the States alone to decide who is qualified to vote in federal

elections. The Voter Qualifications Clause provides that Members of the U.S. House of

Representatives are to be elected by voters who “have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of

11

the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.2 The

Seventeenth Amendment likewise provides that voters for U.S. Senators from each State “shall

have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State

legislatures.” U.S. Const. amend. XVII. Because each State decides who is eligible to vote for

its own state legislators, the Constitution allows the States to decide who may vote for members

of the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate as well.

The Constitution provides more directly for State control over the qualifications for

voters in Presidential elections. The President is elected by vote of the Electoral College. See

U.S. Const. amend. XII. The Electors Clause empowers each State to appoint Electors to the

Electoral College “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.” U.S. Const. art. II,

§ 1, cl. 2. Each State now directs that its Electors be appointed by popular vote of qualified

voters. See Chiafalo v. Washington, 591 U.S. 578, 584–85 (2020).

Although the States determine the requirements for voter eligibility, the Constitution

imposes some limits on their discretion to do so. E.g., U.S. Const. amend. XIX (“The right of

citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged . . . on account of sex.”).

b. Election Procedures

When it comes to the procedural conduct of federal elections, the Constitution grants

broad regulatory authority to the States but reserves final, supervisory authority to Congress.

Starting with the States’ power, the Elections Clause provides that the “Times, Places and

Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State

by the Legislature thereof.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. “The Clause’s substantive scope is

broad.” Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc. (“ITCA”), 570 U.S. 1, 8 (2013). The

2

Article I of the Constitution refers to voters in congressional elections as “Electors.” Article II uses the same term

to refer to different people: the Members of the Electoral College.

12

terms “Times, Places, and Manner” are “comprehensive words” that “embrace authority to

provide a complete code for congressional elections.” Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932).

By default, the Constitution tasks States with regulating, among other things, voter registration,

see id., recounts, Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972), primaries, United States v. Classic,

313 U.S. 299 (1941), and the form and content of ballots, see Munro v. Socialist Workers Party,

479 U.S. 189 (1986).

However, this grant of authority to the States is only “a default provision.” Foster v.

Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997). Under the Elections Clause, the States prescribe regulations in the

first instance, “but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations.” U.S.

Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.3 Put differently, the Elections Clause “grants Congress ‘the power to

override state regulations’ by establishing uniform rules for federal elections, binding on the

States.” Foster, 522 U.S at 69 (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 832–

33 (1995)).

Congress’s Elections Clause power to establish federal election rules is supreme over, but

coextensive with, the States’ own regulatory power under the same clause. See Ex parte Siebold,

100 U.S. 371, 384–85 (1879). For that reason, determining voter qualifications “forms no part of

the power to be conferred upon the national government” by the Elections Clause. ITCA, 570

U.S. at 17 (quoting The Federalist No. 60, at 371 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)). That

power flows from the Voter Qualifications Clause and the Seventeenth Amendment alone.

“[N]othing in th[ose] provisions lends itself to the view that voting qualifications in federal

elections are to be set by Congress.” Id. at 16 (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 210

3

The Elections Clause excepts from Congress’s supervisory authority the power to determine “the Places of chusing

Senators.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (spelling as in original). The Seventeenth Amendment, which dictates that

Senators be popularly elected rather than chosen by state legislatures, moots this exception. See U.S. Const. amend.

XVII.

13

(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part)). The precise boundary between Congress’s regulatory

authority and the States’ authority to determine voter eligibility is contested, but not relevant

here. See id. at 25–36 (Thomas, J. dissenting).

Although the Elections Clause power—whether exercised by the States or Congress—is

sweeping, it has limits. Most notably, it cannot be used to effectuate “the abridgment of

fundamental rights.” Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986); accord

Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992).

The provisions that the Court has reviewed so far focus on congressional elections, but

similar reasoning extends to presidential elections. The Electors Clause empowers States to

determine the “Manner” of electing the President, but unlike the Elections Clause, it does not

explicitly reserve supervisory authority to Congress. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.4 Nevertheless,

whether as a matter of practice5 or as a function of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 “the broad

power given to Congress over congressional elections has been extended to presidential

elections.” Voting Rts. Coal. v. Wilson, 60 F.3d 1411, 1414 (9th Cir. 1995). Throughout this

Opinion, the Court refers to the Elections Clause with this context in mind.

c. Historical Context

As the Court has explained in prior opinions, the Constitution’s allocation of authority

over federal elections reflects carefully considered compromises among the Framers. See

4

The Electoral Votes Clause directs that “Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors.” U.S. Const.

art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (emphasis added) (spelling as in original). This power is self-evidently narrower than the authority

to prescribe “[t]he Times, Places and Manner” of congressional elections that is granted to the States and to

Congress by the Elections Clause. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (emphasis added).

5

Congressional and presidential elections occur simultaneously. 2 U.S.C. § 7; 3 U.S.C. § 1. As a result, regulations

of the former effectively regulate the latter. Cf. Ex parte Coy, 127 U.S. 731, 751–52 (1888) (holding that Congress’s

power to ensure the integrity of federal elections extends to concurrent state elections).

6

See Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545–48 (1934); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90 (1976) (per

curiam).

14

LULAC I, 780 F. Supp. 3d at 158–59; LULAC II, 2025 WL 3042704, at *3–4. Federalists

worried that giving the States exclusive control over election procedure could fatally weaken the

national government by allowing the States to prevent federal elections altogether. See, e.g., The

Federalist No. 59 (A. Hamilton). Meanwhile, Antifederalists were concerned that allowing

Congress to control the procedure for election of its own members would allow Congress to

insulate itself from electoral accountability and accumulate power at the expense of the more

popularly responsive States. See, e.g., Federal Farmer No. 3. The Framers ultimately struck a

balance, “submitt[ing] the regulation of elections for the federal government, in the first

instance,” to the States, while “reserv[ing] to [Congress] a right to interpose” regulations of its

own when the need arose. The Federalist No. 59 (A. Hamilton).

The President is conspicuously absent from this legal and historical context. In fact, the

Framers do not appear to have given any serious consideration to granting the President the

power to regulate federal elections:

[T]here were only three ways in which this power could have been reasonably

modified and disposed: that it must either have been lodged wholly in the national

legislature, or wholly in the State legislatures, or primarily in the latter and

ultimately in the former.

The Federalist No. 59.7

2. The National Voter Registration Act

In 1993, Congress exercised its Elections Clause authority to regulate federal elections by

enacting the National Voter Registration Act (“NVRA”), Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77

(codified, as amended, at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501–20511). Congress’s stated purposes in enacting

the NVRA included “establish[ing] procedures that will increase the number of eligible citizens

7

See also Debate in Massachusetts Ratifying Convention, in 2 The Founders’ Constitution 255 (P. Kurland & R.

Lerner eds., 1987) (“I know of but two bodies wherein [the power to regulate federal elections] can be lodged—the

legislatures of the several states, and the general Congress.” (statement of Caleb Strong)).

15

who register to vote in elections for Federal office,” helping officials at all levels of government

implement the Act’s requirements “in a manner that enhances the participation of eligible

citizens as voters in elections for federal office,” “protect[ing] the integrity of the electoral

process,” and ensuring the maintenance of “accurate and correct voter registration rolls.” See Id.

§ 2(b), 107 Stat. 77 (1993) (codified at 52 U.S.C. § 20501(b)).

The NVRA established a baseline set of voter registration procedures for federal elections

that every State must implement, alongside “any other method of voter registration provided for

under State law.” 52 U.S.C. § 20503(a). For example, the NVRA requires that States allow

people to apply for voter registration when applying for drivers’ licenses. See id. § 20503(a)(1).

The NVRA also requires each State to “accept and use” a standard federal “mail voter

registration form” (the “Federal Form”). Id. § 20505(a)(1).

The Federal Form consists of three components: an application (the portion of the Federal

Form that a would-be voter must fill out); general instructions for completing the application;

and appended state-specific instructions. See 11 C.F.R. § 9428.3. The NVRA sets strict limits

on the contents of the Federal Form. Most relevantly, the application section:

may require only such identifying information (including the signature of the

applicant) and other information (including data relating to previous registration

by the applicant), as is necessary to enable the appropriate State election official

to assess the eligibility of the applicant and to administer voter registration and

other parts of the election process.

52 U.S.C. § 20508(b)(1). The state-specific instructions must “specif[y] each eligibility

requirement (including citizenship)” set by state law. Id. § 20508(b)(2)(A). And the application

must verify an applicant’s eligibility under state law through an “attestation that the applicant

meets each such requirement[s]” that “requires the signature of the applicant, under penalty of

perjury.” Id. §§ 20508(b)(2)(B)–(C). The Federal Form “may not include any requirement for

notarization or other formal authentication.” Id. § 20508(b)(3).

16

The Conference Committee on the bill that became the NVRA considered and rejected an

amendment proposed in the Senate that would have expressly allowed States to “requir[e]

presentation of documentation relating to citizenship of an applicant for voter registration.” See

H.R. Rep. No. 103–66, at 23 (1993) (Conf. Rep.). The Conference Committee concluded that

such an amendment was “not necessary or consistent with the purposes of this Act” and “could

be interpreted by States to permit registration requirements that could effectively eliminate, or

seriously interfere with, the mail registration program of the Act.” Id.

Congress initially assigned responsibility for maintaining the Federal Form and

developing regulations for its use to the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”), a federal agency

that Congress created as an independent, bipartisan commission. See Pub. L. No. 103-31 § 6(a),

107 Stat. 77, 79 (1993) (codified at 52 U.S.C. § 20505(a)(1)); id. § 9(a), 107 Stat. 77, 87 (1993)

(codified, as amended, at 52 U.S.C. § 20508(a)); see also 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a) (establishing the

FEC).

3. The Help America Vote Act

In 2002, Congress enacted the Help America Vote Act (“HAVA”), Pub. L. No. 107-252,

116 Stat. 1666, partly in response to the election administration challenges that arose during the

Presidential election in 2000. See H.R. Rep. 107-329, at 32 (2001). HAVA made several

changes to federal election law, including creating a new independent agency to set standards

and share best practices related to some aspects of federal elections. See Pub. L. No. 107-252,

Title II, § 201, 116 Stat. 1666, 1673 (codified at 52 U.S.C. § 20921).

HAVA created a new “independent entity” in the Executive Branch called the Election

Assistance Commission (“EAC”). Pub. L. No. 107-252, Title II, § 201, 116 Stat. 1666, 1673

(2002) (codified at 52 U.S.C. § 20921). The Act established the EAC as an advisory body

“serv[ing] as a national clearinghouse and resource for the compilation of information and

17

review of procedures with respect to the administration of Federal elections.” Id. § 202, 116

Stat. 1666, 1673–74 (codified at 52 U.S.C. § 20922).

The EAC is composed of four Members nominated by the President with the advice and

consent of the Senate. See 52 U.S.C. § 20923(a)(1). Each Member must “have experience with

or expertise in election administration or the study of elections.” Id. § 20923(a)(3). Members

serve staggered four-year terms in two groups, such that two vacancies arise on the EAC every

two years in the normal course. See id. §§ 20923(b)(1)–(2). After their four-year terms expire,

Members may be reappointed to serve one additional term. Id. § 20923(b)(1). And Members

elect among themselves a chair and vice chair, who each serve a one-year term in that role that

cannot be renewed during their four-year term as Members. Id. § 20923(c).

Congress designed the EAC to be both partisan (i.e., explicitly linked to political parties)

and bipartisan (i.e., balanced equally between the two major political parties). See H.R. Rep.

107-329, at 59 (2001) (describing the EAC as a “four-member, bipartisan commission”). But

that design comes to fruition somewhat indirectly. For example, before the President nominates

a potential Member, the Majority and Minority Leaders of both the House and Senate “shall each

submit to the President a candidate recommendation” for the position “affiliated with the

political party of the Member of Congress involved.” 52 U.S.C. § 20923(a)(2). This

recommendation is a recommendation only; HAVA does not explicitly require that the President

nominate the person so recommended. See id.

But other provisions of the statute implicitly require partisan balancing. For example,

when the first four Members were nominated, two Members had to serve shortened two-year

terms to achieve Congress’s desired staggered-term structure. Congress required that “not more

than one” of the Members relegated to these abbreviated terms “be affiliated with the same

18

political party.” 52 U.S.C. § 20923(b)(2)(A). When Members select their chair and vice chair,

they are similarly restricted: “[T]he chair and vice chair may not be affiliated with the same

political party.” Id. § 20923(c)(1). Because the chair and vice chair may serve in that role for

only one year of their four-year term, and because there are only two political parties whose

members have occupied the roles of Majority and Minority Leader of the House and Senate since

HAVA’s enactment, compliance with this provision necessarily requires that the President

cannot nominate more than two Members from his own political party to the EAC.

By statute, the EAC may not take “[a]ny action” under the chapter of HAVA related to

standards and funding for voting system improvements without “the approval of at least three of

its members.” 52 U.S.C. § 20928. In practice, this requirement ensures that the EAC may only

take actions under this chapter that have bipartisan support.

