Rodney Beeler v. Ron Broomfield

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RODNEY GENE BEELER, No. 20-99014

Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No.

2:96-cv-00606-

v. GW

RONALD BROOMFIELD, Acting

Warden, California State Prison at San OPINION

Quentin,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 11, 2024

Pasadena, California

Filed January 23, 2026

Before: Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Jacqueline H. Nguyen, and

Jennifer Sung, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Nguyen

2 BEELER V. BROOMFIELD

SUMMARY *

Habeas Corpus / Death Penalty

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of Rodney

Gene Beeler’s habeas corpus petition challenging his

California conviction and death sentence for first-degree

murder.

Beeler raised three arguments concerning his

competency to stand trial: (1) the trial court procedurally

erred by not sua sponte holding a competency hearing; (2) he

was incompetent to stand trial; and (3) defense counsel was

ineffective in failing to raise his incompetency. Beeler also

argued that, because he established a prima facie case, the

California Supreme Court’s summary denial of relief

without issuing an order to show cause was

unreasonable. Applying the highly deferential review

required under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the panel held that the

California Supreme Court could have reasonably concluded

the evidence does not sufficiently support Beeler’s

competency claims.

Beeler argued that his counsel provided ineffective

assistance by failing to investigate and present evidence

regarding his mental illness and organic brain damage at

both the guilt and penalty phases. The panel held that, under

*

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

BEELER V. BROOMFIELD 3

AEDPA review, the district court correctly denied Beeler’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

• Beeler claimed that defense counsel

should have used penalty phase

mitigation and extra-record evidence of

his mental illness and brain damage at the

guilt phase to show that he did not form

the specific intent to kill. The panel held

that even assuming defense counsel

performed deficiently in its investigation

and presentation of evidence, Beeler was

not prejudiced by counsel’s

decisions. And while Beeler was clearly

not prejudiced, the California Supreme

Court could also have determined that

trial counsel acted reasonably and

diligently during the guilt stage.

• Beeler claimed that the neurological

evidence not presented at the penalty

phase would have constituted additional

mitigation, and there is a reasonable

probability that one juror would have

made a different decision based on that

evidence. The panel held that the

California Supreme Court could have

reasonably determined that defense

counsel’s performance was not deficient,

as counsel diligently sought neurological

testing both before trial and after Beeler

volunteered new information. Beeler

failed to establish a prima facie case as to

the ineffective assistance of counsel at the

4 BEELER V. BROOMFIELD

penalty phase, and the California

Supreme Court’s summary denial of this

claim was reasonable.

Beeler alleged that the trial court coerced the jury’s death

verdict by failing to replace a juror with an alternate after the

juror informed the court of his father’s sudden

death. Applying AEDPA review, the panel held that the

California Supreme Court neither erroneously applied

federal law nor made an unreasonable determination.

The panel rejected as foreclosed by Karis v. Calderon,

283 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2002), Beeler’s argument that

California fails to adequately narrow the pool of defendants

eligible for the death penalty.

COUNSEL

Marta VanLandingham (argued) and John S. Crouchley,

Deputy Federal Public Defenders; Cuauhtemoc Ortega,

Federal Public Defender; Office of the Federal Public

Defender, Los Angeles, California; for Petitioner-Appellant.

Vincent P. LaPietra (argued), Lise S. Jacobson, and

Stephanie A. Mitchell, Deputy Attorneys General; Holly D.

Wilkens, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; James W.

Bilderback II, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Rob

Bonta, California Attorney General; Office of the California

Attorney General, San Diego, California; for Respondent-

Appellee.

Susan Garvey and Natalie Link, Habeas Corpus Resource

Center, San Francisco, California, for Amicus Curiae

Habeas Corpus Resource Center.

BEELER V. BROOMFIELD 5

Jessica E. Oats, Senior Deputy State Public Defender; Mary

K. McComb, State Public Defender; Office of The State

Public Defender, Sacramento, California; for Amicus Curiae

Office of The State Public Defender.

OPINION

NGUYEN, Circuit Judge:

A jury sentenced Rodney Gene Beeler to death following

his conviction for the first-degree murder of Anthony

“Tony” Joseph Stevenson during a daytime robbery in

December 1985. Beeler appeals the district court’s denial of

his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND 1

A. The Guilt Phase

Tony Stevenson lived with his two brothers, Michael and

Dino, in a house in Orange, California. On the morning of

December 30, 1985, all three brothers left for work. But just

before 11:00 a.m., the Stevensons’ neighbor discovered

Tony lying on the front lawn of the neighbor’s house, shot

in the back. Police and paramedics arrived after the neighbor

called 911, but Tony died at the scene.

The rear, sliding-glass door of Tony’s house had been

pried open with a screwdriver, and the house had been

ransacked. Bullets for Tony’s .22-caliber semi-automatic

rifle were strewn across his bed. The rifle was found on a

1

These facts are largely taken from the California Supreme court’s

opinion in Beeler’s direct appeal, People v. Beeler, 9 Cal. 4th 953 (1995).

6 BEELER V. BROOMFIELD

hallway floor, its wooden parts badly damaged. One of the

bedroom doors had a large gash that police attributed to the

butt of the rifle. Jewelry, a camera and lens, $1,200 in cash,

a dark blue gym bag, Dino’s fake Rolex watch, and

Michael’s .22-caliber single-action Ruger revolver, which

he kept unloaded under his bed with two bullets nearby, were

taken from the house. Michael’s gun was never recovered.

An autopsy revealed Tony died from a single .22 caliber

bullet that entered his back and pierced his lung and heart.

The muzzle of the gun had been more than two feet away

from Tony when he was shot. A ballistics expert determined

the bullet that killed Tony was not fired from the broken rifle

found inside the house but could have been fired from

Michael’s missing revolver. Another .22 caliber bullet was

found lodged in a car parked across the street from the

Stevensons’ house. But the recovered bullet was too

damaged to determine whether it had been fired from either

weapon.

A small bullet hole in the screen door aligned with the

bullet hole in the car across the street, suggesting a gun was

shot through the screen door. Relying on the evidence of

forced entry, ransacking, and a violent struggle inside the

Stevensons’ house, the prosecution theorized that Tony had

returned home during a burglary and confronted the

perpetrator, but as he fled the house, the perpetrator shot him

in the back with Michael’s gun.

Beeler, whose identity as the burglar is not at issue in this

appeal, was linked to the crime by fingerprint evidence and

the testimony of three neighbors. In one of the bedrooms,

Beeler’s fingerprint was found on top of a file cabinet. Floyd

Raney, a neighbor living down the street from the

Stevensons, testified that he was in his garage around the

BEELER V. BROOMFIELD 7

time of the killing with the door open. Raney heard a motor

running outside and saw a pickup truck parked directly

across the street. Beeler approached Raney in his garage in

what Raney described as pale blue jeans and a solid blue

shirt. Beeler asked Raney, “My cat jumped the wall in your

backyard. Would you look back there, please, and see if my

cat is back there?” When Raney returned from checking the

backyard, he saw Beeler taking off in the pickup truck.

About fifteen minutes later, the police arrived in response to

the discovery of Tony’s body. At trial, Raney identified a

picture of Beeler’s truck as being similar to the one he saw

the day of the murder.

Lavada Hoskins lived on the street running parallel to the

Stevensons’ street. A block wall ran between the backyards

of the houses on Hoskins’s street and the Stevensons’ street,

including Raney’s yard. The morning of the killing, Hoskins

was in her backyard talking to her neighbor, Fern Awalt,

when both women saw a man walking along the top of the

block wall between 10:30 a.m. and 11:30 a.m. Neither

Hoskins nor Awalt saw the man’s face, but Hoskins recalled

him wearing a blue plaid shirt and carrying a small, dark

sports bag. Awalt remembered the man wearing work pants

and a solid blue shirt. Neither woman saw any other

unknown person in the neighborhood around the time of the

killing.

The prosecution also offered testimony of Beeler’s

coworkers to link him to the crime. At the time of the killing,

Beeler worked as a senior line operator at a laminated

products company. Jim Anderson, who reported to Beeler,

testified that Beeler had left work early, at about 10 a.m., on

the day of the killing. Calvin Brunsting, the company’s

manager, testified that Beeler’s timecard for December 30,

1985, showed him clocking in at 5:45 a.m. But sometime

8 BEELER V. BROOMFIELD

after December 30, Beeler had asked him to write in that

Beeler had left at 3:40 p.m., explaining that he had forgotten

to clock out.

John Lorenzi, another coworker, testified that sometime

between Christmas and New Year’s Eve, Beeler had said to

him, “John, let me ask you a hypothetical question. If I

was—if you were robbing somebody’s house, someone who

lived there caught you in the act, would you shoot him?”

Lorenzi replied, “Why? Did you kill somebody?” Lorenzi

testified that Beeler became upset and responded, “No,

asshole.” Beeler posed a similar question to Anderson,

asking “Hypothetically speaking, if you were robbing a

house and the guy came home—the guy that lived there, this

is, came home and you had a gun, would you shoot him?”

Anderson said, “No, I wouldn’t. I wouldn’t put myself in

that position to begin with. Why, did you do something, did

you kill somebody?” Beeler said no and walked away.

Sometime after January 1, 1986, Beeler offered

Anderson the stolen watch for $500. On January 7, 1986,

Beeler sold an Italian gold charm taken from the Stevensons.

