awarding “necessary expenses incurred in 12 furnishing effective representation”
How later courts described this case
- awarding “necessary expenses incurred in 12 furnishing effective representation”
- “An attorney’s sworn testimony 18 that, in fact, it took the time claimed is evidence of considerable weight on the issue of the time 19 required.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
1 Margaret McBride (SBN 294066)
mmcbride@clsepa.org
2 COMMUNITY LEGAL SERVICES IN EAST PALO ALTO
1861 Bay Road
3 East Palo Alto, CA 94303
Tel: (650) 326-6440
4 Fax: (866) 688-5204
5 Linda M. Dardarian (SBN 131001)
ldardarian@dhkl.law
6 Andrew P. Lee (SBN 245903)
alee@dhkl.law
7 Katharine F. Trabucco (SBN 305413)
ktrabucco@dhkl.law
8 DARDARIAN HO KAN & LEE
155 Grand Avenue, Suite 900
9 Oakland, CA 94612
Tel: (510) 763-9800
10 Fax: (510) 835-1417
11 Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Settlement Class
(Additional Counsel for Plaintiff and the
12 Settlement Class listed on following page)
13
UNITED DISTRICT COURT
14
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
15
OAKLAND DIVISION
16
17 COURTNEY VAN COTT individually and on Case No.: 25-cv-02358-JSW
behalf of others similarly situated,
18 CLASS ACTION
Plaintiff,
19 vs. [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS FOR FINAL
20 EQUITY RESIDENTIAL, a real estate investment APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
trust, ERP OPERATING LIMITED SETTLEMENT, REASONABLE
21 PARTNERSHIP, a partnership, EQUITY ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS, AND
RESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT, L.L.C. CLASS REPRESENTATIVE SERVICE
22 AWARD, AND ENTERING FINAL
Defendants. JUDGMENT
23
Date: January 9, 2026
24 Time: 9:00 a.m.
Dept: Courtroom 5
25 Before: Hon. Jeffrey S. White
26
27
1 Craig Nicholas (SBN 178444)
craig@nicholaslaw.org
2 Alex Tomasevic (SBN 245595)
alex@nicholaslaw.org
3 NICHOLAS & TOMASEVIC, LLP
225 Broadway, 19th Floor
4 San Diego, CA 92101
Tel: (619) 325-0492
5 Fax: (619) 325-0496
6 Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Settlement Class
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
1 [PROPOSED] ORDER
2 This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of Plaintiff Courtney Van Cott’s
3 Motions for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, for Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees and Costs of
4 $430,000, and for a Class Representative Service Award of $5,000. The Court preliminarily approved
5 the Settlement on August 14, 2025, ECF No. 25, and held a final fairness hearing on January 9, 2026.
6 Having carefully reviewed the papers, considered the arguments, and the relevant legal authority, and
7 good cause appearing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motions for Final Approval of Class Action
8 Settlement, for Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, and for a Class Representative Service Award.
9 I. BACKGROUND
10 This action arises out of the Standard Late Fee (5% of monthly rent, minimum $50) that
11 Defendants Equity Residential, et al. (“Equity”) charged their California tenants between June 2008
12 and April 2024, which this Court found unlawful and void in a related action, Munguia-Brown, et al. v.
13 Equity Residential, et al., No. 4:16-cv-01225-JSW-TSH. The Parties to this action reached a settlement
14 after Equity made a classwide Offer of Judgment Pursuant to Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil
15 Procedure (the “Rule 68 Offer”). Under the settlement, class members will receive restitution of all
16 Standard Late Fees they paid to Equity from October 29, 2022 through April 30, 2024, in excess of the
17 $31.98 per late fee that a Munguia-Brown plaintiff-expert had calculated to be Equity’s actual average
18 cost per late fee of collecting late rent over the Van Cott class period, or credits to their tenant accounts
19 based on the same formula for those class members who had been charged but had not paid the Standard
20 Late Fee. Under the settlement, Equity also agreed to “pay . . . class counsel any reasonable attorneys’
21 fees and costs incurred in this action, as determined by the Court” and a $5,000 service award to
22 Plaintiff Courtney Van Cott separate and apart from the monetary relief to be provided to the class.
23 Subsequent to Plaintiff’s filing of her Motion for Preliminary Approval and the Court’s Order Granting
24 that Motion, the Parties settled Plaintiff’s claimed attorneys’ fees and costs for $430,000.