HAVA reassigned responsibility for maintaining the Federal Form from the FEC to the

newly-created EAC. Pub. L. No. 107-252, Title VIII, § 802, 116 Stat. 1666, 1726 (2002); see 52

U.S.C. § 20508(a). The EAC is therefore responsible for “develop[ing]” the Federal Form “in

consultation with the chief election officers of the States,” 52 U.S.C. § 20508(a)(2), reporting to

Congress periodically on the NVRA’s “impact . . . on the administration of elections for Federal

office,” id. § 20508(a)(3), and prescribing any regulations that are “necessary to carry out” those

duties, id. § 20508(a)(1). The EAC also must “provide information to the States” about each

State’s responsibilities under the NVRA. Id. § 20508(a)(4).

Congress also provided in HAVA that the EAC lacks any rulemaking authority, “except

to the extent permitted under” the section of the NVRA allowing rulemaking regarding the

contents of the Federal Form and periodic reports to Congress on the impact of the NVRA. 52

U.S.C. § 20929; see 52 U.S.C. § 20508(a); see also H.R. Rep. No. 107-730, at 69 (2002) (Conf.

19

Rep.) (explaining that HAVA “[p]rohibits” the EAC “from imposing any rule, regulation, or

taking any action that imposes requirements on State or local governments except as permitted

under the [NVRA]”). Exercising this limited rulemaking authority, the EAC may alter the

Federal Form by promulgating regulations through notice-and-comment rulemaking. See 52

U.S.C. § 20929; cf. Final Rules: National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 59 Fed. Reg. 32,311

(June 23, 1994) (implementing regulations promulgated by the EAC’s predecessor in this role,

the FEC).

The EAC’s rulemaking process is as follows. If the EAC decides that a change to the

Federal Form is necessary, it must develop that change as a proposed rule, which must be

approved by at least three EAC Members. 52 U.S.C. § 20928. Once the EAC has approved a

proposed rule, it must comply with the Administrative Procedure Act by issuing a notice of

proposed rulemaking and receiving public comments. 5 U.S.C. § 553. The EAC must also

“consult[] with the chief election officers of the States” regarding its proposed changes to the

Federal Form. 52 U.S.C. § 20508(a)(2). Once the EAC has received feedback from the public

and the States, it must consider revisions to its proposed rule, and any revisions must again be

approved by at least three EAC Members. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c); 52 U.S.C. § 20928. Following

any revisions, the EAC then promulgates the finalized rule amending the Federal Form. See 5

U.S.C. § 553(c).

Finally, the Federal Form is a “collection of information” subject to the requirements of

the Paperwork Reduction Act. 44 U.S.C. § 3502(3). As a result, the EAC must conduct certain

internal administrative reviews and provide an additional public comment period. See id.

§ 3506(c). The EAC must also submit the collection of information for approval by the Office of

Information and Regulatory Affairs within the Office of Management and Budget. See id.

20

§ 3507(a)(2). But because the EAC is an “independent regulatory agency . . . administered by 2

or more members of a commission,” it “may by majority vote void” any disapproval of its

collection of information by OIRA. Id. § 3507(f)(1).

4. The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act

In 1986, Congress enacted the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act

(“UOCAVA”), Pub. L. No. 99-410, 100 Stat. 924 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20301–

20311).

UOCAVA guarantees the right “to use absentee registration procedures and to vote by

absentee ballot” in federal elections to three categories of qualified voters: uniformed

servicemembers and merchant mariners temporarily absent from their place of residence in the

United States due to active duty or service in the merchant marine, spouses and family members

of uniformed servicemembers and merchant mariners who are similarly absent due to their

qualifying family member’s active duty or service, and United States citizens residing overseas.

52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(1). UOCAVA’s provisions apply to individuals who are “qualified to

vote” in their “place of residence” in the United States or “the last place in which [they were]

domiciled before leaving the United States.” Id. § 20310(a)(1), (5).

UOCAVA requires States to accept an “official post card form” from qualified

individuals in these categories that contains both an application to register to vote and an

application for an absentee ballot. 52 U.S.C. §§ 20301(b)(2), 20302(a)(4). The content of this

“post card form,” commonly called the Federal Post Card Application, is “prescribe[d]” by the

head of an executive department designated by the President and must contain “both an absentee

voter registration application and an absentee ballot application.” Id. § 20301(b)(2). UOCAVA

requires the President’s designee to “prescribe a standard oath for use with” the Federal Post

Card Application, which must “affirm[] that a material misstatement of fact in the completion of

21

[the form] may constitute grounds for a conviction for perjury.” Id. § 20301(b)(7). States must

accept and process the Federal Post Card Application, and they may not refuse to do so based on

an applicant’s failure to comply with State requirements regarding notarization or the use of

certain types of paper or envelopes. Id. § 20301(i).

5. The Federal Election Day Statutes

Two federal statutes specify the date of the federal Election Day. 2 U.S.C. § 7 provides

that “[t]he Tuesday next after the 1st Monday in November, in every even numbered year, is

established as the day for the election” of Members of Congress. 3 U.S.C. § 1 provides that

“[t]he electors of President and Vice President shall be appointed, in each State, on election day,

in accordance with the laws of the State enacted prior to election day.” Neither statute expressly

prescribes any particular procedures for States to use when receiving and counting ballots in

federal elections, and neither statute expressly provides for an enforcement mechanism.

6. The Privacy Act

The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 522a, “was designed to provide individuals with

more control over the gathering, dissemination, and accuracy of agency information about

themselves.” Greentree v. U.S. Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1982). To that end, the

Act imposes burdens on federal agencies and creates rights for individuals when those agencies

collect, maintain, use, or disseminate individuals’ personal information.

The Privacy Act’s requirements apply to “record[s]” and “system[s] of records.” A

“record” is “any item, collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is

maintained by an agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4). A “system of records” is a “group of any

records under the control of any agency from which information is retrieved by the name of the

individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other identifying

particular.” Id. § 552a(a)(5).

22

Many of the Privacy Act’s provisions focus on ensuring that records are accurate. See

All. for Retired Ams. v. Bessent, 770 F. Supp. 3d 79, 87 (D.D.C. 2025) (CKK). However, as

relevant here, the Act also limits federal agencies’ ability to share records about individuals:

No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by

any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant

to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to

whom the record pertains, unless [an enumerated exception applies].

5 U.S.C. § 552a(b).

The Act allows intra-agency sharing of protected records on a need-to-know basis. That

is, an agency may disclose a record “to those officers and employees of the agency which

maintains the record who have a need for the record in the performance of their duties.”

5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1).

The Act imposes stricter limits on sharing information between agencies or outside the

Federal Government. For example, an agency may disclose a record to “another agency or to an

instrumentality of any governmental jurisdiction . . . for a civil or criminal law enforcement

activity,” but only upon a “written request to the agency which maintains the record specifying

the particular portion desired and the law enforcement activity for which the record is sought.”

5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(7).

An agency may also share a record “for a routine use.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3). A routine

use is the use of a record “for a purpose which is compatible with the purpose for which it was

collected.” Id. § 552a(a)(7). An agency cannot invent new routine uses on the fly; instead, when

an agency establishes or revises a system of records, it must “publish in the Federal Register” a

notice containing a list of “each routine use of the records contained in the system, including the

categories of users and the purpose of such use.” Id. § 552a(e)(4)(D). If that system of records

notice (“SORN”) announces “any new use or intended use of the information in the system,” the

23

agency must give notice to the public at least 30 days in advance and “provide an opportunity for

interested persons to submit written data, views, or arguments” about the new routine use. Id. §

552a(e)(11). If the agency proposes to make a “significant change” to a system of records, it

must also provide “adequate advance notice” to two specified congressional committees and the

Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) “to permit an evaluation of the probable or

potential effect of such proposal on the privacy or other rights of individuals.” Id. § 552a(r).

The Privacy Act does not specify a remedy for violations of its nondisclosure rules.

Instead, the Act includes a catch-all remedial provision providing that, when an agency’s

violation of the Act has “an adverse effect on an individual,” the individual may bring a civil

action against the agency in federal district court. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D). If the disclosure

“was intentional or willful,” the individual may recover attorney’s fees and the greater of their

actual damages or $1,000. Id. § 522a(g)(4).

B. Facts and Proceedings

1. Executive Order No. 14,248

On March 25, 2025, President Donald J. Trump signed an Executive Order entitled

“Preserving and Protecting the Integrity of American Elections.” Exec. Order No. 14,248, 90

Fed. Reg. 14005 (Mar. 25, 2025). The Executive Order directs a variety of federal officials to

take actions that the President proffers will help ensure that federal elections are “honest and

worthy of the public trust.” Id. § 1. As relevant here:

Section 2(a) of the Executive Order directs the EAC to “take appropriate action” within

30 days “to require” people registering to vote using the Federal Form to submit “documentary

proof of United States citizenship.” Id. § 2(a). This Court has permanently enjoined the EAC

and other Defendants from taking any action to implement or give effect to this provision. See

LULAC II, 2025 WL 3042704, at *38; Order, Dkt. No. 217.

24

Section 2(b) directs the heads of various federal agencies, including the Department of

Homeland Security (“DHS”), to take action to “identify unqualified voters registered in the

States” by sharing information in various federal databases with State officials and the U.S.

DOGE Service (“USDS,” also called “DOGE”). Id. § 2(b). Similarly, Section 3(a) directs the

Commissioner of Social Security to “take all appropriate action” to make various federal

databases available to “all State and local election officials engaged in verifying” voter

eligibility. Id. § 3(a).

Section 2(d) directs the heads of federal agencies designated as voter registration

agencies under the NVRA to “assess citizenship” before providing the Federal Form to

“enrollees of public assistance programs.” Id. § 2(d).

Section 3(d) directs the Secretary of Defense to “update” the Federal Post Card

Application to require “documentary proof of United States citizenship” and “proof of eligibility

to vote in elections in the State in which the voter is attempting to vote.” Id. § 3(d).8

Section 4(a) directs the EAC to “take all appropriate action to cease providing Federal

funds to States that do not comply with” the requirement to “accept and use” the Federal Form,

including “any requirement for documentary proof of United States citizenship adopted pursuant

to” Section 2(a) of the Executive Order. Id. § 4(a).9

8

The Executive Order uses the title “Secretary of Defense,” which is the statutory title of the head of the

Department of Defense. See Exec. Order No. 14,248; 10 U.S.C. § 113(a)(1) (“There is a Secretary of Defense, who

is the head of the Department of Defense, appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the consent of

the Senate.”). As of September 5, 2025, the Secretary uses the secondary title “Secretary of War” in many official

contexts. See Restoring the United States Department of War, Exec. Order No. 14,347, 90 Fed. Reg. 43893 (Sept. 5,

2025). For consistency with the text of the Executive Order at issue and the parties’ presentations in this case, the

Court shall use the title “Secretary of Defense” in this Memorandum Opinion and the accompanying Order. See

Federal Defs.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 177-1, at 7, 30, 32 (using the title “Secretary of Defense”); Federal Defs.’ Reply &

Opp’n, Dkt. No. 213, at 20, 26 (same).

9

The Democratic Party Plaintiffs initially challenged other parts of Section 4, but they stipulated to the dismissal of

those claims without prejudice on August 17, 2025. See Joint Stipulation of Partial Dismissal Pursuant to Rule 41,

Dkt. No. 193. Although the D.C. Circuit has not yet addressed the issue, multiple circuits have held that Federal

25

Section 7(a) directs the Attorney General to “enforce” two federal statutes, 2 U.S.C. § 7

and 3 U.S.C. § 1, “against States” that count ballots received after Election Day in federal

elections. Exec. Order 14,248 § 7(a).

Section 7(b) directs the EAC to “condition any available funding to a State on that State’s

compliance with” a rule requiring that States only count ballots received on or before Election

Day, subject to limited exceptions for certain ballots cast by servicemembers and other

Americans living abroad, id. § 7(b).

The Executive Order also contains a standard “saving clause,” which provides that the

order “shall be implemented consistent with applicable law.” Id. § 7(b); see Common Cause v.

Trump, 506 F. Supp. 3d 39, 47–53 & n.8 (D.D.C. 2020) (three-judge panel) (discussing an

identical saving clause in another executive order).

2. The Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements Program

In response to Sections 2(b) and 3(a) of Executive Order No. 14,248, the Department of

Homeland Security (“DHS”) implemented several changes to its Systematic Alien Verification

for Entitlements (“SAVE”) program. See Federal Defs.’ Interrog. Resps. (“Defs.’ Resps.”), Dkt.

No. 177-3, at 7, 13–14. SAVE is an online service that allows “registered federal, state,

territorial, tribal, and local government agencies to verify immigration status and U.S. citizenship

of applicants seeking benefits or licenses.” SAVE, U.S. Department of Homeland Security,

Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) allows for the stipulated dismissal only of entire actions, not individual claims. See,

e.g., Bailey v. Shell W. E&P, Inc., 609 F.3d 710, 720 (5th Cir. 2010); Perry v. Schumacher Grp. of Louisiana, 891

F.3d 954, 958 (11th Cir. 2018); see also Loma Linda Kidney Ctr. v. Azar, No. 15-cv-1717, 2018 WL 993000, at *3

(D.D.C. Feb. 21, 2018) (collecting additional cases and reaching the same conclusion), aff’d, 755 F. App’x 7 (D.C.

Cir. 2018). Consistent with “what appears to be the prevailing approach” to such stipulations, this Court shall

construe the parties’ stipulation as a consent motion for leave to amend the Democratic Party Plaintiffs’ Complaint

to strike their claims regarding other provisions of Section 4. See Loma Linda, 2018 WL 993000, at *4.

