White

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

JACKIE WHITE CIVIL CASE NO. 24-35

VERSUS JUDGE EDWARDS

TEXAS PETROLEUM INVESTMENT MAG. JUDGE PEREZ-MONTES

COMPANY, ET AL

MEMORANDUM RULING AND ORDER

Before the Court are four motions. First, Jackie White, on behalf of her minor

son, Alton Ray Bonnett (“Plaintiff”) filed a Motion to Remand (R. Doc. 41). Defendant,

Texas Petroleum Investment Company (“TPIC”) opposes the motion (R. Doc. 44).

Plaintiff replied (R. Doc. 46). Next, Defendant, Oberal Barnes (“Barnes”) filed a

Motion to Dismiss for Insufficient Service of Process (R. Doc. 30). Plaintiff opposes

the motion (R. Doc. 43). Barnes replied (R. Doc. 45). Finally, TPIC filed two Motions

for Summary Judgment (R. Docs. 32, 49). Plaintiff opposes the motions (R. Docs. 47,

51). TPIC replied to both oppositions (R. Docs. 48, 52).

After careful consideration of the parties’ memoranda and the applicable law,

Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is DENIED, TPIC’s Motion for Summary Judgment on

the Statutory Employer Doctrine is GRANTED, and O.B. Barnes’ Motion to Dismiss

and TPIC’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Fraudulent Joinder are DENIED AS

MOOT.

I. Background

This case arises out of the death of Jessie Ira Jones (“Jones”) on September 8,

2023.1 On that date, Jones—who, at the time, was directly employed by Murphrey

Oil Company (“Murphrey Oil”)—was working at the Colgrade Oil Field, an oilfield

location operated by TPIC in Winn Parish.2 TPIC is an oil exploration and production

company.3 Murphrey Oil was contracted with TPIC to perform oil well services and

equipment repairs on TPIC’s property.4 This work involved pulling pumps and

motors from the oil wells and replacing well equipment to put certain oil wells back

into production.5 On the date of the incident, Jones was instructed to hold cables on

the workover rig while a crew raised the derrick.6 As the derrick was being raised,

the rig made contact with a live electrical wire, which caused Jones to be

electrocuted.7

On December 1, 2023, Jackie White filed a wrongful death and survival action

in the 8th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Winn, Louisiana, on behalf of her

minor child, Altus Ray Bonnett, against TPIC and Barnes (collectively

“Defendants”).8 Plaintiff, on behalf of her son, is a citizen of Louisiana.9 TPIC is a

1 See R. Doc. 1-1, ¶ 2.

2 See R. Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 3–4.

3 See R. Doc. 49-1 at 7.

4 See R. Doc. 49-5 at 1–2.

5 See R. Doc. 49-1 at 7.

6 See R. Doc. 1-1, ¶ 5. Workover rigs are used to pull a pump or a motor from an oil well so it can be

replaced or repaired. See R. Doc. 49-6 at 3.

7 See R. Doc. 1-1, ¶ 6.

8 See R. Doc. 1-1.

9 See R. Doc. 41-1 at 1.

Texas citizen.10 Barnes is a Louisiana citizen.11 In the state court Petition, Plaintiff

alleges that “Barnes was employed by [TPIC] to manage the Colgrade Oil Field where

the incident occurred.”12 Plaintiff further alleges that “[TPIC] and/or [ ] Barnes failed

to detect, repair and warn Murphrey Oil [ ] employees or [ ] Jones of the dangerous

electrical wire on the oil well site near the location where they were required to rig

up the workover rig.”13

TPIC removed this action to this Court on January 10, 2024, after being served

on December 19, 2023.14 In the Notice of Removal, TPIC alleged that Barnes was

never served with process before TPIC removed the case, and Plaintiff fraudulently

joined Barnes as a defendant to defeat diversity jurisdiction.15 On April 18, 2024,

Plaintiff attempted to amend her complaint to add Murphrey Oil as a defendant in

this action.16 However, her attempt to do so was denied.17 Plaintiff then requested

summons on Barnes on March 10, 2025—roughly fourteen months after this case was

removed from state court,18 and Barnes was finally served on March 20, 2025.19

Plaintiff now moves to remand this case back to the state court.20 Plaintiff

argues that since Barnes is a citizen of Louisiana, this court does not have subject

10 See R. Doc. 1 at 2 (“Defendant, [TPIC], is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the

State of Texas, and maintains its principal place of business in Houston, Texas.”).