25 On August 14, 2025, the Court preliminarily approved the Settlement – made up of the Rule 68
26 Offer and a Settlement Administration Protocol regarding ancillary terms (hereinafter the Rule 68 Offer
27 and Settlement Administration Protocol will be referred to as “the Settlement Agreement”). ECF No. 25.
1 All Equity Residential tenants in the State of California who, from October 29, 2022 through
April 30, 2024, were first charged one or more late fee(s) under Equity Residential’s former
2 “Standard Late Fee” provision: 5% of the outstanding balance owed (capped at 5% of the total
amount of monthly recurring charges) or $50, whichever is greater.
3
ECF No. 25 at 3-4, ¶¶ 1-3. The Court appointed Plaintiff Courtney Van Cott as the Class
4
Representative and Plaintiff’s Counsel as Class Counsel. Id. at 4, ¶¶ 4-5. The Court also directed
5
notice to the Settlement Class, appointed Simpluris as Settlement Administrator, see id. at 5-7, ¶¶ 9-11,
6
and set the fairness hearing for January 9, 2026. ECF No. 27.
7
On September 12, 2025, Simpluris disseminated Notice to the Class pursuant to the Settlement
8
Agreement and the Court’s Preliminary Approval Order. Specifically, Simpluris sent the Court-
9
approved e-mail notice to 20,347 Class Members and the Court-approved postcard notice to 1,056
10
Class Members, including 274 Class Members whose e-mails were returned undelivered. Simpluris
11
and Class Counsel also posted the Court-approved long-form notice on the Settlement Website and
12
their law firm’s websites in English and Spanish.
13
Also on September 12, 2025, Plaintiff moved the Court for a $5,000 service award for Plaintiff
14
Van Cott (ECF No. 29) as well as an award of $430,000 in Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees and costs (ECF
15
No. 28), later reporting that Class Counsel’s lodestar through November 7, 2025 was $476,607.50
16
based on 548.1 hours of work. See ECF No. 28 (Plaintiff’s Mot. for Atty’s Fees); Dardarian
17
Declaration in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Approval ¶ 8. Plaintiff filed her Motion for Final
18
Approval on November 10, 2025. The Court held a Final Fairness Hearing on January 9, 2026.
19
No Class Members opted out of or objected to the Settlement by the October 27, 2025 deadline,
20
and no Class Members appeared at the fairness hearing.
21
The Court shall address additional facts as necessary in the analysis that follows.
22
II. ANALYSIS
23
A. The Court Grants the Motion for Final Approval.
24
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
25
The Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act
26
(“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. section 1332(d)(2).
27
1 2. Settlement Class Certification
2 The Court preliminarily determined that Plaintiff satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(a) and
3 23(b). The relevant facts have not changed, and the Court incorporates the findings from the
4 Preliminary Approval Order herein. The Court concludes those requirements have been met for final
5 approval. Accordingly, the Court hereby unconditionally certifies, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
6 Procedure 23, the following class for settlement purposes only:
7
All Equity Residential tenants in the State of California who, from October 29, 2022 through
April 30, 2024, were first charged one or more late fee(s) under Equity Residential’s former
8
“Standard Late Fee” provision: 5% of the outstanding balance owed (capped at 5% of the total
amount of monthly recurring charges) or $50, whichever is greater.
9
3. Notice, Objections, and Requests for Exclusion
10
“Adequate notice is critical to court approval of a class settlement under Rule 23(e).” Hanlon
11
v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1025 (9th Cir. 1998). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e),
12
the Court “must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by the
13
proposal.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1). Rule 23(c)(2)(B) requires “the best notice that is practicable under
14
the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable
15
effort.” The notice must “clearly and concisely state in plain, easily understood language” the nature
16
of the action, the class definition, and the class members’ right to exclude themselves from the class.
17
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). Although Rule 23 requires that reasonable efforts be made to reach all
18
class members, it does not require that each class member actually receive notice. See Silber v.
19
Mabon, 18 F.3d 1449, 1454 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that the standard for class notice is “best
20
practicable” notice, not “actually received” notice).
21
The Court finds that distribution of notice of the settlement directed to the Class Members as
22
set forth in the Settlement Agreement has been completed in conformity with the Preliminary Approval
23
Order. Simpluris received a list of 21,800 Class Members, 20,347 with e-mail addresses in Equity’s
24
records and 782 without e-mail addresses, but with valid mailing addresses. Simpluris disseminated
25
the Court-approved email notice to 20,347 Class Members and the Court-approved postcard notice to
26
1,056 Class Members, including 274 Class Members whose emails were returned undeliverable. As of
27
November 10, 2025, only 29 postcard notices were considered undeliverable.