Accordingly, the Court shall GRANT the Democratic Party Plaintiffs’ constructive motion for leave to amend their

Complaint to strike their claims regarding other provisions of Section 4 and DENY AS MOOT the Federal

Defendants’ and Defendant-Intervenor’s Motions for Summary Judgment as to those claims.

26

https://perma.cc/Z82D-SK7N; see also Defs.’ Resps. at 7. To implement the Executive Order’s

directives about sharing citizenship data with State and local election officials, DHS eliminated

fees for State and local government users and implemented a variety of technical changes that

made it easier for users to perform bulk searches for information about large numbers of

individuals. See Defs.’ Resps. at 13–14. The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) also began

allowing DHS to access and query a Social Security database known as “Numident” to help

“verify[] individuals’ citizenship and immigration status for voter verification and other

authorized inquiries.” Id. at 7.

3. Parties

Days after the President issued Executive Order No. 14,248, three groups of Plaintiffs

filed suit in this District seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against various executive

officers and agencies to block implementation of provisions of the President’s Executive Order.

See Compl., Dkt. No. 1 (Case No. 25-cv-0946), ¶ 1 & at 49; Compl., Dkt. No. 1 (Case No. 25-

cv-0952), ¶ 4, at 68–69 & Ex. A; Compl., Dkt. No. 1 (Case No. 25-cv-0955), ¶ 1 & at 33.

Two of the groups of Plaintiffs in these actions consist of nonpartisan, not-for-profit

organizations. The first group to file includes the League of United Latin American Citizens

(“LULAC”), the Secure Families Initiative, and the Arizona Students’ Association (collectively,

the “LULAC Plaintiffs”), and the second group includes the League of Women Voters Education

Fund, the League of Women Voters of the United States, the League of Women Voters of

Arizona, the Hispanic Federation, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored

People (“NAACP”), OCA – Asian Pacific American Advocates, and Asian and Pacific Islander

American Vote (collectively, the “League Plaintiffs”). Compl., Dkt. No. 1 (Case No. 25-cv-

0946), ¶¶ 7–21; Compl., Dkt. No. 1 (Case No. 25-cv-0955), ¶¶ 11–22.

27

The other group of Plaintiffs includes several national organizations affiliated with the

Democratic Party—the Democratic National Committee (DNC), Democratic Governors

Association (DGA), Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC), and Democratic

Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC)—as well as the individual leaders of the

Democratic Caucuses in the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate

Minority Leader Charles E. Schumer and U.S. House of Representatives Minority Leader

Hakeem S. Jeffries. Compl., Dkt. No. 1 (Case No. 25-cv-0952), ¶¶ 9, 12–17. The Court will

refer to these parties collectively as the “Democratic Party Plaintiffs.”

a. The LULAC Plaintiffs

The LULAC Plaintiffs are membership organizations with members and supporters

throughout the Nation.10 Two of these organizations—LULAC and the Secure Families

Initiative—assert specific interests in helping eligible citizens, including eligible members of the

military and their eligible family members, to register and vote in federal elections.11 Toward

that end, these organizations run voter education and outreach programs designed to serve

military families, including programs that encourage the use of the Federal Post Card

Application to register to vote and request absentee ballots in federal elections.12 Some members

10

See, e.g., Decl. of Juan Proaño (“Proaño Decl.”), Dkt. No. 194-5, ¶ 2 (stating that Plaintiff LULAC is a

“nationwide” organization with “more than 400 councils and over 500,000 members”); Decl. of Brandi Jones

(“Jones Decl.”), Dkt. No. 194-4, ¶ 5 (stating that Plaintiff Secure Families Initiative has “over 44,000 members”).

11

See Proaño Decl. ¶ 11 (LULAC); Jones Decl. ¶ 6 (Secure Families Initiative); see also Suppl. Decl. of Kyle

Nitschke (“Nitschke Decl.”), Dkt. No. 145-15, ¶ 3 (Arizona Students’ Association).

12

See Proaño Decl. ¶¶ 11, 21–22 (LULAC); Jones Decl. ¶¶ 19–20 (Secure Families Initiative).

28

of LULAC and the Secure Families Initiative already use and rely upon the Federal Post Card

Application for these purposes.13

Members of LULAC and the Secure Families Initiative also experience situations that

may make it difficult or impossible for them to provide documentary proof of citizenship when

registering to vote and requesting absentee ballots.14 For example, some members may not have

a U.S. passport because of the expense and administrative burden of obtaining one.15 Others

may have obtained U.S. passports but not be able to provide them at the time that they need to

register to vote or request an absentee ballot, whether because they relocated on short notice

under conditions that did not require them to carry their passports, because they lack reliable

access to the internet or other resources necessary to make and submit copies of their passports,

or because their passports were lost or stolen during a move or other travel.16 Some members

also face security threats while outside the United States that cause them to be wary of sending

sensitive personal information, including documentary proof of citizenship, in the mail.17 Still

others are not willing to provide documentary proof of citizenship, even if they have it, because

they fear that doing so may attract attention to family members who are not citizens.18

13

See Proaño Decl. ¶ 13 (LULAC); Decl. of Luis Reyna (Reyna Decl.), Dkt. No. 194-6, ¶ 18 (LULAC Veterans of

Southern California Council); Jones Decl. ¶ 21 (Secure Families Initiative).

14

See, e.g., Proaño Decl. ¶¶ 14–20 (LULAC); Reyna Decl. ¶ 18 (LULAC Veterans of Southern California Council);

Jones Decl. ¶¶ 22–35 (Secure Families Initiative).

15

See Jones Decl. ¶¶ 23–24 (Secure Families Initiative).

16

See Proaño Decl. ¶¶ 15–16 (LULAC); Jones Decl. ¶¶ 23–31 (Secure Families Initiative).

17

See Jones Decl. ¶¶ 32–33 (Secure Families Initiative).

18

See Proaño Decl. ¶ 17–18 (LULAC).

29

LULAC and the Secure Families Initiative also have members who depend on voting by

mail to cast their ballots in federal elections.19 Some of these members specifically rely on laws

in their States that allow the counting of ballots received by mail after Election Day, provided

that the ballots are voted and mailed on or before Election Day.20 For example, some members

of LULAC and the Secure Families Initiative vote by mail because they or their family members

are deployed or stationed abroad, away at school, or otherwise far from home during elections.21

Others vote by mail because their work hours make it difficult to vote in person. 22 Still others

vote by mail because they are more likely to experience voter intimidation if they vote in

person.23 Some members have mobility challenges that limit their ability to return their ballots

by other means.24 Some members also experience significant delays or other issues in the

delivery of their mail.25 Some members who rely on voting by mail often submit their ballots

close in time to Election Day, either because mobility challenges or other issues make it difficult

19

See Proaño Decl. ¶¶ 27–38 (LULAC); Reyna Decl. ¶¶ 16, 20 (LULAC Veterans of Southern California Council);

Decl. of Irma C. Gonzalez (“Gonzalez Decl.”), Dkt. No. 194-7, ¶¶ 5, 7–12 (LULAC San Benito County Council);

Decl. of James Fukuda (“Fukuda Decl.”), Dkt. No. 194-8, ¶¶ 12–13, 17, 26 (LULAC Weehawken Council); Decl. of

Ana Orellana (“Orellana Decl.”), Dkt. No. 194-9, ¶ 5 (LULAC Stockton Council); Decl. of Felix Rivera (“Rivera

Decl.”), Dkt. No. 194-10, ¶¶ 8, 14–15 (LULAC Alaska Council); Jones Decl. ¶ 41 (Secure Families Initiative).

20

See, e.g., Proaño Decl. ¶¶ 37–38 (LULAC); Reyna Decl. ¶¶ 17, 21 (LULAC Veterans of Southern California

Council); Gonzalez Decl. ¶¶ 12, 15 (LULAC San Benito County Council); Orellana Decl. ¶ 11 (LULAC Stockton

Council); Jones Decl. ¶¶ 45–46 (Secure Families Initiative).

21

See, e.g., Reyna Decl. ¶ 17 (LULAC Veterans of Southern California Council); Fukuda Decl. ¶ 26 (LULAC

Weehawken Council); Orellana Decl. ¶ 8–9 (LULAC Stockton Council); Rivera Decl. ¶¶ 13–14 (LULAC Alaska

Council); Jones Decl. ¶¶ 41, 44 (Secure Families Initiative).

22

See, e.g., Orellana Decl. ¶¶ 12, 14 (LULAC Stockton Council).

23

See Orellana Decl. ¶¶ 19–20 (LULAC Stockton Council).

24

See, e.g., Reyna Decl. ¶ 21 (LULAC Veterans of Southern California Council); Gonzalez Decl. ¶¶ 8–10, 12

(LULAC San Benito County Council); Fukuda Decl. ¶¶ 15–17 (LULAC Weehawken Council).

25

See, e.g., Proaño Decl. ¶ 34 (LULAC); Reyna Decl. ¶ 17 (LULAC Veterans of Southern California Council);

Gonzalez Decl. ¶¶ 11, 14–15 (LULAC San Benito County Council); Orellana Decl. ¶¶ 10, 16–18 (LULAC Stockton

Council); Jones Decl. ¶¶ 42–44 (Secure Families Initiative).

30

for them to mail their ballots earlier, or because they prefer to receive as much information as

possible about the candidates and issues on the ballot before casting their votes by mail.26

Some of LULAC’s members are eligible to vote in North Dakota, which changed its

ballot-receipt deadline in response to the Executive Order.27 Some of these members previously

relied on the North Dakota’s prior practice of counting ballots that were voted and mailed on or

before Election Day but received within a certain time thereafter.28

Finally, some LULAC and Secure Families Initiative members rely on State “ballot cure”

programs to resolve technical issues with their mail-in ballots shortly after Election Day.29

b. The Democratic Party Plaintiffs

Each of the Democratic Party Plaintiffs asserts an interest in fair, lawful competition for

federal elective office, including fair opportunities to register and turn out eligible voters who are

likely to support Democratic candidates.30 Like the LULAC Plaintiffs, the Democratic Party

26

See, e.g., Gonzalez Decl. ¶¶ 13, 16 (LULAC San Benito County Council); Fukuda Decl. ¶¶ 13, 15, 17 (LULAC

Weehawken Council); Orellana Decl. ¶¶ 11, 13, 15 (LULAC Stockston Council); Rivera Decl. ¶ 9 (LULAC Alaska

Council).

27

See Proaño Decl. ¶¶ 30–31.

28

Id. ¶ 30.

29

See, e.g., Gonzalez Decl. ¶¶ 18–22 (LULAC San Benito County Council).

30

See, e.g., Second Decl. of Liberty Schneider (“Schneider Decl.”), Dkt. No. 198-3, ¶¶ 4, 7–8, 15, 24, 33–34 (DNC);

Second Decl. of Jillian Edelman (“Edelman Decl.”), Dkt. No. 198-4, ¶¶ 3, 5–6, 15, 21, 30–31 (DGA); Second Decl.

of Lillie Snyder Boss (“Boss Decl.”), Dkt. No. 198-5, ¶¶ 3, 5–7, 17, 23, 33–34 (DSCC); Second Decl. of Erik

Ruselowski, Dkt. No. 198-6, ¶¶ 4, 6–8, 16, 22, 32–33 (DCCC); Second Decl. of Hakeem S. Jeffries (“Jeffries

Decl.”), Dkt. No. 198-1, ¶¶ 3–4, 7, 11–12, 17–21; Second Decl. of Charles E. Schumer (“Schumer Decl.”), Dkt. No.

198-2, ¶¶ 3–4, 8, 11–12, 17–21.

31

Plaintiffs operate voter registration programs throughout the Nation.31 Some of the Democratic

Party Plaintiffs are active in voter registration and turnout efforts in every State.32

Two of the Democratic Party Plaintiffs—U.S. House of Representatives Minority Leader

Hakeem Jeffries and U.S. Senate Minority Leader Charles Schumer—are active candidates for

federal elective office.33

The Democratic Party Plaintiffs collectively represent millions of eligible voters

throughout the United States, including many who vote by mail and who use and rely on the

Federal Post Card Application.34 Because of mail delays and other challenges, some of these

voters specifically rely on laws in their States that allow the counting of ballots received by mail

after Election Day, provided that the ballots are voted and mailed on or before Election Day.35

Some of these voters would be unable to register to vote or would be dissuaded from voting if

they were required to provide documentary proof of citizenship to do so, whether because they

do not have passports or other qualifying documentation, because they live overseas and would

have difficulty securely submitting the required documentation, or because they have had name

31

See, e.g., Schneider Decl. ¶¶ 4, 15 (DNC); Edelman Decl. ¶¶ 6, 15 (DGA); Boss Decl. ¶¶ 3, 17 (DSCC);

Ruselowski Decl. ¶¶ 4, 16 (DCCC).

32

See, e.g., Schneider Decl. ¶¶ 6, 15, 28 (stating that Plaintiff DNC “is actively planning, preparing, budgeting, and

strategizing for the rapidly approaching 2026 midterm elections in all 50 states,” “maintains a website that provides

voters in all fifty states with the information they need to register to vote and check their registrations,” and

“supports candidates throughout the country and thus has large constituencies in every state”); Boss Decl. ¶ 28

(stating that Plaintiff DSCC also “supports candidates throughout the country and thus has large constituencies in

every state”); Ruselowski Decl. ¶ 27 (stating the same for Plaintiff DCCC).

33

See Jeffries Decl. ¶ 3; Schumer Decl. ¶ 3.

