United States v. Haotian Sun

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 24-3129 September Term, 2025

FILED ON: JANUARY 23, 2026

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

HAOTIAN SUN,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with 24-3139

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:21-cr-00646-1)

(No. 1:21-cr-00646-2)

Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, and GINSBURG, Senior

Circuit Judge

JUDGMENT

The Court considered this appeal on the record from the United States District Court for

the District of Columbia and on the briefs of the parties. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); D.C. Cir. R.

34(j). The Court has accorded the issues full consideration and determined that they do not warrant

a published opinion, see Fed. R. App. P. 36; D.C. Cir. R. 36(d), and it is now

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the judgments of the United States District Court for

the District of Columbia be AFFIRMED.

I

Haotian Sun and Peng Fei Xue participated in a scheme to defraud Apple involving the

“return” of counterfeit iPhones to Apple. Sun and Xue would receive counterfeit iPhones from

Hong Kong and submit them for repair to Apple stores and Apple Authorized Service Providers.

The goal of the scheme was to obtain an authentic iPhone from Apple as a replacement, which

would then be sent to China for resale.

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Following a jury trial, Sun and Xue were convicted of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1341 — one count for Sun and six counts for Xue — and conspiracy to commit mail fraud in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. The district court sentenced Sun to 57 months of imprisonment on

each count, to run concurrently, and Xue to 54 months of imprisonment on each count, also to run

concurrently.

II

Sun challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions for mail fraud and

conspiracy to commit mail fraud. “In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to

support [a] conviction, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government

and accept the jury’s guilty verdict if we conclude that any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Saffarinia,

101 F.4th 933, 939 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (cleaned up).

To prove mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, the Government must show “(1) a scheme to

defraud, and (2) the mailing of a letter, etc., for the purpose of executing the scheme.” United

States v. Coughlin, 610 F.3d 89, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2010); accord Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1,

8 (1954) (same). “To commit the offense, the defendant must have fraudulent intent at the time of

the charged mailing: that is, he must both have a fraudulent scheme in mind and intend that the

mailing further that scheme.” Coughlin, 610 F.3d at 97-98. To prove conspiracy to commit mail

fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1349, the government must show the defendant “entered into an

agreement with another with the intent to commit [mail] fraud.” United States v. Brockenborrugh,

575 F.3d 726, 733-34 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The Government may rely upon circumstantial evidence

to prove that Sun acted with the requisite intent. See United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc.,

566 F.3d 1095, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 2009); United States v. Maxwell, 920 F.2d 1028, 1035 (D.C. Cir.

1990).

Sun claims the Government’s evidence was insufficient in three ways. First, Sun argues

the Government did not prove that he knowingly participated in a scheme to defraud. This

argument is meritless. The Government introduced evidence that Sun knew federal agents had

temporarily seized a delivery of iPhones sent to him; Sun was told by federal agents and Apple

employees that some iPhones were counterfeit; Sun continued to return iPhones despite the

repeated warnings about their authenticity; Sun made statements to others indicating his awareness

that his conduct was illegal; and Sun took steps to conceal his involvement and to further the

scheme, including by using mailboxes in different zip codes, using different email addresses, and

using various names to return the iPhones. This evidence was more than sufficient for the jury to

conclude that Sun knowingly participated in a scheme to defraud. See McFadden v. United States,

576 U.S. 186, 192 n.1 (2015) (citing “a defendant’s concealment of his activities” and “knowledge

that a particular [item] is subject to seizure at customs” as circumstantial evidence supporting a

jury’s finding that the defendant acted knowingly).

Sun does not address most of this evidence. Instead, he cherry-picks evidence that he

believes supports his version of events. Even if some of the Government’s evidence is “susceptible

to innocent explanations, the evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence

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or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt.” United States v. Shi, 991 F.3d

198, 209 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). Overall, the evidence amply supported the jury’s finding

that Sun knowingly participated in a scheme to defraud.

Second, Sun argues the Government did not prove that the two iPhones underlying his

mail-fraud conviction were inauthentic. The Government did not need to prove this. “The law is

clear that ‘innocent mailings — ones that contain no false information — may supply the mailing

element.’” Coughlin, 610 F.3d at 98 (quoting Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 715 (1989)).

It was sufficient for the Government to show the mailing was “incident to an essential part of the

scheme or a step in the plot.” Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 710-11 (cleaned up). The evidence established

that the scheme involved the submission of counterfeit iPhones to Apple in exchange for authentic

replacement iPhones and that many counterfeit phones were in fact submitted; at least 74 phones

from just one batch were determined to be inauthentic. Sun returned scores of iPhones to Apple

stores in the Washington, D.C. area as part of the scheme, as he did the two iPhones underlying

his mail-fraud conviction; just one day earlier, for example, Sun had returned 10 phones across

five different Apple stores. Indeed, some stores started recognizing Sun and would reject his

phones because of concerns about their authenticity. Moreover, the Apple store where Sun returned

those two iPhones had previously received iPhones from Sun and other participants in the scheme.

