Dunn

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

Kathy Dunn, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

)

v. ) No. 25 C 9521

)

)

Cook County et al., )

)

Defendants. )

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Plaintiff Kathy Dunn was an employee of defendant Cook County

Department of Public Health (“CCDPH”) until her termination in

October 2023. Because of that firing and a litany of other alleged

acts that preceded it, Ms. Dunn has sued CCDPH, Cook County, and

the Cook County Health and Hospital System under Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), the

Family and Medical Leave Act, (“FMLA”), and Illinois common law.

Before me are the defendants’ motions to dismiss and to strike

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and 12(f). For the reasons that

follow, I grant the former in part and the latter in full.

1

I.

The following facts are drawn from Dunn’s complaint. For

present purposes, I treat them as true.

Dunn was an employee of CCDPH for nearly forty years. Over

the last twenty-five years of that period, Dunn taught nursing

classes at universities in the area. She confined her teaching to

hours during which she was not working for CCDPH, and her

employment with the universities was approved by her CCDPH

supervisors. Sometime before 2022, Dunn disciplined three

employees, one of whom threatened to retaliate against her and

then accused her of violating dual employment rules. Following an

investigation by the Cook County Office of the Independent

Inspector General (“OIIG”), CCDPH determined that Dunn had

violated restrictions on dual employment. On September 11, 2023,

an attorney for CCDPH, Rachel Marrello, gave Dunn the option to

either retire or be terminated. In order to take CCDPH’s decision

to the Cook County Appeals Board, Dunn opted to be fired.

Dunn alleges that the OIIG’s finding was pretextual and that

CCDPH fired her not for dual employment violations but because of

her sex, age, race, religion, and national origin. ECF 1 at 6–7.

She writes, inter alia, that black employees, a younger employee,

and male employees either did not report their dual employment or

performed poorly and, unlike her, were neither disciplined nor

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fired. Id. at 4–5. Dunn adds that she was “subjected to unwelcome

sexual conduct” including “derogatory comments...[and] unwanted

touching” as well as “repeated racial slurs, derogatory comments

about her race, [and] offensive jokes” by black employees. Id. at

5. Dunn reported this treatment and asserts that retaliation for

those reports is another reason behind her firing. Id. at 8.

Separately, in 2022, Dunn was injured on the job and developed

bursitis.1 At some time between then and her firing, Dunn requested

to work from home full time, and CCDPH denied that request. Dunn

reports that “a non-white non-disabled female employee in charge

of environmental food service or manager of food safety” was

allowed to work from home full time. Id. at 6. In May 2023, Dunn

requested leave under the FMLA.2 Dunn was granted FMLA leave and

was slated to return in November 2023. CCDPH terminated Dunn while

she was on leave in September 2023; she cites retaliation for her

taking FMLA leave as a third reason for her firing.

1 Bursitis entails a painful inflammation of the joints. Mayo

Clinic Staff, “Bursitis,” Mayo Clinic (Aug 25, 2022),

mayoclinic.org/diseases=conditions/bursitis/symptoms-

causes/syc-20353242.

2 Dunn does not explain why exactly she needed to go on leave;

given the placement in the complaint, it seems related to her

bursitis.

3

Dunn filed a charge against CCDPH with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on April 7, 2024. In the “Why you

believe you were discriminated against” section, she checked boxes

for age, color, disability, race, and sex. In the “What happened

to you that you believe was discriminatory” section, she wrote:

I worked for CCDPH for 39 years without any disciplinary

action against me. I taught nursing for 25 years on

weekends and at night that was approved by my

supervisors. Three disgruntled workers made false

accusations and I was given the choice of retirement or

termination by HR director Rachel Marrello. I chose

termination because I didn’t violate any dual employment

rules. I have documented evidence and testimony of my

innocence and will appear before the O.C. Appeal Board.

The lead accuser was a younger Black male (who threatened

retaliation). My supervisor was Black/female, the

Department Head is a Black male, the Chief Executive of

Nursing is Indian. My replacement is Black, has less

education, no public health experience, and is younger

than I am.

All employees who have been hired since spring 2023 have

been persons of color. The CCDPH attorney did not follow

department procedures nor did the OIIG’s office conduct

a thorough investigation.

ECF 1-1 at 1.

