Brenden Kapusta v. Dr. Bryce Bennett, Oasis Psychological Services, Bianca Boling

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION TWO

BRENDEN KAPUSTA,

Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

DR. BRYCE BENNETT, OASIS PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICES, AND BIANCA BOLING,

Defendants/Appellees.

No. 2 CA-CV 2024-0317

Filed January 30, 2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2023054647

The Honorable Michael Gordon, Judge

REVERSED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Brenden Kapusta, Aurora, Oregon

In Propria Persona

Klein Thomas Lee & Fresard

By Brandon L. Boxler, Richmond, Virginia

and

By Paul R. Lee and Elsa Paulina Rivera Ramirez, Phoenix

Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Dr. Bryce Bennett and Oasis Psychological

Services

Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP, Phoenix

By Charles T. Carson and J. William Cook

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Bianca Boling

KAPUSTA v. BENNETT

Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Chief Judge Staring authored the opinion of the Court, in which Presiding

Judge Brearcliffe concurred and Judge Eckerstrom dissented.

S T A R I N G, Chief Judge:

¶1 Brenden Kapusta appeals from the superior court’s orders

dismissing his claims against Dr. Bryce Bennet, Oasis Psychological

Services, and Bianca Boling (collectively, “the Oasis Defendants”).1 For the

reasons that follow, we reverse and remand the matter for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 In 2014, Kapusta pled guilty to attempted voyeurism. The

superior court suspended the imposition of sentence and placed him on

probation for ten years. The conditions of Kapusta’s probation required

him to “attend, actively participate in, and remain in sex offender treatment

at the discretion of” the probation department.

¶3 After several years of treatment with another provider, the

probation department referred Kapusta to Oasis Psychological Services,

where he began treatment with a student clinician, Boling, under the

supervision of Dr. Bennett. Oasis discharged Kapusta after approximately

seven months. The discharge summary stated that he had “display[ed]

minimal commitment to the treatment process,” had violated Oasis’s

“group payment policy,” had been “disrespectful” towards “staff and

therapists,” and had disobeyed Oasis’s “Group Expectations and Program

Description policy.”

¶4 Immediately after Oasis discharged Kapusta, the probation

department filed a petition to revoke his probation, noting, among other

things, that he had been “unsuccessfully discharged from sex offender

treatment at Oasis” and had “chose[n] to consume alcohol” in violation of

1Kapusta also appealed the dismissal of his claims against various

employees of the Maricopa County Adult Probation Department. Pursuant

to stipulation, Kapusta’s claims against those defendants were dismissed

with prejudice in February 2025. Accordingly, we consider only the claims

against the Oasis Defendants.

2

KAPUSTA v. BENNETT

Opinion of the Court

the conditions of his probation. At a revocation hearing, Kapusta admitted

he had consumed alcohol. Based on this admission, the superior court

found Kapusta had violated the terms of his probation. At the disposition

hearing, the court again suspended the imposition of sentence and

reinstated probation, extending it for approximately six months. The court

also dismissed the remaining allegations in the petition to revoke.

¶5 Nearly two years later, Kapusta filed this lawsuit, asserting a

number of claims against Oasis, as well as others. Kapusta alleged that

Oasis had wrongfully discharged him and that the superior court had

wrongfully extended the term of his probation by relying on reports

containing deceptive and defamatory statements. Pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6), Ariz. R. Civ. P., all of the defendants moved to dismiss Kapusta’s

claims against them, arguing, in part, that they were shielded by absolute

judicial immunity. The Oasis Defendants additionally claimed that the

statute of limitations barred Kapusta’s negligence-based claims against

them. After hearing argument, the superior court concluded that the

defendants were “entitled to absolute immunity” and granted their

respective motions, but it declined to address additional arguments,

including whether Kapusta had complied with all applicable statutes of

limitation. The court dismissed the action in its entirety, and this appeal

followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and

12-2101(A)(1).

Discussion

I. Judicial Immunity

¶6 Kapusta argues the superior court erred in granting the Oasis

Defendants’ motions to dismiss on the basis of absolute judicial immunity.

