Judka

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JEFFREY JUDKA, : NO. 1:24-CV-00531

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

: (CAMONI, M.J.)

DENNIS EMMEL, et. al. :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the Court are motions to dismiss Plaintiff Jeffrey

Judka’s Second Amended Complaint (doc. 26) filed by Defendants Dennis

Emmel, Michael Smith, Maxine Moul, Greg Moul, Chadwell Keesee,

George Schruefer, Christopher Eberly (Individual Defendants) (doc. 27),

and Defendant Delta Cardiff Volunteer Fire Company (DCVFC) (doc. 49).

I. BACKGROUND1

In this employment discrimination case, Judka, a volunteer

member of DCVFC and Fire Police Officer, sued DCVFC, a nonprofit fire

company in Delta, Pennsylvania, and several of its officers and firefighter

1 In considering this motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all factual

allegations in the Complaint as true. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny,

515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008).

members, the Individual Defendants. Second Amended Complaint, Doc.

26 ¶¶ 4-9.

Judka has served as a volunteer with DCVFC for over a decade. Id.

¶ 19. In 2017, Judka disclosed to some of the Individual Defendants that

he is Jewish. Id. ¶ 20. After Judka revealed his Jewish identity, he was

“subjected to a pattern of anti-Semetic remarks, ridicule, and exclusion”

by his fellow members. See id. ¶ 21. From 2017 through 2022 and 2023,

Judka objected to anti-Semetic comments and raised concerns about the

discrimination he faced. Id. ¶¶ 21-22. In August 2023, following a

disciplinary hearing, DCVFC suspended and demoted Judka. Id.

¶¶ 23-24.

Judka filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, and on

February 13, 2024, received notice of a right to sue. Id. ¶ 14. On March

29, 2024, Judka filed a complaint against the Individual Defendants. Doc.

1. The Individual Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, doc. 8, which the

Court granted, but allowed Judka to file an amended complaint. See docs.

17, 18. Judka filed an amended complaint, adding DCVFC as a named

defendant, and the Individual Defendants again moved to dismiss. Docs.

20, 23. Before the Court could rule on that motion, Judka filed a second

amended complaint. Doc. 26. Finding the second amended complaint

warranted, the Court deemed the second amended complaint as

operative. July 17, 2025, Order, Doc. 28.

In the second amended complaint, Judka alleges four counts: (1)

Title VII – Retaliation; (2) PHRA – Retaliation; (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 –

First Amendment Retaliation; and (4) § 1983 – Due Process. Doc. 26

¶¶ 28-42. Judka brings counts three and four against the Individual

Defendants, and all counts against DCVFC. Id. The Individual

Defendants and DCVFC moved to dismiss the second amended

complaint, docs. 27, 49, and the parties have fully briefed the motions,

docs. 31, 33, 36, 52, 56, 58.2 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a

2 Both the Individual Defendants and DCVFC also included in their

motions to dismiss motions to strike a portion of the second amended

complaint. See Docs. 31, 52. As they highlight, paragraphs 26 and 27

discuss events that do not relate directly to Judka’s claims. See Doc. 26

¶¶ 26-27. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), the Court “may

strike from a pleading . . . any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or

scandalous matter.” Relief under Rule 12(f), however, is generally

disfavored, and will be denied unless the allegations “have no possible

relation to the controversy and may cause prejudice to one of the parties,

or if the allegations confuse the issues in the case.” Fiorentino v. Cabot

Oil & Gas Corp., 750 F. Supp. 2d 506, 509 (M.D. Pa. 2010). As these

paragraphs do not affect the outcome of the defendants’ motions to

dismiss, and finding no prejudice, the Court will deny the motions to

strike. Because the Court grants Judka leave to file a third amended

complaint, Judka is advised to plead only relevant factual allegations.

United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings in this case,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73,

including entry of final judgment. Doc. 47. The motions to dismiss are

thus ripe for disposition.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a plaintiff’s

obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires

more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation modified).

A district court must conduct a three-step analysis when

considering the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). Malleus v.

George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). First, the court must identify

“the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009). Second, the court must identify all of the

plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations, accept them as true, and

“construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). The court

can discard bare legal conclusions or factually unsupported accusations

that merely state the defendant unlawfully harmed the plaintiff. Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678, citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Third, the court must

determine whether “the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to

show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’” Fowler, 578 F.3d

at 211, quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A facially plausible claim “allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 210, quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. On a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the “defendant bears the burden of showing that no

claim has been presented.” Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750

(3d Cir. 2005).

A complaint filed by a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed and,

“however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.

89, 94 (2007), quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).

Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their

complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d

239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).