Based upon this evidence, a rational juror could find that Sun’s return of those phones was

“incident to an essential part of the scheme or a step in the plot.” Id. (cleaned up).

Third, Sun argues the Government did not prove that he intended for Apple to mail the

iPhones underlying his mail-fraud conviction. Wrong again. “Where one does an act with

knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course of business, or where such

use can reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually intended, then he ‘causes’ the mails to

be used.” Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8-9. Sun’s co-conspirator testified at trial that he and Sun had

traveled to an Apple repair depot in Texas, where Apple would send certain phones for repairs, to

“find an insider.” JA 502-03. Sun was also instructed to and did use multiple mailing addresses in

an attempt to “trick Apple to swap out more phone[s].” Id. at 439. Based upon this evidence, a

rational juror could find that Apple’s mailing of the iPhones was reasonably foreseeable to Sun.

In short, Sun’s arguments ignore the evidence in the record supporting his convictions or

rely upon a misunderstanding of our case law. We therefore affirm his convictions.

III

Xue appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained through

a search of his iPhone and several rulings related to his offense level. Each challenge is meritless,

so we affirm his conviction and sentence.

A.

Xue filed a motion to suppress evidence found pursuant to the execution of two search

warrants, one for his iPhone and one for his Google accounts, both of which were denied by the

district court. The district court concluded that the warrants satisfied the particularity requirement

4

of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and that, alternatively, law

enforcement relied upon the warrants in good faith. On appeal, Xue claims only that the search

warrant for his iPhone was overbroad because the warrant was not limited to specific dates.

Xue’s appeal of the denial of his motion to suppress fails because he has not challenged

the district court’s holding on the good-faith exception. Under the good-faith exception to the

exclusionary rule, a court will not exclude “evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance

on a subsequently invalidated search warrant,” subject to certain exceptions. United States v. Leon,

468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). The district court recited the good-faith exception, discussed arguments

Xue raised about that exception with respect to the search of his phone, and explained why it

rejected those arguments. In so doing, the district court referenced the “warrants,” the affidavits

for “the phones,” and the “delay in searching the phones.” Xue therefore had sufficient notice that

the district court’s holding on the good-faith exception applied to the warrants to search both his

cellphone and his Google accounts. Because he does not challenge that holding, we affirm the

denial of his motion to suppress.

B.

Xue next argues the district court erred by calculating his offense level based upon intended

loss. The district court explained that it would use the greater of actual loss or intended loss to

calculate Xue’s offense level. The district court then adopted an intended loss amount of greater

than $1.5 million because the loss amount for Luo, who recruited Xue to join the scheme, was

attributable to Xue pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). Xue argues only that the district court

should have used actual loss rather than intended loss to calculate his offense level.

Under the version of the Guidelines in effect at the time of Xue’s sentencing, the

application notes for U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 stated that “loss is the greater of actual loss or intended

loss.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A) (2023). Shortly after Xue’s sentencing, an amended version

of § 2B1.1 went into effect which moved the loss definition from the application notes to the text

of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(A). See U.S.S.G. App’x C Supp. Amend. 827. Since then, the Eleventh

Circuit has held that the amendment was a “clarifying” amendment, meaning it applies to direct

appeals that were pending when the amendment went into effect. See United States v. Horn,

129 F.4th 1275, 1300-01 (2025); see also United States v. Smaw, 22 F.3d 330, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1994)

(explaining that a clarifying amendment “changes nothing concerning the legal effect of the

guidelines, but merely clarifies what the Commission deems the guidelines to have already

meant”).

We need not decide whether the change to § 2B1.1 was a clarifying amendment in order to

resolve Xue’s challenge. If, on the one hand, the new version of the Guidelines applies, then the

district court’s use of the intended loss amount was clearly appropriate. If, on the other hand, we

apply the Guidelines in effect at the time of Xue’s sentencing, then the district court still properly

relied upon the intended loss amount; before the amendment, we had applied the “general rule”

under § 2B1.1 that “loss is the greater of actual loss or intended loss.” United States v. Bikundi,

926 F.3d 761, 797 (2019) (cleaned up); see also United States v. Studevent, 116 F.3d 1559, 1561-

64 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (affirming a sentence based upon intended loss pursuant to a precursor to

5

§ 2B1.1). * Under either version of the Guidelines, therefore, the district court did not err by relying

upon the intended loss amount.

C.

Xue challenges the two-level increase to his offense level on the ground that “a substantial

part of [the] fraudulent scheme was committed from outside the United States.” U.S.S.G.

§ 2B1.1(b)(10)(B). According to Xue, his involvement in the scheme was limited to acts occurring

in the United States.