11 See R. Doc. 41-1 at 1.

12 See R. Doc. 1-1, ¶ 9.

13 See R. Doc. 1-1, ¶ 12.

14 See R. Doc. 1 at 2.

15 See R. Doc. 1 at 2.

16 See R. Doc. 14.

17 See R. Doc. 22; see also R. Doc. 53.

18 See R. Doc. 23.

19 See R. Doc. 27.

20 See R. Doc. 41.

matter jurisdiction.21 On the other hand, TPIC moves for summary judgment

claiming Barnes was fraudulently joined in this action for the purpose of defeating

diversity.22 Barnes moves to be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(5) for insufficient service

of process.23 TPIC also moves for summary judgment on the basis that Jones was

TPIC’s statutory employee at the time of the incident, and as a result, Plaintiff’s

remedy is not in tort but is limited to workers’ compensation benefits.24

II. Applicable Standards

a. Motion to Remand

A defendant may remove “any civil action brought in a State court of which the

district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction....”25 When original

jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, the cause of action must be between

“citizens of different States” and the amount in controversy must exceed the “sum or

value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.”26 Remand is proper if at any time

the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.27 The removing party bears the burden of

showing that federal jurisdiction exists.28 In assessing whether removal was

appropriate, the Court is guided by the principle, grounded in notions of comity and

21 See R. Doc. 41 at 1.

22 See R. Doc. 32 at 1.

23 See R. Doc. 30.

24 See R. Doc. 49 at 1.

25 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

26 Id. at § 1332(a)-(a)(1). There is no dispute that the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied.

Accordingly, the Court will turn directly to the issue of whether Barnes was improperly joined as a

defendant.

27 See id. at § 1447(c).

28 See Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1335 (5th Cir. 1995).

the recognition that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, that removal

statutes should be strictly construed.29

A defendant may remove by showing that a non-diverse party was improperly

joined.30 Because this is a narrow exception to the rule of complete diversity, the

burden of demonstrating improper joinder is a heavy one.31 To meet its burden, the

removing party must show an “(1) actual fraud in pleading jurisdictional facts, or (2)

inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action against the non-diverse

defendant.”32 To determine whether the latter showing has been made, courts ask

“whether the defendant has demonstrated that there is no possibility of recovery by

the plaintiff against an in-state defendant, which stated differently means that there

is no reasonable basis for the district court to predict that the plaintiff might be able

to recover against an in-state defendant.”33

Generally, a court should “conduct a Rule 12(b)(6)-type analysis ... to determine

whether the complaint states a claim under state law against the in-state

defendant.”34 “If a plaintiff can survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge for failure to state a

claim, there is ordinarily no improper joinder.”35 However, where a plaintiff has

omitted or misstated “discrete facts that would determine the propriety of joinder,”

the district court may “pierce the pleadings and conduct a summary inquiry” to

29 See, e.g., Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002); Neal v.

Kawasaki Motors Corp., No. 95-668, 1995 WL 419901, at *2 (E.D. La. July 13, 1995).

30 Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 572 (5th Cir. 2004).

31 Id. at 574.

32 Id. at 573.

33 Davidson v. Georgia-Pac., L.L.C., 819 F.3d 758, 765 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Smallwood, 385 F.3d

at 573).

34 Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573.

35 Davidson, 819 F.3d at 765.

determine whether a non-diverse defendant has been improperly joined.36 When

conducting a summary inquiry, the court may consider “summary judgment-type

evidence in the record,” and it must resolve all disputed questions of fact and

ambiguities in the controlling state law in favor of the plaintiff.37

“[A] court may choose to use either one of these two analyses, but it must use

one and only one of them, not neither or both.”38 If a court determines that the non-

diverse party has been improperly joined under a Rule 12(b)(6)-type analysis, that

party must be dismissed without prejudice.39 This dismissal is based on lack of

subject matter jurisdiction and does not operate as an adjudication on the merits.40

When applying the improper joinder test, a federal court reads the original state court

pleading through the lens of the federal pleading standards.41

As in the Rule 12(b)(6) context, the plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”42 A claim is facially plausible when the

plaintiff pleads facts that allow the Court to “draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”43 The Court must accept all well-

pleaded facts as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

36 Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573–74.

37 Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 649 (5th Cir. 2003).

38 Int'l Energy Ventures Mgmt., L.L.C. v. United Energy Grp., Ltd., 818 F.3d 193, 207 (5th Cir. 2016)

(emphasis in original).