The EEOC issued a right to sue letter on May 15, 2025, and

Dunn filed this lawsuit on August 11, 2025. Across twelve counts3

citing Title VII, the ADEA, the ADA, the FMLA, and Illinois common

3 Due to a typographical error, Dunn’s complaint skipped Count

VIII; as such, while the last count is numbered XIII, there are

twelve in total.

4

law, Dunn alleges that defendants subjected her to discriminatory

treatment in her working conditions, discriminatory discharge,

retaliatory discharge, harassment, the intentional infliction of

emotional distress, and a hostile work environment due to her age,

disability, race, national origin, religion, and sex.

II.

Dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is proper “when the allegations in a

complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to

relief.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).

In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), I

accept as true a plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations and

draw all reasonable inferences in a plaintiff’s favor.

Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th

Cir. 2007).

To survive a motion to dismiss, the well-pleaded facts of the

complaint must allow the court to infer more than the mere

possibility of misconduct. McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d

611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011). Additionally, the Court “need not accept

as true ‘legal conclusions[, or t]hreadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements.’” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009)

(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

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All the same, a motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of

the complaint, not the merits of the plaintiff’s claim. Gibson v.

City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). And facial

plausibility exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678.

III.

Defendants move to dismiss most of Dunn’s counts (II–VI, IX–

X) by arguing that she has failed to exhaust her administrative

remedies. Defendants then move to dismiss all Dunn’s counts on the

basis that they simply fail to state a claim. And defendants

contend that I must strike Dunn’s requests for punitive damages

because she cannot recover any in a suit against a municipality.

A. The EEOC Charge

Before suing under Title VII, a plaintiff must exhaust her

administrative remedies by filing a charge with the EEOC and

receiving a right to sue letter. Chaidez v. Ford Motor Co., 937

F.3d 998, 1004 (7th Cir. 2019). The same is true under the ADA,

Riley v. City of Kokomo, 909 F.3d 182, 189 (7th Cir. 2018), and

the ADEA, Flannery v. Recording Industry Ass’n of America, 354

F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir. 2004). After filing with the EEOC, a

plaintiff can only include those claims in her complaint in federal

6

court that were part of her original EEOC charge. See McKenzie v.

Ill. Dept. of Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 481 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing

Cheek v. Western and Southern Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 500 (7th

Cir. 1994)).

An EEOC charge need not encompass each fact that a plaintiff

later alleges in her complaint to meet the exhaustion requirement.

Cheek, 31 F.3d at 500. A majority of complainants at the EEOC are

laypersons who complete their charges without the assistance of a

lawyer, and courts should read their charges generously. See Taylor

v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 1188, 1195 (7th Cir.

1992). As such, a plaintiff may sue on the claims that she makes

out in her EEOC charge and those claims that are “like or

reasonably related to the allegations of the charge and growing

out of such allegations.” Geldon v. South Milwaukee School Dist.,

414 F.3d 817, 819 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).

Claims are “like or reasonably related” to the charge when

“(1) ‘there is a reasonable relationship between the allegations

in the charge and the claims in the complaint;’ and (2) ‘the claim

in the complaint can reasonably be expected to grow out of an EEOC

investigation of the allegations of the charge.’” Chaidez, 937

F.3d 1004 (quoting Cheek, 31 F.3d at 500). At minimum, the charge

and complaint must “describe the same conduct and implicate the

same individuals.” Cheek, 31 F.3d at 501 (emphasis in original).

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That the charge and complaint “generally assert the same kind of

discrimination is not sufficient without some factual relationship

between them.” Chaidez, 937 F.3d at 1005. Where a plaintiff brings

suit on claims that she has not included in her EEOC charge and

which are not “like or reasonably related” to those in that charge,

she has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to those

claims and they will be subject to dismissal. Id. at 1004–06.

Dunn’s EEOC charge focuses on her firing and the inadequate

investigation of her dual employment and says little about the

discrimination that she alleges in the complaint:

I worked for CCDPH for 39 years without any disciplinary

action against me...

[After t]hree disgruntled workers made false

accusations...I was given the choice of retirement or

termination...I chose termination because I didn’t

violate any dual employment rules...

The CCDPH attorney did not follow department procedures

nor did the OIIG’s office conduct a thorough

investigation [of whether I broke the dual employment

rules].

ECF 1-1 at 1. The only language in the charge related to the

discrimination in Dunn’s complaint is the following:

The lead accuser [of the three disgruntled workers] was

a younger Black male...