34

See, e.g., Schneider Decl. ¶¶ 5, 10, 14–17 (DNC); Edelman Decl. ¶¶ 3, 2 Jeffries Decl. ¶¶ 2, 7, 9, 11–12; Schumer

Decl. ¶¶ 2, 7, 9, 11–12; Decl. of Bahareh Aziz (“Azizi Decl.”), Dkt. No. 198-7, ¶¶ 3–5; Decl. of Rachel E. Nelson

(“Nelson Decl.”), Dkt. No. 198-8, ¶¶ 3, 6; Decl. of Judy Bryant (“Bryant Decl.”), Dkt. No. 198-9, ¶¶ 3–4; Decl. of

Ada Shen (“Shen Decl.”), Dkt No. 198-10, ¶¶ 7–8; Decl. of Gene Scott Phillips (“Phillips Decl.”), Dkt. No. 198-12,

¶¶ 3–4.

35

See, e.g., Azizi Decl. ¶¶ 7, 9; Nelson Decl. ¶¶ 6–7, 10–11; Bryant Decl. ¶ 6; Shen Decl. ¶ 16; Phillips Decl. ¶¶ 3–4

32

changes—for example, due to marriage—and their legal names no longer match the names on

their citizenship documents.36

Some of these eligible voters have also expressed concerns about improper access to their

personal information by federal officials, including employees of DHS and USDS (also called

“DOGE”).37 Because eligible voters’ concerns about improper access to their information make

it more difficult for the Democratic Party Plaintiffs to register and turn out those voters, these

concerns have led the Democratic Party Plaintiffs to expend additional resources on educating

and assisting voters.38

4. Proceedings

On April 1, 2025, the Clerk of the Court randomly assigned the Democratic Party

Plaintiffs’ case to this Court pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Procedure 40.3(a). The Nonpartisan

Plaintiffs’ cases were later assigned to this Court as “related case[s]” pursuant to Local Rule of

Civil Procedure 40.5(c). These three cases are “related” because they “grow out of the same

event or transaction”—the issuance of Executive Order No. 14,248, 90 Fed. Reg. 14005 (Mar.

25, 2025)—and “involve common issues of fact” related to the effect of that Executive Order.

See LCvR 40.5(a)(3).

Given the extensive commonalities among the factual and legal issues among the three

cases, this Court directed the Democratic Party Plaintiffs to meet and confer with the parties in

36

See, e.g., Azizi Decl. ¶ 5 (challenges submitting documents securely from overseas); Shen Decl. ¶¶ 11, 15 (same);

Boss Decl. ¶ 21 (name changes)

37

See Jeffries Decl. ¶ 16; Schumer Decl. ¶ 16; Schneider Decl. ¶¶ 27, 31 (DNC); Edelman Decl. ¶¶ 24, 28 (DGA);

Boss ¶¶ 27, 31 (DSCC); Ruselowski Decl. ¶¶ 26, 30 (DCCC); Bryant Decl. ¶¶ 8–9; Decl. of Kaitlin Cagle (“Cagle

Decl.”), Dkt. No. 198-11, ¶¶ 9–11.

38

See Jeffries Decl. ¶ 17; Schumer Decl. ¶ 17; Schneider Decl. ¶¶ 27–32 (DNC); Edelman Decl. ¶¶ 24–29 (DGA);

Boss ¶¶ 27–32 (DSCC); Ruselowski Decl. ¶¶ 26–31 (DCCC).

33

all three related cases to determine each parties’ position on whether the cases should be

consolidated and, if appropriate, file a motion to consolidate the cases. See Order, Dkt. No. 15

(Case No. 25-cv-0952); see also Fed. R. Civ. P 42(a)(2) (allowing consolidation of multiple civil

cases presenting “a common question of law or fact”). The Democratic Party Plaintiffs then filed

a motion to consolidate the cases, with the consent of all parties. See Mot. to Consolidate Cases,

Dkt. No. 16 (Case No. 25-cv-0952). This Court granted the motion and consolidated the three

cases, directing the parties to consolidate their briefing “to the greatest extent practicable,” while

recognizing that some aligned parties may need to “request different relief” from one another.

See Mem. Op. & Order, Dkt. No. 20 (Case No. 25-cv-0952), at 4–5.

Shortly thereafter, the LULAC Plaintiffs and League Plaintiffs requested that the Court

set an expedited schedule for briefing on motions for preliminary injunction. See Emergency

Mot. for Clarification of the Consolidation Order and to Expedite Hearing and Briefing, Dkt. No.

30. These Plaintiffs also requested leave to file briefs separately from the Democratic Party

Plaintiffs, given their nonpartisan status and differing interests in these cases. See id. The Court

granted both requests and ordered all Plaintiffs to file their motions for preliminary injunctions

on or before April 7, the Defendants to file any responses to those motions on or before April 14,

and the Plaintiffs to file any replies in support of their motions on or before April 16.39 See

Order, Dkt. No. 31. On April 17, the Court held a hearing on the Plaintiffs’ motions with all

parties present. See generally Tr. of Preliminary Injunction Hr’g (“Tr.”), Dkt. No. 100.

This Court granted Plaintiffs’ motions in part and preliminarily enjoined the

implementation of two provisions of the Executive Order: Section 2(a), which directs the EAC to

39

The Court denied without prejudice a subsequent request from the LULAC Plaintiffs to alter this briefing schedule

as to the LULAC Plaintiffs’ and Democratic Party Plaintiffs’ claims regarding Section 7 of the Executive Order,

which the LULAC Plaintiffs suggested could be briefed on a longer schedule. See Min. Order (Apr. 10, 2025).

34

modify the Federal Form to require applicants to provide documentary proof of U.S. citizenship,

and Section 2(d), which directs the heads of certain federal agencies to “assess citizenship”

before providing the Federal Form “to enrollees of public assistance programs.” LULAC I, 780

F. Supp. 3d at 226; Order, Dkt. No. 103. The Democratic Party Plaintiffs also moved for

injunctions against three other provisions of the Executive Order, but the Court denied those

requests. See LULAC I, 780 F. Supp. 3d at 226 (denying the Democratic Party Plaintiffs’ motion

as to Sections 2(b), 7(a), and 7(b)).

The Republican National Committee (“RNC”) later moved to intervene as a Defendant in

the consolidated cases. Mot. to Intervene, Dkt. No. 125. The Court granted the RNC’s motion

in part, allowing it to intervene as a Defendant against all Plaintiffs’ claims for relief from

implementation of certain sections of Executive Order No. 14,248. See Mem. Op. & Order, Dkt.

No. 135 (granting intervention as to Sections 2(a), 2(b), 2(d), 3(a), and 7(a)).

After the Court resolved Plaintiffs’ motions for preliminary relief and the RNC’s motion

to intervene, it established a phased schedule for summary judgment briefing. See Scheduling

Order, Dkt. No. 141.

In the first phase of briefing, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on

Plaintiffs’ claims regarding Section 2(a) of the Executive Order, which the parties agreed could

be resolved without discovery.

This Court granted Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment on their constitutional

separation-of-powers claims regarding Section 2(a), entered partial final judgment in Plaintiffs’

favor on those claims, and issued a permanent injunction barring the relevant Defendants from

implementing that provision. See LULAC II, 2025 WL 3042704, at *38; Order, Dkt. No. 217.

35

Finally, after an opportunity for limited discovery through written interrogatories, the

Federal Defendants, the LULAC Plaintiffs, and the Democratic Party Plaintiffs each filed cross-

motions for summary judgment, addressing the remainder of Plaintiffs’ challenges to the

Executive Order’s directives. See Federal Defs.’ Mot., Dkt. No. 177; Def.-Intervenor’s Mot.,

Dkt. No. 176; LULAC Pls.’ Mot., Dkt. No. 194; Dem. Pls.’ Mot., Dkt. No. 196.

Soon after the parties finished the initial round of briefing on their cross-motions for

summary judgment regarding Plaintiffs’ remaining claims, the Federal Defendants notified the

Court that two federal agencies have issued new system of records notices (“SORNs”) that are

relevant to the resolution of the Democratic Party Plaintiffs’ Privacy Act claim regarding

changes to the use of DHS’s SAVE Program and SSA’s Numident system adopted in response to

Sections 2(b) and 3(a) of the Executive Order. See Federal Defs.’ Notice of Factual

Developments, Dkt. No. 222. At the Court’s direction, the parties submitted supplemental

memoranda regarding this development. See Federal Defs.’ Suppl., Dkt No. 226; Dem. Pls.

Suppl., Dkt. No. 232.

The parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment are now ripe for decision.

5. Parallel Proceedings

In parallel with these consolidated cases, two groups of States filed related challenges to

Executive Order No. 14,248 in other Districts: one in the U.S. District Court for the District of

Massachusetts, which was assigned to Judge Denise J. Casper, and one in the U.S. District Court

for the Western District of Washington, which was assigned to Judge John H. Chun. See

California v. Trump, No. 25-cv-10810 (D. Mass. filed Apr. 3, 2025); Washington v. Trump, No.

2:25-cv-0602, (W.D. Wash. filed Apr. 4, 2025).

Both Judge Casper and Judge Chun have now preliminarily or permanently enjoined the

implementation of many provisions of the Executive Order with respect to the plaintiff States.

36

See California v. Trump (“California I”), 786 F. Supp. 3d 359, 396–97 (D. Mass. 2025)

(preliminarily enjoining the implementation of Sections 2(a), 2(d), 3(d), 7(a), and 7(b));

Washington v. Trump, No. 2:25-cv-0602, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2026 WL 73866, at *39 (W.D.

Wash. Jan. 9, 2026) (permanently enjoining the implementation of Sections 2(a), 4(a), 4(b), and

aspects of Section 7); see also California v. Trump (“California II”), No. 25-CV-10810, --- F.

Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2663106, at *13 (D. Mass. Sept. 17, 2025) (denying motion to dismiss).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A moving party is entitled to summary judgment when it “shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact” and that it is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a).

The Declaratory Judgment Act allows a court, “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its

jurisdiction,” to “declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such

declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). Whether

to issue a declaratory judgment under this provision “always rests within the sound discretion of

the court.” President v. Vance, 627 F.2d 353, 365 n.76 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Among the factors that

courts in this Circuit consider when deciding whether to grant a declaratory judgment are

(1) “whether the judgment will serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations at issue”

and (2) “whether the judgment will terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity,

and controversy giving rise to the proceeding.” See Glenn v. Thomas Fortune Fay, 222 F. Supp.

3d 31, 36 (D.D.C. 2016) (RCL) (citing Vance, 627 F.2d at 364 n.76).

To obtain a permanent injunction, a plaintiff must make four showings. Monsanto Co. v.

Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 156–57 (2010). First, “the prevailing party must

demonstrate that it actually ‘has suffered,’ or is ‘likely to suffer irreparable harm’” in the absence

of an injunction. In re Fed. Bureau of Prisons’ Execution Protocol Cases, 980 F.3d 123, 137

37

(D.C. Cir. 2020) (first quoting Monsanto, 561 U.S. at 156–57; and then quoting Winter v. Nat.

Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). Second, the moving party must show “that remedies

available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury.”

Monsanto, 561 U.S. at 156–57 (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391

(2006)). Third, the moving party must show that, “considering the balance of hardships between

the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted.” Id. (quoting eBay, 547 U.S. at

391). Fourth, and finally, the moving party must show “that the public interest would not be

disserved by a permanent injunction.” Id. (quoting eBay, 547 U.S. at 391). “[W]hen the

Government is the opposing party,” as it is in this case, the balance-of-hardships and public-

interest factors “merge,” and courts address those factors together. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S.

418, 435 (2009); Singh v. Berger, 56 F.4th 88, 107 (D.C. Cir. 2022).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Threshold Issues

Before turning to the merits of the individual claims at issue, the Court introduces several

threshold issues of justiciability that apply to multiple claims.

1. Standing

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43,

56–57 (2024); U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. One necessary condition for a claim to come within

this Court’s limited subject-matter jurisdiction is that the plaintiff must have standing to advance

the claim. Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 624 (D.C. Cir. 2017). To have standing, the

plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact” that is “concrete and particularized,” “actual or

imminent,” and “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant,” which “likely”

will be “redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61

(1992) (alterations in original) (first quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984); then

38

quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990); and then quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky.

Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976)).

A party must have standing “for each claim that [it] press[es] and for each form of relief

that [it] seek[s].” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 431 (2021). For a plaintiff to have

standing to pursue “forward-looking” relief such as an injunction, the plaintiff must “face ‘a real

and immediate threat of repeated injury.’” Murthy, 603 U.S. at 58 (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton,

414 U.S. 488 (1974)). The party asserting standing must show that each of these requirements is

satisfied “with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the

litigation.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.

Most of the Plaintiffs in these cases are organizations, rather than individuals. As the

Court has explained at some length in prior opinions in this case, there are two ways that

organizations can have standing to sue in federal court. See LULAC I, 780 F. Supp. 3d at 178–

82; LULAC II, 2025 WL 3042704, at *11–14; Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental

Drugs v. Eschenbach, 469 F.3d 129, 132 (D.C. Cir. 2006). First, an organization can have

standing “on its own behalf,” which is called “organizational standing.” Abigail All., 469 F.3d at

132 (citing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378–79 (1982); and Warth v. Seldin,

422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975)). Second, an organization can have standing to advance a claim “on

behalf of its members,” which is called “associational standing.” Id. (citing United Food &

Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 553 (1996); and

Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)); Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v.