III. DISCUSSION

Judka brings claims under Title VII, PHRA, and § 1983. Doc. 26

¶¶ 28-42. The Court begins with the § 1983 claims as they are alleged

against all the defendants, before turning to the Title VII and PHRA

claims, which are alleged against only DCVFC.

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983—State Action Requirement

The threshold issue in a § 1983 case is whether a defendant acted

under color of state law in depriving a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995) (“The

color of state law element is a threshold issue.”). This is because § 1983

“excludes from its reach ‘merely private conduct, no matter how

discriminatory or wrongful.’” American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. v. Sullivan, 526

U.S. 40, 50 (1999), quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982).

All defendants argue that Judka’s § 1983 claims fail because they

did not act under color of state law to deprive Judka of his constitutional

rights. Doc. 31 at 8; Doc. 52 at 21. Judka, in opposition, argues that he

has alleged sufficient facts which “plausibly support the inference that

DCVFC operated under color of state law and exercised power derived

from state authority.” Pl.’s Br., Doc. 56 at 20-21; see also Pl.’s Br., Doc. 33

at 3 (arguing that the Second Amended Complaint alleges that DCVFC

and Delta Borough were “structurally and operationally intertwined”).

To state a claim for relief in an action brought under § 1983, a

litigant must establish that they were deprived of a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged

deprivation was committed under color of state law. Sullivan, 526 U.S.

at 49-50. In § 1983 cases, “under color of law” has been “treated as the

same thing” as the Fourteenth Amendment’s “state action” requirement.

Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995) (collecting

cases). The state action principle requires that “constitutional standards

are invoked only when it can be said that the [government] is responsible

for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.” Id. at 1141-42

(emphasis in original), citing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500

U.S. 614, 632 (1991). The central question, then, is whether the state is

responsible for DCVFC’s conduct in demoting and suspending Judka.

The Court finds that Judka has not alleged any facts to indicate

that DCVFC’s conduct in demoting and suspending Judka was carried

out with state authority. The only allegation that addresses the state

action requirement is a legal conclusion. See Doc. 26 ¶ 37 (“Defendants,

acting under color of state law, retaliated against Plaintiff[.]”). The Court

must discard such bare legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Judka additionally argues that courts have “repeatedly recognized

that volunteer fire companies may qualify as state actors where they

perform delegated governmental responsibilities or are intertwined with

municipal authority.” Doc. 56 at 21. Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the

Third Circuit has determined that a volunteer fire company was a state

actor under § 1983. Mark, 51 F.3d at 1148. That holding, however, was

narrowly confined to the factual circumstances of that case. Id. (“In the

circumstances, we hold that Enterprise is a state actor for purposes of

this case.”). And Mark is readily distinguishable from this case.

The plaintiff in Mark sought to recover losses from a fire, alleging

a constitutional deprivation that arose from a firefighter setting fire to

the plaintiff’s property. Id. at 1140. Under that factual circumstance, the

Mark court determined that “the allegation of an unconstitutional

deprivation is related directly to the Borough’s agreement with

Enterprise that the latter would be the official provider of fire services.”

Id. at 1144 (emphasis added). No such facts are alleged here.

The crux of Judka’s § 1983 claim is that he was demoted and

suspended after raising concerns that he suffered discrimination for

being Jewish. Doc. 26 ¶¶ 35-42. His demotion and suspension do not even

remotely relate to the volunteer fire company’s arguable state action in

providing fire services. Because Judka has pleaded no facts to allege that

any of the defendants acted under color of state law, and DCVFC’s

provision of public services does not relate to the constitutional violation

that Judka alleges, Judka’s section 1983 claims fail at the threshold, and

will be dismissed.

B. Title VII and PHRA Retaliation and Discrimination

Turning to Judka’s retaliation claims under Title VII and PHRA,

the Court first addresses DCVFC’s objection that Judka’s Title VII claim

is time barred.

1. Judka’s Title VII claim is not time barred.

DCVFC argues that Judka’s Title VII claim is time barred for

failure to bring suit within 90 days of the receipt of EEOC’s right to sue

letter. DCVFC’s Br., Doc. 52 at 7. DCVFC contends that although Judka

filed the initial complaint within the 90-day time period, Judka did not

name DCVFC as a defendant until June 20, 2025, well beyond the 90-day

deadline. Id. at 11. It further argues that Judka has asserted no equitable

basis for tolling. Id. at 12. In opposition, Judka argues that the operative

complaint naming DCVFC relates back to the original complaint as

DCVFC reasonably should have understood that it was an intended

defendant and that its omission in the caption was the result of a mistake

by the Plaintiff, who filed the initial complaint pro se. Pl.’s Br., Doc. 56 at

12.