My supervisor was Black/female, the Department Head is

a Black male, the Chief Executive of Nursing is Indian.

My replacement is Black, has less education, no public

health experience, and is younger than I am.

8

All employees who have been hired since spring 2023 have

been persons of color.

Id.

Most of the claims in Dunn’s complaint are absent from and

are not “like or reasonably related to” the claims in her EEOC

charge. Dunn has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as

to all of her ADA claims (Counts IV–VI), given that her EEOC charge

never mentions disability—her ADA claims are not “reasonably

related” to the facts alleged in the charge. Riley, 909 F.3d at

189. Dunn has likewise failed to exhaust her remedies as to her

non-FMLA retaliation claims (II, V, IX) because the EEOC charge

describes neither protected activity nor retaliation against her

for it; it does not “describe the same conduct” as her complaint.

Cheek, 31 F.3d at 501 (emphasis in original). And Dunn has failed

to exhaust her remedies as to her hostile work environment claims

(III, IV, X) because the EEOC charge does not allege any of the

harassment or abuse on which those claims are based. Id.

Dunn seeks to broaden the scope of the EEOC charge by

directing me to a “Supplemental Information” letter that she sent

the EEOC in November 2024. Assuming arguendo that I can consider

it, the letter does not sufficiently broaden the scope of the

9

charge.4 The letter, while more detailed than the charge, is

focused on the same thing: that she was fired for violation of

dual employment rules after an insufficient or otherwise defective

investigation by the OIIG, and not on the discrimination at which

her complaint is aimed. ECF 17-2 at 1–6. Even considered in full,

the letter would not amend the EEOC charge such that it would

reasonably relate to the claims in Counts II–VI and IX–X. Those

must be dismissed.

That leaves Count I—discrimination under Title VII due to

race, religion, or national origin—and Count VII—discrimination

based on age. Reading the EEOC charge as generously as possible,

I find that it implies, by stating that Dunn’s supervisor, her

department head, and the chief executive of nursing at CCDPH were

of different races from her, that Dunn was fired because of her

race. ECF 1-1 at 1. In the same way, because the charge states

that Dunn’s replacement was both younger and less qualified than

her, I read it to imply that she was discharged due to her age.

Id. Thus, her discriminatory discharge claims at Counts I and VII

could “reasonably be expected to grow out of an EEOC investigation

4 Cheek suggests that I can consider it “to the extent that the

letter may be considered an amendment to the original charge

within the meaning of 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b),” which allows a

charge to be amended “‘to clarify and amplify allegations made

therein.’” 31 F.3d at 502.

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into” the allegations in the charge. Cheek, 31 F.3d at 500. As

such, Dunn has exhausted her administrative remedies as to claims

in those counts.

But to be clear, the claims that Dunn has preserved are

narrower than those laid out in her complaint. Because the EEOC

charge does not imply that Dunn’s national origin, religion, or

sex were at issue, any claim in Count I that she was terminated

because of those factors is outside of the scope of the charge—

there is no “factual relationship between” the two sets of

allegations. Chaidez, 937 F.3d at 1005. Likewise, because the

charge does not mention any adverse employment action on CCDPH’s

part besides Dunn’s firing, Dunn has failed to exhaust her remedies

as to any claim at Counts I and VII based on any adverse employment

action other than her termination. Id.

B. Failure to State a Claim

With the above out of the way, I consider whether Dunn states

a claim at the surviving counts (I, VII, and XI–XIII).

1. Count I—Title VIII Discriminatory Discharge

When shorn of those elements which Dunn did not include in

her EEOC charge, her claim in Count I boils down to that she was

fired because she was white. Dunn pleads that the following were

“examples of [CCDPH] treating similarly situated [non-white]

employees...more favorably than [her].” ECF 1 at 4. “An African-

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American male employee who worked as Associate Administrator

performed little or no substantive work and/or did not attend

meetings but was not disciplined or terminated.” ECF 1 at 4. Dunn

“was disciplined more harshly than African-American or minority or

non-white employees.” Id. “On information and belief, Defendants

replaced Dunn with several African American employees.” Id. “[T]wo

African-American employees with the title Public Health Nurse III

and IV were not performing their jobs, but were not disciplined.”

Id.

