“[I]t has long been the policy of [appellate courts] to avoid constitutional questions where a matter can be decided on alternative, non-constitutional grounds.”
How later courts described this case
- “[I]t has long been the policy of [appellate courts] to avoid constitutional questions where a matter can be decided on alternative, non-constitutional grounds.”
- pro se [litigants] are held to same standards as licensed attorneys
- explaining that a majority opinion is binding precedent on the courts of this Commonwealth as to different parties in cases involving substantially similar facts pursuant to the rule of stare decisis
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
John Kline, :
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
Pennsylvania Public :
Utility Commission, : No. 918 C.D. 2024
Respondent : Submitted: October 7, 2025
BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge
OPINION BY
JUDGE COVEY FILED: January 22, 2026
John Kline (Petitioner), pro se, petitions this Court for review of the
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission’s (Commission) October 8, 2020 Final
Order (Final Order) denying Petitioner’s Exceptions to the Administrative Law
Judge’s (ALJ) Initial Decision that dismissed Petitioner’s formal complaint against
PPL Electric Utilities Corporation (PPL) (Complaint), and the Commission’s May
23, 2024 order denying Petitioner’s Petition for Reconsideration (Reconsideration
Order). There are five issues before this Court: (1) whether the Commission erred
by concluding that Act 129 of 20081 (Act 129) required electric distribution
companies (EDCs) to install an Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) smart
meter at Petitioner’s property; (2) whether the Commission may deny Petitioner the
opportunity for a substitute meter under Section 1501 of the Public Utility Code
(Code);2 (3) whether the Commission erred by granting PPL’s Exceptions while
1
Act of October 15, 2008, P.L. 1592, No. 129, 66 Pa.C.S. §§ 2803, 2806.1, 2807, 2811,
2813-2815.
2
66 Pa.C.S. § 1501 (relating to character of service and facilities).
concluding that PPL’s introduction of extra-record information in its Exceptions was
procedurally improper; (4) whether the ALJ erred by denying Petitioner the
opportunity to impeach PPL’s expert witnesses during the evidentiary hearing; and
(5) whether Act 129 constitutes discriminatory service which violates Section 1502
of the Code,3 the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States (U.S.) Constitution,
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, article 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, PA. CONST. art.
I, and the Consumer Bill of Rights.4 After review, this Court affirms.
Background
On November 14, 2008, the General Assembly enacted Act 129, which
required EDCs with more than 100,000 customers, like PPL, to file smart meter
3
66 Pa.C.S. § 1502 (relating to discrimination in service).
4
Petitioner presents seven issues in his Statement of Questions Involved: (1) whether the
Commission failed to uphold Act 129 as written, by allowing the unintended forced installation of
smart meter technology on Petitioner and circumventing Act 129 to support mandated installations
when the directive presented to EDCs, e.g., PPL, that smart meter technology shall be deemed to
be new service offered for the first time is clearly permissive language; (2) whether the
Commission violated Section 4903 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 4903 (relating to false
swearing) by twisting the General Assembly’s words in its Final Order, which amounts to a
dishonest purpose, untrustworthy performance of duties, neglect of fair dealing standards, and
fraudulent statements; (3) whether the Commission is guilty of administrative overreach, violating
the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501-1991, by exceeding its legally granted
authority and constitutional boundaries, with its interpretation of Act 129, mandating smart meters,
when it is clear that was not the General Assembly’s intent; (4) whether the Commission may deny
Petitioner the opportunity for a substitute meter when Section 1501 of the Code authorizes
remedies pursuant to Section 1505(a) of the Code, 66 Pa.C.S. § 1505(a); (5) whether the
Commission erred by granting PPL’s Exceptions while concluding that PPL’s introduction of
extra-record information in its Exceptions was procedurally improper; (6) whether the ALJ erred
by denying Petitioner the opportunity to impeach PPL’s witnesses, Christopher C. Davis, Ph.D.
and Mark A. Israel, M.D. during the evidentiary hearing and whether the Commission erred by
denying Petitioner’s motion to impeach the ALJ; and (7) whether applying the mandate that affects
only select customers, like Petitioner, constitutes discriminatory service under Section 1502 of the
Code and violates Petitioner’s constitutional rights, including but not limited to a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution, article 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and
the Consumer Bill of Rights. See Petitioner Br. at 6-7. This Court combined the first three issues
and will address them accordingly.