United States Dep’t of Com. (“EPIC”), 928 F.3d 95, 101 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

A party can show organizational standing by making “the same showing required of

individuals: an actual or threatened injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s

39

allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by a favorable court decision.” Am. Anti-

Vivisection Soc’y v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 946 F.3d 615, 618 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (first

quoting Abigail All., 469 F.3d at 132; and then quoting Am. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty

to Animals v. Feld Entertainment, Inc., 659 F.3d 13, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). “To demonstrate

injury in fact, an organization must allege a ‘concrete and demonstrable injury to the

organization’s activities’ that is ‘more than simply a setback to the organization’s abstract social

interests.’” Id. (quoting Havens, 455 U.S. at 379). However, because a party cannot “spend its

way into standing,” mere “issue-advocacy” activities are not sufficient to support organizational

standing. See Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U.S. at 395–96. However, organizations

can have standing to challenge practices that directly interfere with their core activities, such as

direct services programs. See Food and Drug Administration v. Alliance for Hippocratic

Medicine, 602 U.S. 367, 394–96 (2024); Equal Rights Ctr. v. Post Props., Inc., 633 F.3d 1136,

1141–42 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

Regardless of whether an organization has standing to pursue a claim on its own behalf, it

may have associational standing to sue on behalf of its members. This path to standing is always

available to a “voluntary membership organization with identifiable members” that “represents

[its members] in good faith.” Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of

Harvard Coll., 600 U.S. 181, 201 (2023). An organization not meeting that description may also

have associational standing, but to do so, it “must have” at least “the ‘indicia of a traditional

membership association.’” Viasat, Inc. v. FCC, 47 F.4th 769, 781 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (quoting

Sorenson Commc’ns v. FCC, 897 F.3d 214, 225 (D.C. Cir. 2018)); see also Hunt, 432 U.S. at

343. If these threshold requirements are satisfied, an organization may establish that it

associational standing by showing that “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in

40

their own right; (b) the interests [the organization] seeks to protect are germane to the

organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the

participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343; EIPIC, 928 F.3d at

101.

Some of the Democratic Party Plaintiffs also assert “political-competitor” standing,

which refers to a political candidate or party’s standing to challenge the “illegal structuring of a

competitive environment” in which “rival parties defend their concrete interests.” Shays v. Fed.

Election Comm’n, 414 F.3d 76, 85–87 (D.C. Cir. 2005).40 This type of standing is relevant

primarily when a plaintiff challenges an improper benefit to a competitor: although parties

usually lack standing to challenge benefits to others, political-competitor standing—like the

analogous doctrine of economic-competitor standing—recognizes that certain benefits

predictably inflict concrete harms on the head-to-head competitors of their beneficiaries. See id.

Political candidates’ standing to challenge unlawful rules shaping the “competitive

environment” for elections derives from the principle that “parties defending concrete interests”

suffer a cognizable harm when they are denied fair opportunities to protect those interests.

Shays, 414 F.3d at 87. In the election context, as in other regulated arenas, the D.C. Circuit has

recognized that “regulated litigants suffer legal injury when agencies set the rules of the game in

violation of statutory directives.” Id. at 85.

40

See also, e.g., Mecinas v. Hobbs, 30 F.4th 890, 898 (9th Cir. 2022) (“If an allegedly unlawful election regulation

makes the competitive landscape worse for a candidate or that candidate’s party than it would otherwise be if the

regulation were declared unlawful, those injured parties have the requisite concrete, non-generalized harm to confer

standing.”); Texas Democratic Party v. Benkiser, 459 F.3d 582, 587 (5th Cir. 2006) (recognizing political party’s

associational standing “on behalf of its candidate” to challenge action that allegedly “threaten[ed] [the candidate’s]

election prospects and campaign coffers”); Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621, 626 (2d

Cir. 1989) (recognizing standing to challenge the exclusion of a candidate from a political debate, which “palpably

impaired [the candidate’s] ability to compete on an equal footing with other significant presidential candidates”).

41

In a recent decision, the Supreme Court endorsed an expansive view of political-

competitor standing, holding that a political candidate always has standing to challenge vote-

counting procedures, regardless of whether those procedures “help, hurt, or have no effect on”

the candidate’s electoral fortunes or the cost of the candidate’s campaign. See Bost v. Illinois

State Bd. of Elections, No. 24-568, --- S. Ct. ----, 2026 WL 96707, at *3, *5 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2026).

Because political-competitor standing in this Circuit has historically been based on

political candidates’ underlying interest in the “retention of elected office,” see Shays, 414 F.3d

at 85, it is available primarily to candidates with “concrete plans to run for office in the future,”

see Nader v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 725 F.3d 226, 229 (D.C. Cir. 2013).41 At least one other

court in this District has also concluded that the “party affiliate” of active candidates for political

office may also have political-competitor standing. See Nat. L. Party of U.S. v. F.E.C., 111 F.

Supp. 2d 33, 47 (D.D.C. 2000) (ESH). By contrast, courts in this Circuit have declined to extend

political-competitor standing to political action committees, reasoning that such organizations do

not “compete” in elections in the relevant sense. See Gottlieb v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 143

F.3d 618, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1998); AB PAC v. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 22-cv-2139, 2023 WL

4560803, at *4 (D.D.C. July 17, 2023) (TJK).

2. Ripeness

The justiciability doctrine of ripeness, which aims to prevent premature judicial

intervention in abstract or ill-defined controversies, has both a constitutional component and a

prudential component.42 Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003).

41

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bost may lead courts in this Circuit to take a more expansive view of

political-competitor standing in the future. See Bost, 2026 WL 96707, at *3 (concluding that candidates’ interest in

winning elective office “cannot be severed from their interest in the electoral process” and that candidates always

“suffer when the process departs from the law”).

42

The Supreme Court has cast doubt on the enduring vitality of the prudential ripeness doctrine. See Susan B.

Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 167 (2014). At least one member of the D.C. Circuit has done the same.

42

In a case like this one that involves a pre-enforcement challenge to executive action,

“[c]onstitutional ripeness ‘is subsumed into the Article III requirement of standing, which

requires a [plaintiff to show] an injury-in-fact that is “imminent” or “certainly impending.”’”

POET Biorefining, LLC v. EPA, 970 F.3d 392, 403 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting Am. Petrol. Inst. v.

EPA, 683 F.3d 382, 386 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).

The prudential component of ripeness requires courts to balance two competing

considerations. See Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967). On the one hand,

courts must weigh institutional reasons for deferring review, such as a need for further factual

development or an indication that the challenged action is merely tentative, rather than final. Id.

On the other hand, courts must assess the hardship that would result from delaying review. Id.

As this Court previously explained, the prudential ripeness of a challenge to an executive

order can be analyzed in part by analogy to the distinction bfetween “legislative rules” and

“guidance” in the administrative law context. See LULAC I, 780 F. Supp. 3d at 174–75.

Legislative rules, which purport to create binding obligations, may be subject to pre-enforcement

review. See Nat’l Min. Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 251–52 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Kavanaugh,

J.). However, pre-enforcement review is not available when an agency issues non-binding

guidance. Id. Similarly, executive actions that purport to create binding obligations or “dictate

particular outcomes” may be prudentially ripe for pre-implementation review, while directions

from the President that merely provide general direction and “do not have any independent

operative legal effect” may not be subject to such review. See Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-

See Indus. Energy Consumers of Am. v. FERC, 125 F.4th 1156, 1163–67 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (Henderson, J.,

concurring). However, neither court has definitively abandoned prudential ripeness, and this Court cannot do so on

its own.

43

CIO v. Trump, 318 F. Supp. 3d 370, 437 (D.D.C. 2018) (KBJ), rev’d on other grounds, 929 F.3d

748 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

Consistent with these principles, both the Supreme Court and a recent three-judge panel

in this District have held that a challenge to an executive order was prudentially unripe when the

order at issue did not require a particular substantive outcome. See Trump v. New York, 592 U.S.

125, 132 (2020); Common Cause v. Trump, 506 F. Supp. 3d 39, 45–53 (D.D.C. 2020) (three-

judge panel) (Katsas, J.). The order at issue in those cases announced a policy of excluding

aliens from census apportionment “to the maximum extent feasible and consistent with the

discretion delegated to the executive branch.” See Presidential Memorandum: Excluding Illegal

Aliens from the Apportionment Base Following the 2020 Census § 2, 85 Fed. Reg. 44,679,

44,680 (July 21, 2020). It also directed the Secretary of Commerce “to provide information

permitting the President” to effectuate that policy. Id. Both the Supreme Court and a three-

judge panel in this District concluded that this order was unfit for judicial review because it left

significant uncertainty about how, and to what extent, the articulated policy would be

implemented. Trump, 592 U.S. at 132; Common Cause, 506 F. Supp. 3d at 47–53.

In sum, ripeness doctrine requires this Court to assess not only the basic requirements of

standing—namely, whether Plaintiffs have shown threatened injuries that are “imminent” or

“certainly impending”—but also whether institutional reasons for deferring review outweigh the

hardship that would result from postponing any available relief. Those considerations weigh

against judicial review of an executive order if the order does not direct a particular substantive

outcome and there is significant uncertainty about how the order will be implemented.

3. Mootness

Because the power of Article III courts extends only to actual “Cases” and

“Controversies,” federal courts lack jurisdiction to decide claims that have been mooted by

44

subsequent developments. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). “A case becomes

moot—and therefore no longer a “Case” or “Controversy” for purposes of Article III—‘when the

issues presented are no longer “live” or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the

outcome.’” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013) (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455

U.S. 478, 481 (1982) (per curiam). Courts analyze mootness on a claim-by-claim basis. See

Coal. of Airline Pilots Associations v. FAA, 370 F.3d 1184, 1189–90 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

“Corrective action by an agency is one type of subsequent development that can moot a

previously justiciable issue.” Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 680

F.2d 810, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Unless an exception applies, a case is “plainly moot” when the

challenged action has been superseded by subsequent agency action. Alaska v. United States

Dep’t of Agric., 17 F.4th 1224, 1226 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas

Co. v. FERC, 962 F.2d 45, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). Although a defendant’s “voluntary cessation”

of a challenged practice ordinarily does not moot a case, that exception to the general rules of

mootness “‘has no play’ when the agency did not act ‘in order to avoid litigation.’” Id. (quoting

Am. Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 636 F.3d 641, 648 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). Similarly, although a practice that

is “capable of repetition, yet evading review” may be challenged notwithstanding the ordinary

rules of mootness, an agency’s decision to change course generally falls outside this exception

because if the agency repeats the challenged conduct in the future, its action will be subject to

review at that time. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1988)

(quoting Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)).

4. Statutory and non-statutory rights of action

To proceed in federal court, a plaintiff must be “a member of the class of litigants that

may, as a matter of law, appropriately invoke the power of the court”—a concept often

shorthanded by stating that the plaintiff must have a “cause of action.” See Davis v. Passman,

45

442 U.S. 228, 236–41 & n.18 (1979). But see Samuel L. Bray & Paul B. Miller, Getting into

Equity, 97 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1763, 1776 (2022) (“It is a mistake, or at least conducive of a

mistake, to refer to ‘causes of action’ in equity.”).

a. Statutory review under the Administrative Procedure Act

In many cases, the plaintiff’s right to seek judicial intervention arises from a statute.

Most often, in cases challenging action by the Executive Branch, that statute is the

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). See 5 U.S.C. § 704. Judicial review under the APA is

available only in challenges to “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy

in a court.” Id.

Because “the President is not an agency within the meaning of” the APA, the issuance of

an executive order is not a final agency action that is reviewable within the APA framework.

Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992). Therefore, the APA does not afford a

statutory right to direct judicial relief from a Presidential executive order. See LULAC II, 2025

WL 3042704, at *23.

Furthermore, an executive order that has not yet been implemented is not “final agency

action,” and such an order is therefore not ripe for review in an APA suit against any other

federal defendant. See 5 U.S.C. § 704.

b. Non-statutory rights of action

Lacking a statutory right of action for several of their claims, Plaintiffs must show that

they are entitled to judicial intervention on non-statutory, equitable grounds.

If a plaintiff’s claim is based on a defendant’s alleged a violation of a federal statute, the

availability of equitable relief to enforce compliance with the statute in the absence of a statutory

cause of action—often called ultra vires review—is “extremely limited” in scope. Changji

Esquel Textile Co. v. Raimondo, 40 F.4th 716, 721–22 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (quoting Griffith v. Fed.

46

Lab. Rels. Auth., 842 F.2d 487, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). To prevail on such a claim, “the plaintiff

must establish three things: ‘(i) the statutory preclusion of review is implied rather than express;

(ii) there is no alternative procedure for review of the statutory claim; and (iii) the agency plainly

acts in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the statute that is

clear and mandatory.’” Id. at 722 (quoting DCH Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Azar, 925 F.3d 503, 509

(D.C. Cir. 2019)). The requirement of showing a legal error is “especially demanding” and

requires an error that is “‘so extreme that one may view it as jurisdictional or nearly so.’” Id.

(quoting Griffith, 842 F.2d at 492).

As these demanding requirements suggest, an equitable ultra vires claim arising directly

from an alleged violation of a statute “rarely succeeds.” Nuclear Regul. Comm’n v. Texas, 605

U.S. 665, 681 (2025). Accordingly, the Federal Defendants argue persuasively that ultra

vires review is not available in this case to redress alleged statutory violations by federal

agencies. See Fed. Defs.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 16–17

However, plaintiffs have broader latitude when seeking equitable relief from

a constitutional violation, rather than a statutory one. “[W]henever a separation-of-powers

violation occurs, any aggrieved party with standing may file a constitutional challenge.”