Under Title VII, a plaintiff can make out a prima facie case

of discrimination by offering evidence that “(1) he is a member of

a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the applicable

positions; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4)

similarly-situated persons not in the protected class were treated

more favorably.” Martino v. Western & Southern Financial Grp., 715

F.3d 195, 202 (7th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).

Here, Dunn’s theory is that she, unlike non-white employees

who broke the rules, was fired. And while her pleadings could be

more robust, she states a prima facie case. She is a member of a

protected class. McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S.

273, 279–280 (1976). She pleads that she was qualified for the

position she held. She was fired. And though she will need to

develop these facts moving forward, she has alleged that similarly

12

situated non-white employees—an associate administrator and the

employees with which she was replaced—were treated more favorably

than her. She has pled “enough facts to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

2. Count VII—ADEA Discriminatory Discharge

What remains of this count is that Dunn was discharged because

of her age. In service of this theory, Dunn alleges the following

facts. “An employee younger than Dunn was given significantly less

work and verbally treated better than Dunn.” ECF 1 at 5. And

“younger employees were not disciplined or terminated despite poor

performance or similar conduct for which [Dunn] was disciplined or

terminated.” Id. at 15.

Like with Title VII, to make out a prima facie case of age

discrimination under the ADEA, Dunn can show, inter alia, that

younger, similarly-situated employees were treated more favorably

than she was. Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617

(7th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Ortiz v. Werner

Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765–66 (7th Cir. 2016)). To do

that, the plaintiff must plead specific facts about those

employees, like “showing that [they] dealt with the same

supervisor, were subject to the same standards, and had engaged in

similar conduct without such differentiating or mitigating

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circumstances” as would justify disparate treatment. Id. at 617–

18.

Here, Dunn has only gestured towards a prima facie case. She

has asserted that younger employees were better treated, but she

has failed to plead any facts about these younger employees (or

their supervisors or what standards they were subject to); instead,

she has given me “mere conclusory statements” which cannot survive

defendants’ motion to dismiss. Brooks, 578 F.3d at 581 (citing

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

3. Count XI—FMLA Retaliation

In Count XI, Dunn asserts that defendants violated her rights

under the FMLA by either denying her leave to which she was

entitled or by firing her in retaliation for taking FMLA leave.

ECF 1 at 17–18. In service of those assertions, Dunn pleads the

following facts. “In March of 2022, Dunn fell and was injured on

the job, injuring her hip. Dunn underwent surgery...and was

diagnosed with chronic bursitis.” Id. at 3. “On information and

belief, Dunn’s [bursitis] substantially limits her in one or more

major life activities.” Id. at 5. “At all relevant times, Dunn had

a ‘serious health condition,’” which was presumably her bursitis.

Id. In May 2023, “Dunn requested leave pursuant” to the FMLA, and

“[p]rior to being terminated in 2023, Dunn was given” FMLA leave.

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Id. at 6. “On September 11, 2023, while Dunn was on family medical

leave,” defendants terminated her employment. Id.

Defendants argue that Dunn has failed to state a claim for

denial of FMLA leave, given that she pleads that CCDPH in fact

granted her leave. I agree. Defendants then argue that Dunn fails

to state a claim for retaliation because she fails to plead that

she was entitled to FMLA leave.

To make out an FMLA claim, an employee must show that “(1) he

was eligible under the FMLA, (2) his employer was covered by the

FMLA, (3) he was entitled to leave under the FMLA, (4) he provided

notice of his intent to take leave, and (5) his employer denied

him FMLA benefits to which he was entitled.” Lutes v. United

Trailers, Inc., 950 F.3d 359, 363 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing 29 U.S.C.

§ 2615). An employee is entitled to leave under the FMLA if “(1)

she is afflicted with a ‘serious health condition’ and (2) that

condition renders her unable to perform the functions of her job.”

Guzman v. Brown County, 884 F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 2018). The

FMLA defines a “serious health condition” as “an illness, injury,

impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves—(A)

inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care

facility; or (B) continuing treatment by a health care provider.”

29 U.S.C. 2611(11).

15

As at Counts I and VII, the factual allegations Dunn offers

to support Count XI are vague and conclusory. She states that

“[a]t all relevant times” she had a “serious health condition,”

but other than noting that she had bursitis, she does not plead

that she had a condition requiring inpatient care or continuing

treatment as required by 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11). ECF 1 at 5. She

writes that her bursitis entitled her to FMLA leave, but at no

point does she plead that the condition rendered her unable to

perform her duties. Guzman, 833 F.3d at 638. Although she writes

that the bursitis impaired “one or more major life activities,”

she does not name which activities, and I cannot find on that basis

that she has pled that the bursitis made her incapable of work.