Police eventually searched Beeler’s locker at work and

found the stolen camera and lens.

The defense offered two alternative theories to counter

the intent-to-kill requirement of the felony-murder special

circumstance. The primary theory was that Beeler’s work

supervisor, Mitchell Jackley, participated in the burglary and

was the actual killer. Jackley testified for the prosecution at

Beeler’s preliminary hearing under a grant of immunity for

receiving stolen property from Beeler. But the defense

called him as a witness at trial in an attempt to undermine his

credibility.

BEELER V. BROOMFIELD 9

The defense argued that Jackley knew details about the

crime that suggested he was the shooter. Jackley testified

that he had breakfast with Beeler the day of the killing and

authorized Beeler to leave work early. Beeler told Jackley

later that day that he had broken into the Stevensons’ house

and killed Tony. Jackley also testified that he stole the key

to Beeler’s locker and found the camera, handling it with silk

gloves so as not to leave fingerprints.

On January 9, 1986, Jackley called the police to

implicate Beeler for killing Tony. Jackley testified that he

reported Beeler anonymously because he feared being

connected to the crime for two reasons. First, Jackley said

he had been inside the Stevensons’ house before the killing

because his wife was acquainted with Dino, so he feared his

fingerprints might show up. Second, Jackley testified that

he had previously been charged with murder. Additionally,

Jackley had received stolen belongings from Beeler from a

prior robbery.

Jackley provided the following account of the crime to

police investigators:

The way [Beeler] explained it to me is that

while he was in the house, that is, ah, ah,

Tony apparently’s his name, came in and

brought his—brought his dog in? Ya. Called

his dog. His dog was with him. [Beeler] was

saying his dog was with him and he thought

he was calling some friends or somethin’ and

then—what the fuck else did he say?—he

said right after that took place, [Beeler]

apparently was in one of the bedrooms, he

said or somethin’, and went behind the corner

or somethin’ like that . . . . And the guy

10 BEELER V. BROOMFIELD

[Tony] went into his room. He [Beeler] told

me he [Tony] came out with a goddamn ah

rifle and told him he was gonna beat the shit

out of him with it, and he’s gonna to do [sic]

bodily damage . . . . And he [Beeler] said

somethin’ to the effect that they got into an

altercation in the hallway, and that the guy

came at him with a rifle, used it like a

club—.

Jackley provided other details of the crime. For instance,

Beeler told him he “hit” two rooms in the Stevensons’ house

and was in the third when Tony unexpectedly returned home.

Beeler took a .22-calliber revolver from the house and shot

Tony in the back with a hollow-point bullet as Tony ran

away from the house. Beeler told Jackley that Tony fell on

the front lawn and that Beeler escaped “down a brick wall

running on the back of” the Stevensons’ house. Beeler said

he had left his truck idling and had a conversation with a

person outside the house at the end of the wall.

The defense attacked Jackley’s credibility with the fact

that he had been charged with a similar crime years earlier,

but those charges were dropped once Jackley agreed to

testify for the prosecution. Jackley and his accomplices were

arrested in 1974 in connection with a robbery-murder in

South Carolina. Jackley admitted to the burglary but denied

any involvement with the killing. Jackley provided a similar

story in that case, alleging that one of his acquaintances

confessed the killing to Jackley, an anonymous call was

made to the police implicating that defendant, Jackley had

received stolen goods from the defendant, and Jackley knew

many of the details of the crime. And, similar to this case,

BEELER V. BROOMFIELD 11

the charges against Jackley were dropped once he testified

for the prosecution.

Jackley also admitted to three other burglaries in which

he knew the victims, the items taken were similar to those

stolen from the Stevensons’ house, and his fingerprints were

not found at any of the crime scenes. The defense argued

that all the similarities to the instant case pointed to Jackley

as the killer and principal burglar, not Beeler.

The second theory the defense offered assumed that

Beeler was the shooter but that the evidence of the bullet’s

trajectory was consistent with “at least two reasonable

interpretations.” One was the prosecutor’s theory; the other

was that during the struggle inside the house, Tony used the

rifle to fire a shot “down the hall” that hit the car outside,

and Beeler fell and shot Tony as Tony was standing over

him. The prosecution’s expert conceded on cross-

examination that the evidence of the bullet’s trajectory was

compatible with this defense theory.

After a seven-day guilt-phase trial and less than a half

day of deliberations, the jury found Beeler guilty of first-

degree murder and burglary. The jury also found Beeler

personally used a handgun during the commission of the

offense and the felony-murder special circumstance to be

true, making Beeler eligible for the death penalty.

B. The Penalty Phase

1. Prosecution’s Case in Aggravation

During the penalty phase, the prosecution presented

evidence of Beeler’s three prior burglaries and one prior

rape. The parties stipulated that Beeler had convictions for

second-degree burglary in 1971, first-degree burglary in

1974, and second-degree burglary in 1976. He was

12 BEELER V. BROOMFIELD

committed to the California Youth Authority for the first

burglary and sentenced to state prison for the subsequent

convictions.

In 1985, Beeler raped Roxanne Doyle as she was

delivering newspapers. She testified that he told her a false

story about his truck breaking down as an excuse to

accompany her along her route. After Doyle completed her

deliveries, Beeler hit her in the face, forced her to the ground,

and orally and vaginally raped her while threatening her with

a knife.

Beeler then forced Doyle to give him her wedding and

engagement rings. She begged to keep her rings because she

had recently gotten married, but he threatened, “Give me

your rings or I’ll cut your finger off.” He also laughed when

he discovered that he had broken her eyeglasses. Beeler’s

coworker testified that when Beeler arrived at work that

morning, he bragged that he had robbed and “fucked the shit

out of” a “good looking” woman with a “nice figure” and

“big tits.”

2. The Defense’s Case in Mitigation

The defense presented a substantial mitigation case,

featuring five mental health experts and several lay

witnesses from Beeler’s personal life. 2 The mitigation

evidence focused on the physical and sexual abuse Beeler

suffered as a child and his long-term mental impairments.

The defense also offered evidence of his positive qualities as

2

A total of five mental health expert witnesses testified on Beeler’s

behalf. At counsel’s request, the trial court appointed two additional

psychologists, Drs. Jay Adams and Francis Crinella, to evaluate Beeler,

but they did not testify.

BEELER V. BROOMFIELD 13

a father and his successful adjustment to the structured

setting of incarceration.

Beeler’s mother, Lillian Morris, testified that Beeler had

been a normal child growing up, even though Beeler’s father

was known to beat him and his brother, Tom. This abuse

involved beating the boys with a piece of automative rubber

when Beeler was as young as six years old. Nonetheless, it

was not until she and Beeler’s father separated in 1960—

when Beeler was about ten years old—that Beeler began to

show behavioral issues. After the separation, Beeler and his

brother were forced to live with their father and stepmother

Lorna Jenkins, who treated Beeler cruelly.

The jury heard from several lay and expert witnesses

about Jenkins’ abuse of Beeler. Beeler’s mother said that

Jenkins prevented Beeler from having contact with or

receiving presents from his mother. Beeler’s stepsister,

Rebecca Mullins, testified that Jenkins was “a very violent

person” who abused Beeler and her other children. Jenkins

would burn Beeler’s hands with a lighter, lock him in the

closet from 30 minutes to several hours, force him to eat fruit

preserves until he vomited, and beat him with a belt buckle

hard enough to draw blood and leave welts.

Several neighbors also testified to Jenkins’ abuse of

Beeler. Byron and Barbara Fellows testified that on one

occasion Jenkins punished Beeler for smoking by forcing

him to smoke unfiltered cigarettes until he burned his lips

and fingers. On another occasion, Beeler was outside at 4:00

a.m. after being locked in the closet all night. The neighbors

later reported Jenkins to the police when Beeler’s brother

came to their house with injuries to his body from being

beaten with an electrical cord. Jolene Higley testified that

she was “raised with [Beeler] like a sister” and witnessed the

14 BEELER V. BROOMFIELD

severe abuse inflicted on Beeler by his stepmother, who

regularly referred to him as “a little bastard.” The abuse

included being locked in a small closet for hours, chained to

a basement post, thrown down a flight of stairs with his

hands tied behind his back, beaten with a belt buckle and

brush, and forced to hold his hands over a flame. Moreover,

Beeler once touched Higley “in the breast and vagina area,”

and said, “It’s okay, Mom showed me this.”

Dr. Lenore Walker, a clinical and forensic psychologist,

provided some of the most disturbing testimony regarding

Jenkins. Dr. Walker testified that she and her associate, Lon

Kopit, another psychologist, spent 29.5 hours over the

course of fourteen sessions interviewing Beeler and

administering cognitive and personality tests. In addition to

the other abuse already described, Dr. Walker deemed

credible Beeler’s accounts of Jenkins smearing fecal matter

on his face as punishment for soiling himself and the sexual

abuse she inflicted when Beeler was between the ages of ten

and twelve. She would tie his penis back with a string and

make him wear dresses because she wanted him to look like

a girl. Later, she began inserting her soiled tampons into his

anus and forcing him to masturbate and orally copulate her.

She would also masturbate him and painfully squeeze his

testicles to prevent him from reaching an orgasm, or “take

the semen and smear it all over his face” as punishment. This

abuse progressed to vaginal intercourse during which Beeler

was not allowed to reach an orgasm.