Collins v. Yellen, 594 U.S. 220, 245 (2021). The D.C. Circuit has recognized that federal courts’

power to “enjoin unconstitutional acts by the [G]overnment” is “inherent in the Constitution

itself.” Hubbard v. U.S. E.P.A. Adm’r, 809 F.2d 1, 11 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Accordingly, an

aggrieved party may seek equitable relief from unconstitutional Government action by

proceeding “directly under the Constitution,” regardless of whether that party has an express

statutory cause of action or has satisfied the strictures that apply to ultra vires review of statutory

claims. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 491 n.2 (2010); see

47

also Trudeau v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 456 F.3d 178, 190 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that a “direct

cause of action” under the Constitution may be “inferred,” even in the absence of a statutory

entitlement to judicial relief).

Given the significant differences between the scope of review available for equitable

claims alleging statutory violations as opposed to constitutional violations, the Court begins by

determining “whether the underlying claim is properly characterized as statutory or

constitutional.” See Glob. Health Council v. Trump, 153 F.4th 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (amended).

As the D.C. Circuit recently explained, the “framework for resolving that question” comes from

the Supreme Court’s decision in Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994). See Glob. Health

Council, 153 F.4th at 14.

This Court recently recounted the details of the Dalton decision in its summary judgment

ruling on Plaintiffs’ claims regarding Section 2(a) of the Executive Order at issue in these

consolidated cases. See LULAC II, 2025 WL 3042704, at *24. In brief, Dalton involved a

challenge to the Executive Branch’s decision to close certain military bases. See 511 U.S. at

464–68. In the decision under review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

concluded that the President had acted in violation of constitutional separation-of-powers

principles by closing the bases without adhering to procedural requirements that Congress had

set by statute. See id. at 466–68. The Supreme Court reversed, noting that the statute on which

the Executive Branch relied to close the bases had explicitly granted the President the authority

to close bases. Id. at 469–72. Therefore, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs’ challenge

amounted only to a claim that the President had “exceeded his authority” under the relevant

statute, making the claim statutory—rather than constitutional—in nature. Id. at 477–78.

48

Finally, the Court concluded that because the relevant statute committed decision-making “to the

discretion of the President,” judicial review was “not available.” Id. at 474, 478,

Two recent panel decisions of the D.C. Circuit have applied Dalton to analyze the proper

scope of equitable review of Executive Branch action. In Global Health Council v. Trump, 153

F.4th 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (amended), a panel concluded that plaintiffs were not entitled to

proceed with equitable claims based on asserted violations of the Constitution because, under

Dalton, the plaintiffs’ claims were best characterized as statutory, not constitutional. A separate

panel reached a similar conclusion in a now-vacated decision in another recent case, National

Treasury Employees Union v. Vought (“NTEU”), in which the D.C. Circuit has granted a petition

for en banc review. See, 149 F.4th 762, 790–94 (D.C. Cir. 2025), reh’g en banc granted,

opinion vacated, No. 25-5091, 2025 WL 3659406 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 17, 2025).

Although the panel’s analysis of the Dalton decision in Global Health Council may

ultimately be superseded by the en banc court’s decision in NTEU, this Court is bound to follow

the panel’s decision in Global Health Council unless and until it is abrogated or overruled. See

Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (noting that

when a precedential decision “has direct application in a case,” lower federal courts must “follow

the case which directly controls” and leave to higher courts “the prerogative of overruling [their]

own decisions”).

Nonetheless, as this Court has already held, the separation-of-powers claims at issue in

these consolidated cases are readily distinguishable from the claims at issue in both Dalton and

Global Health Council. See LULAC II, 2025 WL 3042704, at *25. Unlike the base-closure

statute at issue in Dalton, the statutes at issue in these consolidated cases assign no relevant role

to the President. Cf. Dalton, 511 U.S. at 469–72 (noting “the importance of [the President’s] role

49

in the base closure process” prescribed by statute). And unlike in Global Health Council, the

theories of relief on which Plaintiffs rely in these consolidated cases are not “predicated

on underlying statutory violations,” cf. Global Health Council, 153 F.4th at 17, or on whether

any purported statutory duties were “mandatory,” cf. Global Health Council v. Trump, No. 25-

5097, 2025 WL 2709437, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 28, 2025) (Katsas, J., concurring in the denial of

rehearing en banc).43 Instead, Plaintiffs’ separation-of-powers claims arise directly from specific

provisions of the Constitution. Their argument is that the President has wrongly exercised

powers that the Constitution vests in Congress and the States alone. As this Court recently

explained, that argument “is a charge that the President has acted unconstitutionally, not merely

that he has ‘acted in excess of his statutory authority.’” LULAC II, 2025 WL 3042704, at *25

(quoting Dalton, 511 U.S. at 472).

In sum, although this Court is mindful of the limits on non-statutory, equitable review of

actions taken by the Executive Branch, those limits are no impediment to claims that arise

“directly under the Constitution,” including claims that the President has overstepped the

constitutional separation of powers by purporting to exercise powers vested in Congress and the

States. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 491 n.2; LULAC II, 2025 WL 3042704, at *25.

5. The Purcell principle

The Supreme Court has “repeatedly emphasized that lower federal courts should

ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of an election.” Republican National

Committee v. Democratic National Committee, 589 U.S. 423, 424 (2020) (per curiam). The

purpose of this directive, which is known as the “Purcell principle,” is to avoid “voter

43

See also Global Health Council, 153 F.4th at 9–10 (noting that the plaintiffs in Global Health Council alleged that

the defendants had violated the 2024 Appropriations Act, the Impoundment Control Act, and the Anti-Deficiency

Act by impounding funds Congress had appropriated for foreign assistance).

50

confusion” and to ensure that federal courts do not undermine “[c]onfidence in the integrity of

our electoral processes,” which is “essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy.”

Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006) (per curiam).

The Supreme Court has taken a broad view of what constitutes the “eve of an election” in

this context. See, e.g., Abbott v. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, No. 25A608, 607 U.S. ----,

2025 WL 3484863, at *1 (U.S. Dec. 4, 2025) (granting a stay of an injunction that would affect a

primary election taking place 15 weeks later, in part because the district court had “violated” this

principle by “improperly insert[ing] itself into an active primary campaign”). This Court shall

therefore assume, without deciding, that the present moment falls on the “eve” of a relevant

election, triggering the principle against lower court interventions that alter election rules.

Nonetheless, for many of the same reasons that this Court explained at the preliminary

injunction stage of these consolidated cases, the Purcell principle does not necessarily weigh

against granting the relief that Plaintiffs seek. See LULAC I, 780 F. Supp. 3d at 219–20.

First, and most importantly, the relief to which Plaintiffs are entitled in these

consolidated cases would not alter the status quo. A primary function of the Purcell principle is

to avoid unfairness and voter confusion by discouraging court-imposed rule changes in the

immediate run-up to an election. See Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879, 880–81 (2022)

(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in grant of applications for stays). Here, most of the relief that

Plaintiffs seek would not change any election rules. On the contrary, most of the requested relief

would prevent the Executive Branch from forcing late-breaking changes to State election

procedures. Moreover, most of the challenged directives from the President have not yet been

implemented—whether because the Executive Branch has decided to postpone implementation

or because the relevant provisions of the Executive Order have been enjoined by other courts.

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Put simply, enjoining the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Executive Order

would not alter the status quo for federal election rules.

Second, Plaintiffs in these consolidated cases have not unduly delayed bringing their

claims before the Court. On the contrary, they brought suit promptly after the issuance of the

Executive Order, and they expeditiously sought and obtained preliminary relief. See LULAC I,

780 F. Supp. 3d at 226–28. The equitable considerations that sometimes weigh against granting

relief to dilatory plaintiffs therefore do not apply in these cases.

Third, unlike the typical case in which the Purcell principle is successfully invoked, none

of the parties in these cases who may be subject to injunctions or other equitable remedies are

State agencies or officials. Plaintiffs are not seeking to enlist this Court’s assistance to assert

federal power over the conduct of a State election. Instead, they are urging one Branch of the

Federal Government to act as a check on another coordinate Branch. Therefore, the important

federalism concerns animating the Purcell principle do not weigh against granting relief here.

Fourth, and finally, as it has done at each stage of these consolidated cases, this Court has

heeded Purcell’s command that lower courts must explain their reasoning when issuing orders

affecting the conduct of elections. See Purcell, 549 U.S. at 5.

In sum, the Purcell principle does not weigh against granting appropriate relief in these

consolidated cases.

* * *

With these threshold issues and frameworks in mind, the Court turns to the merits.

B. Section 2(d): Requiring Agencies to “Assess Citizenship” before Providing

the Federal Form to “Enrollees of Public Assistance Programs”

The Federal Defendants and the RNC as Defendant-Intervenor each move for summary

judgment on the Democratic Party Plaintiffs’ claims regarding Section 2(d) of the Executive

52

Order, which purports to impose new requirements on federal agencies that provide the Federal

Form to individuals who use their services. See Fed. Defs.’ Mem. at 16–17, 27–30; Def.-

Intervenor’s Mot. at 3, 8–13. The Democratic Party Plaintiffs cross-move for summary

judgment and seek both a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction barring several

federal agencies and officials from implementing Section 2(d). See Dem. Pls.’ Mot. at 4–13, 60.

Section 2(d) provides:

The head of each Federal voter registration executive department or agency

(agency) under the National Voter Registration Act, 52 [§] U.S.C. 20506(a), shall

assess citizenship prior to providing a Federal voter registration form to enrollees

of public assistance programs.

Exec. Order No. 14,248, 90 Fed. Reg. 14005 (Mar. 25, 2025), § 2(d).

This Court preliminarily enjoined the implementation of Section 2(d), concluding that the

Democratic Party Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of a statutory challenge to the

provision and that they had met each of the other requirements for preliminary relief. See

LULAC I, 780 F. Supp. 3d at 206–12. For similar reasons, the Court shall now GRANT

summary judgment in the Democratic Party Plaintiffs’ favor on their constitutional separation-

of-powers challenge to Section 2(d), DECLARE that Section 2(d) is inconsistent with the

constitutional separation of powers, and PERMANENTLY ENJOIN the implementation of that

provision.

Meanwhile, because the Democratic Party Plaintiffs have not shown final agency action

implementing Section 2(d), the Court shall GRANT summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on

the Democratic Party Plaintiffs’ APA claims regarding this provision. The Court shall DEFER

RULING on the Democratic Party Plaintiffs’ remaining claims regarding Section 2(d), which

would benefit from further factual development.

53

1. The Democratic Party Plaintiffs have standing to challenge Section 2(d).

As the Court concluded at the preliminary injunction stage, the Democratic Party

Plaintiffs have standing to challenge Section 2(d) because of its effect on their voter registration

efforts, their members’ ability to register and vote in federal elections, and their ability to

compete for federal elective office. See LULAC I, 780 F. Supp. 3d at 207–10.

First, the DNC, DGA, DSCC, and DCCC have organizational standing to challenge

Section 2(d) because limiting eligible voters’ access to the Federal Form at federal voter

registration agencies would require these organizations to invest additional resources in

registering eligible voters who are likely to support Democratic candidates, forcing them to

divert resources from other time-sensitive, election-related activities in service of their mission

of electing Democratic candidates. The implementation of Section 2(d) would therefore hinder

these Plaintiffs’ “core business activities.” See All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 395.

Further, because Section 2(d) purports to direct the heads of federal agencies to begin

implementing its provisions immediately, the injury to the Plaintiffs’ organizational interests is

“sufficiently imminent and substantial” to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement and support their

standing to seek “forward-looking” injunctive relief against the implementation of that

provision. See TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 435. These Plaintiffs’ injuries are “fairly . . . trace[able]

to” Section 2(d) of the Executive Order and would “likely” be “redressed by a favorable

decision” from this Court enjoining the implementation of that provision. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at

560. Accordingly, the DNC, DGA, DSCC, and DCCC have organizational standing to challenge

Section 2(d).

Second, as an alternative basis for standing, the DNC has associational standing to

challenge Section 2(d) on behalf of its members—registered Democratic voters—who may be

denied statutorily required opportunities to update or renew their voter registrations at federal

54

offices if Section 2(d) is implemented. In order to have associational standing on behalf of these

members, the DNC must show that “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in

their own right; (b) the interests [the DNC] seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s

purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of

individual members in the lawsuit.” Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343; EPIC, 928 F.3d at 101.

The DNC’s members would have standing to challenge the provision at issue here.

Specifically, they would have standing to challenge the denial of a procedural right guaranteed

by statute (the right to receive the Federal Form from State-designated voter registration

agencies) because Congress created that right to protect a separate concrete, substantive interest

(the right to register and vote in federal elections). See 52 U.S.C. § 20506(a)(4), (a)(6); see

also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 & n.7.

The Supreme Court has recognized that “procedural rights” like the one that the DNC

asserts on behalf of its members here are entitled to “special” treatment in the Article III standing

analysis: A person may assert a procedural right that protects an underlying concrete interest

“without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at

572 n.7; see also Sierra Club v. Perry, 373 F. Supp. 3d 128, 140 (D.D.C. 2019) (EGS).

