Lurch

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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ROBERT DEREK LURCH, JR.,

Plaintiff,

REPORT AND

-against- RECOMMENDATION

24-CV-1113 (DG) (TAM)

MTA, NYCTA, JOHN DOE OFFICERS,

JAMAICA HOSPITAL MEDICAL

CENTER, JOHN DOES 1–3,

Defendants.

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TARYN A. MERKL, United States Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff Robert Derek Lurch, Jr., initiated this action pro se on February 9, 2024,

against Defendants Metropolitan Transit Authority (the “MTA”), the New York City

Transit Authority (the “NYCTA”), and John Doe New York Police Department

(“NYPD”) Officers “that transported me to Jamaica Hospital (and informed hospital

staff I jumped).” See Compl., ECF 1, at ECF p. 1 (capitalization modified). On June 5,

2024, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint, adding as Defendants Jamaica

Hospital Medical Center (“JHMC”) and multiple John Doe JHMC employees1 (together,

the “JHMC Defendants”), and terminating the MTA as a Defendant. See Mot. to Am.

Compl., ECF 21; Am. Compl., ECF 21-1. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant JHMC

unlawfully seized him in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and contrary to

1 Specifically, Plaintiff identifies as putative Defendants (1) the John Doe “JHMC

Employee that documented in the records of the incident that the plaintiff was found down on

the train tracks”; (2) the John Doe “JHMC Employee that documented in the plaintiff’s patient

chart that the plaintiff told providers in the trauma bay that he intentionally jumped onto the

train tracks”; and (3) the John Doe “JHMC Employee that documented in the plaintiff’s patient

chart that the plaintiff told police he intentionally jumped.” Am. Compl., ECF 21-1, at ECF pp. 4,

17–18.

New York state law by hospitalizing him for several hours following an incident where

he fell onto the subway tracks at the Jamaica-Van Wyck E train station. Am. Compl.,

ECF 21-1, at ECF pp. 15–18, 21–24. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant NYCTA was

negligent in, inter alia, allowing “an oily substance” and “buil[t] up debris” to

accumulate on a subway platform, which allegedly caused Plaintiff’s fall. Id. at ECF pp.

7, 20.

Presently before the Court are Defendants JHMC and NYCTA’s motions to

dismiss the amended complaint. For the reasons that follow, the Court respectfully

recommends that the motions to dismiss be granted in their entirety.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I. Factual Background

According to Plaintiff’s amended complaint, on June 3, 2023, between the hours

of 2:00 and 4:00 a.m., Plaintiff was waiting for the subway at the Jamaica-Van Wyck E

train station when he slipped and fell onto the tracks, fracturing his ribs. See Am.

Compl., ECF 21, at ECF p. 6. In his recitation of the facts, Plaintiff describes having seen

“an oily substance on the smooth bumps that make up the yellow tiling of the

platform.” Id. at ECF p. 7; see also id. at ECF p. 12 (alleging that Plaintiff fell on the tracks

“due to oil and debris that accumulated on the subway platform tiling”). A “good

Samaritan” called out to Plaintiff to warn him that a train was approaching the station

and to get off the tracks; Plaintiff walked along the tracks to the stairs located at the

front of the tunnel, climbed the stairs back up to the platform, and “collapsed, losing

consciousness.” Id. at ECF p. 6.

In the amended complaint, Plaintiff does not allege any particular facts about

who found him or transported him to the hospital. Cf. generally id. He awoke on a

gurney in the emergency department at JHMC, where a nurse informed him that he

could not leave because police officers had told the hospital that he had jumped onto

the tracks.2 Id. at ECF pp. 6–7. Plaintiff told the nurse he had slipped, not jumped, and

had only lost consciousness after returning safely to the platform. Id. at ECF p. 7. The

nurse told Plaintiff that to be discharged, he needed someone to pick him up and

confirm he was not suicidal. Id. at ECF pp. 7–8. Plaintiff “tried to get up and leave[,] but

hospital security was alerted,” and he was unable to leave of his own accord. Id. at ECF

p. 8. Security personnel lent Plaintiff a phone to call his girlfriend to pick him up. Id.

Approximately four hours later, Plaintiff was transferred to JHMC’s adult

Comprehensive Psychiatric Emergency Program (“CPEP”). Id. at ECF pp. 8–9. Plaintiff’s

girlfriend later arrived and was interviewed by the doctor; around 45 minutes later, on

the same day that he arrived at the hospital, Plaintiff was discharged. Id. at ECF p. 9.

II. Procedural History

As noted above, Plaintiff initiated this action pro se by filing a complaint on

February 9, 2024, alleging a claim of false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”)

against the John Doe officers, and a common law negligence claim against the MTA and

the NYCTA. See generally Compl., ECF 1. On April 25, 2024, Defendants MTA and

NYCTA moved to dismiss the complaint, and Plaintiff filed his opposition on May 22,

2024. Letter, ECF 18; Pl. Opp’n, ECF 20. On June 5, 2024, Plaintiff moved to amend the

complaint, removing his claims against the MTA, renewing his negligence claim against

2 Plaintiff disputes the veracity of certain medical records, attached as exhibits to the

amended complaint and relied upon therein, which reflect a narrative that he told police officers

that he jumped onto the tracks in an apparent attempted suicide. See, e.g., Ex. A, ECF 21-1, at

ECF p. 28 (reporting that Plaintiff was found on train tracks and had told police he had jumped

but told providers in trauma bay that he fell). Plaintiff also argues that the discrepancies in the

medical records themselves, some of which indicate Plaintiff was found on the platform while

others suggest he was found on the tracks, support his claim that JHMC violated his rights by

unlawfully seizing him. See Pl. Opp’n, ECF 38, at ECF pp. 8–10; see also Am. Compl., ECF 21-1,

at ECF pp. 16–17.

the NYCTA, and bringing new claims for unlawful seizure and Monell liability against

JHMC and its John Doe employees. Am. Compl., ECF 21, at ECF pp. 15–18 (alleging

unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment), 19–20 (negligence claim), 21–

23 (Monell claim).