In 1964, there was a juvenile proceeding due to the

reported abuse. Dr. Robbert Lippold, a former clinical

psychologist who had assessed Jenkins characterized her as

a “potentially explosive” and “character-disordered

individual who . . . was fully capable of operating in a very

bizarre and very disturbed manner,” including sexually.

BEELER V. BROOMFIELD 15

Jenkins admitted to Dr. Lippold that she had beat Beeler and

his brother but appeared to be “more concerned about being

caught than the action itself.” Even though “deprivation of

custody cases were relatively rare at that point in time,” Dr.

Lippold recommended to the court that “the children be

taken away from her.”

Beeler was removed from Jenkins’ home and thereafter

spent time in foster homes, mental hospitals, youth camps,

the military, and prison. Cleo Christensen’s family was one

of Beeler’s foster homes. Christensen testified that he

caught Beeler molesting his four-year-old son in a corn field.

At the caseworker’s direction, Christensen took Beeler back

to his stepmother, even though he was reluctant to do so

because he knew that Beeler previously had been “tied up to

a pole and beaten by her.” In 1966, Beeler was committed

to a mental hospital. Upon his release, Beeler temporarily

moved in with his mother, but she did not receive any refills

for his medication or other information regarding his mental

health issues. John Cahill, a camp counselor while Beeler

was incarcerated at Spring Mountain Youth Camp as a 15-

year-old, testified that Beeler was “a pitiful character” who

“tended to be easily manipulated and generally picked on.”

Another camp counselor, Marlin Robinson, said Beeler did

not engage in violent or aggressive behavior but would steal

“small inconsequential items.”

Dr. Noble testified to his examination of Beeler in 1971,

while he worked for the California Department of

Corrections. Dr. Noble opined that Jenkins was “extremely

vicious” to Beeler, priming him from an early age to view

his life as a cycle of misbehavior and punishment. He

believed that Beeler’s prior burglaries were “almost routine,

automatic kind of behaviors” and a subconscious cry for help

because “he had virtually no insight” into his “psychiatric

16 BEELER V. BROOMFIELD

problems.” Dr. Noble had recommended psychotherapy for

Beeler, but the prison only provided him with medication

used to treat manic depression.

According to Dr. Walker, Beeler’s past abuse caused him

to experience various forms of gender confusion and engage

in sexual misconduct and compulsive theft. Beeler also had

learning disorders, and suffered from feelings of guilt, a need

to be punished, and dissociative symptoms, which

manifested in him “often wak[ing] up in the middle of a

burglary” without “know[ing] how he got there or . . . what

he was doing.” She believed that his tendency to steal was

not motivated by greed, but by a compulsion he could not

control. In her opinion, Beeler exhibited “a very

inconsistent, unusual kind of diagnostic pattern” that was

consistent with—but went beyond—post-traumatic stress

and dissociative disorders. At times, “his mind [was] so

interfered with that . . . he would look like a schizophrenic”

or “profoundly emotionally disturbed,” but “there [we]re

other times when he d[id] not appear to be that way.”

Particularly during bouts of significant stress, Beeler would

become “psychotic” and “not know the difference

between . . . what is real and what is in his head.” Dr.

Walker noted that Beeler had consistently “plead[ed]” for

counseling and psychotherapy, but the institutional systems

had offered only medication, including the antipsychotic

medication Stelazine, and had not provided “the kind of help

that would have made a difference for him.”

Similarly, Dr. Stephen Wells, a clinical psychologist,

found that Jenkins’ prolonged and severe abuse “was almost

an impossible group of experiences [for Beeler] to recover

from.” Dr. Wells generally agreed with Dr. Walker

regarding Beeler’s severe emotional problems, including

“occasional psychotic episodes” and bouts of dissociation

BEELER V. BROOMFIELD 17

during which “he did things without being aware of what he

was doing.”

Dr. Walker, Dr. Noble, and Dr. Wells all testified that

Beeler had adjusted well to an institutionalized setting. For

instance, Beeler had volunteered to help the prison laundry

and chapel during an inmate strike. And Dr. Wells

determined that Beeler would not pose a danger to guards or

inmates if he were to serve a sentence of life without the

possibility of parole.

Beeler has two children, who were minors at the time of

the trial. Beeler’s wife, Kathleen Beeler, and his welding

instructor, Lee Saylor, both testified that Beeler was a loving

father to his two children and that he never abused them. Dr.

John Selden, another clinical psychologist, testified that he

had been treating Beeler and his five-year-old son for

behavioral issues around the time of the murder. Dr. Selden

learned that the family was under great stress due to medical

and financial problems and that Beeler was very concerned

about his family’s welfare and not repeating the abuse he

himself had suffered as a child. He also testified that

Beeler’s son seemed very attached to him.

3. Closing Arguments, Verdict, and Sentencing

On July 12, 1988, after deliberating for one full day and

brief portions of two others, the jury reached its death

verdict. At defense counsel’s request, the sentencing hearing

was continued to November 4. On November 4, defense

counsel successfully moved for a second continuance,

asserting, among other things, the need to investigate a

previously unreported head injury, which Beeler had only

recently realized was potentially significant.

18 BEELER V. BROOMFIELD

On December 16, the trial court held a hearing on

Beeler’s motion, brought pursuant to People v. Marsden,

465 P.2d 44, 49 (Cal. 1970) (in bank), seeking to discharge

and substitute counsel. At the hearing, Beeler stated that he

wanted to undergo an electroencephalogram (“EEG”) and a

computed axial tomography (“CAT”) scan, imploring, “I

feel there is something wrong.” Defense counsel explained

that, during the time granted by the previous continuance,

they had deemed such tests unnecessary after investigating

and consulting with two doctors about the possibility of

organic brain damage based on Beeler’s self-reported

blackouts from several years ago. But defense counsel stated

that Beeler “has today informed us, for the first time, that

these blackouts, such as the two or three that we were

previously aware of, continue and [occur] perhaps even on a

daily basis now.” Beeler said at the hearing that the new

blackouts, which he had not reported to the jail medical staff,

“last for a few minutes but I’m having them so often that

hours go by that I don’t even remember what’s going on.”

The trial court denied the Marsden motion but granted

counsel’s motion for a third continuance.

On January 27, 1989, the trial court again granted a

fourth continuance for counsel to “obtain[] . . . additional

expert information based on tests yet to be completed.” On

March 24, counsel obtained a fifth continuance to allow

psychiatrist Dr. Monte Buchsbaum time to complete

analysis and calculations on recent positron emission

topography (“PET”) scan results of Beeler’s brain, after

which a forensic neurologist would review Dr. Buchsbaum’s

findings and conclusions.

While the trial court had previously warned against

further delays, defense counsel requested a sixth continuance

at the next hearing on May 5. As support, defense counsel

BEELER V. BROOMFIELD 19

filed their own declaration, stating that preliminary

interpretations from the neurological testing indicated

“significant evidence of dysfunction in the right temporal

and bilateral frontal lobes of Mr. Beeler’s brain.” Counsel

explained that while this evidence was potentially relevant

to the guilt phase issue of intent and the penalty phase issue

of mitigation, there was no further information available

because “the people who gave the test . . . aren’t really

qualified to interpret the data,” and a qualified expert had

just agreed to conduct the analysis. The trial court denied

the continuance motion, expressing doubt that any expert

could provide new insights into Beeler’s mental status. The

trial court also emphasized that defense counsel “ha[d] done

a diligent effort in pursuing everything that [they saw] fit,”

and the failure to find a new expert was not due to delay or

incompetence.

At that same hearing, the trial court denied the defense’s

motion for a new trial based on insufficient evidence of

intent to kill and Beeler’s alleged organic brain damage. The

trial court further denied the defense motion to modify the

death verdict after reweighing the aggravating and

mitigating circumstances.

4. Post-Trial Proceedings

On automatic direct appeal, the California Supreme

Court affirmed Beeler’s conviction and sentence in a

reasoned opinion, issued on April 10, 1995. See Beeler, 9

Cal. 4th 953. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.

Beeler filed his first state habeas petition while his

appeal was pending. As relevant here, he claimed that trial

counsel was prejudicially ineffective for failing to present

evidence of his diagnoses of organic brain damage, possible

seizure disorder and multiple personality disorder in the guilt

20 BEELER V. BROOMFIELD

and penalty phases of his trial and for failing to provide

competent evidence of his organic brain damage before

sentencing. In November 1995, the California Supreme

Court denied the petition on the merits as well as some of the

claims on procedural grounds.

Beeler filed a second state habeas petition in 1997,

arguing that he had been incompetent to stand trial, the trial

court violated his rights by failing to sua sponte hold a

competency hearing, and trial counsel rendered prejudicially

ineffective assistance for failing to declare a doubt as to his

competency. Beeler also asked the California Supreme

Court to reconsider his prior ineffective assistance of counsel

claim. In 2004, the state court denied the petition on the

merits, except for Beeler’s claim that he was incompetent to

be executed, which it denied as premature. The court also

ruled that certain claims and/or subclaims were procedurally

barred, including Beeler’s claim that the trial court erred by

failing to conduct competency proceedings.

Beeler filed a first amended federal habeas petition on

February 11, 2005, and the district court granted the State’s

motion to dismiss an unexhausted claim. On September 9,

2009, Beeler filed an amended petition without the

unexhausted claim. On December 2, 2020, the district court

entered judgment denying the amended petition and issued a

certificate of appealability on claims K (incompetency

claim) and L (ineffective assistance of counsel at guilt and

penalty phases) of the amended petition. Beeler timely

appealed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we

review de novo a district court’s denial of habeas relief.

