Pollard

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

MICHAEL STEVEN POLLARD, JR.,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 8:25-cv-2371-MSS-SPF

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

________________________________/

O R D E R

Pollard filed a second amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus under

28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his state court convictions. (Docs. 6, 10, 11, and 12) The

Court reviews the second amended petition for sufficiency. Rule 4, Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases.

Judicially noticed records1 show that, in Case Number 23-CF-475 in Hernando

County, Florida, Pollard pleaded no contest to possession of a firearm by a felon and

grand theft, and pursuant to a negotiated plea, the trial judge sentenced Pollard to five

years in prison. State v. Pollard, No. 23-CF-475 (Fla. 5th Jud. Cir.).

In Case Number 24-CF-340, Pollard pleaded no contest to two counts of witness

intimidation, and pursuant to a negotiated plea, the trial judge sentenced Pollard to

five years in prison. State v. Pollard, No. 24-CF-340 (Fla. 5th Jud. Cir.).

1 The Court attaches to this Order a copy of the relevant state court records.

In his second amended federal petition, Pollard asserts the following four

grounds (Doc. 6 at 5–10):

[Pollard’s] double jeopardy rights were violat[ed] when

[police] arrested [Pollard] [for] out-of-state allegations.

(Ground One)

Fraudulent criminal processes violations, individually and

collectively, [were] irreparably insufficient to afford

jurisdiction over [Pollard]. Prosecutors knew that the

information [ ] was insufficient to establish jurisdiction over

[Pollard].

(Ground Two)

The numerous due process violations, individually and

collectively, by [the] trial court, [which] erred [by]

summarily denying [Pollard’s] right to a fair trial. The law

protect[s] [Pollard], [who is] unlearned in the law. Courts

“cannot impose on [him] the same high standards of legal

art which might be placed on the members of the legal

profession.”

(Ground Three)

[Pollard] alleges that Florida law enforcement has failed

adequately to respond to all requests under the Public

Records [law]. The record prov[es] violations [of the]

Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, and the

Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. [Pollard] subsequently

expanded the requests to also seek record[s] relating to the

information [ ] filed by law enforcement.

(Ground Four)

In memoranda that support the second amended petition, Pollard asserts that

the trial judge and the prosecutor lacked jurisdiction over the prosecution and that the

charges violated the statute of limitations. (Docs. 10, 11, and 12) Pollard demands

release from prison. (Doc. 12 at 2)

A one-year statute of limitation applies to a Section 2254 petition. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1). The limitation starts “the date on which the judgment became final by

the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.”

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The state court judgment entered in Case Number 24-CF-

340 on March 11, 2024. Pollard, No. 24-CF-340. Pollard did not appeal, and the time

to appeal expired thirty days later — April 10, 2024. Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(3). The

limitation started to run the next day. Because Pollard did not seek post-conviction

relief in state court, the limitation ran for a year and expired on April 11, 2025. See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Consequently, Pollard untimely filed his Section 2254 petition

attacking the judgment in Case Number 24-CF-340 by placing the petition in the hands

of prison officials for mailing on August 28, 2025. (Doc. 1 at 4) Washington v. United

States, 243 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001).2

The state court judgment entered in Case Number 23-CF-475 on March 11,

2024. Pollard, No. 23-CF-475. Pollard did not appeal, and the time to appeal expired

April 10, 2024. Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(3). The limitation period started to run the

next day. On December 13, 2024, Pollard filed a motion to vacate an injunction

prohibiting his contact with the victims. Pollard, No. 23-CF-475. At that time, 246 days

had run on the limitation. Assuming that the motion is an “application for State post-

2 The Court assumes that the claims in the second amended petition relate back to the

claims in the petition that Pollard initially filed. Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005).

conviction or other collateral review” that tolls the limitation, the

post-conviction court denied the motion on January 14, 2025. Pollard, No. 23-CF-475.