39 Id. at 209.

40 Id. at 210.

41 Id. at 203.

42 Id. at 200 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

43 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

plaintiff.44 But the Court is not bound to accept as true legal conclusions couched as

factual allegations.45

b. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.”46 A material fact impacts the outcome of a lawsuit and can be

identified through substantive law.47 A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if

the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could render a verdict for the nonmoving

party.”48 “[A] party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must

support the motion by citing to particular parts of materials in the record.”49

In a summary judgment motion, “a party seeking summary judgment always

bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its

motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings ... [and] affidavits, if any,

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”50 If the

movant meets this initial burden, then the non-movant has the burden of going

beyond the pleadings and designating specific facts that prove that a genuine issue

of material fact exists.51 A non-movant, however, cannot meet the burden of proving

44 Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 239 (5th Cir. 2009).

45 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

46 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

47 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

48 Id.

49 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).

50 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

51 Id. at 324.

that a genuine issue of material fact exists by providing only “some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated

assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.”52 Similarly, “unsupported allegations or

affidavit or deposition testimony setting forth ultimate or conclusory facts and

conclusions of law are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.”53

In reviewing the evidence, "the court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or

weigh the evidence.”54 The district court will not “evaluate the credibility of the

witnesses, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual disputes.”55 Factual controversies

are to be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, “but only when … both parties have

submitted evidence of contradictory facts.”56

III. Analysis

a. Motion to Remand57

Plaintiff argues remand is proper in this case because she contends that

Barnes was properly joined as a defendant since there is a possibility that he could

be held liable for damages under state law.58 However, Defendants assert that Barnes

52 Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).

53 Clark v. Am's Favorite Chicken, 110 F.3d 295, 297 (5th Cir. 1997).

54 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).

55 Int'l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263 (5th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).

56 Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.

57 This Court chooses not to “pierce the pleadings,” but instead chooses to do a “Rule 12(b)(6)-like”

analysis. Int’l Energy Ventures, 818 F.3d at 207 (“[A] court may choose to use either one of these two

analyses, but it must use one and only one of them, not neither or both.”) (emphasis in original).

Because of this, the facts and allegations relied on its remand analysis come directly “from the

operative […] complaint because, at this stage, we accept all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff….” Nevarez v. Dorris, 135 F.4th 269, 271 n.1 (5th Cir. 2025)

(citation modified).

58 See R. Doc. 41-1 at 3.

was joined for the sole purpose of defeating diversity.59 Defendants further assert

that Plaintiff’s Petition “includes no allegation that TPIC delegated any personal duty

to Barnes or anyone else ….”60

Louisiana law sets forth circumstances under which an employee can be held

individually liable for injuries to third persons. In Canter v. Koehring Co.,61 the

Louisiana Supreme Court held that an employee may be personally liable to third

parties when these “four elements” are met:

1. First, the employer must owe a duty of care to the plaintiff, the

breach of which caused the injury at issue.

2. Second, the employer must have delegated that duty to the employee

at issue.

3. Third, the employee at issue must have breached the duty through

his own personal fault.

4. And fourth, the employee’s breach must have been more than a

simple breach of a ‘general administrative responsibility,’ but must

instead stem from the breach of a duty the employee owed the

plaintiff personally that was not properly delegated to another

employee.62

Personal liability under Canter only exists in “limited circumstances.”63

In the Petition, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants endangered the public and

caused plaintiff’s harm by:”

a. Failing to warn workers of the live electrical wire on the oil well site;

59 See R. Doc. 44 at 4.

60 See R. Doc. 44 at 5.

61 283 So. 2d 716 (La. 1973), superseded by statute on other grounds, La. Rev. Stat. § 23:1032 (1998).

62 Rolls ex rel. A.R. v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 34 F.4th 431, 437–38 (5th Cir. 2022) (brackets omitted)

(quoting Canter, 283 So. 2d at 721).; see also Anderson v. Ga. Gulf Lake Charles, LLC, 342 F. App'x

911, 916 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Canter’s four-part test is used to determine whether an employee is

individually liable to third persons, even if they are not co-employees.”) (quoting In re 1994 Exxon

Chem. Fire, 558 F.3d 378, 386 (5th Cir. 2009)).