2
technology procurement and installation plans with the Commission within nine
months. On June 24, 2009, the Commission issued its Smart Meter Implementation
Order, which set forth requirements for the smart meter plans and procedures for the
submission, review, and approval thereof. On August 14, 2009, PPL filed its initial
Smart Meter Plan with the Commission, in which it claimed its existing metering
system met the requirements of Act 129 and the Smart Meter Implementation Order.
After the Commission determined that PPL’s system did not fully satisfy necessary
requirements, it directed PPL to modify its Smart Meter Plan. PPL submitted its
modified Smart Meter Plan on June 30, 2014, therein proposing to deploy smart
meters to its 1.4 million customers from 2015 through 2021, with full deployment
of meters throughout its service territory occurring from 2017 through 2019,
followed by a two-year stabilization period. The Commission approved PPL’s
modified Smart Meter Plan on September 3, 2015.
Petitioner is a PPL customer. On May 1, 2017, PPL notified Petitioner
that it intended to install a new AMI meter on his property within the following
weeks. On August 24, 2017, Petitioner filed the Complaint to prevent PPL’s planned
installation of a new AMI smart meter at Petitioner’s service address, asserting that
he has the right to opt out and keep his current meter for health, fire safety, privacy,
and discrimination reasons, and to prohibit PPL from terminating his electric utility
service because of his challenge. See Supplemental Reproduced Record (S.R.R.) at
1b-10b. Petitioner also contested the Commission’s interpretation of Act 129 based
on the Pennsylvania Constitution and requested a hearing. See S.R.R. at 5b-6b. On
September 13, 2017, PPL filed an answer to the Complaint, therein declaring that it
was legally required under the Code and PPL’s Smart Meter Plan to install the smart
meters, and specifically denying Petitioner’s allegations because Petitioner failed to
state the specific health or safety effects of smart meters or to provide medical
documentation thereof. See S.R.R. at 11b-20b. On March 28, 2018, PPL filed a
3
motion in limine to exclude Petitioner’s pre-marked exhibits from being admitted
into evidence.
On March 29, 2018, the ALJ held an evidentiary hearing at which
Petitioner appeared pro se, and PPL offered four witnesses: PPL AMI Business
Integrations Manager William Hennegan, PPL Senior Engineer Scott Larson
(Larson), Christopher Davis, Ph.D. (Dr. Davis), and Mark Israel, M.D. (Dr. Israel).
See Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 108-152, 186-319.5 During the hearing, the ALJ
heard argument on PPL’s motion in limine and admitted Petitioner’s exhibits. After
the hearing, the ALJ directed the parties to file briefs, which they did. On August
16, 2018, the ALJ issued an Initial Decision dismissing the Complaint on the basis
that Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the AMI meter
installation constitutes unsafe or unreasonable service under Section 1501 of the
Code. See S.R.R. at 21b-50b. The Initial Decision also contained certain fire safety
recommendations the ALJ made for PPL. See S.R.R. at 38b-39b. Both parties filed
Exceptions to the Initial Decision6 and Reply Exceptions to one another’s
Exceptions. See R.R. at 376-439.
5
Petitioner’s Reproduced Record fails to comply with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate
Procedure. See Pa.R.A.P. 2173 (“[T]he pages of . . . the reproduced record . . . shall be numbered
separately in Arabic figures . . . thus 1, 2, 3, etc., followed in the reproduced record by a small a,
thus 1a, 2a, 3a, etc.”). For consistency, this Court will refer to the Reproduced Record page
numbers herein as they appear in the Reproduced Record.