On December 18, 2024, then-Magistrate Judge Sanket J. Bulsara issued a Report

and Recommendation (“R. & R.”), recommending that the motion to amend be granted

and Defendants MTA and NYCTA’s motions to dismiss be denied without prejudice,

which the Honorable Diane Gujarati adopted on January 13, 2025, rendering the

proposed amended complaint the operative complaint.3 See R. & R., ECF 29; Jan. 13,

2025 ECF Order Adopting R. & R.

On March 12 and 14, 2025, JHMC and the NYCTA mailed Plaintiff copies of their

respective notices of motion and memoranda of law in support, along with copies of

cases and authorities pursuant to E.D.N.Y. Local Rule 7.2. See JHMC Letter, ECF 36;

NYCTA Letter, ECF 37. On May 5, 2025, Plaintiff filed his opposition to the JHMC’s

motion. Pl. Opp’n, ECF 38. On May 15 and 16, 2025, JHMC and the NYCTA filed their

motions to dismiss and memoranda of law on ECF, as well as Plaintiff’s memorandum

of law in opposition to JHMC’s motion and JHMC’s reply. See JHMC Mot. to Dismiss,

ECF 39; JHMC Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“JHMC Mem.”), ECF 39-1; Pl. Opp’n,

ECF 39-3; JHMC Reply, ECF 40; NYCTA Mot. to Dismiss, ECF 41; NYCTA Mem. in

Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“NYCTA Mem.”), ECF 42. On August 12, 2025, the case was

3 In adopting the R. & R., Judge Gujarati emphasized that Plaintiff “must identify the

John Doe NYPD officers sued for false arrest under the Amended Complaint,” which then-

Magistrate Judge Bulsara had also directed in his R. & R. Jan. 13, 2025 ECF Order Adopting

R. & R.; see R. & R., ECF 29, at 4 n.1. On December 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel,

requesting that the Court order the City of New York “to obtain the names of the John Doe

officers by contacting the EMTs that were involved in this incident.” Mot. to Compel, ECF 47.

reassigned to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for all further proceedings, and on

August 14, 2025, Judge Gujarati referred the motions to dismiss for a report and

recommendation. See Aug. 12, 2025 ECF Order Reassigning Case; Aug. 14, 2025 ECF

Order Referring Motions.

For the reasons discussed below, the Court respectfully recommends that the

motions to dismiss be granted in their entirety.

DISCUSSION

Based on the allegations described above, Plaintiff asserts five causes of action,

which the Court construes liberally given his pro se status. These are: (1) false arrest

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the John Doe NYPD officers, who have not been

identified or served in this case; (2) unlawful seizure under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

JHMC and its John Doe employees; (3) Monell liability against JHMC; (4) false arrest

under New York state law against JHMC and its John Doe employees; and (5) state-law

negligence against the NYCTA.4 See generally Am. Compl., ECF 21-1; Pl. Opp’n, ECF 39-

3.

4 The Court observes that Plaintiff’s amended complaint is organized in such a way that

his Section 1983 claims, specifically, are alleged against Defendants John Doe NYPD officers, not

Defendants John Doe JHMC employees. Compare Am. Compl., ECF 21-1, at ECF pp. 11–14

(section captioned “Fourth Amendment Violation: False Arrest,” discussing Section 1983 case

law; indicating “John Doe officers (NYPD)” as “parties liable”) with id. at ECF pp. 15–18 (section

captioned “Fourth Amendment Violation: Unlawful Seizure,” discussing N.Y. Mental Hygiene

L. § 9.37 and related case law; indicating John Doe JHMC employees as “parties liable”).

Construing the pro se Plaintiff’s pleadings liberally, as the Court must, and knowing that Section

1983 “provides only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere”

in lieu of creating any substantive rights, Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993), the Court

reads Plaintiff’s amended complaint to allege both federal Section 1983 claims and state false

arrest claims against the JHMC Defendants. See Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471,

474 (2d Cir. 2006) (observing that the court must interpret a pro se litigant’s submissions “to

raise the strongest arguments that they suggest” (quotation marks omitted)).

Defendants JHMC and NYCTA advance multiple independent grounds for

dismissing Plaintiff’s amended complaint and the claims contained therein. JHMC

argues that (1) Plaintiff fails to state a Section 1983 claim under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6); (2) Plaintiff’s false arrest claim under New York state law should be

dismissed for the same reason; and (3) if the Court dismisses the federal claim, but not

the state law claim, the Court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

state law claim. See generally JHMC Mem., ECF 39-1. The NYCTA contends that

(1) Plaintiff’s negligence claim against the NYCTA should be dismissed on procedural

grounds due to Plaintiff’s failure to allege that he followed the required notice of claim

procedure under New York law; (2) the Court should not exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over a state law claim that is factually unrelated to Plaintiff’s federal claims;

and (3) Plaintiff fails to allege all the elements of a negligence claim, as required to

survive a motion to dismiss. See generally NYCTA Mem., ECF 42.

I. Legal Standards

A. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to

dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff alleges facts that

allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged,” which requires establishing “more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Hernandez

v. United States, 939 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2019) (explaining that courts are “not required

to credit conclusory allegations or legal conclusions couched as factual allegations”

(quotation marks omitted)); Jackson v. Nassau County, 552 F. Supp. 3d 350, 364 (E.D.N.Y.

2021) (“‘[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of

a cause of action will not do.’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation

marks omitted))). At the motion to dismiss stage, “all factual allegations in the

complaint are accepted as true and all inferences are drawn in the plaintiff’s favor.”

Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 306 (2d Cir. 2015). When deciding a motion to

dismiss, the court does not “weigh the evidence that might be presented at trial but

merely . . . determine[s] whether the complaint itself is legally sufficient.” Bertuglia v.

City of New York, 839 F. Supp. 2d 703, 713 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); see Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d

1059, 1067 (2d Cir. 1985).

In addition, although the scope of review for Rule 12(b)(6) motions is generally

limited to the complaint, courts may consider some extrinsic materials, including

“material that the complaint ‘incorporate[s] by reference,’ that is ‘integral’ to the

complaint, or of which courts can take judicial notice.” Lively v. WAFRA Inv. Advisory

Grp., Inc., 6 F.4th 293, 305 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d

147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002)); see also Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47–48

(2d Cir. 1991) (holding that the district court was entitled to consider documents

incorporated in the complaint by reference and which were integral to the plaintiff’s

claim on a motion to dismiss).

Finally, “[i]t is well established that a court is ordinarily obligated to afford a

special solicitude to pro se litigants.” Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 2010).