We review de novo the dismissal of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Coleman v.

City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, ¶ 7 (2012); see also Brittner v. Lanzilotta, 246 Ariz.

294, ¶ 6 (App. 2019) (whether judicial immunity applies is question of law

reviewed de novo). In doing so, we “must assume the truth of all

well-pleaded factual allegations and indulge all reasonable inferences from

those facts.” Coleman, 230 Ariz. 352, ¶ 9. Dismissal is inappropriate unless,

as a matter of law, the plaintiff “would not be entitled to relief under any

interpretation of the facts susceptible of proof.” Fid. Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. State

Dep’t of Ins., 191 Ariz. 222, ¶ 4 (1998). As a general policy matter, Rule

12(b)(6) motions to dismiss are disfavored under Arizona law. See State

ex rel. Corbin v. Pickrell, 136 Ariz. 589, 594 (1983).

¶7 Kapusta argues the Oasis Defendants are not entitled to

judicial immunity because they “were not advising the Court nor were they

3

KAPUSTA v. BENNETT

Opinion of the Court

acting pursuant to any Court order” when the allegedly defamatory

discharge report was written. (Emphasis omitted.) We agree.

¶8 “Judicial immunity protects judges from civil liability for

judicial acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions.” Brittner,

246 Ariz. 294, ¶ 6. Over the years, judicial immunity has also been extended

to certain officers “who perform functions integral to the judicial process.”

Lavit v. Superior Court, 173 Ariz. 96, 99, 101 (App. 1992) (psychologist aiding

court in determining child custody entitled to absolute immunity); see also

Brittner, 246 Ariz. 294, ¶ 7 (therapist appointed by court as advisor

regarding child custody entitled to judicial immunity); DeSilva v. Baker,

208 Ariz. 597, ¶ 16 (App. 2004) (probation officers filing probation revocation

petitions entitled to absolute immunity). “The consistent reasoning in these

cases is that each non-judicial officer performed a function, pursuant to a

court directive, which was related to the judicial process. This application

of judicial immunity . . . would not exist except for the direct connection

with the court.” Acevedo v. Pima Cnty. Adult Prob. Dep’t, 142 Ariz. 319, 321

(1984). Importantly, “governmental liability is the rule in Arizona and

immunity is the exception.” Doe ex rel. Doe v. State, 200 Ariz. 174, ¶ 4 (2001).

Therefore, the reach of judicial immunity is extremely limited, and courts

bestow immunity with hesitance. See id.; Grimm v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons &

Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 265 (1977).

¶9 Here, there is no direct connection between the defendants

and the superior court. See Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 321 (“[J]udicial immunity

may fairly be described as derivative in that the immunity would not exist

except for the direct connection with the court.”). The court played no role

in the selection of Oasis and did not require Oasis to provide any specific

treatment or information to it. The court merely ordered Kapusta to attend

sex-offender treatment “at the discretion of” the probation department.

Thus, the court did not even directly order Kapusta to attend treatment.

The probation department exercised its discretion, initially referring

Kapusta to one treatment program and, several years later, requiring that

he attend Oasis. Notably, in Acevedo, a case that arose from allegations of

negligence in supervising a sex offender on probation, our supreme court

concluded that probation officers do not have immunity for supervisory

and administrative acts concerning probationers, highlighting the limited

nature of judicial immunity. Id. at 320, 322; see also Garibay v. Johnson, 259

Ariz. 248, ¶ 16 (2025) (“We distill from our jurisprudence the principle that

common law judicial immunity applies to court officers, employees, and

agents who ‘assist the court in the judicial process’ by carrying out court

orders or otherwise serving an integral part of the judicial process.”

(quoting Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 322)). Acevedo and Garibay, along with the fact

4

KAPUSTA v. BENNETT

Opinion of the Court

that immunity is disfavored under Arizona law, compel the conclusion that

the Oasis Defendants do not enjoy judicial immunity.