To bring a claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must file a charge of

discrimination with the EEOC and procure a notice of the right to sue.

Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 163 (3d Cir. 2013). This

procedural requirement ensures that a plaintiff’s claims fall “fairly

within the scope of the prior EEOC complaint, or the investigation

arising therefrom.” Id., citing Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 1295 (3d Cir.

1996). Once a plaintiff procures a notice of the right to sue, if he chooses

to bring a private action, “it must be filed within 90 days of the date on

which the complainant has notice of the EEOC’s decision not to pursue

the administrative charge.” Burgh v. Borough of Montrose, 251 F.3d 465,

470 (3d Cir. 2001), citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1). The Third Circuit has

strictly construed the 90-day time limit and has held that, without an

equitable basis for tolling, a civil suit filed “even one day late is

time-barred and may be dismissed.” Id.

Although the Third Circuit strictly construes the 90-day time limit

to file suit, Title VII “does not contain a statute of limitations applicable

to joinder.” Brzozowski v. Corr. Physician Servs. Inc., 360 F.3d 173, 180

(3d Cir. 2004). “The Act does not address . . . whether an additional

defendant may be joined after the 90–day period has expired.” Id. And

while courts have strictly construed the 90-day limitations period against

plaintiffs who either misnamed the appropriate party in their complaint

or have otherwise entirely failed to meet the filing requirements in the

statute, those cases are “distinguishable from the litigation here where

the original complaint was timely filed.” Id.

Here, as was the case in Brzozowski, Judka has filed the initial

complaint, as DCVFC concedes, within the 90-day time period. Doc. 1;

Doc. 52 at 11. Judka has, therefore, met Title VII’s procedural

requirement. And because Title VII does not set any time limit on joining

additional defendants once the complaint is timely filed, Rule 15(c)

relation back doctrine has no application here. “The relation back

provisions of Rule 15 are primarily concerned with alleviating unfair

prejudice in circumstances involving statutes of limitations.” Brzozowski,

360 F.3d at 182. In a case where no statute of limitations applies, the

doctrine “has no controlling force.” Id.

Nonetheless, were Rule 15(c) to apply here, Judka’s second

amended complaint does relate back to the date of the original pleading.

See Brzozowski, 360 F.3d at 180. Under that rule, an amendment to a

complaint relates back to the date of the original pleading when: (1)

permitted by the statute of limitations applicable to the action; (2) the

claim or defense arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set

forth in the original pleading; or (3) the amendment changes a party and

the foregoing (2) is satisfied. Id., citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c). When

relation back is based on the third option, the party to be joined must also

have received notice of the suit within the 120-day period under Rule

4(m), must not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense, and should have

known that, but for a mistake in identity, the suit would have been

brought against it. Id.

Under either the second or the third factor of Rule 15(c)(3), Judka’s

second amended complaint relates back to the date of the original

pleading. The second factor is easily satisfied as Judka’s claim arises out

of the same conduct, transaction, and occurrence set forth in the original

complaint. Docs. 1, 26. The third factor is also satisfied as the second

amended complaint adds DCVFC and the second factor is satisfied. Id.

And DCVFC knew or should have known that the suit would be brought

against it as Judka filed an EEOC charge against it and named DCVFC

in the original civil cover sheet in this case. See Doc. 1-1 at 1; Doc 1-2 at

1. Additionally, Judka served the original complaint on several DCVFC

board members, named as defendants, including the Company’s

President, CEO and Vice President, and Secretary, within the time

period allowed by Rule 4(m), so the company had the requisite notice.

Neither is DCVFC prejudiced in maintaining a defense. Therefore,

Judka’s Title VII claim is not time barred.

2. Judka has sufficiently pleaded Title VII and PHRA

retaliation claims.

Having determined that Judka’s Title VII claim is not time barred,

the Court examines whether Judka’s retaliation claims under Title VII

and PHRA survive the motions to dismiss.3

3 The Court addresses retaliation claims under Title VII and PHRA

together as they fall under the same analytical framework. Qin v. Vertex,

Inc., 100 F.4th 458, 470 (3d Cir. 2024). As DCVFC acknowledges (doc. 52

at 13), so long as the Court has original jurisdiction over the civil action,

DCVFC argues that Judka fails to plead sufficient facts to support

his retaliation claims. Doc. 52 at 13. It asserts that Judka fails to

“establish a prima facie case” of retaliation because he fails to

demonstrate a causal connection between his objections to discriminatory

conduct and subsequent demotion and suspension. Id. at 13-14. DCVFC’s

argument starts on the wrong foot.