Pro se complaints, in particular, “‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court is

therefore required to interpret the submissions of a pro se litigant “to raise the strongest

arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d

Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted). To that end, “[w]here new allegations in a pro se

plaintiff’s opposition memoranda ‘are consistent with the allegations contained’ in the

Complaint, they may be read ‘as supplements to th[e] pleadings.’” Vail v. City of New

York, 68 F. Supp. 3d 412, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Boyer v. Channel 13, Inc., Nos. 04-

CV-2137, et al. (JSR) (FM), 2005 WL 2249782, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2005)); see

Chukwueze v. NYCERS, 891 F. Supp. 2d 443, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); see also Adkins v. City of

New York, No. 19-CV-3628 (GBD) (DF), 2020 WL 2950979, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2020)

(finding that “courts should act with particular care” before dismissing a pro se

plaintiff’s complaint, “[e]specially in the civil rights context”), report and recommendation

adopted, 2020 WL 1031130 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2020). However, courts do not have to credit

new causes of action raised for the first time in a pro se plaintiff’s opposition. See, e.g.,

Mathie v. Goord, 267 F. App’x 13, 14 (2d Cir. 2008) (summary order) (affirming the

district court’s rejection of a new constitutional cause of action raised in pro se plaintiff’s

opposition). And, although a pro se complaint is “construed liberally . . . and interpreted

to raise the strongest claims that it suggests,” it must still state a plausible claim to relief.

Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 515 (2d Cir. 2013).

B. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction is proper when “the district court lacks the statutory or

constitutional power to adjudicate” the plaintiff’s claim. Doyle v. Midland Credit Mgmt.,

Inc., 722 F.3d 78, 80 (2d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). To have subject matter

jurisdiction, federal courts must have original jurisdiction over at least one of the claims

in the action. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552–55, 559–61

(2005). For a court to have original jurisdiction, the claim must “arise under” the

Constitution or laws of the United States, or the plaintiffs and defendants must be of

diverse citizenship and the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000. 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1331, 1332. A plaintiff has the burden to prove subject matter jurisdiction. Makarova v.

United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). While courts typically may not look to

materials outside the pleadings on a motion to dismiss, when assessing whether subject

matter jurisdiction exists, courts “may refer to evidence outside the pleadings.” Cangemi

v. United States, 13 F.4th 115, 129 (2d Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted).

When a court has original jurisdiction over a claim, it also has “supplemental

jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such

original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(a). A claim forms part of the same case or controversy when it “‘derive[s] from a

common nucleus of operative fact.’” Shahriar v. Smith & Wollensky Rest. Grp., Inc., 659

F.3d 234, 245 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d

296, 308 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)). To determine whether the

claims derive from this common nucleus, courts ask whether the facts underlying the

state and federal claims “‘substantially overlapped’” or whether they are “‘essentially

unrelated.’” Sadigh v. City of New York, No. 25-CV-0948 (RPK) (RML), 2025 WL 1092842,

at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2025) (first quoting Achtman v. Kirby, McInerney & Squire, LLP,

464 F.3d 328, 335 (2d Cir. 2006) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted), then

quoting Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Lussier, 221 F.3d 697, 704 (2d Cir. 2000)).

The decision to retain supplemental jurisdiction, however, is discretionary. See

Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Klein & Co.

Futures v. Bd. of Trade, 464 F.3d 255, 263 (2d Cir. 2006) (observing that a litigant does not

have a right to supplemental jurisdiction). In determining whether to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction, courts often weigh (1) judicial economy, (2) convenience,

(3) fairness, and (4) comity. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill (“Cohill”), 484 U.S. 343, 350

(1988); see Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan (“Uzan”), 388 F.3d 39, 56 (2d Cir. 2004); Cappone

v. Morrissey, No. 16-CV-7170 (RRM) (SJB), 2018 WL 4055280, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. July 27,

2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 4054871 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2018). A

district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” if it “has dismissed all

claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). “[A]s a general

proposition,” the Second Circuit has held, “‘if [all] federal claims are dismissed before

trial . . . , the state claims should be dismissed as well.’” Uzan, 388 F.3d at 56 (quoting

Castellano v. Bd. of Trs., 937 F.2d 752, 758 (2d Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

II. Analysis

A. Federal and State Claims Against the JHMC Defendants

As set forth above, Plaintiff’s amended complaint, liberally construed, asserts

three claims against JHMC and its John Doe employees: (1) a Section 1983 claim against

JHMC and its John Doe employees for unlawful seizure; (2) a Monell-type claim against

JHMC; and (3) a claim for false arrest and false confinement under New York state law

against JHMC and its John Doe employees. See Am. Compl., ECF 21-1, at ECF pp. 15–18

(detailing unlawful seizure claim under the Fourth Amendment and New York state

law); id. at 21–23 (alleging Monell claim). JHMC counters that Plaintiff’s Section 1983

allegations fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted because JHMC and its

John Doe employees are not state actors and thus not proper Section 1983 defendants.5

JHMC Mem., ECF 39-1, at 7; see also JHMC Reply, ECF 40, at 2–4. JHMC further argues

that Plaintiff’s New York false arrest and false imprisonment allegations fail to state a

claim; and, even if they did, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over these state law claims in the absence of a cause of action over which

the Court has original jurisdiction. JHMC Mem., ECF 39-1, at 7–10.

1. Section 1983 Claim

Plaintiff alleges that JHMC’s John Doe employees violated Section 1983 by

depriving him of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful seizure when

JHMC relied on “false evidence” — i.e., statements that Plaintiff had jumped onto the

train tracks in an apparent mental health crisis6 — to “justify involuntarily hospitalizing

the Plaintiff.” Am. Compl., ECF 21-1, at ECF pp. 16, 18. Plaintiff also asserts that

information in the hospital records “suggest[s] that hospital officials intended to

5 JHMC does not explicitly address Plaintiff’s Monell-type claim in its memorandum or

reply. See generally JHMC Mem., ECF 39-1; JHMC Reply, ECF 40.