1 No Class Member requested exclusion from the Settlement, or objected to the Settlement, the
2 proposed attorneys’ fees and costs, or the proposed service award by the October 27, 2025 deadline or
3 after the deadline, including at the Final Fairness Hearing. As there were no Class Members who
4 requested exclusion from the Settlement, all Settlement Class members are covered by and included
5 within the settlement and within this Order granting final approval.
6 In light of these facts, the Court finds the Parties have sufficiently provided the best practicable
7 notice to Settlement Class Members.
8 4. The Relevant Factors Weigh in Favor of Concluding the Settlement Is Fair,
Reasonable, and Adequate.
9
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) permits a court to approve a settlement that will bind a
10
class “only on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate after considering” a number of factors.
11
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2); see also Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). The
12
factors the Court must consider are whether:
13
the class representatives and class counsel have adequately represented the class; the proposal
14 was negotiated at arm’s length; the relief provided for the class is adequate, taking into account:
(i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal; (ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method
15
of distributing relief to the class, including the method of processing class-member claims; (iii)
16 the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees, including timing of payment; and (iv) any
agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3); and the proposal treats class members
17 equitably relative to each other.
18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(A)-(D). Further, the court “may consider some or all” of the following
19 factors:
20
(1) the strength of plaintiff's case; (2) the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of
21 further litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; (4) the
amount offered in settlement; (5) the extent of discovery completed, and the stage of the
22 proceedings; (6) the experience and views of counsel; (7) the presence of a governmental
participant; and (8) the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.
23
24 Rodriguez v. West Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 963 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026.
25 These same factors are also sometimes referred to as the eight “Churchill factors.” See, e.g., In re
26 Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig. (“Bluetooth”), 654 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting
27 Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir. 2004)). “The relative degree of
1 Comm’n of City & Cty. of San Francisco, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982).
2 Based on the record as a whole, the Court finds that the relevant factors support a finding that
3 the Settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. Class Counsel and the named Plaintiff have
4 adequately represented the Settlement Class Members. The Court hereby confirms Dardarian Ho Kan
5 & Lee, Nicholas & Tomasevic, LLP, and Community Legal Services in East Palo Alto as Class
6 Counsel. The record shows that the Settlement was reached as the result of Class Counsel’s good
7 faith, serious, and non-collusive arms-length consideration of the Rule 68 Offer, guided by the
8 significant knowledge and experience they had gained litigating the same claims against Defendants on
9 behalf of the parallel classes in Munguia-Brown.
10 The Court has also considered the nature of the claims, the amounts and kinds of benefits paid
11 in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds among the Settlement Class Members, and the fact
12 that a settlement represents a compromise of the Parties’ respective positions rather than the result of a
13 finding of liability at trial. To settle this action, Defendants have agreed to pay up to $2,934,620 in
14 restitution and account credits – based on Class Members’ actual late fee charges and payments as
15 reflected in Equity’s tenant ledger data, minus $31.98 offset per late fee, plus an extra 5% margin of
16 error to cover potential errors and omissions in those calculations. Plaintiff posits that the Settlement
17 thereby provides a refund or credit of all late fees that could be restored to Plaintiff and the Settlement
18 Class under the applicable law and facts of this case. Plaintiff has adequately described the risks
19 associated with continuing to litigate this case or taking it to trial, including the possibility that Equity
20 would continue its vigorous opposition to class action status through trial and that it would appeal any
21 successful judgment as it plans to do in Munguia-Brown. The Parties also provided for an effective
22 method for distributing monetary relief to Settlement Class Members without the need to submit
23 claims and gave Class Members receiving restitution payments the option to receive electronic
24 payments in lieu of mailed checks. Any uncashed checks will be deposited with the state of
25 California’s Unclaimed Property program and so will remain available for Class Members to claim at
26 any time. No funds that are owed to Class Members will revert to Equity. Accordingly, the Court also
27 finds that relief provided for the class is adequate. Additionally, the Court finds that the terms of the
1 to any individual Class Member. There have been no objections to the Settlement, and the favorable
2 reaction also favors granting the motion.