Pollard did not appeal, and the limitation tolled until the time to appeal expired thirty

days later — February 13, 2025. Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(b) and 9.141(b)(1). Cramer v.

Sec’y, Dep’t Corrs., 461 F.3d 1380, 1383 (11th Cir. 2006). The limitation resumed the

next day and expired 119 days later, on June 13, 2025. Pollard placed the petition in

the hands of prison officials for mailing on August 28, 2025. (Doc. 1 at 4)

Consequently, the petition attacking the judgment in Case Number 23-CF-475 is

untimely. Washington, 243 F.3d at 1301.

Even if the petition were timely, Pollard asserts that the trial judge and the

prosecutor lacked jurisdiction over the prosecution, that the charges violated the

statute of limitations, and that a Florida law enforcement agency violated public

records law. Because these claims assert a violation of state law, the claims are not

cognizable on federal habeas. Branan v. Booth, 861 F.2d 1507, 1508 (11th Cir. 1988).

§17, Art. V, Fla. Const. §§ 119.07, 775.15, and 910.005, Fla. Stat.

Pollard admits that he did not exhaust his remedies in state court.

(Doc. 6 at 6–11) Because the time to seek a direct appeal expired on April 10, 2024,

the time to seek post-conviction relief in state court may not have expired.

Consequently, Pollard should seek relief in state court. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b)

(requiring a defendant to file a post-conviction motion within two years of the

judgment and sentence becoming final). Sadler v. State, 141 So. 3d 1266, 1268 (Fla. 1st

DCA 2014) (“If no direct appeal is taken, a judgment and sentence become final after

the thirty-day period for filing an appeal has expired.”).

The double jeopardy claim is cognizable on federal habeas. The arrest affidavit

in Case Number 23-CF-475 states that Pollard stole a firearm in Indiana and

transported the stolen firearm and four other firearms from Indiana to Florida. Pollard,

No. 23-CF-475. The arrest affidavit in Case Number 24-CF-340 states that Pollard

tampered with the witness before the witness traveled from Indiana to Florida. Pollard,

No. 24-CF-340.

In the Florida court, Pollard pleaded no contest pursuant to an agreement with

the prosecutor. Pollard, Nos. 23-CF-475 and 24-CF-340. By entering the negotiated

plea, Pollard waived all non-jurisdictional defects in the criminal proceedings,

including the double jeopardy claim. Dermota v. United States, 895 F.2d 1324, 1325–26

(11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Broome, 628 F.2d 403, 404 (5th Cir. 1980).3 Also,

Pollard does not allege that he received a conviction in an Indiana court for possession

of a firearm by a felon, grand theft, or witness Intimidation. He alleges only that the

convictions in Florida were based on conduct that occurred in Indiana. Consequently,

he fails to allege facts that demonstrate a violation of double jeopardy. Brown v. Ohio,

432 U.S. 161, 165–66 (1977).4

3 Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981).

4 Even if the claim were not waived and Pollard was convicted of the same crimes in

an Indiana court, the convictions in Florida likely do not violate double jeopardy.

Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985) (“The dual sovereignty doctrine, as originally

articulated and consistently applied by this Court, compels the conclusion that

Accordingly, Pollard’s second amended petition (Doc. 6) for a writ of habeas

corpus is DENIED in part and DISMISSED 1n part. The double jeopardy claim 1s

DENIED. All other claims based on state law are DISMISSED without prejudice for

Pollard to seek relief in state court. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter a judgment

against Pollard only on the double jeopardy claim and to CLOSE this case.

DENIAL OF CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY AND

LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Because Pollard neither makes a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right nor demonstrates that reasonable jurists would find debatable

both the merits of the underlying claims and the procedural issues that he seeks to

raise, a certificate of appealability and leave to appeal in forma pauperis are DENIED.

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000).

DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on J anuary 12,2026.

MARYS. SORIVEN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

successive prosecutions by two States for the same conduct are not barred by the

Double Jeopardy Clause.”).