6
Petitioner’s Exceptions asserted that the ALJ erred by: (1) ignoring his motion to impeach
PPL’s expert witnesses because of their financial interests as professional witnesses; (2) ignoring
his motion to impeach Dr. Davis’s testimony on the basis of his veracity; (3) being persuaded by
and declaring credible PPL’s witnesses regarding medical issues and fire safety; (4) ignoring
Petitioner’s legal arguments related to discrimination, constitutional violations, and unfair and
deceptive practices; (5) failing to address and recognize the importance of Petitioner’s National
Toxicology Program Report; (6) giving little or no weight to Petitioner’s exhibits because the
authors thereof were not present to be cross-examined; (7) accepting Dr. Israel’s testimony that
there is no reliable scientific/medical basis to suggest that radio frequency exposure can cause
biological effects in humans; (8) concluding that PPL is legally required by Act 129 to install a
smart meter on Petitioner’s property; and (9) declaring that Petitioner failed to sustain his burden
4
On October 8, 2020, the Commission issued its Final Order, therein
denying Petitioner’s Exceptions, granting PPL’s Exceptions, and adopting the ALJ’s
Initial Decision as modified.7 See S.R.R. at 62b-159a. On October 23, 2020,
Petitioner filed the Petition for Reconsideration of the Commission’s Final Order,
therein asserting: (1) nothing in Act 129 requires every customer to endure
involuntary exposure to radio frequency (RF) emissions; (2) Act 129 does not
preclude PPL or the Commission from accommodating a customer’s request to
refuse smart meter installation; (3) the Commission violated the Commonwealth
Court’s decisions in Povacz v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (Pa.
Cmwlth. No. 492 C.D. 2019, filed October 8, 2020), Murphy v. Pennsylvania Public
Utility Commission (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 606 C.D. 2019, filed October 8, 2020), and
Randall v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 607 C.D.
2019, filed October 8, 2020) (collectively, Povacz appeals) (i.e., Povacz I); (4)
electro-hypersensitivity is a newly-identified neurologic pathological disorder; (5)
Petitioner has undertaken additional mitigation efforts at his home; and (6) the
Commission overlooked Petitioner’s reasonable accommodation request. See R.R.
at 1-28. On November 2, 2020, PPL filed an answer to the Petition for
Reconsideration. See S.R.R. at 184b-201b.
While the instant matter was pending before the Commission, this
Court consolidated the Povacz appeals pending before it, which involved the same
or similar issues. On October 8, 2020, this Court affirmed in part, reversed and
of proving that installing the new AMI meter would constitute unsafe or unreasonable service in
violation of Section 1501 of the Code. See R.R. at 397-437.
PPL’s sole Exception was to the ALJ’s fire safety recommendations, which PPL claimed
was unnecessary in light of the audited fire safety practices and procedures it already had in place.
See R.R. at 376-384.
7
The Commission modified the ALJ’s fire safety recommendations to make them
consistent with considerations addressed in Schmukler v. PPL Electric Utilities Corporation,
Docket No. C-2017-2621285 (order entered July 23, 2019).
5
remanded in part, and vacated and remanded in part the Commission’s final orders
underlying the Povacz appeals. See Povacz v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 241 A.3d 481
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (Povacz I), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 280 A.3d 975 (Pa. 2022)
(Povacz II). Specifically, the Povacz I Court affirmed this Court’s rejection of the
consumers’ constitutional challenge, reversed the Commission’s conclusion that it
lacked authority to accommodate the consumers’ desire to avoid RF emissions from
smart meters, and affirmed the Commission’s determination regarding the burden of
proving harm.
On October 27, 2020, PPL filed a Motion to Stay this Proceeding
(Motion to Stay) in the instant action to extend all deadlines pursuant to this Court’s
Povacz I decision because it was not apparent at the time whether the Commission
and/or other parties would seek an appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
(Supreme Court). See S.R.R. at 164b-172b. On October 30, 2020, Petitioner
objected to PPL’s Motion to Stay. On November 4, 2020, the Commission entered
an Order and Notice at Docket No. M-2009-2092655 that instituted a stay of formal
complaint challenges to EDCs’ deployment of smart meter technology as being in
violation of Section 1501 of the Code, including Petitioner’s, which stay would
remain in place until lifted by further Commission action.
The Povacz parties appealed to the Supreme Court. See Povacz v. Pa.
Pub. Util. Comm’n, 253 A.3d 220 (Pa. 2021) (Povacz - Allocatur). On August 16,
2022, the Supreme Court issued its Opinion in the Povacz appeals, holding that “Act
129 does mandate that EDCs furnish smart meters to all electric customers within
an electric distribution service area and does not provide electric customers the
ability to opt out of having a smart meter installed.” Povacz II, 280 A.3d at 983.