Avena v. Chappell, 932 F.3d 1237, 1247 (9th Cir. 2019).

BEELER V. BROOMFIELD 21

Because Beeler filed his federal habeas petition after April

24, 1996, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) applies. Murray v. Schriro, 745

F.3d 984, 996 (9th Cir. 2014). Under AEDPA, habeas relief

is barred unless the state court’s denial of the claim “was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1)–(2).

Review under § 2254(d) applies to the last reasoned state

court decision. Hibbler v. Benedetti, 693 F.3d 1140, 1146

(9th Cir. 2012). This court “confine[s its] § 2254(d)(1)

analysis to the state court’s actual decisions and analysis,”

as opposed to “some hypothetical alternative rationale.”

Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 738 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

However, where there is no reasoned state court decision

addressing a claim, we conduct the AEDPA analysis by

“consider[ing] what arguments or theories could have

supported the state court’s summary denial.” Montiel v.

Chappell, 43 F.4th 942, 958 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 96, 102 (2011)), cert.

denied, 143 S. Ct. 1785 (2023).

When determining whether the state court violated

§ 2254(d), we look to California’s procedures for handling

habeas petitions, which require the state court to issue an

order to show cause when the petitioner makes out a prima

facie case for relief on a claim. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563

U.S. 170, 188 n.12 (2011); People v. Duvall, 886 P.2d 1252,

1258 (Cal. 1995) (in bank). “If no prima facie case for relief

is stated, the court will summarily deny the petition.”

Duvall, 886 P.2d at 1258. The California Supreme Court

22 BEELER V. BROOMFIELD

finds a prima facie case for relief when, “‘assuming the

petition’s factual allegations are true, the petitioner would be

entitled to relief.’” In re Figueroa, 412 P.3d 356, 364 (Cal.

2018) (quoting Duvall, 886 P.2d at 1258); but see Pinholster,

563 U.S. at 188 n.12 (noting that “wholly conclusory

allegations” do not state a prima facie case for relief under

California law). As a result, while the California Supreme

Court’s summary denial in this context “is a decision on the

merits and thus entitled to AEDPA deference,” Ochoa v.

Davis, 50 F.4th 865, 888 (9th Cir. 2022), cert. denied sub

nom Ochoa v. Smith, 144 S. Ct. 381 (2023), such a denial

“necessarily assume[s] the truth of [the petitioner’s] factual

allegations,” Michaels v. Davis, 51 F.4th 904, 940 n.17 (9th

Cir. 2022).

We treat Beeler’s opening brief, which addresses two

uncertified issues, as an application to expand the certificate

of appealability, see Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(2) and Ninth Cir.

R. 22-1(e), and we grant the application as to both.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Competency Claim

Beeler raises three arguments concerning his

competency to stand trial: (1) the trial court procedurally

erred by not sua sponte holding a competency hearing; (2) he

was incompetent to stand trial; and (3) defense counsel was

ineffective in failing to raise his incompetency. Beeler also

argues that, because he established a prima facie case, the

California Supreme Court’s summary denial of relief

without issuing an order to show cause was unreasonable.

Applying the “highly deferential” AEDPA review, Clark v.

Arnold, 769 F.3d 711, 724 (9th Cir. 2014), we are compelled

to find that the California Supreme Court could have

reasonably concluded the evidence does not sufficiently

BEELER V. BROOMFIELD 23

support Beeler’s competency claims, see Montiel, 43 F.4th

at 958; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

1.

“[T]he criminal trial of an incompetent defendant

violates due process.” Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437,

453 (1992). Competency requires “the capacity to

understand the nature and object of the proceedings . . . , to

consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing [one’s]

defense.” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975).

“Competency disputes can give rise to two distinct claims—

substantive and procedural—that trigger different analyses

under the general heading of due process.” Lounsbury v.

Thompson, 374 F.3d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 2004).

As to procedural competency, the trial court must sua

sponte conduct a hearing to determine a defendant’s

competency if “the evidence before [it] raises a ‘bona fide

doubt’ as to a defendant’s competence.” Maxwell v. Roe,

606 F.3d 561, 568 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pate v. Robinson,

383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966)); see also People v. Rogers, 141

P.3d 135, 152 (Cal. 2006) (noting that California Penal Code

§ 1368 similarly provides that the trial court must “suspend

trial proceedings and conduct a competency hearing

whenever the court is presented with . . . evidence that raises

a reasonable or bona fide doubt concerning the defendant’s

competence”). A bona fide doubt exists when “a reasonable

judge, situated as was the trial court judge whose failure to

conduct an evidentiary hearing is being reviewed, should

have experienced doubt with respect to competency to stand

trial.” Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 860 (9th Cir. 2011)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Under this standard, the

trial court must have been presented with substantial

24 BEELER V. BROOMFIELD

evidence of incompetence. Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d

567, 604 (9th Cir. 2004).

While the court’s “responsibility [to conduct

competency assessment] continues throughout trial,”

Maxwell, 606 F.3d at 568, there is no “general standard with

respect to the nature or quantum of evidence necessary” to

trigger a hearing, Drope, 420 U.S. at 172. Instead, “the trial

judge must evaluate all the evidence and evaluate the

probative value of each piece of evidence in light of the

others.” Chavez v. United States, 656 F.2d 512, 518 (9th Cir.

1981). Relevant “evidence includes the defendant’s

demeanor before the trial judge, irrational behavior of the

defendant, and available medical evaluations of the

defendant’s competence to stand trial.” Williams, 384 F.3d

at 604 (citing Drope, 420 U.S. at 180). The evidence may

include the observations of trial counsel, Medina, 505 U.S.

at 450, but counsel’s opinion “certainly is not

determinative,” Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 718 (9th

Cir. 1991); see also Michaels, 51 F.4th at 943 (explaining

that, “[g]iven the generality and flexibility of the

competency inquiry,” state courts have even more leeway

under AEDPA in reaching a reasonable decision).

Beeler points to three categories of evidence to support

his claim. 3 He first points to significant trial testimony

recounting his childhood, institutionalizations, and mental

health issues, which included schizophrenia, manic

depression, and dissociation. He next points to post-verdict

3

Beeler never states when exactly the trial court should have ordered a

competency hearing. Nonetheless, “[t]he competency right does not end

at a conviction, but rather persists through sentencing,” United States v.

Dreyer, 705 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up), so the totality of

the circumstances will be considered.

BEELER V. BROOMFIELD 25

evidence of his self-reported blackouts and counsel’s

assertion that the uninterpreted raw testing data showed

“significant evidence of [neurological] dysfunction.” And

lastly, Beeler relies on juror declarations stating that, during

the trial, Beeler “seldom talked to his attorneys,” “did not

show any emotion,” “looked very strange,” and “just [sat]

like a lump.”

The evidence of Beeler’s mental health and blackouts

does not raise a bona fide doubt as to his competency

because none of it demonstrates “a causal connection

between the mental disease or defect and his inability to

understand the proceedings.” United States v. Neal, 776

F.3d 645, 656 (9th Cir. 2015); see also United States v.

Garza, 751 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Even a

mentally deranged defendant is out of luck if there is no

indication that he failed to understand or assist in his

criminal proceedings.”). Trial counsel and expert witnesses

never raised an argument regarding his competency to stand

trial but instead focused on connecting Beeler’s mental

health to the issues of his guilt and penalty. In fact, Dr.

Walker specifically testified that Beeler was aware of the

charges against him, understood the purpose of

psychological tests, and shared his views on his wife’s

potential as a witness. See Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628,

647 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting competency claim in part

because the expert “gave no indication that he thought

[petitioner] was not competent”).

Nor does Beeler allege that he displayed any irregular

behavior in or out of the courtroom. See Williams, 384 F.3d

at 605 (deeming it relevant that petitioner did not “evidence

any bizarre or irrational behavior”). He cites to juror

declarations that describe his passivity at the counsel table,

but such evidence on its own neither proves nor disproves

26 BEELER V. BROOMFIELD

competency. See, e.g., Odle v. Woodford, 238 F.3d 1084,

1088–89 (9th Cir. 2001). Moreover, the trial court had more

information as to Beeler’s capabilities than the jury. For

example, the trial court was informed that Beeler had

significantly participated in the preparation of a lengthy

mitigation document. And at sentencing, the trial court

observed Beeler coherently explain the reasons for his

Marsden motion. Because the evidence at trial was

insufficient to raise doubt as to his competency, we cannot

conclude that the California Supreme Court acted

unreasonably in denying this claim. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(2).

2.

Beeler next raises a substantive due process argument

based on his claim that he was incompetent to stand trial.

See Williams, 384 F.3d at 608. In comparison to procedural

competency, substantive competency involves both an easier

and a more difficult standard. It involves an easier standard

because, unlike procedural competency, review of

substantive competency is not limited to the “facts and

evidence that were” at “the state trial court before and during

trial.” Williams, 384 F.3d at 608. It involves a more difficult

standard, however, because the petitioner must show actual

incompetence at the time of trial. Id. In assessing actual

incompetence, the court “disfavor[s] retrospective

determinations of incompetence, and give[s] considerable

weight to the lack of contemporaneous evidence of a

petitioner’s incompetence to stand trial.” Id. Moreover,

while “not a trained mental health professional,” Odle, 238

F.3d at 1088–89, the fact that counsel did not move for a

competency hearing is “especially relevant,” Williams, 384

F.3d at 608; see Cal. Penal Code § 1368 (providing that

either counsel or the trial court may move for a competency

BEELER V. BROOMFIELD 27

hearing); Medina, 505 U.S. at 450 (noting that “defense

counsel will often have the best-informed view of the

defendant’s ability to participate in [the] defense”).