¶10 The Oasis Defendants nonetheless argue that the lack of a

direct connection has no impact on the applicability of judicial immunity

because probation officers are members of the judicial branch, “[s]o either

way, Oasis served and reported to the judiciary.” As noted, this argument

fails in light of Acevedo. Further, a connection to a member of the judicial

branch who reports to the court cannot be equated with a direct connection

to the court itself. See A.R.S. § 12-253 (adult probation officers exercise

supervision over probationers, subject to control and direction by the

court); see also Griggs v. Oasis Adoption Servs., Inc., 241 Ariz. 71, ¶ 20 (App.

2016) (“A generalized connection to the judicial process does not confer

immunity for all activities.”); Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 322 (no immunity for

negligent supervision of probationers).

¶11 The Oasis Defendants additionally argue that Lavit and

Brittner are analogous to the instant case, which compels a finding in their

favor. In Lavit, we determined that a psychologist, chosen by the parties

and directly ordered by the court to “serve as an expert for the [trial] court”

in determining child custody, was entitled to judicial immunity. 173 Ariz.

at 100-01. We reasoned that “his evaluations and recommendations aided

the trial court” and that “his services were performed pursuant to a court

order,” elevating the psychologist’s “role to that of a court-appointed

psychologist.” Id. Similarly, in Brittner, this court concluded that a

court-appointed therapist was entitled to judicial immunity because she

was appointed primarily to “make recommendations to assist in a custody

determination,” and the trial “court ultimately relied on” those

recommendations. 246 Ariz. 294, ¶ 7. We further reasoned that the

therapeutic services she had provided—which generally would not be

protected by immunity—were merely “incidental to the court’s purpose.”

Id. ¶¶ 7, 9.

¶12 Lavit and Brittner are distinguishable from this case. First,

unlike the trial courts in Lavit and Brittner, the superior court here neither

appointed the defendants nor requested their recommendations. As

discussed above, the court ordered that the probation department would

have the discretion to require Kapusta to attend sex-offender treatment, and

it was the probation department that referred Kapusta to Oasis and that

provided information about his discharge to the court.

¶13 Next, defendant Boling contends that, as in DeSilva, the

defendants are entitled to judicial immunity because their conduct, as it

relates to the preparation of the discharge summary, is closely related to the

5

KAPUSTA v. BENNETT

Opinion of the Court

judicial process. In DeSilva, the court determined that probation officers are

entitled to absolute immunity when filing probation revocation petitions

because doing so is “necessary to carry out and enforce the conditions of

probation of the court.” 208 Ariz. 597, ¶¶ 21-22. The court further reasoned

that “probation officers are a well-recognized part of the judicial

department” and that their statutory duties to supervise probationers are

performed “on behalf of and in aid of the court’s jurisdictional function.”

Id. ¶ 23. However, this rationale does not extend to the present matter

because, unlike the probation officers in DeSilva, the defendants are not

members of the judicial branch nor are they bound by statute to supervise

probationers on behalf of the court. See id. ¶¶ 22-23, 26.

¶14 Finally, the Oasis Defendants contend that policy

considerations support extending judicial immunity to the defendants.

Quoting Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 321, they argue that granting judicial

immunity to the defendants would “further ‘the underlying policy of

judicial immunity’—namely, to safeguard ‘principled and fearless

decision-making.’” However, the defendants’ conduct, insofar as it relates

to drafting the allegedly defamatory discharge summary, did not involve

any decision-making integral to the judicial process. Indeed, the discharge

summary stated the reasons for Kapusta’s discharge after the decision to

discharge him had already been made. Thus, its drafting did not require

anyone to exercise discretion or reach a conclusion. See DeSilva, 208 Ariz.

597, ¶¶ 23-24.

¶15 The Oasis Defendants also allege that their exposure to

liability will discourage practitioners from accepting “the burdens of

providing these court-ordered treatments.” But we have no evidence that

this phenomenon has occurred in other contexts in which immunity has

been denied, and, on the record before us, we decline to depart from our

precedent, including Arizona’s strong preference for not granting

immunity. See, e.g., Adams v. State, 185 Ariz. 440, 447 (App. 1995) (denying

immunity to state caseworkers for pre-adoption investigations and

post-placement monitoring); Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 322 (not “all the activities

of a probation officer in supervising a probationer are entitled to

immunity”). Accordingly, we reverse the superior court’s conclusion that

the Oasis Defendants were entitled to judicial immunity for their role in

preparing the discharge summary provided to the probation department.