63 See Banks v. Wal-Mart, Inc., No. 18-749, 2018 WL 4001289, at *3 (W.D. La. Aug. 6, 2018).

b. Failing to keep the oil well site in a safe condition for others;

c. Failing to properly instruct workers where to place their workover

rig; and

d. Requiring workers to setup their workover rig in a dangerous place.64

While Plaintiff alleges that “Barnes was employed by [TPIC] to manage the Colgrade

Oil Field where the incident occurred,” she does not identify any specific duties of

care owed to Jones that were delegated by TPIC to Barnes, or anyone else for that

matter.65 In fact, the only other allegation in Plaintiff’s Petition that mentions Barnes

alleges that “[TPIC] and/or [ ] Barnes failed to detect, repair and warn Murphrey Oil

[ ] employees or [ ] Jones of the dangerous electrical wire on the oil well site near the

location where they were required to rig up the workover rig.”66 These allegations

from Plaintiff’s Petition are wholly insufficient to establish the second element of

Canter and cannot meet “Canter’s high bar for imposing personal liability on a

management-level employee.”67

Because of this, Plaintiff cannot establish that the second element of Canter is

satisfied, namely that TPIC delegated to Barnes any personal duties of care owed to

Jones. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to remand is denied, and her claims against

Barnes are dismissed without prejudice.68 Consequently, Barnes’ motion to dismiss69

64 See R. Doc. 1-1, ¶ 8.

65 See R. Doc. 1-1, ¶ 9.

66 See R. Doc. 1-1, ¶ 12.

67 See Rolls, 34 F.4th at 438.

68 See Int’l Energy Ventures, 818 F.3d at 210 (“[T]he dismissal of a nondiverse party over whom the

court does not have jurisdiction must be a dismissal without prejudice in every instance.”) (emphasis

in original).

69 See R. Doc. 30.

and TPIC’s motion for summary judgment on fraudulent joinder70 are denied as

moot.71

b. Motion for Summary Judgment

TPIC also moves for summary judgment arguing that pursuant to the Master

Service Agreement (the “MSA”) between TPIC and Murphrey Oil, there is a

rebuttable presumption that Jones was the statutory employee of TPIC that Plaintiff

cannot overcome.72

i. Evidentiary Objection

First, Plaintiff contends that the MSA is improper summary judgment

evidence because it lacks proper foundation, and that Barnes lacks the personal

knowledge and competence to authenticate the MSA.73

At the summary judgment stage, “[a] party may object that the material cited

to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible

in evidence.”74 But “materials cited to support or dispute a fact need only

be capable of being presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.”75 Thus,

“a precondition for considering evidence in an improper form ... [is] that the ‘the party

submitting the evidence [must] show that it will be possible to put the information ...

70 See R. Doc. 32.

71 See Bourgeois v. U.S. Ship. Corp., 683 F. Supp. 3d 548 (E.D. La. 2023) (denying as moot motion to

dismiss after denying plaintiff’s motion to remand); see also McMorris v. Stafford, 655 F. Supp. 671

(M.D. La. 1987) (denying as moot motion for summary judgment after denying plaintiff’s motion to

remand).

72 See R. Doc. 49 at 2.

73 See R. Doc. 51 at 2–4.

74 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2); see also Lee v. Offshore Logistical & Transp., L.L.C., 859 F.3d 353, 355 (5th

Cir. 2017), as revised, (July 5, 2017).

75 Maurer v. Indep. Town, 870 F.3d 380, 384 (5th Cir. 2017) (emphasis original and internal quotations

omitted) (quoting LSR Consulting, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 835 F.3d 530, 534 (5th Cir. 2016)).

into an admissible form.’”76 Accordingly, “except where a document is obviously and

categorically inadmissible, an authentication objection will tend to be insufficient

unless it makes some case for why it could not be made admissible.”77

Plaintiff argues that the MSA is not presented in a form that would be

admissible at trial because Barnes’ deposition testimony cannot authenticate it.78

Notably, Plaintiff does not object on the grounds that the MSA is not authentic, only

on that it has not been authenticated.79 In fact, Plaintiff’s objection does not allege

that the MSA is inaccurate in any way. Although Plaintiff may be correct that the

MSA exhibit was not properly authenticated as presented to the Court, the crucial

questions is whether it could be authenticated.80 The Court finds that TPIC has

shown that it could be properly authenticated with the Unsworn Declaration of Travis

Wells.

ii. Statutory Employer Doctrine

TPIC contends that Jones was TPIC’s statutory employee at the time of the

incident, and as a result, Plaintiff’s remedy is not in tort but is limited to workers’

compensation benefits.81

76 Campos v. Steves & Sons, Inc., 10 F.4th 515, 521–22 (5th Cir. 2021) (second brackets and ellipses in

original) (quoting Lee, 859 F.3d at 355).