Because, as discussed above, the evidence during trial

was not enough to raise a bona fide doubt of competency,

Beeler’s success on the substantive competency claim

necessarily hinges on evidence that was not available to the

trial court. See Williams, 384 F.3d at 608. On appeal, Beeler

points to five pieces of additional evidence. First, in a

declaration filed alongside Beeler’s first state habeas

petition, Dr. Walker stated that she “advised Beeler’s

counsel that Beeler’s blackouts and mental condition may

have a neurological basis, and . . . that counsel [should]

retain a neurologist and neuropsychologist.” Second, Dr.

Wells also provided a declaration, in which he declared that

he had “recommended to [counsel] that Beeler undergo a

highly sophisticated mental health evaluation to alleviate”

his self-reported “auditory and visual hallucinations.” Third,

a declaration from Dr. Monte Buchsbaum—the doctor who

evaluated Beeler’s post-verdict EEG and PET scans—

confirmed counsel’s representation to the trial court that

Beeler’s scans showed brain abnormalities consistent with

head injury. Dr. Buchsbaum declared that Beeler’s results

were “among the most abnormal” he had seen and were

“similar to those often found in people diagnosed as

schizophrenics.” Fourth, jail records showed that before and

during trial, Beeler was on suicide watch, reported hearing

voices, suffered head injuries, pulled out his toenails, was

prescribed antidepressant and antipsychotic medications,

and experienced chest pains. Fifth, declarations from three

fellow inmates stated that Beeler appeared to be mentally

impaired, “understood very little of what went on at his

trial,” “would not have been able to assist his attorneys,”

28 BEELER V. BROOMFIELD

“did not seem to understand the difference between his

lawyers and people who were potentially hostile to his

defense,” and “had memory lapses that covered long periods

of time.”

As with the procedural incompetency claim, the new

evidence of declarations from the medical professionals and

the jail records do not causally connect Beeler’s mental

health problems with his competency to stand trial. See

Neal, 776 F.3d at 656; Garza, 751 F.3d at 1136. For

instance, the jail records reflect that Beeler attributed his

self-harm that resulted in his placement on suicide watch “to

racial unrest on his floor and fear for his physical safety.”

See also Dennis ex rel. Butko v. Budge, 378 F.3d 880, 892

(9th Cir. 2004) (“[E]vidence of suicidal ideation or attempts

to commit suicide in the past is insufficient to demonstrate

incompetency.”). Medical reports from the jail reflected that

Beeler pulled out his toenails as a result of his stress about

going to court and as a means of manipulation. Further, the

reports noted that the antidepressant medications had helped

with his behavior and mood. As a result, instead of being

indicative of an inability to understand the proceedings or

participate in his defense, the mental health issues

experienced by Beeler in jail appear to have been the product

of situational stress or malingering, and his symptoms had

been effectively treated. See, e.g., United States v. Telles, 18

F.4th 290, 300–01 (9th Cir. 2021) (explaining that

malingering “behavior does nothing to demonstrate [a

defendant’s] inability to understand the proceedings or assist

in his defense”). And while the medical professional

declarations comment on the severity of Beeler’s mental

health issues, none of the declarations assert that his

struggles interfered with his competency to stand trial.

BEELER V. BROOMFIELD 29

The declarations from Beeler’s fellow inmates provide a

stronger causal connection between Beeler’s mental health

and his competency, but they do not render the California

Supreme Court’s denial of this issue unreasonable under

AEDPA because they are merely conclusory lay opinions of

Beeler’s alleged incompetence. See Alpha & Omega Dev.,

LP v. Whillock Contracting, Inc., 200 Cal. App. 4th 656, 664

(2011) (noting that “speculative” or “conclusory”

declarations are insufficient to make a prima facie case under

California law). The inmates were not medical

professionals, did not attend any of Beeler’s courtroom

proceedings, and did not participate in any discussions

between Beeler and counsel. Further, the declarations are

refuted by Dr. Walker’s testimony about Beeler’s

competence, Beeler’s active participation in the case before

the trial court, the absence of comment by any of the medical

experts, and the lack of concern by both the trial court and

defense counsel as to his competency. See Medina, 505 U.S.

at 450; Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005)

(“[T]he most telling evidence that [petitioner] was

competent at trial is that neither defense counsel—who

would have had every incentive to point out that his client

was incapable of assisting with his defense—nor the trial

court even hinted that [he] was incompetent.”). Under

deferential AEDPA review, we affirm the district court’s

denial of habeas relief on this claim.

3.

For counsel to be found ineffective for failing to raise a

competency issue, there must have been “sufficient indicia

of incompetence to give objectively reasonable counsel

reason to doubt the defendant’s competency, and . . . a

reasonable probability that the defendant would have been

found incompetent to stand trial had the issue been raised

30 BEELER V. BROOMFIELD

and fully considered.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at 862 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Similar to substantive

competency, “additional evidence submitted . . . [in a] state

habeas petition is cognizable as to [an ineffective assistance

of counsel] competency claim.” Michaels, 51 F.4th at 943.

Beeler’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim relies on

the same evidence presented to support the procedural and

substantive competency claims. As a result, his ineffective

assistance of counsel claim fails for the same reasons. Davis,

384 F.3d at 647 (“In light of our evaluation of the substantive

competence claim, [petitioner’s] claim that his trial attorneys

rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to move

for a competency hearing in the trial court also fails.”); see

also Stanley, 633 F.3d at 862–63 (holding that an ineffective

assistance competency claim lacked merit where both the

trial and post-conviction experts failed to conclude that

petitioner was incompetent).

4.

Because the California Supreme Court could have

reasonably concluded that Beeler’s evidence of substantive

and procedural incompetency did not establish a prima facie

case, Beeler’s claim that there should have been an

evidentiary hearing on his competency claim also lacks

merit. See Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 188 n.12; Michaels, 51

F.4th at 940 n.17. His claim that the district court was

required to conduct a hearing fails for the same reason. See

Murray v. Schriro, 882 F.3d 778, 802 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[S]o

long as we are reviewing a petitioner’s claim under AEDPA,

our review is limited to the facts before the state court and

the petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing in

federal court.”).

BEELER V. BROOMFIELD 31

B. Guilt and Penalty Phases Ineffective Assistance of

Counsel Claims

Beeler argues that his counsel provided ineffective

assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668 (1984), by failing to investigate and present

evidence regarding his “mental illness and [organic brain

damage]” at both the guilt and penalty phases.

To succeed on this claim, the “defendant must show that

counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness” and prejudiced him, “considering all the

circumstances.” Id. at 687–88. Under this standard,

“[c]ounsel in a death-penalty case has ‘a duty to make

reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision

that makes particular investigations unnecessary.’” Andrus

v. Texas, 590 U.S. 806, 814 (2020) (per curiam) (quoting

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003)). “[T]he

defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the

circumstances, the challenged action might be considered

sound trial strategy.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Our examination of defense

counsel’s performance “must be highly deferential,”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, and, when conducted through

AEDPA’s lens, our review of counsel performance is

“doubly deferential,” Hardy v. Chappell, 849 F.3d 803, 825

n.10 (9th Cir. 2016).

To show that the deficient performance was prejudicial,

the defendant must establish that the alleged errors “actually

had an adverse effect on the defense,” meaning that “but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693–94.

“Establishing prejudice in the death sentence context

requires a showing that ‘there is a reasonable probability

32 BEELER V. BROOMFIELD

that, absent the errors, the sentencer would have concluded

that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances

did not warrant death.’” Bible v. Ryan, 571 F.3d 860, 870

(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695)

(cleaned up). We do not apply “double deference” in the

prejudice analysis. Hardy, 849 F.3d at 825 n.10.

Again, we conclude that the district court, under AEDPA

review, correctly denied Beeler’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claim.

1.

Counsel consulted with five psychologists before trial,

and two of those psychologists, Drs. Wells and Walker,

recommended that Beeler also be evaluated by a neurologist.

Dr. Walker declared that defense counsel had “represented

to [her] that they had already petitioned the court for funds

for the appointment of a neurologist, but their request was

denied.” On appeal, Beeler asserts that defense counsel had

lied to Dr. Walker, but he provides no explanation or

evidentiary support.

As discussed above, after receiving a death verdict,

Beeler pressed defense counsel for neurological testing

based on his newly reported head injury and frequency of

blackouts. In response, counsel arranged for Dr. Arnold

Starr, a neurologist, to interview Beeler. Dr. Starr reported

that Beeler’s “mental status would be in keeping with

someone who was mentally slow with an IQ estimated to be

75 or 80.” Dr. Starr also suggested a possible diagnosis of

schizophrenia based on Beeler’s history of trauma,

institutionalizations, and self-reported auditory

hallucinations. Accordingly, Dr. Starr recommended

neurological testing, including a PET scan. Defense counsel

had a PET scan conducted and hired Dr. Buchsbaum to

BEELER V. BROOMFIELD 33

review the scan. Dr. Buschbaum determined that Beeler’s

PET scan indicated “brain damage or dysfunction.” But the

trial court denied the defense motion for an additional

continuance to have a qualified neurologist review the scan.