II. Statute of Limitations

¶16 The Oasis Defendants argue, in the alternative, that we

should “affirm the dismissal of the two negligence-based claims . . . because

those claims are time-barred.” Specifically, they claim that Kapusta should

6

KAPUSTA v. BENNETT

Opinion of the Court

have filed suit by June 2023—instead of December 4, 2023—because the

two-year statute of limitations began to run when Oasis discharged him in

June 2021. In reply, Kapusta contends that “[n]othing in the Verified

Complaint, or the record as a whole, conclusively establishes that [he]

discovered or should have discovered the alleged wrongdoing outside the

limitations period.”

¶17 The statute of limitations for a negligence claim is two years.

A.R.S. § 12-542. The statute begins to run when “the plaintiff knows or with

reasonable diligence should know the facts underlying the cause.” Doe v.

Roe, 191 Ariz. 313, ¶ 29 (1998). “A plaintiff need not know all the facts

underlying a cause of action” but “must at least possess a minimum

requisite of knowledge sufficient to identify that a wrong occurred and

caused injury.” Id. ¶ 32. Generally, when a claim accrued is a question of

fact for the jury. Satamian v. Great Divide Ins. Co., 257 Ariz. 163, ¶ 14 (2024).

¶18 Below, the superior court declined to address the defendants’

statute of limitations argument after dismissing Kapusta’s claims on

immunity grounds. And the fact that Oasis discharged Kapusta in June

2021 does not, on its own, establish that he knew or should have known the

facts underlying the cause of action at that time. See Doe, 191 Ariz. 313, ¶ 29.

As such, we remand the case to the superior court to determine whether

Kapusta’s claims were time-barred. See Coulter v. Grant Thornton, LLP,

241 Ariz. 440, ¶ 17 (App. 2017) (remanding to trial court to resolve factual

question of when limitations period commenced).

Disposition

¶19 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the

superior court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

E C K E R S T R O M, Judge, dissenting:

¶20 “The purpose behind judicial immunity is to protect

‘principled and fearless decision-making.’” Widoff v. Wiens, 202 Ariz. 383,

¶ 9 (App. 2002) (quoting Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1980)).

In practice, judges, and those performing integral judicial functions, must

be able to perform their duties “without fear of the threat of litigation.” See

id. ¶ 12. Non-judicial actors are deemed to perform integral judicial

functions when they act on behalf of the court “pursuant to a court

directive, which was related to the judicial process.” Acevedo v. Pima Cnty.

Adult Prob. Dep’t, 142 Ariz. 319, 321 (1984).

7

KAPUSTA v. BENNETT

Opinion of the Court

¶21 In essence, Kapusta maintains that the Oasis Defendants

harmed him by authoring reports that caused the superior court judge to

make adverse decisions about his probation. In authoring those reports—

and conducting the evaluations and treatment sessions underlying them—

Oasis performed several integral judicial functions. It provided an

evaluation, thereby assisting the court in determining whether Kapusta

needed treatment and whether that treatment could assist him. It provided

treatment allowing Kapusta to receive an opportunity for rehabilitation,

thereby facilitating the court’s traditional probationary goals of improving

a probationer’s life trajectory and reducing the risk of recidivism. And, it

provided reports containing a candid judgment about Kapusta’s

compliance with the evaluation and counseling regimen, thereby allowing

the court to determine whether Kapusta had been abiding by his conditions

of probation—crucial information relied upon by the court to vigilantly

guard the public from future harm. Because Kapusta’s grievances relate

exclusively to how the Oasis Defendants performed these judicial

functions, each integral to the court’s implementation and enforcement of

its sentencing order, I cannot agree with my colleagues that the court erred

in dismissing Kapusta’s complaint. Id. at 321-22 (judicial immunity should

apply when non-judicial actor engages in integral judicial functions

pursuant to court directive).