6 The exhibits Plaintiff attached to his complaint include the underlying hospital

treatment notes and the “false evidence” Plaintiff claims support his allegations. See Ex. A, ECF

21-1, at ECF p. 28 (treatment notes indicating that Plaintiff “told police he intentionally jumped

and told providers in the trauma bay he fell on train tracks”); Ex. B, ECF 21-1, at ECF p. 31

(stating that Plaintiff “told police he fell and told providers in the trauma bay he intentionally

jumped on to train tracks”); Ex. C, ECF 21-1, at ECF p. 34 (describing patient as “intoxicated and

fell onto the train tracks” but “able to get back on the platform” and indicating history of

attempted suicide); Ex. E, ECF 21-1, at ECF p. 43 (reporting that Plaintiff “informed crew that

he[ had] been drinking all day and . . . fell on the track” and was found “sitting in the upright

position on subway platform with CFR and NYPD officers”); Ex. F, ECF 21-1, at ECF p. 45

(explaining that Plaintiff reported that “he fell due to under influence of drugs”); Ex. G, ECF 21-

1, at ECF p. 48 (quoting Plaintiff saying “I fell on to the tracks because I was black out drunk”);

Ex. J, ECF 21-1, at ECF p. 58 (“Patient reports he was drunk, slipped and fell down the train

track. Patient then states he eventually stood and climbed up [on] the podium.”).

involuntarily commit the Plaintiff with or without justification.” Id. at ECF p. 17 (citing

Ex. H, ECF 21-1, at ECF pp. 51–527).

In order to maintain a claim under Section 1983, “two essential elements must be

present: (1) the conduct complained of must have been committed by a person acting

under color of state law; and (2) the conduct complained of must have deprived a

person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the

United States.” Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1994); see Vega v. Hempstead

Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 87–88 (2d Cir. 2015). Such deprivations of

constitutional rights are “only actionable against state actors or private parties acting

under the color of state law.” Betts v. Shearman, 751 F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2014) (quotation

marks omitted). A plaintiff alleging Section 1983 claims “bears the burden of showing

state action on the part of the defendant.” Bryant v. Steele, 462 F. Supp. 3d 249, 266

(E.D.N.Y. 2020).

“[A] private entity can qualify as a state actor in a few limited circumstances.”

Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck (“Halleck”), 587 U.S. 802, 809 (2019). In Halleck,

the Supreme Court identified three such circumstances: “(i) when the private entity

performs a traditional, exclusive public function; (ii) when the government compels the

private entity to take a particular action; or (iii) when the government acts jointly with

the private entity.” Id. (citations omitted); see also Sybalksi v. Indep. Grp. Home Living

Program, Inc., 546 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 2008). “While the Supreme Court did not

7 The treatment note Plaintiff cites in support of his claim that the hospital records reflect

the intention to hold him with or without justification reads, in relevant part, as follows:

“Patient keeps on threatening to leave[.] Psychiatry resident says without any collateral

information as well as history of suicidal ideation/attempt patient needs to be brought to

CPEP.” Ex. H, ECF 21-1, at ECF p. 51.

indicate that those circumstances exhaust the possibilities, their limited number evinces

that holding a private actor liable for constitutional violations is a high bar.” Lurch v.

City of New York, No. 19-CV-11253 (AJN), 2021 WL 1226927, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31,

2021).

Plaintiff directs the Court to a purported fourth circumstance identified by the

Ninth Circuit: where the “governmental nexus” test applies. Pl. Opp’n, ECF 38, at ECF

pp. 3–6 (citing, inter alia, Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003)). In this

circuit, however, whether there is a close nexus between the state and the challenged

action is examined under the joint action test, the third circumstance identified in

Halleck. See Sybalksi, 546 F.3d at 257 (citing Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch.

Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001)). Plaintiff also identifies the “symbiotic

relationship” test as a fifth test under this framework. Pl. Opp’n, ECF 38, at ECF pp. 5–6.

Like the “governmental nexus” test, this is best analyzed as a derivative of the joint

action test. See, e.g., Findley v. Carter, No. 23-CV-0946 (LTS) (RFT), 2025 WL 1002386, at

*3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025) (observing that the symbiotic relationship test is “one

mechanism” by which to show joint action). Courts in this circuit therefore focus on

Halleck’s “[t]hree main tests,” with the “fundamental question under each test [being]

whether the private entity’s challenged actions are fairly attributable to the state.”

Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 207 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted); see

Barrows v. Becerra, 24 F.4th 116, 135 (2d Cir. 2022).

Various cases in this Circuit have found that JHMC, specifically, is not a state

actor for purposes of Section 1983, drawing on a larger body of case law finding that

private hospitals are generally not proper Section 1983 defendants. See McGugan v.

Aldana-Bernier, 752 F.3d 224, 229–31 (2d Cir. 2014) (affirming the dismissial of Section

1983 claims against JHMC and four employees for failure to state a claim; observing

that, although “the state endowed Defendants with the authority to involuntarily

hospitalize” the plaintiff, “it did not compel them to do so”); Schoolcraft v. City of New

York, 103 F. Supp. 3d 465, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding on summary judgment that

JHMC, as a private hospital, does not qualify as a “person” under Section 1983); Murphy

v. New York City, No. 23-CV-5244 (HG) (LB), 2023 WL 4827118, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 27,

2023) (“Jamaica Hospital is a private hospital . . . and a private hospital is not a state

actor for § 1983 actions.”); see also Joseph v. Jamaica Hosp. Med. Ctr., No. 21-CV-2137

(PKC) (PK), 2021 WL 2400995, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 11, 2021); Sadigh, 2025 WL 1092842,

at *3.

Here, as in the above cases, Plaintiff makes no allegations that JHMC or its

employees were performing a traditional, exclusive public function. See Amira v.

Maimonides Hosp., No. 21-CV-3976 (RPK) (TAM), 2022 WL 18034533, at *7 (E.D.N.Y.

Nov. 30, 2022) (collecting Second Circuit cases holding that involuntary commitment is

not a traditionally exclusive public function), report and recommendation adopted, Dec. 29,

2022 ECF Order Adopting R. & R. Nor does Plaintiff plausibly plead that the

government compelled JHMC to involuntarily hospitalize him. Even taking as true his

allegations that JHMC employees “documented false information” supplied by the

NYPD “to justify involuntarily hospitalizing” him, this claim does not plausibly allege

that JHMC was “‘controlled’ by” the state or acted pursuant to the state’s “‘coercive

power’” in doing so. Am. Compl., ECF 21-1, at ECF p. 16; Sybalski, 546 F.3d at 257

(quoting Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 296); see also Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004

(discussing state action by private nursing homes).