The Povacz II Court added: “An electric customer with concerns about smart meters
may seek an accommodation from the [Commission] or EDC, but to obtain one the
6
customer must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that installation of a
smart meter violates Section 1501 [of the Code].” Id. at 983-84 (footnote omitted).
By November 9, 2023 order (entered November 14, 2023), the
Commission lifted its stay in the instant matter, see S.R.R. at 202b-211b, notified
Petitioner thereof, and informed him of his procedural rights. On May 23, 2024, the
Commission entered its Reconsideration Order. See S.R.R. at 212b-234b. On June
11, 2024, Petitioner appealed from the Commission’s Final Order8 and
Reconsideration Order to this Court.9 On August 12, 2024, PPL filed a Notice of
Intervention.10
8
This Court’s review of a [Commission] adjudication determines
“whether constitutional rights have been violated, an error of law
has been committed, or the Commission’s findings and conclusions
are, or are not, supported by substantial evidence.” Barasch v. [Pa.]
Pub[.] Util[.] Comm[’n], . . . 493 A.2d 653, 655 ([Pa.] 1985). As to
questions of law, this Court’s scope of review is plenary, and its
standard of review is de novo. See Popowsky v. [Pa.] Pub[.] Util[.]
Comm[’n], 910 A.2d 38 . . . ([Pa.] 2006).
Twin Lake Utils., Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 281 A.3d 384, 389 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022).
9
Duick [v. Pennsylvania Gas & Water Co., 56 Pa. PUC 553 (1982),]
requires that a reconsideration petition identify “new and novel
arguments, not previously heard, or considerations which appear to
have been overlooked or not addressed by the Commission,” not “‘a
second motion to review and reconsider, to raise the same questions
which were specifically considered and decided against them.’” Id.
[at 559] (quoting P[a.] R[.R.] Co. v. [] Pub[.] Serv[.] Comm[’n], . . .
179 A. 850, 854 ([Pa.] 1935)).
Exec. Transp. Co., Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 138 A.3d 145, 150 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). This
Court “review[s] a denial of reconsideration for abuse of discretion. The [Commission] abuses its
discretion if the denial of reconsideration demonstrates bad faith, fraud, capricious action, or abuse
of power.” Id. at 148 n.8 (citation omitted).
10
On September 23, 2024, Petitioner filed an Application to be Excused from Filing a
Reproduced Record, which this Court denied on September 30, 2024, as untimely filed.
7
Discussion
1. Act 129
Petitioner argues that the Commission failed to uphold Act 129, as
written, by allowing the unintended forced installation of smart meter technology on
Petitioner when Act 129 contains clearly permissive language and, thus, the smart
meter program is opt-in only. Specifically, Petitioner contends that the Commission
twisted the General Assembly’s words and is guilty of administrative overreach and
exceeded its authority and constitutional boundaries with its interpretation of Act
129, mandating smart meters, when it is clear that was not the General Assembly’s
intent.
Initially, Act 129 added Section 2807(f) of the Code, which provides,
in relevant part:
Smart meter technology and time of use rates.--
(1) Within nine months after the effective date of this
paragraph, [EDCs] shall file a smart meter technology
procurement and installation plan with the [C]ommission
for approval. The plan shall describe the smart meter
technologies the [EDC] proposes to install in accordance
with paragraph (2).
(2) [EDCs] shall furnish smart meter technology as
follows:
(i) Upon request from a customer that agrees to
pay the cost of the smart meter at the time of the
request.
(ii) In new building construction.
(iii) In accordance with a depreciation schedule
not to exceed 15 years.
66 Pa.C.S. § 2807(f). Act 129 defines smart meter technology as
technology, including metering technology and network
communications technology capable of bidirectional
8
communication, that records electricity usage on at least
an hourly basis, including related electric distribution
system upgrades to enable the technology. The
technology shall provide customers with direct access to
and use of price and consumption information. The
technology shall also:
(1) Directly provide customers with information on their
hourly consumption.
(2) Enable time-of-use rates and real-time price programs.
(3) Effectively support the automatic control of the
customer’s electricity consumption by one or more of the
following as selected by the customer:
(i) the customer;
(ii) the customer’s utility; or
(iii) a third party engaged by the customer or the
customer’s utility.