ECF 1 at 5. Dunn has failed to plead sufficient facts to survive

defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

4. Count XII—Retaliatory Discharge

At Count XII, Dunn alleges that defendants committed the

Illinois tort of retaliatory discharge. In service of that claim,

she alleges that on “August 28, 2023, [Dunn] filed a worker’s

compensation claim in Kathy Dunn v. Cook County Health Department

in 23WC022359,” and that on “December 17, 2012, [Dunn] had also

filed a worker’s compensation claim in Kathy Dunn v. Cook County

in 12WC043254.” Defendants argue first that the 2012 worker’s

compensation claim is too remote in time to be causally related to

16

Dunn’s firing in September 2023. Second, they attach a transcript

from another proceeding where Ms. Dunn apparently admits that the

CCDPH was already planning on firing her on August 25, 2023; thus,

they argue, her September firing could not have been retaliation

for an August claim for worker’s compensation.

To make out a claim for retaliatory termination for worker’s

compensation, an employee must show: “(1) that he was an employee

before the injury; (2) that he exercised a right granted by the

Worker’s Compensation Act; and (3) that he was discharged and the

discharge was causally related to his filing a claim under the

Workers’ Compensation Act.” Clemons v. Mechanical Devices Co., 704

N.E.2. 403, 335–36 (Ill. 1998).

Dunn has pled that she was an employee, was injured, and that

she exercised her rights under the Worker’s Compensation Act. Dunn

apparently filed her worker’s compensation claim after CCDPH

intimated that it would be firing her, but it is “well-established

that ‘[t]he fact that a plaintiff has not filed a [worker’s

compensation] claim in Illinois prior to her discharge does not

preclude her from bringing a retaliatory discharge cause of

action.’” Planell v. Whitehall North, LLC, 2015 IL App (1st)

140799, at *1, *14 (2015) (quoting Reinneck v. Taco Bell Corp.,

696 N.E.2d 839, 842 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)). It is sufficient for a

plaintiff to plead that she “was discharged in anticipation of

17

[her] filing a worker’s compensation claim.” Fuentes v. Lear

Siegler, Inc., 529 N.E.2d 40, 42 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).

Defendants argue that Dunn failed to plead that CCDPH was on

notice that she might file for worker’s compensation in August of

2023. But at that point, Dunn had filed for compensation once in

the past and had gone on FMLA leave for her bursitis. It was

reasonable to foresee that she might file for worker’s compensation

a second time. This is more than a threadbare recitation of the

elements of retaliatory discharge, and Count XII survives the

motion. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

5. Count XIII—Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

In Count XIII, Dunn alleges that defendants committed the

Illinois tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress

(“IIED”). Beyond the facts pled at the preceding counts, Dunn adds

that defendants “engaged in truly extreme and outrageous conduct”

which was “intentional or so reckless that Defendants knew severe

emotional distress was substantially certain to result” and that

the conduct “caused [Dunn] to suffer severe emotional distress.”

ECF 1 at 20.

Defendants respond that Dunn’s IIED claim is barred by the

statute of limitations contained in Illinois’s Tort Immunity Act.

745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/8-101(a). I agree.

18

Dunn contends that the statute of limitations should have

been tolled because of actions defendants allegedly took in her

appeal of her firing with the Cook County Appeals Board. I do not

see how. If Dunn had been treated so egregiously as to warrant the

filing of an IIED claim, she would have been on notice immediately,

regardless of her action in front of the Appeals Board. As such,

her ITIED claim needed to be filed within a year of her firing in

September 2024. 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/8-101 (a).

C. Punitive Damages

The parties agree that Dunn is not entitled to punitive

damages. As such, I strike her requests for punitive damages.

Iv.

I grant defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and deny it in

part. All claims at Count I other than Dunn’s discriminatory

discharge on account of her race are dismissed. Count XII survives

as pled. Counts II-XI and XIII are dismissed.

ENTER ORDER:

fo BudAm~

Elaine E. Bucklo

United States District Judge

Dated: January 21, 2026

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