At the pleading stage, a plaintiff is not “required to establish a

prima facie case.” Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 791 (3d

Cir. 2016); Gavura v. Pa. State House of Reps., 55 F. App’x 60, 65 (3d Cir.

2002) (“McDonnell Douglas standard is an evidentiary standard, not a

pleading requirement.”). To plead a retaliation claim, Judka must allege

sufficient facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will

reveal evidence of the following elements: (1) he engaged in conduct

protected by Title VII; (2) the employer took adverse action against him;

and (3) a causal link exists between his protected conduct and the

employer’s adverse action. Connelly, 809 F.3d at 789. Judka’s factual

the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state PHRA claim,

which arises from the same case and controversy. See Burgh, 251 F.3d at

469 (“The District Court had original federal question jurisdiction over

the Title VII claim, . . . and supplemental jurisdiction over the PHRA

claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).”).

allegations raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal

evidence of these three elements.

To begin with, DCVFC concedes the first two elements and only

challenges whether Judka has sufficiently pleaded causality. See Doc. 52

at 14 (“Moving Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff engaged in

protected activity . . . . Further, it is not disputed that a suspension and

demotion are . . . adverse employment actions.”).

As for causality, Judka has pleaded that throughout 2022 and 2023,

he raised concerns about discriminatory practices. Doc. 26 ¶ 22.

Following his protected activity in raising concerns about the

discrimination he faced, DCVFC conducted a disciplinary hearing in 2023

and took the adverse employment action against Judka. Id. ¶ 23.

Although Judka did not allege a detailed date of when he last made

complaints about the discrimination, at this stage, he is not required to

plead “detailed factual allegations.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515

F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008), quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “In any

case, the question of temporal proximity does not render [Judka’s]

retaliation claim facially implausible.” Connelly, 809 F.3d at 792.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Judka has alleged facts that could

support a reasonable inference of a causal connection between his

protected activity throughout 2022 and 2023 and the adverse

employment action in August 2023. See id. at 793.

Accordingly, the Court will deny the motion to dismiss as to both

the Title VII and PHRA claims.

3. Religious Discrimination Claim

In his brief in opposition to DCVFC’s motion to dismiss, Judka

argues, apparently for the first time, that he has alleged a religious

discrimination claim and that by failing to address it, DCVFC has

forfeited any arguments on this claim. Doc. 56 at 15-16. Indeed, DCVFC

has not made any argument against Judka’s religious discrimination

claim. See Doc. 52. But Judka did not include a religious discrimination

claim in his causes of action in the second amended complaint. See Doc.

26. The only causes of action he has alleged are the § 1983 claims, and

Title VII and PHRA retaliation claims, discussed above. See id. ¶¶ 28-42

(alleging four causes of action which do not include a claim of religious

discrimination).

Judka, however, was proceeding pro se at the time he filed the

operative complaint and did state in the introductory paragraph that he

“brings this civil rights action . . . for religious discrimination in violation

of Title VII[.]” Doc. 26 at 2. But that statement alone helps neither

DCVFC nor the Court as there are several different theories of liability

for religion-based discrimination available under Title VII, including

disparate treatment and impact, and hostile work environment. And the

evidence required to prevail on a religious discrimination claim under

Title VII depends upon the theory of liability, and on the facts of a

particular case. Korman v. Settlers Hosp. Grp., LLC, No. 22-1579, 2024

WL 5430600, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2024), citing Jones v. Sch. Dist. of

Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 411 (3d Cir. 1999), report and recommendation

adopted, No. 22-1579, 2025 WL 608628 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2025). Given

the lack of specificity regarding what type of religious discrimination

claim Judka intended to bring, and the lack of specific factual allegations

regarding such a claim, the Court cannot construe the operative

complaint to include such a claim, even under the generous standards

applicable to a pro se complaint. To do so would necessarily require a

finding that DCVFC had sufficient notice of such a claim and should have

addressed it in its motion to dismiss.

Because Judka was proceeding pro se when he filed the second

amended complaint, the Court will grant Judka leave to file a third

amended complaint to allow him an opportunity to fully plead any

potential claims of religious discrimination if he wishes to do so and to

cure, if possible, the deficiencies in the § 1983 claims noted above.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Individual Defendants’ motion to dismiss, doc. 27,

is granted in its entirety, and DCVFC’s motion to dismiss, doc. 49, is

granted in part and denied in part. The plaintiff may amend his

complaint, but if he does not do so, the only claims that will go forward

are the Title VII and PHRA Retaliation claims against DCVFC. An

appropriate order follows.

Date: January 21, 2026 s/Sean A. Camoni

Sean A. Camoni

United States Magistrate Judge