Finally, Plaintiff does not allege particularized facts from which to infer that any

state actor — whether through the NYPD as its representative or otherwise — acted

jointly with JHMC to achieve a “common goal” (i.e., hospitalizing Plaintiff in violation

of his rights). Betts, 751 F.3d at 85 (citing Ginsberg v. Healey Car & Truck Leasing, Inc., 189

F.3d 268, 272 (2d Cir. 1999)); see also Meadows v. United Servs., Inc., 963 F.3d 240, 243 (2d

Cir. 2020) (observing that “the mere fact that a private actor received police assistance is

not sufficient to transform that private actor’s conduct into state action for § 1983

purposes”). The Court notes that the exhibits to Plaintiff’s amended complaint suggest

that there was some exchange of information between police and emergency

responders, insofar as certain JHMC providers documented what Plaintiff told police.

See, e.g., Ex. A, ECF 21-1, at ECF p. 28. However, Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not

allege any facts from which to infer who called emergency services, or who transported

him to JHMC, much less that any individual who was a state actor acted in concert with

JHMC to achieve a common goal of violating Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Rather,

Plaintiff’s amended complaint states that he lost consciousness and woke up on a

gurney in the JHMC. Am. Compl., ECF 21-1, at ECF p. 6. Plaintiff’s opposition, which

references case law applying the above factors, contains no additional facts or argument

that would support a different conclusion. See generally Pl. Opp’n, ECF 38.

For all of these reasons, Plaintiff has not alleged specific facts from which to infer

that JHMC and its employees’ actions are attributable to the state. See Fabrikant, 691 F.3d

at 207. Accordingly, they cannot be proper Section 1983 defendants as a matter of law.

The Court thus finds that the Fourth Amendment claim against the JHMC Defendants

does not allege facts that would allow the Court “to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Court

respectfully recommends dismissing Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim as to the JHMC

Defendants under Rule 12(b)(6).

2. “Monell-type” Claim

Plaintiff asserts an additional claim for Monell liability against JHMC. See Am.

Compl., ECF 21-1, at ECF pp. 21–23. In essence, and construed liberally, Plaintiff alleges

that JHMC’s “failure to supervise” hospital personnel who have authority to

involuntarily hospitalize individuals in mental health crisis under New York’s Mental

Hygiene Law (“MHL”) § 9.37 allows physicians to “falsif[y] the circumstances of an

incident” in order to “justify an involuntary commitment” under the MHL, in violation

of the Fourth Amendment. Id., at ECF p. 22. Even assuming, arguendo, that JHMC’s

actions were under color of law, or violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Plaintiff has

not alleged sufficient, non-conclusory facts to plausibly plead a policy or practice under

Monell.

To establish a municipal liability (or Monell) claim, “a plaintiff is required to

plead and prove three elements: (1) an official policy or custom that (2) causes the

plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right.” Wray v. City of New

York, 490 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted); see Agosto v. New York

City Dep’t of Educ., 982 F.3d 86, 97 (2d Cir. 2020). The Second Circuit has recognized that

the rationale of Monell has been extended in some circumstances to private entities

acting under color of state law, which entities would not otherwise be considered state

actors. See Rojas v. Alexander’s Dep’t Store, Inc., 924 F.2d 406, 409 (2d Cir. 1990) (citing

cases in the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits extending Monell to suits against private

entities where the private entity has relied on state law to deprive a person of their civil

rights); see also Rivers v. New York City Hous. Auth., 176 F. Supp. 3d 229, 242–43 (E.D.N.Y.

2016) (recognizing extension of Monell to private employers, but granting summary

judgment on Monell-type claim where plaintiffs did not allege that the defendant union

had a policy or practice of targeting individuals for retaliation based on their political

beliefs), aff'd sub nom. Crenshaw v. New York City Hous. Auth., 697 F. App’x 726 (2d Cir.

2017).

To state a claim for relief under Monell on a failure to supervise theory, a plaintiff

must plausibly allege that the entity acted with “deliberate indifference” to “the need

for more or better supervision to protect against obvious constitutional violations.”

Alwan v. City of New York, 311 F. Supp. 3d 570, 580–81 (E.D.N.Y. 2018). The Alwan court

observed that an obvious need for better supervision may be demonstrated through, for

example, repeated complaints of civil rights violations, while deliberate indifference

may be inferred from a lack of “meaningful attempt . . . to investigate or to forestall

further incidents” beyond mere “bureaucratic inaction.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

“While plaintiff need not conclusively prove the existence of a policy” at the motion to

dismiss stage, “he must allege facts tending to support, at least circumstantially, an

inference that such a . . . policy or custom exists.” Innamorato v. County of Suffolk, No. 23-

CV-6573 (NCM) (ARL), 2025 WL 2605604, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2025) (quotation

marks omitted); see Tieman v. City of Newburgh, No. 13-CV-4178 (KMK), 2015 WL

1379652, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015). “[M]ere allegations of a . . . custom, a practice of

tolerating official misconduct, or inadequate training and/or supervision are

insufficient to demonstrate the existence of such a custom unless supported by factual

details.” Tieman, 2015 WL 1379652, at *13.

Here, taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, as the Court must, he fails to state a

plausible Monell claim against JHMC. As discussed above, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently

allege a constitutional violation. Even assuming, arguendo, that he did, however,

Plaintiff fails to plead a failure-to-supervise claim under Monell. Plaintiff’s conclusory

allegations — that JHMC employees deliberately created a false narrative in order to

justify his involuntary hospitalization — fail to set forth any particularized facts that

would give rise to a reasonable inference that there is a policy in place to encourage

such false narratives, or that JHMC is deliberately indifferent to a need for more or

better supervision to protect against constitutional violations occasioned by such false

narratives.

Consequently, the Court respectfully recommends dismissing Plaintiff’s Monell-

type claim against Defendant JHMC.