About four years later, in connection with Beeler’s first

state habeas petition, he was evaluated by Dr. Jonathan

Pincus, a neurologist, and Dr. Stephen Marmer, a

psychiatrist. Dr. Pincus’s report states that, after reviewing

Beeler’s medical and social history, as well as examining

him, Dr. Pincus was “convinced that Mr. Beeler has brain

damage.” He opined that Beeler’s reported blackouts “could

be dissociative episodes or seizures,” and recommended an

8-hour EEG in order to confirm a possible “diagnosis of

epilepsy.” Dr. Marmer also focused on Beeler’s blackouts,

concluding that Beeler suffers from multiple personality

disorder, a type of dissociative disorder. He believed that

“Beeler’s host personality does not have control over the

conduct of his alternate personalities and generally suffers

from a blackout while alternate personalities are present.”

As a result, Dr. Marmer opined that it was highly probable

that “Beeler’s host personality was not . . . co-conscious at

the time of the death of [Tony] Stevenson” or “the rape of

Mrs. Doyle, if Beeler was present at all.”

2.

Beeler first claims that defense counsel should have used

penalty phase mitigation and extra-record evidence of his

mental illness and brain damage at the guilt phase to show

that he did not form the specific intent to kill. He argues that

had defense counsel presented evidence showing that he

lacked “the capacity to think clearly enough, in the panic of

the moment, to form the specific intent to kill,” the jury

34 BEELER V. BROOMFIELD

would not have found true the burglary murder special

circumstance.

But even assuming defense counsel performed

deficiently in its investigation and presentation of evidence,

Beeler was not prejudiced by counsel’s decisions. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (“If it is easier to dispose of an

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient

prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course

should be followed.”).

To the extent Beeler is arguing that his counsel should

have presented a defense of diminished capacity, his

argument fails because at the time of his trial, that defense

was not allowed by California law. Noguera v. Davis, 5

F.4th 1020, 1048 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[B]ecause [the] murder

took place after June 1982, a diminished capacity defense

was unavailable to [petitioner] under California law.”). As

a result, defense counsel could have only used the mental

health evidence to argue that Beeler did not form the specific

intent to kill. Cal. Penal Code § 28 (“Evidence of mental

disease, mental defect, or mental disorder is admissible

solely on the issue of whether or not the accused actually

formed a required specific intent . . . .”). Neither Beeler’s

trial experts nor post-trial experts, however, opined that his

mental health issues prevented him from forming the intent

to kill. These experts gave opinions only about compulsion,

dissociation, epilepsy, and multiple personality disorder. As

a result, without a nexus between Beeler’s conditions and his

specific intent, any mental health evidence would have been

inadmissible at the guilt phase.

Moreover, the crime scene evidence strongly disputes a

finding of lack of specific intent. Beeler’s mental incapacity

argument relies on the premise that the circumstances of the

BEELER V. BROOMFIELD 35

crime—even without consideration of his mental health

evidence—showed a lack of intent. While the defense

theorized that Tony had been shot during a struggle inside

the house, significant evidence established that Beeler shot

Tony in the back as Tony fled from the house. James v.

Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that conclusory

allegations that fail to explain how counsel could have

rebutted overwhelming evidence of guilt are insufficient to

warrant relief under Strickland). And defense counsel had

in fact argued during trial that the killing was unintentional

and done in the heat of the struggle. The jury chose the

prosecution’s view that the killing was intentional.

The penalty phase mental health evidence likely would

not have changed the jury’s determination, as it could have

been easily rebutted. See Andrews v. Davis, 944 F.3d 1092,

1108–09 (9th Cir. 2019). Any evidence suggesting that

Beeler had no memory of the killing due to a blackout or

dissociation would have been contradicted by his post-crime

activities, including his discussion of the crime with

coworkers and efforts to create an alibi. Evidence of

dissociation also could have opened the door to additional

rebuttal, such as Beeler’s bragging about his rape of Doyle

despite a similar claim of having suffered a blackout during

that crime. See Bolin v. Davis, 13 F.4th 797, 821 (9th Cir.

2021) (noting that, under California law, expert mental

health testimony could have opened door to rebuttal

evidence).

Similarly, the additional neurological evidence collected

after trial could have been rebutted. Expert testimony

suggesting that Beeler was suffering from a seizure or

multiple personality disorder at the time of the crime would

have been rebutted by his deliberate shooting of Tony, his

furtive post-crime conduct, as well as the fact that Dr.

36 BEELER V. BROOMFIELD

Walker never diagnosed Beeler as suffering from multiple

personality disorder. See id. at 816 (holding that “a

reasonable jurist could conclude that [petitioner’s]

neurological deficits theory [wa]s of uncertain relevance to

the offenses” and “unpersuasive” because it did not explain

petitioner’s “deliberate shooting of three people and his

strategic thinking after the murders”); Williams, 384 F.3d at

617 (holding that counsel reasonably could have determined

that “a defense of diminished mental capacity was not

feasible” in part because “[t]he facts of the crimes reflected

deliberate and methodical action”).

Beeler points to juror declarations discussing what effect

learning about Beeler’s brain damage would have had on

their assessment of his crimes and his failure to testify, but

that evidence is barred by the no-impeachment rule. See

Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)(1) (prohibiting, subject to exceptions

not applicable here, “a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a

juror’s statement” regarding “the effect of anything on that

juror’s or another juror’s vote[] or any juror’s mental

processes concerning the verdict”); see also Cal. Evid. Code

§ 1150(a) (“No evidence is admissible to show the effect of

[a] statement, conduct, condition, or event upon a juror either

in influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or

concerning the mental processes by which it was

determined.”). Further, the juror declarations merely state

that the jurors thought the evidence of brain damage “would

have explained more . . . about Mr. Beeler’s actions” or

“why [Beeler’s] judgment was so impaired.” These are

vague statements that do not affirmatively say that the

evidence would have changed their verdict.

While Beeler was clearly not prejudiced, the California

Supreme Court could have also determined that trial counsel

acted reasonably and diligently during the guilt stage. For

BEELER V. BROOMFIELD 37

instance, trial counsel presented various defense theories,

such as that another person shot Tony, which “indicate[d]

active and capable advocacy.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 111.

And trial counsel’s decision not to pursue a defense

based on Beeler’s alleged inability to form intent was not

because defense counsel failed to investigate. Beeler argues

that “numerous red flags” should have alerted counsel to the

fact that he had brain damage, such as the abuse he suffered

as a child, his impaired motor skills, his repeated

institutionalizations, evidence of a head injury, signs of

depression and memory lapses, and more. But the record

shows that trial counsel heeded these “red flags,” hiring

numerous medical professionals to evaluate Beeler both

before and after trial. Beeler does not provide any support

for his assertion that defense counsel lied about

unsuccessfully filing a pre-trial request for funds to hire a

neurologist. In fact, the evidence shows that counsel

diligently attempted to pursue the issue when Beeler

volunteered new information before sentencing. But as

discussed above, this evidence would not have been helpful

to Beeler at the guilt phase, so counsel’s decision not to

present it does not show deficient performance.

Accordingly, we affirm the denial of habeas relief as to

Beeler’s claim of a Strickland violation at the guilt phase.

3.

Beeler also claims that the neurological evidence not

presented at the penalty phase would have constituted

additional mitigation, and there is a reasonable probability

that one juror would have made a different decision based on

38 BEELER V. BROOMFIELD

that evidence. 4 Just as with Beeler’s claim of guilt-phase

ineffective assistance of counsel, the California Supreme

Court could have reasonably determined that defense

counsel’s performance was not deficient, as counsel

diligently sought neurological testing both before trial and

after Beeler volunteered new information. See Demetrulias

v. Davis, 14 F.4th 898, 915 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Because we

conclude that [counsel’s] performance was not deficient, we

need not address whether [the petitioner] was prejudiced by

any deficiency.”).

The California Supreme Court could have also

reasonably determined that even if counsel had lacked

diligence, counsel’s failures did not prejudice Beeler. The

additional neurological testing would have done little to

explain or excuse Tony’s killing. Dr. Starr, the neurologist

who interviewed Beeler prior to sentencing, stated that

testing was needed to offer an affirmative diagnosis

regarding organic brain damage. Dr. Buchsbaum, who

determined that Beeler’s PET scan “indicated . . . brain

damage or dysfunction,” was a psychiatrist and did not offer

a neurological diagnosis. Dr. Pincus, who evaluated Beeler

4

As an initial matter, the parties dispute which California Supreme Court

ruling we should review for this claim. Beeler asserts that this court

should “look through” that California Supreme Court’s 2004 summary

denial and review the reasoning of the California Supreme Court’s direct

appeal opinion while still taking into account “the additional supporting

evidence” presented on state habeas. See Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122,

125 (2018) (holding that a federal habeas court should “look through” an

unexplained state court decision and apply AEDPA deference to “the last

related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale”). But

“the operative decision is the California Supreme Court’s summary

denial because its decision on direct review did not address [Beeler’s]

more fully developed claim . . . .” Cain v. Chappell, 870 F.3d 1003,

1018 n.5 (9th Cir. 2017).

BEELER V. BROOMFIELD 39

for his state habeas petitions, concluded that Beeler has

organic brain damage, but he also qualified its impact on

Beeler and recommended additional testing to confirm a

possible diagnosis of epilepsy. See Runningeagle v. Ryan,

825 F.3d 970, 987–88 (9th Cir. 2016) (concluding that

mental health reports were “not of material mitigating

weight” because the experts “used qualifying language” and

“gave no affirmative diagnosis”).