However, the “chain of causation between the alleged procedural violation and the concrete

interest” must not be purely “speculative.” Ctr. for L. & Educ. v. Dep’t of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152,

1159 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

Here, the DNC has shown that its members would have standing to challenge

Section 2(d) because that provision orders the heads of federal agencies to disregard their

statutory right to receive the Federal Form at offices of State-designated voter registration

agencies. Compare Exec. Order No. 14,248 § 2(d), with 52 U.S.C. § 20506(a)(4), (a)(6).

55

Plaintiffs’ underlying interest in registering and voting in federal elections “free of arbitrary

impairment by state action” has long been recognized as “concrete” for purposes of Article

III standing. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207–08 (1962); see also TransUnion, 594

U.S. at 425 (recognizing that “intangible harms” with “a close relationship to harms traditionally

recognized as providing a basis for lawsuits in American courts” or “specified by the

Constitution itself” can be “concrete” injuries that support Article III standing). And the

connection between the procedural right that Plaintiffs seek to enforce—their members’ right to

receive the Federal Form—and their members’ underlying concrete interest is far from

“speculative.” Cf. Ctr. for L. & Educ., 396 F.3d at 1159. An eligible voter who receives the

Federal Form from a voter registration agency as required by law can secure the voter’s

underlying concrete interest—the right to participate in federal elections with an up-to-date voter

registration—by simply filling out the one-page form and returning it to the agency. See 52

U.S.C. § 20506(a)(4)(A)(iii) (providing that voter registration agencies must “[a]ccept[] . . .

completed voter registration application forms for transmittal to the appropriate State election

official”).

Finally, the members’ procedural injury is “fairly . . . trace[able] to” Section 2(d) of the

Executive Order and would “likely” be “redressed by” an injunction prohibiting the

implementation of that section. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Accordingly, the

DNC’s individual members would have standing to challenge Section 2(d) in their own right.

The DNC also satisfies the remaining requirements for associational standing to

challenge Section 2(d) on behalf of its members: Its challenge to Section 2(d) is germane to its

mission of helping to elect Democrats by registering and turning out voters, and its individual

members’ participation is not necessary to the resolution of any issue in these consolidated

56

cases. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343; EPIC, 928 F.3d at 101. Therefore, the DNC has associational

standing to challenge Section 2(d) on behalf of its members.

Third, as a further alternative basis for standing, several of the Democratic Party

Plaintiffs have political-competitor standing on the grounds that the implementation of

Section 2(d) would amount to the “illegal structuring of a competitive environment” in which

“rival parties defend their concrete interests.” Shays, 414 F.3d at 85–87; see also Bost, 2026 WL

96707, at *3 (recognizing that all political candidates “have an interest in a fair process”).

Specifically, Plaintiffs Jeffries and Schumer have political-competitor standing to challenge

Section 2(d) based on their active candidacies for reelection to federal office, which will be

hampered if some of their supporters are denied statutorily required opportunities to register to

vote or update their voter registration at federal offices. This competitive burden is heightened

by the fact that enrollees of public assistance programs—the only people for whom Section 2(d)

directs federal agencies to “assess citizenship”—are both more likely to support Democratic

candidates and less likely to have documentary proof of citizenship than other voters, even if

they are eligible to vote. As with the burden on other Democratic Party Plaintiffs’ organizational

interests and the interests of the DNC’s individual members, the competitive burden that Plaintiff

Jeffries and Plaintiff Schumer challenge is both “fairly . . . trace[able] to” Section 2(d) and

“likely” to be “redressed by a favorable decision” from this Court enjoining the implementation

of that section. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Finally, because a “party affiliate” of an active

candidate may also exercise political-competitor standing, see Nat. L. Party, 111 F. Supp. 2d at

47, the Democratic Party Plaintiffs affiliated with Plaintiffs Jeffries and Schumer and other

active Democratic candidates throughout the country have standing to raise the same challenge.

57

Contrary to the Federal Defendants’ arguments, these injuries are not too speculative to

support Article III standing. In Section 2(d), the President has issued an unambiguous,

mandatory command: agency heads “shall assess citizenship prior to providing” the Federal

Form to certain individuals. Exec. Order No. 14,248 § 2(d) (emphasis added). The Executive

Order does include a standard saving clause, which provides that the order “shall be

implemented consistent with applicable law.” Id. § 11(b). However, because Section 2(d) is

clear and “unambiguously commands action,” the Executive Order’s saving clause “does not and

cannot override its meaning.” City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1240

(9th Cir. 2018). Executive orders, like statutes, “cannot be held to destroy themselves through

saving clauses.” Common Cause, 506 F. Supp. 3d at 53 n.8 (quoting FTC v. Credit Bureau Ctr.,

LLC, 937 F.3d 765, 755 (7th Cir. 2019)). Plaintiffs’ threatened injuries are concrete and directly

traceable to Section 2(d)’s clear command, and a favorable decision from this Court would

provide meaningful redress.

In sum, the Democratic Party Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the implementation of

Section 2(d) of Executive Order No. 14,248.

2. The Democratic Party Plaintiffs have an equitable right of action to

challenge Section 2(d) on constitutional separation-of-powers grounds.

Next, the Court must consider whether the Democratic Party Plaintiffs are among “the

class of litigants that may, as a matter of law, appropriately invoke the power of the court” to

challenge Section 2(d). See Davis, 442 U.S. at 239 n.18. The Federal Defendants argue that the

Democratic Party Plaintiffs lack a viable cause of action to challenge Section 2(d) because they

lack a ripe APA claim against any agency, they cannot bring an APA claim against the President

directly, and the fact that they will have a “meaningful and adequate opportunity” to challenge

any unlawful agency action under the APA at a later point precludes them from bringing an

58

equitable ultra vires claim. Federal Defs.’ Mem. at 16–17 (quoting Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 605

U.S. at 681). This Court disagrees.

The Democratic Party Plaintiffs have an equitable right of action “directly under the

Constitution” to challenge Section 2(d) on the grounds that it contravenes the constitutional

separation of powers. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 491 n.2. Plaintiffs are not challenging

the wrongful “exercise” of the President’s discretion under a statute; instead, their argument is

that the relevant statute “delegates no authority to the President” over the subject matter at issue.

See Chamber of Com. of U.S. v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1331–32 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (distinguishing

Dalton, 511 U.S. 462). They argue that, by acting in the total absence of authority from

Congress in a domain that the Constitution assigns to Congress and the States, the President has

overstepped the constitutional separation of powers. See Dem. Pls.’ Mem. at 7–13. The

Democratic Party Plaintiffs have an equitable right of action to raise this constitutional challenge

in federal court, notwithstanding the absence of a viable APA claim or ultra vires challenge to an

agency’s compliance with a statute. See Collins, 594 U.S. at 245 (“[W]henever a separation-of-

powers violation occurs, any aggrieved party with standing may file a constitutional challenge.”).

Assured of its jurisdiction and Plaintiffs’ right to proceed with their separation-of-powers

challenge to Section 2(d) of the Executive Order, the Court turns to the merits of that challenge.

3. Section 2(d) is inconsistent with the constitutional separation of powers.

The NVRA provides that each State-designated voter registration agency, including

several federal agencies that are Defendants here, “shall” make the Federal Form available and

provide it “with each application” for “service or assistance” unless the applicant declines “in

writing” to register to vote. 52 U.S.C. § 20506(a)(4)(A)(i), (6)(A). This mandatory duty

imposed by Congress leaves no discretion for Executive Branch agencies to “assess citizenship

prior to providing” the Federal Form to “enrollees of public assistance programs,” as

59

Section 2(d) of the Executive Order purports to require. Because there is no statutory authority

for the Executive Order’s attempt to impose such a requirement, because regulating federal

election procedures is the exclusive province of Congress and the States, and because the

President’s directive in Section 2(d) is contrary to the manifest will of Congress, as expressed in

the text, structure, and context of the NVRA, Section 2(d) is inconsistent with our Constitution’s

separation of powers. It cannot lawfully be implemented.

In our constitutional order, the President can neither make law nor rewrite the law that

Congress has enacted. Accordingly, it is “black letter law” that “‘[t]he President’s power, if any,

to issue [an executive] order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution

itself’” Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 188–89 (1999)

(indirectly quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952)); see also

Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587 (“In the framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to

see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.”).

As this Court has explained at some length in two prior opinions in these consolidated

cases, the President’s power is “at its lowest ebb” when he seeks to alter federal election

regulations to require new methods of proving voter eligibility. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 639

(Jackson, J., concurring); see LULAC I, 780 F. Supp. 3d at 195–96; LULAC II, 2025 WL

3042704, at *27. When “the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or

implied will of Congress . . . he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any

constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.” Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576

U.S. 1, 10 (2015) (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring)). Under those

circumstances, the President’s actions “must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is

the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 639

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(Jackson, J., concurring). For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that Section 2(d)

cannot withstand this scrutiny.

a. Section 2(d) is contrary to the NVRA.

Imposing a mandatory citizenship assessment for certain users of the Federal Form is

“incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress.” See Zivotofsky, 576 U.S. at 10.

Congress has consistently exercised its constitutional authority to prescribe means of voter

registration in which applicants confirm their qualifications by attesting to them under penalty of

perjury, not by providing documentary proof. See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 20506(a)(6). The NVRA

expressly provides that the Federal Form “may not include any requirement for notarization or

other formal authentication.” 52 U.S.C. § 20508(b)(3). In fact, during Congress’s deliberations

on the bill that became the NVRA, the Conference Committee considered and rejected a

proposed amendment that would have allowed States to supplement the Federal Form with a

requirement that prospective voters must present proof of citizenship. See H.R. Rep. No. 103–

66, at 23 (1993) (Conf. Rep.). The Conference Committee concluded that such a requirement

was “not necessary or consistent with the purposes of” the NVRA. Id. And in the specific

context of voter registration agencies, Congress was unambiguous: The NVRA provides that

each State-designated voter registration agency “shall” make this Form available and provide it

“with each application” for “service or assistance” unless the applicant declines “in writing” to

register to vote. 52 U.S.C. § 20506(a)(4)(A)(i), (6)(A)(i). The President’s attempt in

Section 2(d) to alter this scheme by adding a citizenship assessment requirement for certain users

of the Federal Form is contrary to the NVRA and the manifest intent of Congress.

The RNC, as Defendant-Intervenor, argues that Section 2(d) is not contrary to the NVRA

because separate statutes already contemplate that federal public assistance agencies, including

some federal voter registration agencies, will inquire into the citizenship or immigration status of

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enrollees in federal benefits programs. See Def.-Intervenor’s Mem. at 8–11 (citing 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1611, 1642(a)(1)–(2)). The RNC argues that Section 2(d) therefore imposes “nothing more

than a sequencing requirement.” Id. at 9. Under the RNC’s theory, federal voter registration

agencies will “assess citizenship” of applicants for their services eventually, so there is nothing

wrong with taking that step “prior to providing” the Federal Form to those applicants. See id.

(quoting Exec. Order No. 14,248 § 2(d)).

The RNC’s argument fails to persuade because, as this Court has previously noted, the

NVRA imposes a mandatory duty to provide the Federal Form to “[a]pplicants for public

assistance programs,” not “recipients of public assistance.” LULAC I, 780 F. Supp. 3d at 210

(emphasis in original). Accordingly, agencies have no discretion to apply their own programs’

eligibility criteria when deciding which applicants should receive the Federal Form. The NVRA

mandates that agencies “shall” provide the Federal Form to each and every applicant, “unless the

applicant, in writing, declines to register to vote.” 52 U.S.C. § 20506(a)(6)(A).

Notwithstanding this clear directive, the RNC argues that agencies must be allowed to

perform some “pre-screening” of applicants before sharing the Federal Form because, otherwise,

the NVRA might require an agency to give the Form to an applicant who “answered ‘no’ to the

question ‘would you like to apply to register to vote here today?’” or “openly declare[d] that she

is a non-citizen ineligible to register to vote.” See Def.-Intervenor’s Mem. at 9–10.

Fortunately, Congress anticipated these kinds of situations, and the NVRA gives clear

direction to agencies about their responsibilities and the appropriate procedures. If an applicant

declines to register to vote, the agency must ensure that the applicant provides that decision “in

writing.” 52 U.S.C. § 20506(a)(6)(A). If the applicant does so, the agency is not required to

provide a copy of the Federal Form. Id. In every other situation—including when an applicant

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declares that she is ineligible to register to vote—the NVRA mandates that the agency “shall”

provide the Federal Form to the applicant. See id. These provisions manifest Congress’s

judgment that, because the Federal Form itself “specifies each eligibility requirement (including

citizenship)” and “requires the signature of the applicant, under penalty of perjury,” attesting

“that the applicant meets each such requirement,” agencies need not and should not conduct any

pre-screening of applicants before providing the Federal Form. See id. § 20508(b)(2).

b. The President lacks any constitutional authority to support the

directive in Section 2(d).

Because the NVRA manifests congressional intent that is contrary to the President’s

directive in Section 2(d) of the Executive Order, that directive can only be sustained by reference

to the President’s “own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over

the matter.” See Zivotofsky, 576 U.S. at 10. To sustain the lawfulness of the provision, the

Federal Defendants must show that the President has powers that are “both ‘exclusive’ and

‘conclusive’ on the issue.” Id. (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637–38 (Jackson, J.,

concurring)). They cannot make any such showing. The President has no relevant constitutional

power on which to rely, and Congress’s countervailing power under the Elections Clause is

“broad” and “comprehensive.” See ITCA, 570 U.S. at 8; U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.