3. State Law False Arrest and False Imprisonment

As discussed above, Plaintiff alleges false arrest and unlawful seizure under the

Fourth Amendment, as a Section 1983 claim, and also under New York state law. See

Am. Compl., ECF 21-1, at ECF pp. 15–18. JHMC argues that, first, Plaintiff’s allegations

fail to state a claim under state law; second, that, to the extent that these allegations

arise under state law, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over them. JHMC Mem., ECF 39-1, at 9–10. The Court first addresses whether the

exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is appropriate. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank

Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008) (instructing that “the existence of subject matter

jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry” (quotation marks omitted)). If Plaintiff’s Section 1983

claim against JHMC is dismissed, there will be no other claims concerning his alleged

seizure at the hospital by which Plaintiff can establish federal question jurisdiction.

Accordingly, the Court must first assess whether retaining jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

state law claims premised on the same facts is appropriate. See Uzan, 388 F.3d at 56

(stating that when “a federal court dismisses all claims over which it had original

jurisdiction, it must reassess its jurisdiction over the case”).

“[F]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” and generally only

authorized to hear cases arising under federal question or diversity jurisdiction. Owen

Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978); see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. Given

the lack of complete diversity among the parties, Plaintiff’s case is premised on federal

question jurisdiction in light of his Section 1983 claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The

district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”); see also id. § 1332(a) (defining

complete diversity). As discussed, a district court “may decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction” if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Here, the facts underlying Plaintiff’s state law unlawful seizure claim against

JHMC are clearly “related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction” —

the Section 1983 claims that the Court has recommended be dismissed — insofar as they

derive from a common nucleus of operative fact. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Indeed, the facts

underlying both the Section 1983 claim and the state law false arrest claim against

JHMC are the same, in that they stem from Plaintiff’s being held involuntarily at the

hospital. See Amira, 2022 WL 18034533, at *14–15 (finding that Plaintiff’s state law

claims, including, inter alia, gross negligence, formed part of the same case or

controversy as her Section 1983 claims because they arose out of actions a private

ambulance and hospital took in involuntarily hospitalizing her).

The question for the Court then becomes whether the Cohill factors — judicial

economy, convenience, fairness, and comity — counsel in favor of the exercise of

supplemental jurisdiction. “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are

eliminated before trial, the balance of factors” will ordinarily “point toward declining to

exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350 n.7; see

also Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc., v. Wullschleger, 145 S. Ct. 41, 50 (2025) (observing that, when

federal-law claims are dismissed, “the court may (and indeed, ordinarily should) kick

the case to state court”). This includes instances where, as here, the jurisdiction-

invoking claims that form part of the same case or controversy — that share that

common nucleus of operative fact — are dismissed on a timely Rule 12(b)(6) motion.8

See, e.g., Turner v. N.Y. Rosbruch/Harnik, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 161, 170–71 (E.D.N.Y. 2015);

Camhi v. Glen Cove City Sch. Dist., 920 F. Supp. 2d 306, 312–13 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); Johnson v.

Levy, 812 F. Supp. 2d 167, 184–85 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).

In this case, the Cohill factors weigh against exercising supplemental jurisdiction

over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claim against JHMC. Considering judicial economy

and convenience, this is not a case where “dismissal of the federal claim occurs late in

the action, after there has been substantial expenditure in time, effort, and money.”

Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134, 138 (2d Cir. 1994) (quotation marks omitted). As set

forth above, Plaintiff filed his complaint in February 2024, and Defendants notified the

8 The Court notes that consideration of the remaining Section 1983 claim for false arrest,

alleged against the John Doe NYPD officers (who, as noted supra, have neither been identified

nor appeared in this case), does not alter the Court’s analysis. Plaintiff’s sole claim against the

officers is for false arrest, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, apparently premised on the

theory that NYPD officers took Plaintiff into custody and communicated information to JHMC

employees concerning the circumstances of Plaintiff’s fall onto the subway tracks. See Am.

Compl., ECF 21-1, at ECF pp. 11–14. Although the officers’ actions, as pleaded by Plaintiff, may

have set the JHMC Defendants’ actions into motion, the amended complaint does not plead any

non-conclusory facts from which to conclude that the officers and JHMC were acting in concert,

or that there is sufficient factual overlap between the different institutional actors’ roles to retain

jurisdiction over the state law claims against JHMC. Rather, Plaintiff’s claims against the NYPD

officers are almost entirely distinct from Plaintiff’s remaining claims, insofar as the false arrest

claim against the NYPD officers centers on what occurred at the subway station prior to

Plaintiff’s transportation to JHMC (apparently by FDNY EMTs). See id.; see also Ex. E, ECF 21-1,

at ECF p. 40 (FDNY Prehospital Care Report summarizing the details of Plaintiff’s transport to

JHMC). There is thus no common nucleus of operative fact as between the claim against the

John Doe NYPD officers and the claims against the JHMC Defendants, which center on his

being required to stay in the hospital against his will by hospital staff. See Sadigh v. City of New

York, No. 25-CV-0948 (RPK) (RML), 2025 WL 1092842, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2025) (finding

that the plaintiff’s claims concerning NYPD officers’ actions prior to her arrival at Jamaica

Hospital lacked a “‘common nucleus of operative fact’” with her claims against JHMC

regarding alleged mistreatment while she was at the hospital (quoting Shahriar v. Smith &

Wollensky Rest. Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 234, 245 (2d Cir. 2011)).

court of their intention to file 12(b)(6) motions on April 3, 2024. See Apr. 3, 2024 Mot. for

Extension of Time to File an Answer; Apr. 5, 2024 ECF Order (granting Defendants’

motion). After Plaintiff amended his complaint, Defendants filed the current motion to

dismiss in May 2025 — a little over a year after the complaint was initially filed, and

before any discovery had commenced. See Dec. 18, 2024 R. & R., ECF 29; Jan. 13, 2025

Order Adopting R. & R.; JHMC Mot. to Dismiss, ECF 39; cf. Finkelstein v. Mardkha, 495 F.

Supp. 2d 329, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (retaining supplemental jurisdiction where parties

had already completed discovery); Drake v. Lab’y Corp. of Am. Holdings, 323 F. Supp. 2d

449, 454–55 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (same, where plaintiff had spent a decade litigating related

claims, rendering federal court “uniquely familiar with all the underlying facts and

history”). Accordingly, judicial economy and convenience would not be preserved by

retaining jurisdiction over these claims, which weighs against exercising supplemental

jurisdiction.