Xue’s argument ignores that the guideline is not limited to whether the defendant’s

activities occurred outside the United States. Instead, it asks whether a “substantial part of [the]

fraudulent scheme” occurred outside the United States. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(B). The district

court found by a preponderance of the evidence that it did.† The district court explained that Xue

“received shipments of inauthentic phones from Hong Kong,” which he then “submitted for repair

or replacement at Apple Stores in the United States.” JA 1264. Xue does not challenge this finding

by the district court. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s application of the enhancement to

Xue.

D.

Finally, Xue raises two challenges with respect to his role in the conspiracy. First, Xue

argues the district court erred by applying a two-level enhancement for his role as “an organizer,

leader, manager, or supervisor in [the] criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). “A manager or

supervisor must exercise some control over others.” United States v. Johnson, 64 F.4th 1348, 1352

(D.C. Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). We consider

the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation in the

commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a

larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of participation in planning or

*

Xue does not address this case law or the amendment to § 2B1.1. Instead, Xue relies upon cases from the Third

Circuit holding that “loss” in the previous version of § 2B1.1 was limited to “actual loss.” See, e.g., United States v.

Banks, 55 F.4th 246, 255-58 (2022). In addition to being inconsistent with our precedent, the Third Circuit’s position

is a minority of one among the circuits that have addressed whether to defer to the application note about intended

loss. See, e.g., United States v. Nock, 148 F.4th 607, 619 (8th Cir. 2025); United States v. Rainford, 110 F.4th 455, 475

n.5 (2d Cir. 2024); United States v. Boler, 115 F.4th 316, 328-29 (4th Cir. 2024); United States v. Rao, 123 F.4th 270,

282-83 (5th Cir. 2024); United States v. Ponle, 110 F.4th 958, 961-63 (7th Cir. 2024); United States v. You, 74 F.4th

378, 397-98 (6th Cir. 2023); see also Horn, 129 F.4th at 1299-1300 (holding that the pre-amendment Guidelines

“unambiguously” instructed courts to consider actual and intended loss for crimes covered by § 2B1.1).

†

Other circuits have held that a sentencing court may apply this enhancement even when the defendant did not

“personally take action from outside of the United States.” United States v. Singh, 291 F.3d 756, 761 (11th Cir. 2002);

see United States v. Arnaout, 431 F.3d 994, 999 (7th Cir. 2005) (affirming the application of the enhancement “even

though all of [the defendant’s] racketeering activities occurred within the United States”); United States v. Luton,

No. 21-1285, 2022 WL 2764202, at *4 (10th Cir. July 15, 2022) (“Numerous courts have held that the enhancement

applies even when a particular defendant has not personally acted from outside the United States, in part due to the

well-established principle that an act may be imputed from one co-conspirator to another”).

6

organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree

of control and authority exercised over others.

United States v. Vega, 826 F.3d 514, 538 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt. n.4).

“No single factor is dispositive.” Bikundi, 926 F.3d at 801.

The district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Xue recruited, trained,

and managed others as part of the scheme and profited from their participation. In challenging this

finding, Xue relies primarily upon his role in the scheme relative to others. As we have said,

however, “[t]here can, of course, be more than one person who qualifies as a leader or organizer

of a criminal association or conspiracy.” United States v. Bras, 483 F.3d 103, 113-14 (D.C. Cir.

2007) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt. n.4).

The district court recognized that others joined the conspiracy before Xue but found the

degree of control that Xue exercised over others justified the enhancement. We see no error in that

reasoning.

Xue also challenges the district court’s finding that Luo’s testimony and his identification

of “Rex” as a person recruited by Xue was credible. It is well settled that the “district court’s

credibility determinations are entitled to the greatest deference from this court on appeal.” Vega,

826 F.3d at 543 (quoting Carter v. Bennett, 840 F.2d 63, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). Luo’s testimony

was also corroborated by text messages between Xue, Luo, and individuals they recruited. Xue

does not dispute that these individuals participated in the scheme. Nor does he cite any case

requiring the Government to identify with greater specificity the participants over whom the

defendant exercised control. We therefore affirm the district court’s application of this sentencing

enhancement to Xue.

Second, Xue claims he was entitled to a three-level reduction in his offense level because

of the modest degree of his participation in the conspiracy. Xue asserts but does nothing to develop

this argument. “We do not consider arguments raised in such skeletal form.” Allen v. District of

Columbia, 969 F.3d 397, 405 (D.C. Cir. 2020). In any event, Xue’s argument is moot based upon

our affirmance of the district court’s conclusion that Xue had a supervisory role in the conspiracy.

Because all of Xue’s arguments are meritless, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

* * *

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is

directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely

petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. R. 41.

Per Curiam

7

FOR THE COURT:

Clifton B. Cislak, Clerk

BY: /s/

Daniel J. Reidy

Deputy Clerk