77 Hernandez v. Allstate Veh. and Prop. Ins. Co., No. 24-00086, 2025 WL 1485872, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Apr.

22, 2025) (emphasis omitted).

78 See R. Doc. 51 at 3–4.

79 See R. Doc. 51 at 2–4.

80 Akers v. Beal Bank, 845 F. Supp. 2d 238, 243 (D.D.C. Feb. 29, 2012) (holding that the 2010

Amendment to Rule 56 “eliminated the unequivocal requirement that documents submitted in support

of a summary judgment motion must be authenticated.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c), 2010 Amend.

81 See R. Doc. 49 at 1.

Under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act (“LWCA”),82 “an employee

injured in an accident while in the course and scope of his employment is generally

limited to the recovery of workers’ compensation benefits as his exclusive remedy

against his employer and may not sue his employer, or any principal, in tort.”83 The

LWCA applies both to a direct employer/employee relationship as well as to a

statutory employer/employee relationship.84 The “statutory employer” doctrine—

codified in Louisiana Revised Statute 23:1061—provides that when a valid written

contract recognizes the existence of a statutory employer relationship:

there shall be a rebuttable presumption of a statutory employer

relationship between the principal and the contractor’s employees that

can only be overcome by showing the work performed is not an integral

part of or essential to the ability of the principal to generate that

principal’s good, products, or services.85

Under Louisiana law, a survival action and/or wrongful death claim related to an

injury for which workers’ compensation is recoverable is barred by the workers’

compensation claim.86 Therefore, if TPIC is found to be Jones’ statutory employer,

Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statutory immunity provisions of the LWCA.

In this case, Jones was directly employed by Murphrey Oil at the time of the

incident.87 Murphrey Oil was contracted with TPIC to perform oil well services and

82 LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1032.

83 Louque v. Scott Equip. Co., LLC, 212 So.3d 1203, 1208 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/18/17), writ denied, 218

So.3d 629 (La. 4/13/17) (cleaned up) (citing Deshotel v. Guichard Operating Company, Inc., 916 So.2d

72, 76–79 (La. 12/17/04)).

84 See LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1061(A)(1).

85 Id. at § 23:1061(A)(3).

86 See id. at § 23:1032(A)(1)(a) (“[e]xcept for intentional acts ... the rights and remedies herein granted

to an employee or his dependent on account of an injury ... shall be exclusive of all other rights,

remedies, and claims for damages.”).

87 See R. Doc. 1-1, ¶ 4.

equipment repairs on TPIC’s property.88 The MSA between TPIC and Murphrey Oil

contains provisions identifying TPIC as the statutory employer, providing:

In all cases where [Murphrey Oil’s] employees … are governed by the

Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Act, Louisiana R.S. 23:1021 et seq.,

[TPIC] and [Murphrey Oil] agree and recognize, and [Murphrey Oil]

stipulates, that all Work provided by [Murphrey Oil] and its employees

pursuant to this Agreement is an integral part of and is essential to the

ability of [TPIC] to generate [TPIC’s] goods and services for purposes of

Louisiana R.S. 23:1061(A)(1). Furthermore, [TPIC] and [Murphrey Oil]

agree and recognize, and [Murphrey Oil] stipulates, that [TPIC] is the

principal or statutory employer of [Murphrey Oil’s] employees for

purposes of Louisiana R.S. 23:1061(A)(3) and is entitled to the benefits

afforded a statutory employer under Louisiana law. Irrespective of

[TPIC’s] status as the statutory employer or special employer (as defined

in Louisiana R.S. 23:1031(C)) of [Murphrey Oil’s] employees, [Murphrey

Oil] agrees to remain primarily responsible for the payment of Louisiana

Worker’s Compensation benefits to its employees and shall not be

entitled to seek contribution for any such payments from [TPIC] and

agrees to indemnify [TPIC] for any such payments.89

The above quoted language from the MSA recognizes the existence of a statutory

employer relationship and is valid.90 Accordingly, a rebuttable presumption of a

statutory employer relationship has been created, and it can only be overcome by

showing that the work performed is not an integral part of or essential to the ability

of TPIC to generate its goods, products, or services.91

In an apparent effort to rebut the statutory employer relationship

presumption, Plaintiff contends that disputed facts exist as to whether Murphrey

Oil’s work was integral or essential to TPIC’s business by essentially arguing that

88 See R. Doc. 49-5.

89 See R. Doc. 49-5 at 15.

90 See e.g., Courville v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 643 F. Supp. 3d 627, 633–34 n. 1 (W.D. La. 2022) (finding

a similar provision valid and collecting cases).