¶22 The majority reasons that the Oasis Defendants do not qualify

for judicial immunity because they acted without “direct connection” to the

superior court’s orders. In support of this premise, my colleagues

emphasize that the court’s sentencing order granted the probation office

discretion whether to require Kapusta to participate in counseling. The

majority further observes that the court’s sentencing order is silent as to the

identity of any specific provider and even any requirement that a report be

provided.

¶23 This reasoning overlooks that the probation department acted

exclusively under the authority of the superior court’s sentencing order

when it required Kapusta to participate in counseling with Oasis. That

order directed Kapusta to “actively participate and cooperate in any

program of counseling . . . as determined by [the Adult Probation

Department (APD)].” The order implicitly directed the probation

department to assess whether Kapusta needed counseling to remain

law-abiding. Further, the court’s order expressly contemplated and

8

KAPUSTA v. BENNETT

Opinion of the Court

facilitated the court’s access to any reports on Kapusta’s performance in any

counseling ultimately required under the authority of the court’s order.2

¶24 In short, the sentencing order delegated to the probation

department the authority to act as a conduit for executing the superior

court’s orders as to Kapusta’s counseling. Indeed, in the absence of the

court’s sentencing order, the probation department lacked any authority to

direct Kapusta into counseling or any leverage to induce his compliance

with it. When the Oasis Defendants carried out those directives, as

communicated by the probation department, they engaged in functions

integral to executing the court’s orders. They acted, at the direction of the

court’s express delegates, in conformity with the intentions of the court as

expressed by its sentencing order.

¶25 In determining whether non-judicial actors, such as the Oasis

Defendants, are entitled to absolute immunity for facilitating the superior

court’s conditions on a claimant’s probation, we should honor our supreme

court’s reasoning on that specific question. In Acevedo, the court clarified

that non-judicial officers are “entitled to absolute protection from suit for

actions which are necessary to carry out and enforce the conditions of

probation imposed by the court.” See id. at 322 (applying principle of

judicial immunity to probation officers).3 Kapusta’s complaint focuses

entirely on actions the Oasis Defendants took to execute and enforce the

conditions of probation imposed on Kapusta. Thus, under both the public

policy rationale for judicial immunity articulated in Acevedo and our

supreme court’s specific application of that rationale to the implementation

2The court’s sentencing order required Kapusta to “sign any release

or consent required by the APD so the APD can exchange information in

relation to my treatment, behavior and activities.”

3The majority opinion suggests the Oasis Defendants should not

receive immunity for their actions to supervise and enforce probation

conditions because they are neither officers of the court nor employees of a

judicial officer. But, our supreme court has expressly declined to make that

distinction in assessing immunity for non-judicial actors. Acevedo, 142 Ariz.

at 322 (“Those officers, employees, and agents who assist the court in the

judicial process are also entitled to absolute immunity.”) (emphasis added);

see also Brittner v. Lanzilotta, 246 Ariz. 294, ¶¶ 11-12 (App. 2019) (granting

absolute immunity to therapist appointed to assist parents in child custody

dispute).

9

KAPUSTA v. BENNETT

Opinion of the Court

of probation conditions, the Oasis Defendants should receive absolute

immunity from such lawsuits. See id. at 321-22.

¶26 The inevitable result of the majority’s contrary conclusion

should give us pause. In deciding whether to provide services to our courts,

the Oasis Defendants, and the host of other non-employee counselors who

assist our courts, now must weigh the financial risks of defending lawsuits

like Kapusta’s. And, even if our courts remain able to secure providers

under these circumstances, those providers will now face the potential

threat of legal retaliation from each probationer who takes issue with the

content of their reports or the quality of their counseling sessions. Such

threats of litigation will predictably challenge a provider’s resolve either to

insist on substantial compliance with the counseling regimen or to provide

uncompromising candor in their subsequent reports to the court.

¶27 For all the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.4

4Because I would affirm the court’s dismissal of the case on the

ground that the Oasis Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity, I do

not address the question of whether the action is also time-barred.

10