Dr. Marmer’s diagnosis of multiple personality disorder

could have also been refuted by Dr. Walker’s assessment and

findings that Beeler understood the nature of his actions.

The jury likely would have accorded little weight to this

speculative and indefinite evidence. Apelt v. Ryan, 878 F.3d

800, 834 (9th Cir. 2017) (determining that an ineffective

assistance mitigation claim failed for lack of prejudice in

part because “none of the proffered mitigating evidence

excuse[d] [the petitioner’s] callousness” or “reduce[d] [his]

responsibility for planning and carrying out the murder”).

More importantly, defense counsel presented an

extensive mitigation case. Through the testimony of

nineteen lay and expert witnesses, defense counsel offered

classic and substantial mitigation evidence regarding

Beeler’s severe childhood abuse, mental health issues,

positive character, and institutional adjustment. See Avena,

932 F.3d at 1249 (“[T]estimony by character witnesses and

the presentation of a defendant’s social history and

background play a fundamental role in securing confidence

in the outcome of the penalty phase.”); Bonin v. Calderon,

59 F.3d 815, 834 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding it was

reasonable for counsel to rely on an “institutional

adjustment” theory for mitigation without also presenting

brain dysfunction or psychiatric testimony); cf. Summerlin v.

Schriro, 427 F.3d 623, 635 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (noting

40 BEELER V. BROOMFIELD

that counsel failed to present “available classic mitigation

evidence concerning family history, abuse, … and mental

disorders”). And contrary to Beeler’s assertion, trial counsel

provided extensive evidence of his social history. Given the

relative weakness of the unpresented evidence, combined

with counsel’s extensive mitigation presentation, the

neurological evidence likely would not have affected the

jury’s balancing of the aggravating and mitigating

circumstances.

As a result, Beeler failed to establish a prima facie case

as to the ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty

phase, and the California Supreme Court’s summary denial

of this claim was reasonable.

4.

Finally, as with the competency claim, Beeler asserts that

he established a prima facie case, so the California Supreme

Court’s summary denial of his ineffective assistance claims

was unreasonable. As discussed, Beeler’s ineffective

assistance claims lack merit, so the California Supreme

Court reasonably denied relief, and no federal hearing was

required under AEDPA. See Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 188

n.12; Michaels, 51 F.4th at 940 n.17; Murray, 882 F.3d at

802. We therefore affirm the denial of habeas relief as to all

of Beeler’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

C. Coercion of Death Verdict Claim

Beeler alleges that the trial court coerced the jury’s death

verdict by failing to replace a juror, Michael C., with an

alternate after Michael C. informed the court of his father’s

sudden death. According to Beeler, the trial court placed the

jury in the “suddenly intensified” position of either reaching

a verdict during a truncated morning deliberation session, or

BEELER V. BROOMFIELD 41

“fac[ing] . . . the prospect of their service being extended”

until Michael C. returned from his father’s funeral the

following week. Applying AEDPA review, we find that the

California Supreme Court neither erroneously applied

federal law nor made an unreasonable determination.

1.

Before the start of the third day of jury deliberations on

Tuesday, July 12, 1988, Michael C. called the court clerk to

explain that his father had suddenly died and he had

scheduled a flight for 2 p.m. that afternoon. The attorneys

were informed of the dilemma but were delayed at another

courthouse, so at 10:00 a.m., the court met with Michael C.

ex parte to discuss the issue. The court instructed Michael

C. to continue deliberations, which would be recessed

“sometime before noon” in order to allow him to leave for

the airport. The court also instructed Michael C. that

deliberations would resume on the following Monday, July

18, when he was scheduled to return from his father’s

funeral. Michael C. then returned to the jury room to

deliberate, and the trial court did not pass along any further

instructions or information to the rest of the jury.

The attorneys arrived shortly thereafter. Outside the

presence of the jury, the court relayed its decision, to which

counsel then objected and requested that Michael C. be

replaced with an alternate. Defense counsel argued that “the

jury may feel some sense of urgency in reaching a verdict

today” because “if they have to come back next week that’s

going to put them beyond” the court’s earlier estimate that

the case would not extend past the middle of July. Counsel

also expressed concern that the court had failed to inquire

into Michael C.’s emotional state or admonish him and the

42 BEELER V. BROOMFIELD

other jurors to refrain from quickly reaching a verdict in

order to avoid returning the following week.

In declining to appoint an alternate, the trial court

explained that keeping Michael C. on the jury would result

in only a two-day delay in deliberations in light of Beeler

having a medical appointment that afternoon and Friday

being an off-day. The court also stated that it would

reconvene the jury at 11:00 a.m. The jury, however, reached

its death verdict before 11:00 a.m.

Prior to reading the verdict, with counsel and the jury

present, the trial court inquired of the jury foreman whether

the jurors felt pressure to reach a decision due to Michael

C.’s situation. The jury foreman responded negatively. The

trial court further probed, “if any juror now feels that they

need additional time to discuss the case or reconsider the

verdict because of the pressure of time, I’ll hear from any

juror.” After receiving no response, the trial court then

requested that any juror who had such a feeling to “please

raise your hand.” None of the jurors raised a hand. The trial

court continued to press, asking whether the fact that

Michael C. was going to be excused and there was a

probability that deliberations would not resume until the

following Monday had anything to do with the verdict the

jury reached. The jury foreman again answered, “no.” The

trial court asked the jurors whether anyone felt “differently

than that, that there might be some impropriety in the verdict

because of the press of time? If so, please raise your hand.”

Again, no juror raised a hand or voiced any disagreement.

The trial court then proceeded with reading the jury’s death

verdict. After the verdict was read, the trial court inquired

whether this was the jury’s verdict which, in unison, the jury

affirmed. The court then individually polled each member

BEELER V. BROOMFIELD 43

of the jury, and each answered affirmatively that the verdict

read was his or her verdict.

On direct appeal, Beeler claimed that Michael C.’s

presence on the jury resulted in a coerced penalty-phase

verdict. The California Supreme Court rejected this

contention, holding that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Beeler’s request to excuse the juror.

Beeler again raised the issue as part of his second state

habeas petition, which he supplemented with declarations

from jury members. For instance, juror Catherine A.

declared that

On the last day of our deliberations, a juror

came in and told the rest of us that his father

had passed away and that he had to leave that

afternoon for the funeral. He stated that we

should get this done and urged us to reach a

verdict that day because if we did not, we

would have to introduce an alternate to our

deliberations and everything would get more

complicated.

And Harold W. stated that after four days of deliberations,

I did not want to hold everything up if I could

not convince others of my positions. . . . I

told my fellow jurors that I just did not feel it

was right to give Mr. Beeler the death

penalty. But everyone knew I was the one

holding up the verdict, and given the

44 BEELER V. BROOMFIELD

situation, I did not feel like I could take any

more of the jurors’ time.

Lois L. recalled that the penalty deliberations had been

going on for days without any consensus. But on the

morning her fellow juror had a death in the family, the jurors

came to a unanimous decision on the first vote. Similarly,

Walter P. said that the verdict and sentence were just but also

recalled that the jury reached a verdict quickly after learning

that a juror needed to leave to attend a funeral.

2.

As a threshold issue, the parties dispute whether AEDPA

deference or de novo review applies to this issue. Beeler

asserts the last reasoned decision is the California Supreme

Court’s majority opinion on direct appeal, as the denial on

state habeas merely stated that his claim failed procedurally

and on the merits. Kipp v. Davis, 971 F.3d 939, 948 (9th Cir.

2020) (“When the state’s highest court does not provide

reasoning for its decision, a federal habeas court may ‘look

through the unexplained decision to the last related state-

court decision that does provide a relevant rationale’ and

‘presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same

reasoning.’” (quoting Wilson, 584 U.S. at 125)). Because

the majority opinion on direct appeal failed to address the

federal aspect of his claim, Beeler argues that de novo

review applies. See Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167

(9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen it is clear that a state court has not

reached the merits of a properly raised issue, we must review

it de novo.”).

The State disagrees on two points. First, the State argues

that the look through doctrine is inapplicable because the

California Supreme Court clearly denied the claim on

BEELER V. BROOMFIELD 45

different grounds on state habeas than it did on direct appeal.

See Kernan v. Hinojosa, 578 U.S. 412, 415 (2016) (“It quite

obviously rested upon some different ground. [The] ‘look-

through’ approach is therefore inapplicable.”). Second, even

looking through to the opinion on direct appeal, the

California Supreme Court’s majority necessarily rejected the

federal aspect of the claim, so AEDPA deference is

appropriate. 5

The State is correct that Beeler’s jury coercion claim was

denied on the merits on state habeas, and “AEDPA deference

‘applies even where there has been a summary denial.’”

Ochoa, 50 F.4th at 888 (quoting Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 187).

As a result, even if we “look through” to the majority opinion

5

The State contends the claim is procedurally barred due to the

California Supreme Court’s alternative untimeliness determination. The

California Supreme Court did not explain why it found this claim

untimely. If the claim was not altered, the state’s time-bar ruling does

not constitute a procedural bar or affect the proper exhaustion of the

claim on direct appeal. See Koerner v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039, 1053 (9th

Cir. 2003) (“A claim cannot be both previously litigated and

procedurally defaulted; either it was raised in a prior proceeding or it was

not.”). It is therefore likely that the California Supreme Court deemed

Beeler’s addition of the juror declarations to have altered the claim such

that the procedural bar applies.