3 The Court concludes the Settlement is fair, reasonable, adequate and in the best interests of
4 Settlement Class Members, and it GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Approval.
5 B. The Court Grants the Motion for Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees and Costs.
6 In a class action settlement, the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and nontaxable
7 costs that are authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). Here, Plaintiff is
8 entitled to her reasonable fees and costs under the terms of the Rule 68 Offer. As Plaintiff’s
9 underlying claims are based on state law, the Court applies state law with respect to Plaintiff’s request
10 for attorneys’ fees and costs. Chicken Ranch Rancheria of Me-Wuk Indians v. California, 65 F.4th
11 1145, 1148–49 (9th Cir. 2023); Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002).
12 1. Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees.
13 The “starting point of every fee award” under California law is to determine the amount of
14 reasonable attorney fees based on the “lodestar-adjustment” method. Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.,
15 1 Cal. 5th 480, 498 (2016) (quoting Serrano v. Priest (“Serrano III”), 20 Cal. 3d 25, 49 n.23 (1977)).
16 “Using that method, the trial court first determines a touchstone or lodestar figure based on a careful
17 compilation of the time spent by, and the reasonable hourly compensation for, each attorney, and the
18 resulting dollar amount is then adjusted upward or downward by taking various relevant factors into
19 account.” Chavez v. City of Los Angeles, 47 Cal. 4th 970, 985 (2010) (citing Press v. Lucky Stores,
20 Inc., 34 Cal. 3d 311, 321-22 (1983)). There is a strong presumption that the lodestar amount represents
21 a reasonable fee. PLCM Grp. v. Drexler, 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1097 (2000), as modified (June 2, 2000);
22 see also Stanger v. China Elec. Motor, Inc., 812 F.3d 734, 738 (9th Cir. 2016).
23 a. Hourly Rates.
24 The Court determines the reasonableness of hourly rates by considering the prevailing hourly
25 rates for attorneys of similar expertise and experience in the relevant market. See PLCM Grp., 22 Cal.
26 4th at 1096 (affirming attorney fee award based “on the number of hours expended by counsel
27 multiplied by the prevailing market rate for comparable legal services in San Francisco, where counsel
1 relevant legal community is “where the court is located.”). “[T]he fee applicant has the burden of
2 producing ‘satisfactory evidence’ that the rates he requests meet these standards.” Gonzalez v. City of
3 Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1206 (9th Cir. 2013).
4 Here, Class Counsel submitted detailed declarations – from Linda M. Dardarian of Dardarian
5 Ho Kan & Lee, Craig Nicholas of Nicholas & Tomasevic, LLP, and Margaret McBride of Community
6 Legal Services in East Palo Alto – setting forth the experience and education of the billing attorneys
7 and legal staff, the work each biller performed on the case, examples of other California state and
8 federal courts approving their hourly rates, and, for DHKL, other entities that pay them their regular
9 hourly rates pursuant to ongoing settlement obligations. Plaintiff also submitted a declaration from
10 well-respected attorney-fee expert Richard M. Pearl describing Class Counsel’s hourly rates as
11 appropriate for the Bay Area legal market for the type of services provided, based on his extensive
12 experience, review of court orders awarding attorneys’ fees, other Bay Area law firms’ reports
13 regarding the hourly rates they charge for non-contingent work, and an independent survey of Bay
14 Area legal market hourly rates.
15 The Court finds, based on the extensive evidence submitted, that Class Counsel’s 2025 hourly
16 rates are reasonable and within the range of market rates charged by attorneys with similar skill and
17 experience handling similarly complex litigation in this district. Accordingly, the Court approves the
18 hourly rates set forth in the following table.
19 Grad. Date/
Years of
20 Name Position Experience Rate
21 Dardarian Ho Kan & Lee
Linda M. Dardarian Managing Shareholder 1987, 38 years $1,275
22 Andrew P. Lee Shareholder 2008, 17 years $1,075
Katharine F. Trabucco Partner 2015, 10 years $900
23
Associate $850
24 Stephanie Tilden Associate 2021, 4 years $700
Jacqueline Thompson Senior Lead Paralegal 37 years $475
25 Scott Grimes Senior Paralegal 36 years $475
Damon Valdez Paralegal 22 years $425
26
Sophia Kaufmann Paralegal 1 year $375
27 Nicholas & Tomasevic, LLP
Craig Nicholas Partner 1995, 30 years $875
1 Jordan Belcastro Associate 2021, 4 years $400
Emilia Carrilo Paralegal 10 years $225
2
Community Legal Services in East Palo Alto
3 Margaret McBride Managing Attorney 2013, 12 years $525
4 b. Hours Billed.