91 See LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1061(A)(3).

TPIC could have hired a different contractor to do the work but hired Murphrey Oil

because it was conveniently local.92 Plaintiff cites no legal authority to support this

contention, and TPIC is correct in pointing out, “[t]his is telling, as it shows that

Plaintiff has no legal argument that servicing oil wells is not essential to the business

of an oil company such as TPIC.”93

“In its current form, § 1061(A)(3) is interpreted liberally by courts across

Louisiana and their federal counterparts.”94 The reasoning behind this rests in the

view that “the legislature has specifically rejected a restrictive analysis [of La. Rev.

Stat. § 23:1061] in favor of a more liberal interpretation of the words ‘integral’ and

‘essential.’”95 Several state and federal courts in Louisiana have “construed the

statute liberally to find even the most peripheral tasks by a contractor for its

statutory employer to be essential and integral to the employer’s ability to generate

its services.”96

92 See R. Doc. 51 at 4–5.

93 See R. Doc. 52 at 5.

94 Ayers v. Packaging Corp of Am. Inc., No. 18-00289, 2020 WL 6301964 (W.D. La. Oct. 27, 2020) (citing

Whitehead v. Int'l Paper Co., No. 16-176, 2018 WL 6186944, at *2 (W.D. La. Nov. 27, 2018)); see also

English v. Apache Corp., No. 10-4419, 2011 WL 3352011, at *7 (E.D. La. Aug. 3, 2011) (“Louisiana

jurisprudence demonstrates that rebutting the presumption of a statutory employer relationship is

difficult because the words ‘integral’ and ‘essential’ are liberally interpreted, in keeping with the

Louisiana Legislature's intent.”) (citation omitted).

95 Ramos v. Tulane Univ. of La., 951 So.2d 1267, 1270 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/31/07).

96 Hodges v. The Mosaic Co., No. 05-5201, 2007 WL 2008503, at *3 (E.D. La. July 6, 2007) (finding

installation of electrician scaffolding essential to chemical manufacturer’s operations); see also

Courville, 643 F. Supp. 3d. at 635 (finding that a vessel inspector’s inspection work at an oil refinery

was an integral part of the refinery’s operations, even though the inspector was on a lunch break at

the time of his death); see also English, 2011 WL 3352011 (rejecting argument that the plaintiff was

outside the scope of his employment when he was injured while walking to a pre-job safety meeting);

see also Oliver v. Day Zimmerman, No. 05-3072, 2006 WL 508047, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 22, 2006)

(finding security services essential to oil refinery’s operations); and see also Johnson v. Tennessee Gas

Pipeline Co., 99 F. Supp. 2d 755 (E.D. La. 2000) (finding contracted catering services on board an oil

and gas compressor facility to be integral and essential to the statutory employer’s ability to operate

its oil and gas compressor facility).

In this case, Murphrey Oil was contracted by TPIC to perform oil well services

and equipment repairs on TPIC’s oil wells, including pulling pumps and motors from

the oil wells and replacing well equipment in order to put certain oil wells back into

production.97 Accepting Plaintiff’s position as true would necessarily require this

Court to shove the will of the legislature aside and be restrictive in its analysis of §

23:1061.98 This Court, however, declines to do so. Because Plaintiff has failed to

overcome the presumption that TPIC was Jones’ statutory employer, Plaintiff is

barred from seeking a remedy in tort against TPIC for damages resulting from Jones’

death. Accordingly, TPIC’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

97 See R. Doc. 49-5 at 1; see also R. Doc. 51-2 at 4.

98 See Ramos, 951 So.2d at 1270 (“[T]he legislature has specifically rejected a restrictive analysis in

favor of a more liberal interpretation of the words ‘integral’ and ‘essential.’”).

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (R. Doc. 41) is DENIED,

and Plaintiffs claims against Barnes are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Barnes’ Motion to Dismiss for Insufficient

Service (R. Doc. 30) is DENIED AS MOOT.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that TPIC’s Motion for Summary Judgment on

Fraudulent Joinder (R. Doc. 32) is DENIED AS MOOT.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that TPIC’s Motion for Summary Judgment on

the Statutory Employer Doctrine (R. Doc. 49) is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs claims

against TPIC are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED this 26th day of January, 2026.

RRY EDWARDS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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