The principle of comity, on the other hand, weighs neither for nor against the

Court’s exercise of its discretion. This is because federal courts look “to the law of the

state in which the arrest occurred” in analyzing Section 1983 claims for false arrest and

unlawful seizure. Alberty v. Hunter, 144 F.4th 408, 414–15 (2d Cir. 2025) (quotation

marks omitted); see Dancy v. McGinley, 843 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2016); see also Weyant v.

Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996) (observing that the Fourth Amendment right to be

free from unreasonable seizure is “substantially the same as a claim for false arrest

under New York law”); cf. Baptiste v. W Hotel, No. 04-CV-5544 (DLC), 2005 WL 1020779,

at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2005) (“[T]he principle of comity dictates that where a plaintiff’s

remaining claims solely sound in state law, a federal court should decline to exercise

jurisdiction.”). Fairness, likewise, does not tip the scale. The tolling provision in 28

U.S.C. § 1367(d) preserves Plaintiff’s right to refile any state law claims arising from his

hospitalization within 30 days of dismissal, preventing the dismissal from prejudicing

his rights. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (providing that the limitations periods for claims

brought under supplemental jurisdiction are “tolled while the claim is pending and for

a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling

period”).

The balance of the Cohill factors weighs against exercising supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law false arrest and/or unlawful seizure claims against

the JHMC Defendants. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s state law

claims against JHMC and its employees be dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

B. State Claim Against Defendant NYCTA

Plaintiff’s sole claim against the NYCTA is negligence under state law. He alleges

that “[t]he entity that built and maintains” the station at which he was injured “has an

obligation to its customers to ensure their safe[ty],” and a “duty to fix” unsafe

conditions “to prevent foreseeable harm” to its customers. Am. Compl., ECF 21-1, at

ECF p. 19. He alleges that this duty includes keeping stations “well lit,” installing

“guardrails to prevent customers from falling onto the tracks,” and designing platforms

“without any smooth surfaces” so as to prevent customers from slipping. Id. He further

alleges that the NYCTA “has a duty to prevent liquid and debris from building up on

its platforms.” Id., at ECF p. 20.

The NYCTA counters that this claim must be dismissed because (1) Plaintiff did

not properly serve the NYCTA with a notice of claim; (2) even if the Court does not

dismiss the federal law claims against JHMC, as it has recommended supra, it should

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in light of the lack of common facts

between the negligence claim against the NYCTA and the federal claims; and

(3) Plaintiff’s negligence allegations do not state a claim against the NYCTA, and should

be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). See generally NYCTA Mem., ECF 42. The Court

addresses the jurisdictional question first, then turns to the NYCTA’s notice of claim

argument.

1. Lack of Supplemental Jurisdiction

Because the state law negligence claim against the NYCTA is so factually

unrelated from the other federal claims alleged in this action, the Court recommends

dismissal for lack of supplemental jurisdiction. Importantly, and in contrast to the state

law claims against JHMC discussed above, which were grounded in substantially the

same facts as the Section 1983 claims (construed liberally as against JHMC and its

employees), the NYCTA argues that the negligence claim does not “derive from a

common nucleus of operative fact” as the claims related to Plaintiff’s alleged false arrest

and unlawful seizure. NYCTA Mem., ECF 42, at 9 (quotation marks omitted); see id.

(discussing how the “negligence claim requires facts about the NYCTA’s knowledge of,

and ab[ility] to prevent, the allegedly ‘unsafe conditions’ on the subway platform that

purported[ly] caused Plaintiff’s injuries,” while the false arrest claims and Monell-type

claims concern the actions of the NYPD officers, JHMC, and JHMC employees).

The recent opinion of the Honorable Rachel P. Kovner in Sadigh v. City of New

York is instructive. There, the court found that the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction

was inappropriate where the pro se plaintiff’s state law negligence claims against JHMC

and John Doe staff — arising from the plaintiff’s allegations of mistreatment while at

the hospital — lacked a common nucleus of operative fact with her Section 1983

excessive force claims, which arose prior to her transport to the hospital. See 2025 WL

1092842, at *1, *4. In Sadigh, even though the NYPD officer defendants’ alleged excessive

force in arresting the plaintiff and transporting her to the hospital precipitated the

involuntary hospitalization during which her negligence claims arose, Judge Kovner

found that the two incidents shared “no overlap, much less substantial overlap, in the

factual allegations.” Id. at *4 (quotation marks and alterations omitted).

So too here. The facts underlying Plaintiff’s negligence claim — his alleged slip-

and-fall onto the train tracks — appear to have led to his involuntarily hospitalization,

which gave rise to his claims against JHMC and the NYPD, but the events concerning

his fall, which form the basis of his claim against the NYCTA, are otherwise factually

unrelated.9 The negligence claim against the NYCTA would require inquiry into what

duty of care the NYCTA owes its customers; whether the conditions on the platform

complied with that duty, or were the cause of Plaintiff’s injuries; and other questions

that center entirely on conditions at the Jamaica-Van Wyck E train station. By contrast,

the federal claims against JHMC involve questions about the policies, practices, and

decisionmaking surrounding Plaintiff’s involuntary hospitalization. Likewise, the

federal claims against the NYPD involve questions about whether Plaintiff was

confined, who confined him, whether he was conscious of or consented to such

confinement, and whether that confinement was otherwise privileged.10

That the chain of events preceding the state and federal law claims against the

NYPD officers and the JHMC Defendants derive from a single incident — here,

9 Taking the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint as true, he claims only that he lost

consciousness and woke up on a gurney in the Emergency Department of JHMC; he does not

allege who, if anyone, called emergency services to facilitate his transport to the hospital while

unconscious, and, as discussed, denies telling police officers that he jumped onto the tracks.

Am. Compl., ECF 21-1, at ECF pp. 6–7; see supra note 6. In addition, Exhibit E to the amended

complaint suggests that FDNY, not NYPD officers, transported Plaintiff to the hospital. Ex. E,

ECF 21-1, at ECF p. 40 (FDNY Prehospital Care Report Summary).

10 As discussed, Plaintiff does not allege specific facts detailing any particular NYPD

officer’s actions in this case. See supra note 9; see also supra note 8.