5 Controlling law instructs that attorney fee awards “should be fully compensatory,” and absent
6 “circumstances rendering the award unjust, an . . . award should ordinarily include compensation for
7 all the hours reasonably spent.” Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1133 (2001) (emphasis
8 original); accord Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983). The party requesting attorneys’ fees
9 must prove the requested hours are reasonable by providing “a sufficient and proper basis for making
10 that determination.” Rey v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 203 Cal. App. 4th 1223, 1244 (2012). “The
11 Court must review time records to determine whether the hours are adequately documented in a
12 manner that can be properly billed directly to clients.” Zhu v. Li, No. 19-cv-02534-JSW, 2023 WL
13 5279451, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2023) (quoting Int'l Petroleum Prods. & Additives Co. v. Black
14 Gold S.A.R.L., No. 19-cv-03004-YGR, 2020 WL 789567 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2020)).
15 Plaintiff attached detailed billing records to Class Counsel’s declarations, which provide the
16 Court sufficient information to confirm that the hours Class Counsel is requesting are reasonable. See,
17 e.g., Blackwell v. Foley, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“An attorney’s sworn testimony
18 that, in fact, it took the time claimed is evidence of considerable weight on the issue of the time
19 required.”) (citations omitted). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has instructed district courts to “defer to
20 the winning lawyer[s’] professional judgment as to how much time [they were] required to spend on
21 the case.” Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096, 1111 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Moreno v.
22 City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008)); accord Kerkeles v. City of San Jose, 243
23 Cal. App. 4th 88, 104 (2015). Class Counsel’s time spent on this matter was efficient and diligent and
24 led to an excellent result for the class. The Court notes that Class Counsel exercised reasonable billing
25 judgment by making a significant reduction in their total lodestar to account for duplicative, inefficient
26 or unproductive time, and time spent on anticipated discovery that was ultimately made unnecessary
27 by the settlement.
1 judgment, Class Counsel worked a total of 548.1 hours on this matter through November 7, 2025. The
2 Court is satisfied that the hours requested by Class Counsel are reasonable.
3 Accordingly, based on substantial evidence, Class Counsel’s reasonable lodestar exceeds the
4 $430,000 amount that Plaintiff requests for all of her attorneys’ fees and costs in this matter.
5 2. Reasonable Costs.
6 In her Motion for Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, Plaintiff demonstrated that she
7 incurred $13,307.55 in costs that were necessary to the prosecution and resolution of this case and
8 which are of the type normally billed to a client paying for counsel’s services on a regular basis. See
9 Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Class counsel is entitled to recover ‘those out-of-
10 pocket expenses that would normally be charged to a fee-paying client.’”); In re Media Vision Tech.
11 Sec. Litig., 913 F. Supp. 1362, 1372 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (awarding “necessary expenses incurred in
12 furnishing effective representation”). Defendant objected that awarding expert expenses would not be
13 authorized by either California law or the Class Members’ lease. ECF No. 30. Given that Plaintiff’s
14 reasonable lodestar fee exceeds the $430,000 that Plaintiff requests, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s
15 request for cost reimbursement and Defendants’ objection thereto to be moot.
16 C. The Court Grants the Motion for Class Representative Service Award.
17 The Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly held that reasonable incentive awards to class representatives
18 are permitted.” In re Apple Inc. Device Performance Litig., 50 F.4th 769, 785-87 (9th Cir. 2022)
19 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, service awards are “fairly typical in class action cases”
20 and are meant “to compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the class, to make up
21 for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action, and, sometimes, to recognize their
22 willingness to act as a private attorney general.” Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 958-9.1 In evaluating requests
23 for service awards, courts consider the following factors: (1) the amount of time and effort spent by the
24 class representatives on the litigation; (2) the degree to which the class representatives’ efforts
25
26
27
1 California law also permits service awards to reasonably compensate plaintiffs for undertaking and
fulfilling a fiduciary duty to represent the absent class members. See Cellphone Term. Fee Cases, 186
Cal. App. 4th 1380, 1393-94 (2010); Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 115 Cal. App. 4th 715, 725-26
1 benefitted the class; (3) the personal difficulties encountered by the class representatives; (4) the
2 duration of the litigation; (5) the risk to the class representatives in commencing suit, whether
3 financial, reputational, or otherwise; and (6) whether the litigation has promoted important public
4 policy. Id.
