An “allegation of residence alone” does not suffice to establish the “essential element” of diversity of citizenship. (quoting Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 792 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (emphasis omitted))
How later courts described this case
- An “allegation of residence alone” does not suffice to establish the “essential element” of diversity of citizenship. (quoting Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 792 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (emphasis omitted))
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JOHNATHAN THORNTON,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 25 - 865 (SLS)
v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan
HUGHIE DUVALL HUNT,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this action, Johnathan Thornton, a District of Columbia resident appearing pro se, sues
his former attorney, Hughie Duvall Hunt, a resident of Maryland. Mr. Thornton claims that
Mr. Hunt “did not follow thru [sic] with his contract obligations.” Compl. at 4, ECF No. 1. He
alleges that “after we won the ‘judgment’ in federal court,” Mr. Hunt “abandoned the case which
means I was never awarded or compensated because” of Mr. Hunt’s “false statement.” Id.
Mr. Thornton seeks “to be compensated or awarded what the [Judge] has ordered.” Id. His
Complaint does not specify the amount in controversy, but his Opposition attaches various
documents stating that he was awarded $50,000 in prior litigation where Mr. Hunt served as his
counsel. ECF No. 9, at 6–7. Mr. Hunt has moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). ECF No. 6. The Court recognizes that Mr. Thornton is frustrated because
of his inability to obtain a prior judgment. But because the Court has no authority to consider these
contractual claims, it must grant Mr. Hunt’s motion under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.
The Court draws the facts, accepted as true, from Mr. Thornton’s Complaint. Wright v.
Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Found., 68 F.4th 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2023). Because Mr. Thornton is
proceeding pro se, the Court considers the Complaint “in light of all filings, including filings
responsive to [the] motion to dismiss.” 1 Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152
(D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (cleaned up).
A federal “court must assure itself of the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction before
reaching the merits” of a claim. Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 896 F.3d
501, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2018). Without subject-matter jurisdiction, a court “has no authority to address
the dispute presented,” Lovitky v. Trump, 949 F.3d 753, 763 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting Attias v.
Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 624 (D.C. Cir. 2017)), and must dismiss the action, Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(h)(3).
District courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions “arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and civil actions where the parties are of
diverse citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds “the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive
of interest and costs,” id. § 1332(a). For jurisdiction to exist under Section 1332, the complaint
must allege the threshold dollar amount and establish “complete diversity between the parties,
which is to say that the plaintiff may not be a citizen of the same state as any defendant.” Bush v.
Butler, 521 F. Supp. 2d 63, 71 (D.D.C. 2007). Because the citizenship requirement is “assessed at
the time the suit is filed,” the plaintiff bears the burden of pleading each party’s citizenship. Id.
at 70–71.
Mr. Thornton’s Complaint does not present a federal question or establish diversity
jurisdiction. In the jurisdictional section of the form Complaint, Mr. Thornton checks the “Federal
1
Mr. Thornton attached various exhibits to his Opposition to Mr. Hunt’s Motion to Dismiss,
including a letter he wrote to Judge Carl J. Nichols in connection with a different lawsuit, a letter
from Mr. Hunt to Mr. Thornton about a $50,000 judgment in connection with a lawsuit in the
District of Maryland, and what appears to be an intake form from the D.C. Bar Pro Bono Center.
See ECF No. 9.
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question” box. Compl. at 3. But “[f]or a case to raise a federal question within the scope of
28 U.S.C. § 1331, it must implicate some provision of substantive federal law,” Youkelsone v.
FDIC, 560 F. App’x. 4, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (per curiam), which this contract action does not. And
Mr. Thornton does not establish diversity jurisdiction. The Complaint alleges that Mr. Thornton is
a resident of the District, and that Mr. Hunt is a resident of Maryland. Compl. at 1–2. Even
assuming that these allegations are sufficient to plead complete diversity between the Parties, but
see Novak v. Cap. Mgmt. & Dev. Corp., 452 F.3d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (An “allegation of
residence alone” does not suffice to establish the “essential element” of diversity of citizenship.
(quoting Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 792 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (emphasis
omitted))), the Complaint does not allege that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
Mr. Thornton’s Complaint is silent about the amount in dispute. But his Opposition and the
accompanying attachments suggest that he seeks to collect a prior $50,000 judgment, which falls
short of the jurisdictional minimum. Again, the Court understands Mr. Thornton’s frustrations. In
these circumstances, however, it has no jurisdiction to consider his claim.
For these reasons, the Court grants Mr. Hunt’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 6. A separate
order will issue.
SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN
United States District Judge
Date: January 27, 2026
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