Plaintiff’s slip-and-fall — does not support exercising supplemental jurisdiction. See,

e.g., Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Tr. Co., 221 F.3d at 704–05; Sadigh, 2025 WL 1092842, at *4;

Hahn v. Rocky Mountain Exp. Corp., No. 11-CV-8512 (LTS) (GWG), 2012 WL 2930220, at

*1 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2012) (“The only overlap between Plaintiff’s [federal] wage claims

and his [state] age discrimination claim is the fact that both arose in connection with his

employment at RMX.”). Because the Court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over claims lacking a “common nucleus of operative fact,” the Court respectfully

recommends dismissing Plaintiff’s negligence claim against Defendant NYCTA for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction.11

2. Failure to Serve Notice of Claim

Even if there were grounds for exercising supplemental jurisdiction over this

claim, the Court would decline to do so on procedural grounds. “In federal court, state

notice-of-claim statutes apply to state-law claims.” Parise v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Sanitation,

306 F. App’x 695, 697 (2d Cir. 2009). Under the New York General Municipal Law and

Public Authority Law, an individual injured by a public benefit corporation like the

NYCTA must serve a notice of claim within 90 days of an incident as “a condition

precedent to bringing a personal injury action.” Id. (citing N.Y. Gen. Mun. L. § 50-e); see

11 The Court also notes that, beyond the judicial economy concerns discussed above,

comity cuts firmly against retaining jurisdiction here. The New York state courts are best

positioned to adjudicate questions of New York state law, as to both the procedural sufficiency

of Plaintiff’s notice of claim and whether Plaintiff has stated a claim for negligence. See Cave v.

E. Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist., 514 F.3d 240, 250 (2d Cir. 2008). Also, as discussed above, the

tolling provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) operates to preserve Plaintiff’s right to refile his

negligence claim within 30 days of dismissal, preventing the dismissal from prejudicing his

rights.

N.Y. Pub. Auth. L. § 1212(2), (4).12 The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating his

compliance with this requirement, and failure to comply requires dismissal for failure

to state a claim. See Islam v. Melisa, No. 18-CV-2535 (KAM) (LB), 2020 WL 1452463, at *7

(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2020) (collecting cases).

Here, Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not allege that he served the NYCTA

with a notice of claim, properly or at all.13 The Court therefore recommends that his

negligence claim against the NYCTA be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to

state a claim. See, e.g., id. (dismissing negligence claims against the NYCTA for failure to

12 The notice of claim statutes include specific procedural requirements. The notice must

be served via personal delivery or physical mail on the person designated for service of

summons or “an attorney regularly engaged in representing such public corporation.” N.Y.

Gen. Mun. L. § 50-e(3)(a). In a city of over one million people, the notice may also be served “by

electronic means in a form and manner prescribed” by the city; New York City requires the

claims to be submitted by email or mail to “Department of Law – Claims, 130 Livingston Street,

10th Floor, Brooklyn, NY 11201.” Id.; NYCTA Mem., ECF 42, at 7. If the notice is served within

90 days, but in a manner out of compliance with the statute’s requirements, the service is still

valid if “the notice is actually received by a proper person within the time specified by this

section,” and the public corporation does not return the notice, along with an explanation of the

defect, within 30 days.” N.Y. Gen. Mun. L. § 50-e(3)(c).

13 The NYCTA further argues that, even if the Court were to consider materials outside

the amended complaint, Plaintiff’s allegations in his opposition to the NYCTA’s first motion to

dismiss — asserting that Plaintiff completed a Personal Injury Claim Form from the New York

City Comptroller’s Office and provided it to a “NYCDOC official” in an envelope addressed to

NYCTA/MTA at “2 Broadway” — likewise fail to allege legally sufficient service of a notice of

claim. NYCTA Mem., ECF 42, at 6–7; see Pl. Opp’n, ECF 20, at ECF p. 2; Ex. A, ECF 20, at ECF

pp. 7–12; Ex. B, ECF 20, at ECF p. 13–14; see N.Y. Gen. Mun. L. § 50-e.

As discussed above, a court deciding a motion to dismiss must ordinarily limit itself to

considering pleadings within the four corners of the operative complaint and documents

incorporated therein by reference. See Bellin v. Zucker, 6 F.4th 463, 473 (2d Cir. 2021); see also

Leonard F. v. Israel Disc. Bank of New York, 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999). In light of the special

solicitude granted to pro se plaintiffs, district courts may also consider factual allegations made

in papers opposing a motion to the extent that they are consistent with the complaint. See Walker

v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 122 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Garcia v. Alk, No. 09-CV-2045 (DLI) (LB),

2015 WL 1469294, at *3 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2015) (collecting cases). Here, Plaintiff has not

included any factual allegations regarding service of a notice of claim in the amended

complaint, which is now the operative complaint, nor in the opposition papers to the instant

motions to dismiss.

allege service of notice of claim); Chabot v. County of Rockland, No. 18-CV-4109 (KMK),

2019 WL 3338319, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2019) (same, against local Board of Elections

defendants).

Accordingly, the Court recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s state law negligence

claims against NYCTA on procedural grounds, in addition to the recommendation that

it be dismissed for lack of supplemental jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed herein, the Court recommends that Defendants’

motions to dismiss be granted, and that Plaintiff’s claims be dismissed, with prejudice,

as follows. Plaintiff’s federal claims against JHMC and John Doe JHMC employees

should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Am. Compl., ECF 21-1, at ECF pp. 15–18 (Section 1983 claim), 21–23

(Monell-type claim). Plaintiff’s state claims against JHMC and John Doe JHMC

employees and the NYCTA should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Am. Compl., ECF 21-1, at ECF pp. 15–18 (state law false arrest

claim), 19–20 (negligence claim).

* * * * *

This report and recommendation will be filed electronically. Objections to this

report and recommendation must be filed, with a courtesy copy sent to the Honorable

Diane Gujarati at 225 Cadman Plaza East, Brooklyn, New York 11201, within fourteen

(14) days of filing. Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to

appeal both before the district court and appellate courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.

R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) (providing the method for computing

time). Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. See, e.g., Caidor v. Onondaga County, 517 F.3d 601, 604 (2d Cir.

2008) (explaining that “failure to object timely to a... report [and recommendation]

operates as a waiver of any further judicial review of the magistrate[ judge’s] decision”

(quotation marks omitted)).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York

December 19, 2025 __

He 4. □□

TARYN A. MERKL

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

28