5 “Courts in this district have found $5,000 incentive awards to be presumptively reasonable,”
6 and this Court regularly approves service awards of at least $5,000. See Salamanca v. Sprint/United
7 Mgmt. Co., No. 4:15-CV-05084-JSW, 2018 WL 1989568, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2018) (approving
8 $5,000 service award as reasonable where the plaintiff spent between 20 and 30 hours assisting class
9 counsel in the case, aiding mediation, providing information, and searching for and gathering
10 documents); see also, e.g., Clayborne v. Newtron, LLC, No. 4:19-cv-07624-JSW, 2023 WL 5748773,
11 at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2023) (noting $5,000 presumptively reasonable and awarding $10,000 service
12 award where plaintiff did not sit for deposition or attest that he feared for professional or personal
13 reputation, but “did play important role in the litigation with at least some personal and professional
14 risk”).
15 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s requested $5,000 service award is presumptively reasonable
16 under the authorities above and cited in Plaintiff’s motion. The Court finds the award appropriate
17 given the time and effort Plaintiff expended on this matter and the risk of retaliation she faces as a
18 California tenant having filed a lawsuit against a large residential landlord.
19 III. CONCLUSION
20 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Approval of Class
21 Action Settlement, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees and Costs in the amount of
22 $430,000, and Plaintiff’s Motion for a Class Representative Service Award in the amount of $5,000.
23 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED:
24 The Court directs the Parties and the Settlement Administrator to effectuate the Settlement
25 according to the terms set forth in the Settlement Agreement and this Final Approval Order and
26 Judgment.
27 The Court approves the distribution of the restitution payments and account credits to
1 No later than sixty-one (61) days after the date of Final Approval, meaning the day after the deadline
2 for filing a notice of appeal from the Judgment, if no notice of appeal is filed, or if a timely appeal is
3 filed, the day after the appellate court affirms the Judgment and enters the mandate; Equity will deliver
4 the sum total of cash payments to be made to Class Members to the Qualified Settlement Fund. Within
5 fourteen days (14) after the funds are delivered, during which time Simpluris shall have performed
6 another national change of address database review of Class Members’ mailing addresses, Simpluris
7 shall provide payment to Class Members who are primary tenants and did not opt out and are due a
8 payment, including by digital means if the Class Member provided the necessary information.
9 Physical checks shall have a stale date of one hundred and eighty (180) days, after which any money
10 remaining shall be deposited with the state of California’s Unclaimed Property program.
11 No later than seventy-five (75) days after the date of Final Approval, as defined above, Equity
12 will confirm with Simpluris that it has issued the appropriate account credits to Class Members. For
13 any Class Member who is entitled to an account credit but is no longer a tenant at an Equity property
14 and therefore no longer has an Equity account, Equity will, no later than seventy-five (75) days after
15 the date of Final Approval, notify its applicable collection agency to apply the credit to the Class
16 Member’s outstanding debt. If the Class Member has paid their late fee balance upon moveout, by use
17 of any means including a deduction from their security deposit, Equity will notify the Settlement
18 Administrator and cause a check to be mailed to that Class Member. No later than three (3) calendar
19 days after Equity delivers this information, Simpluris shall notify relevant Class Members about the
20 account adjustment.
21 No later than seventy-five (75) days after the date of this Order, Equity will deliver payments in
22 the amount of $430,000 for Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees and $5,000 for Plaintiff’s service award to Class
23 Counsel.
24 Any payments to Class Members, Plaintiff and Class Counsel that are not timely made within
25 the seventy-five (75) day deadlines above shall accrue post-judgment interest at the rate of ____, which
26 is “equal to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield, as published by the Board of
27 Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the calendar week preceding the date of the judgment.”
1]| https://www.casb.uscourts.gov/post-judgment-interest-rates (citing Federal Reserve, Se/ect Interest
2|| Rates, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H15/Current).
3 If this Settlement does not become final and effective in accordance with the terms of the
Settlement Agreement, this Final Approval Order and Judgment and all orders entered in connection
5|| herewith shall be vacated and shall have no further force or effect.
6 This Court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the Settlement Agreement and this
7\| Final Approval Order and Judgment.
8 The Court hereby DISMISSES this action WITH PREJUDICE, and HEREIN ENTERS
JUDGMENT in this matter. The Clerk shall close the file.
10 IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 9, 2026
12 HON. J JNHITE
United States District Judge
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