We have not resolved the question of whether the addition of evidence

changes a claim. See Reno v. Davis, 46 F.4th 821, 831 n.4 (9th Cir.

2022), cert. denied sub nom. Reno v. Broomfield, 144 S. Ct. 119 (2023)

(stating that where the state contended that new evidence changed the

claim, this court did “not resolve this question” because it found that the

claim did not survive AEDPA review on the merits). We need not

resolve it here because, regardless, the claim does not survive review on

the merits even with the additional evidence. See Apelt, 878 F.3d at 825

(“[W]hen a state court ‘double-barrels’ its decision—holding that a claim

was procedurally barred and denying the claim on its merits—both its

procedural default ruling and its merits ruling are entitled to deferential

review by federal courts, as intended by AEDPA.”).

46 BEELER V. BROOMFIELD

on direct appeal to fill in the summary denial on habeas, we

must apply deference to the underlying reasoning. Wilson,

584 U.S. at 125 (explaining that a federal habeas court

should “look through” an unexplained state court decision

and apply AEDPA deference to “the last related state-court

decision that does provide a relevant rationale”).

Moreover, Beeler’s argument that we should “look

through” to the majority opinion on direct appeal is

incompatible with Beeler’s claim that the California

Supreme Court has failed to address his constitutional claim

entirely. While the look-through doctrine instructs that we

should rely on the reasoning provided in an earlier ruling to

fill the gaps of an unreasoned opinion, Kipp, 971 F.3d at 948,

Beeler asks that we look through the summary denial on state

habeas to conclude that the preceding opinion on direct

appeal had no reasoning. Beeler cites no legal support for

such a maneuver. Absent such showing, we apply the

traditional analysis called for by AEDPA, “consider[ing]

what arguments or theories could have supported the state

court’s summary denial.” Montiel, 43 F.4th at 958 (citing

Richter, 562 U.S. at 96, 102).

Even if we were to “look through” to the majority

opinion on direct appeal, that opinion does not establish that

the California Supreme Court failed to address the federal

claim. “[W]hen a federal claim has been presented to a state

court and the state court has denied relief, it may be

presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the

merits in the absence of any indication or state-law

procedural principles to the contrary.” Johnson v. Williams,

568 U.S. 289, 298 (2013) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 99).

The presumption, often referred to as the “Richter

presumption,” is “strong but rebuttable.” Id. at 301. “We

adhere to this ‘strong’ presumption because ‘it is not the

BEELER V. BROOMFIELD 47

uniform practice of busy state courts to discuss separately

every single claim to which a defendant makes even a

passing reference.’” Sherman v. Gittere, 92 F.4th 868, 875–

76 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Johnson, 568 U.S. at 298). As a

result, federal habeas law “does not require a state court to

give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been

‘adjudicated on the merits.’” Johnson, 568 U.S. at 298

(quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 100).

To be sure, this presumption can “rebutted” in “limited”

or “unusual circumstances.” Id. at 301–02. “Thus, for

example, the presumption doesn’t hold if the federal claim

was ‘rejected as a result of sheer inadvertence.’” Sherman,

92 F.4th at 876 (quoting Johnson, 568 U.S. at 302–03). But

“‘the evidence’ must ‘very clearly’ lead to ‘the conclusion

that a federal claim was inadvertently overlooked in state

court.’” Id. (quoting Johnson, 568 U.S. at 303).

Beeler points to Justice Kennard’s dissent as proof that

the majority failed to consider the federal law. Justice

Kennard criticized the majority for “analyz[ing] the trial

court’s conduct . . . solely in terms of [California] Penal

Code section 1089 . . . . More fundamental constitutional

rights, however, are also implicated by the trial court’s

course of action.” Beeler, 9 Cal. 4th at 1012. While Justice

Kennard is correct that the majority opinion focused on

Penal Code § 1089, see id. at 989, that does not necessarily

lead to the conclusion that the federal claim was overlooked.

The California Supreme Court may have simply regarded the

claim as “too insubstantial to merit discussion.” See

Johnson, 568 U.S. at 299. Indeed, it may very well be that

the dissent’s criticism merely shows that the majority

decided against writing on the federal claim in its opinion,

not that the majority overlooked the issue.

48 BEELER V. BROOMFIELD

Moreover, we cannot say the California Supreme Court

“inadvertently overlooked” the issue when Justice

Kennard’s dissent, as Beeler himself recognizes, brought it

to the attention of the California Supreme Court. 6 And for

us to conclude that a line in a dissent speaks for the majority

is not only unprecedented, but in the habeas context, upends

the AEDPA deference we owe the majority opinion. We

therefore conclude that the California Supreme Court

addressed Beeler’s Sixth Amendment jury coercion claim on

the merits and apply AEDPA deference.

3.

“Any criminal defendant, and especially any capital

defendant, being tried by a jury is entitled to the uncoerced

verdict of that body.” Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231,

241 (1988). Whether “the trial court’s actions and inactions

were noncoercive” should be assessed “individually and

cumulatively.” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 9 (2002).

Beeler points to several cases, but none shows that the

California Supreme Court unreasonably applied clearly

established federal law. Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120,

126 (2008) (“Because our cases give no clear answer to the

question presented, let alone one in [the defendant]’s favor,

‘it cannot be said that the state court unreasonably applied

clearly established Federal law.’” (cleaned up) (quoting

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006))). Beeler cites

Shields v. United States, 273 U.S. 583, 587 (1927) to argue

that there is coercion if the trial court’s direction to the jury

6

In fact, it is likely that the issue was deliberated by the Justices. See

generally Justice Goodwin Liu, How the California Supreme Court

Actually Works: A Reply to Professor Bussel, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 1246,

1255 (2014) (detailing the California Supreme Court’s unique and

intensive “deliberative process” of issuing opinions).

BEELER V. BROOMFIELD 49

caused the jury to render a verdict “which they were plainly

reluctant to return.” But Shields concerned a district court’s

ex parte instruction to a deadlocked jury to continue

deliberating, which violated the defendant’s right “to be

present from the time the jury is impaneled until its discharge

after rendering the verdict.” 273 U.S. at 584–85, 588–89. It

did not concern a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an

uncoerced jury.

Beeler also cites to Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S.

445 (1965) (per curiam) and United States v. United States

Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978), but they are factually

distinct. In Jenkins, the Supreme Court held that the district

court coerced the deadlocked jury’s verdict by demanding

that, “You have got to reach a decision in this case” after

they had been deliberating for only two hours. 380 U.S. at

446. And in Gypsum Co., the jury foreman had an ex parte

discussion with the judge about the deteriorating health of

the jurors and the jury’s deadlock, and the trial court’s stern

response gave the foreman the impression that there must be

a verdict “one way or the other.” 438 U.S. at 432. In

contrast, the jury here never indicated that it was deadlocked,

there was no supplemental instruction requiring the jury to

reach a verdict, and the trial court did not indicate the jury

was taking too long. To the contrary, the trial court

repeatedly confirmed that the verdict was reached

unanimously and voluntarily and was not rushed.

Additionally, because neither Shields, Jenkins, nor

Gypsum Co. were decided on constitutional grounds, Beeler

cannot rely on them under AEDPA. See Rushen v. Spain,

464 U.S. 114, 119 n.4 (1983) (explaining that Shields was

decided on non-constitutionally based rules of orderly trial

procedure); Early, 537 U.S. at 10 (“Neither Jenkins nor

Gypsum Co. is relevant to the § 2254(d)(1) determination,

50 BEELER V. BROOMFIELD

since neither case sets forth a rule applicable to state-court

proceedings. . . . [N]either opinion purported to interpret any

provision of the Constitution. That alone would be enough

to defeat a claim that their application to state-court

proceedings is ‘clearly established.’”). We thus affirm the

district court’s denial of Beeler’s jury coercion claim. 7

D. California’s Death Eligibility Process

Beeler’s last uncertified claim argues that California fails

to adequately narrow the pool of defendants eligible for the

death penalty under the 1978 statute. This argument is

foreclosed. See Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117, 1141 n.11

(9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting “argument that [California’s

sentencing] scheme does not adequately narrow the class of

persons eligible for the death penalty”); Mayfield v.

Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 2001) (denying a

certificate of appealability because “[a] reasonable jurist

could not debate . . . that the 1978 California statute, which

narrowed the class of death-eligible defendants at both the

guilt and penalty phases, was constitutional”). We affirm the

denial of this claim.

7

The California Supreme Court also could have reasonably found that

the evidence does not amount to coercion. The trial court surveyed the

jurors multiple times to ensure that there was no “impropriety in the

verdict because of the press of time.” And none of the jurors claimed

that the delay caused them to change their vote. The most serious

declaration came from juror Harold W., who stated that he switched his

vote because he “did not want to hold everything up if [he] could not

convince others” to choose life without the possibility of parole and

“given the situation, [he] did not feel like [he] could take any more of the

jurors’ time.” But Harold W. did not say whether the “situation” had to

do with Michael C.’s family tragedy as opposed to feeling that no one

else would agree with him or that he was coerced into changing his vote.

BEELER V. BROOMFIELD 51

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s denial of Beeler’s petition

for a writ of habeas corpus.

AFFIRMED.