The Federal Defendants briefly attempt to ground Section 2(d) in the President’s

authority to direct the activities of the Executive Branch, but this attempt is unpersuasive. See

Fed. Defs.’ Mot. at 28. No matter how broadly one reads either the Executive Vesting Clause or

the Take Care Clause, the President’s power to supervise and control Executive Branch officials

does not authorize him or his subordinates to intrude on the exclusive powers of Congress and

the States, including the power to regulate federal elections. Subordinate officers subject to the

President’s supervision generally must follow the President’s directives, but only “to the extent

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allowed by the law” as embodied in the Constitution or enacted by Congress. See

Bldg. & Const. Trades Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d 28, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Each

Branch of our Federal Government must neither “arrogate power to itself” nor “impair another in

the performance of its constitutional duties.” Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 500 (quoting Loving

v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996)). Because the President’s directive to agency heads to

“assess citizenship” before providing the Federal Form to certain prospective voters is contrary

to the NVRA and intrudes upon Congress’s constitutional authority to regulate federal elections,

the President’s supervisory authority over the Executive Branch cannot sustain that directive.

* * *

In sum, as this Court held at the preliminary injunction stage, the NVRA “leaves no role

for agencies to ‘assess citizenship,’ and the President lacks any lawful authority to contravene

the NVRA by requiring agencies to do so.” LULAC I, 780 F. Supp. 3d at 211 (quoting Exec.

Order No. 14,248 § 2(d)). Section 2(d) is inconsistent with the constitutional separation of

powers and cannot lawfully be implemented.

4. A declaratory judgment and permanent injunction against implementation

of Section 2(d) are appropriate remedies for the constitutional separation-

of-powers violation.

Having determined that Section 2(d) cannot lawfully be implemented, the Court turns to

the issue of remedies. The Democratic Party Plaintiffs seek both a declaratory judgment and a

permanent injunction barring the relevant Federal Defendants from enforcing Section 2(d). See

Dem. Pls.’ Mem. at 60. For the reasons that follow, this Court agrees that both a declaratory

judgment and a permanent injunction are appropriate remedies.

A declaratory judgment is warranted because it will both “serve a useful purpose in

clarifying the legal relations at issue” and “afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and

controversy giving rise to the proceeding”—namely, uncertainty about whether and to what

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extent Section 2(d) of the Executive Order may lawfully be implemented. See Glenn, 222 F.

Supp. 3d at 36. The Court shall therefore GRANT the Democratic Party Plaintiffs’ request for a

declaratory judgment and DECLARE that Section 2(d) is inconsistent with the constitutional

separation of powers.

A permanent injunction against the implementation of Section 2(d) is also warranted. To

be entitled to a permanent injunction, Plaintiffs must prevail on the merits and show (1) that they

are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction, (2) “that remedies available

at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate” as redress for that irreparable harm (3) “that,

considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is

warranted,” and (4) “that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”

Monsanto, 561 U.S. at 156–57; In re Execution Protocol Cases, 980 F.3d at 137. Any injunction

must also comport with the limits on the equitable authority that Congress has granted to the

federal courts, including the principle that equitable relief should be “party-specific.” See Trump

v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 841–44 (2025). The Democratic Party Plaintiffs have made each of

the necessary showings and are entitled to a permanent injunction in their favor.

None of the Defendants seriously contests any of the permanent-injunction factors other

than the Democratic Party Plaintiffs’ success on the merits. See Fed. Defs.’ Reply & Opp’n,

Dkt. No. 213, at 41–42 (arguing only that Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction and that the Executive Order’s directives are lawful); see generally Def.-Intervenor’s

Reply & Opp’n, Dkt. No. 210, at 1–2 (arguing only that the Court should grant summary

judgment in Defendants’ favor).

The Court shall therefore address the relevant factors only briefly. The Democratic Party

Plaintiffs have carried their burden of showing that Section 2(d) would irreparably harm them in

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the absence of an injunction because, as the Court explained at the preliminary injunction stage,

the Court “cannot provide a ‘do-over’ or any other meaningful form of redress for lost

competitive opportunities to register and mobilize voters in the inherently time-limited

environment of an election cycle.” LULAC I, 780 F. Supp. 3d at 211 (citing League of Women

Voters of the United States v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). Remedies at law,

including monetary damages, would be manifestly inadequate to compensate Plaintiffs for both

their lost electoral opportunities and their separation-of-powers injuries. See id.; cf. O’Donnell

Const. Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (concluding that damages

were inadequate to redress an injury to a party’s “right to a legally valid procurement process”

and any complete relief therefore “must be equitable”). Finally, because agencies have no

legitimate interest in the perpetuation of unlawful practices and because the public interest

“favors permitting as many qualified voters to vote as possible,” both the balance of hardships

and the public interest weigh in favor of granting a permanent injunction. See Newby, 838 F.3d

at 12. As the Court explained at the preliminary injunction stage, “although there is a strong

public interest in ‘preserving the integrity of [the] election process,’ the present record does not

show that an injunction against Section 2(d) would disserve that interest.” LULAC I, 780 F.

Supp. 3d at 211 (alteration in original) (quoting Newby, 838 F.3d at 13). Congress weighed the

relevant election-integrity considerations when it enacted the NVRA, and this Court shall not

upset its judgment about the proper balance between ensuring voter access and preventing

unlawful participation. In sum, all the requirements for a permanent injunction are satisfied.

The only remaining issue is the proper scope of the injunction. Permanent injunctions,

like all equitable relief, must be “party-specific.” See CASA, 606 U.S. at 841–44. Federal courts

like this one “do not exercise general oversight of the Executive Branch,” but rather “resolve

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cases and controversies consistent with the authority Congress has given them.” Id. at 861.

Accordingly, equitable relief must be both “limited to the inadequacy that produced the injury in

fact that the [Plaintiffs have] established,” Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. 48, 68 (quoting Lewis v.

Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996)), and not “more burdensome [to the Defendants] than

necessary” to provide complete redress to the Plaintiffs, Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702

(1979). In short, this Court must take care that any injunction is not “broader than necessary to

provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue.” CASA, 606 U.S. at 861.

Enjoining the proper named Defendants from implementing Section 2(d) is a party-

specific remedy that is consistent with these principles. For the reasons the Court has explained,

Section 2(d) is inconsistent with the constitutional separation of powers and cannot lawfully be

implemented. If the named Defendants were to implement Section 2(d), the Democratic Party

Plaintiffs—including Plaintiffs that operate in every State throughout the Nation—would be

irreparably harmed. Accordingly, the only adequate and appropriate injunction is one barring the

relevant Defendants from implementing Section 2(d).

Although this injunction reaches the relevant Defendants throughout the Nation, it is not

an improper “universal” injunction. Cf. CASA, 606 U.S. at 861. Instead, it is a proper, party-

specific and benefits non-parties “only incidentally.” See id. at 851; see also Trump v. Hawaii,

585 U.S. 667, 717 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). Like the permanent injunction this Court

issued against the implementation of Section 2(a), an injunction barring the proper named

Defendants from implementing Section 2(d) is no broader than necessary to provide complete

relief to the prevailing Plaintiffs before the Court. See LULAC II, 2025 WL 3042704, at *36.

Awarding narrower relief—for example, by “enjoining the named Defendants from

implementing [the relevant provision] only in certain States, under certain circumstances, or with

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respect to certain categories of individuals”—would not fully redress the threatened injuries that

entitle the Democratic Party Plaintiffs to relief. See id.; see also CASA, 606 U.S. at 863

(Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that “equitable remedies historically operated on a plaintiff-

specific basis”); id. at 868 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (noting that district courts crafting

equitable injunctions “may award only plaintiff-specific relief”). To award complete relief, the

Court has “only one feasible option,” which is to enjoin the implementation of Section 2(d) in

full. See CASA, 606 U.S. at 851–52; see also LULAC II, 2025 WL 3042704, at *36 (explaining

that just an injunction is “consistent with longstanding equitable tradition”).

For all these reasons, the Court shall PERMANENTLY ENJOIN the relevant Federal

Defendants from taking any action to implement or give effect to that Section 2(d) of Executive

Order No. 14,248.

5. Because Plaintiffs have not shown final agency action implementing

Section 2(d), the Court shall grant Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on their APA claims regarding this provision.

The Court agrees with the Federal Defendants that, on the present record, the Democratic

Party Plaintiffs’ APA claims regarding Section 2(d) of the Executive Order cannot succeed

because Plaintiffs have not shown that any proper Defendant has yet taken “final agency action”

in response to Section 2(d). The Court shall therefore GRANT summary judgment in

Defendants’ favor as to these claims.

Final agency action is a prerequisite to a successful APA claim. 5 U.S.C. § 704. Agency

action is “final” and judicially reviewable under the APA when it “mark[s] the ‘consummation’

of the agency’s decisionmaking process” and is an action “by which ‘rights or obligations have

been determined,’ or from which ‘legal consequences will flow.’” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S.

154, 178 (1997) (first quoting Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333

68

U.S. 103, 113 (1948); and then quoting Port of Boston Marine Terminal Assn. v.

Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)).

Here, because Plaintiffs have not shown that any of the agency Defendants have taken

action to implement Section 2(d), there is no final agency action on which a successful APA

claim can proceed. Accordingly, the Court shall GRANT the Federal Defendants’ motions for

summary judgment on these claims. This disposition is based on the present record and shall not

preclude appropriate further action if new facts or circumstances arise that should alter the

Court’s analysis.

6. Further factual development is necessary to resolve the Democratic Party

Plaintiffs’ remaining claims regarding Section 2(d).

Finally, the Court shall DENY WITHOUT PREJUDICE the Federal Defendants’ and

Defendant-Intervenor’s motions for summary judgment regarding the Democratic Party

Plaintiffs’ undue-burden claims regarding Section 2(d) because those claims cannot properly be

resolved on the merits without additional discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).

At this stage of these consolidated cases, the Court has allowed only limited discovery,

and it has directed the parties to focus their motions and briefing on “purely legal” arguments

that they contend can be resolved without discovery. See Scheduling Order, Dkt. No. 141, at 3.

The Court agrees with the Democratic Party Plaintiffs that their undue burden claims

raise significant questions of fact and are appropriately resolved only after an opportunity for

more extensive discovery. Regardless of whether the Democratic Party Plaintiffs’ undue-burden

claims are assessed under the Anderson-Burdick framework or within the generally applicable

Equal Protection Clause framework,44 deciding their merits would require a “fact-intensive”

44

The Democratic Party Plaintiffs state that it is an open question in this Circuit whether the Anderson-Burdick

framework applies to claims like their challenge to Section 2(d). See Dem. Pls.’ Mem. at 59 n.21. The D.C. Circuit

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inquiry into the actual effects of the challenged practices on eligible voters’ ability to exercise

their rights. See Gill v. Scholz, 962 F.3d 360, 365 (7th Cir. 2020).

Accordingly, these claims are not appropriate for summary judgment at this stage of the

proceeding, at which the Court and the parties have focused on “purely legal” arguments for

which discovery is not necessary. See Scheduling Order, Dkt. No. 141, at 3. The Court shall

therefore DENY WITHOUT PREJUDICE the Defendants’ motions for summary judgment on

the Democratic Party Plaintiffs’ undue-burden claims, which the Court shall DEFER to the next

phase of proceedings in this case.

C. Section 3(d): Requiring Documentary Proof of Citizenship on the Federal

Post Card Application

Next, the Federal Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims

regarding Section 3(d) of the Executive Order, which purports to require the Secretary of

Defense to add a documentary proof of citizenship requirement to the Federal Post Card

Application for military and overseas voters. See Fed. Defs.’ Mem. at 7–8, 16–21, 30–33. Both

the LULAC Plaintiffs and the Democratic Party Plaintiffs cross-move for summary judgment

and seek both a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction barring the Secretary of

Defense from implementing Section 3(d). See LULAC Pls.’ Mot. at 9–15, 24–33, 45; Dem. Pls.’

Mot. at 13–22, 60.

Section 3(d) provides:

The Secretary of Defense shall update the Federal Post Card Application,

pursuant to the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 52

[§] U.S.C. 20301, to require:

and other courts in this District have applied that framework to similar claims. See, e.g., Libertarian Party v. D.C.

Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 682 F.3d 72, 73 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Vote Forward v. DeJoy, 490 F. Supp. 3d 110, 121–28

(D.D.C. 2020) (EGS).

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(i) documentary proof of United States citizenship, as defined by [S]ection

2(a)(ii) of [the Executive Order]; and

(ii) proof of eligibility to vote in elections in the State in which the voter is

attempting to vote.

Exec. Order No. 14,248, 90 Fed. Reg. 14005 (Mar. 25, 2025), § 3(d).

Section 3(d) has many commonalities with Section 2(a), which this Court permanently

enjoined on constitutional separation-of-powers grounds. For similar reasons, the Court shall

now GRANT summary judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor on their constitutional separation-of-powers

challenge to Section 3(d) and PERMANENTLY ENJOIN the implementation of that provision.

Meanwhile, because Plaintiffs have not shown final agency action implementing

Section 3(d), the Court shall GRANT summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on the

Democratic Party Plaintiffs’ related APA claims challenging that provision.

1. Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the implementation of Section 3(d).

Because Plaintiffs must have Article III standing “for each cl

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