66 Pa.C.S. § 2807(g).
In Povacz II, the Supreme Court concluded: “Act 129 does mandate
that EDCs furnish smart meters to all electric customers within an electric
distribution service area and does not provide electric customers the ability to
opt out of having a smart meter installed.” Povacz II, 280 A.3d at 983 (emphasis
added). The Commission and this Court are bound by the Supreme Court’s ruling.11
Because the Supreme Court has ruled that Section 2807(f)(2) of the Code mandated
the system-wide installation of smart meter technology, the Commission properly
interpreted that Act 129 does not include a smart meter opt-out (or opt-ins) for
11
See Commonwealth v. Koehler, 229 A.3d 915, 934 (Pa. 2020) (“[T]he nature of
precedential opinions is that they create rules of law that extend beyond the case and the parties
therein, to afford protections to other similarly situated litigants.”); see also Commonwealth v.
Tilghman, 673 A.2d 898, 903 (Pa. 1996) (explaining that a majority opinion is binding precedent
on the courts of this Commonwealth as to different parties in cases involving substantially similar
facts pursuant to the rule of stare decisis).
9
customers. See Schmukler v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 302 A.3d 247 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2023).
2. Section 1501 of the Code
Petitioner argues that the Commission may not deny him the
opportunity for a substitute meter when Section 1501 of the Code authorizes
remedies pursuant to Section 1505(a) of the Code.12 Petitioner also contends that
the Commission erred by declaring that he failed to sustain his burden of proving
that installing the new AMI meter would constitute unsafe or unreasonable service
in violation of Section 1501 of the Code. Petitioner claims that he
does not have to prove harm or that the smart meter is
unsafe, only that it is unreasonable to have a meter that has
the risk of harm, forcefully installed at his property,
without the option of choice. It is unreasonable to force
this device on [] Petitioner, who is currently suffering from
[two] major medical conditions, after he has taken steps to
remediate other wireless and microwave radiation from his
property. This [C]ourt can rule, with the evidence
presented here . . . in its entirety, [installing a smart meter]
12
Section 1505(a) of the Code states:
Whenever the [C]ommission, after reasonable notice and hearing,
upon its own motion or upon complaint, finds that the service or
facilities of any public utility are unreasonable, unsafe, inadequate,
insufficient, or unreasonably discriminatory, or otherwise in
violation of this part, the [C]ommission shall determine and
prescribe, by regulation or order, the reasonable, safe, adequate,
sufficient, service or facilities to be observed, furnished, enforced,
or employed, including all such repairs, changes, alterations,
extensions, substitutions, or improvements in facilities as shall be
reasonably necessary and proper for the safety, accommodation, and
convenience of the public.
66 Pa.C.S. § 1505(a).
10
constitutes unreasonable service under Section 1501 [of
the Code].
Petitioner Br. at 41.
Section 1501 of the Code provides, in relevant part:
Every public utility shall furnish and maintain adequate,
efficient, safe, and reasonable service and facilities, and
shall make all such repairs, changes, alterations,
substitutions, extensions, and improvements in or to
such service and facilities as shall be necessary or
proper for the accommodation, convenience, and
safety of its patrons, employees, and the public.
66 Pa.C.S. § 1501 (emphasis added).
Although the Povacz II Court unequivocally ruled that Act 129 does
not provide for opt-outs or opt-ins, it added:
An electric customer with concerns about smart meters
may seek an accommodation from the [Commission] or
EDC,[FN]5 but to obtain one the customer must establish by
a preponderance of the evidence that installation of a smart
meter violates Section 1501 [of the Code].
[FN]5
This holding does not preclude an electric
utility from providing a reasonable
accommodation to an electric customer in the
absence of a Section 1501 [of the Code] violation
pursuant to a customer service policy.
Povacz II, 280 A.3d at 983-84.
Thus, in order to qualify for an accommodation, a customer must first
“prove, by a preponderance of the evidence - with expert opinion within a reasonable
degree of certainty - that the service or facility is unsafe [or unreasonable] and that
a causal connection exists between the allegedly unsafe service or facility and harm,
either to the public at large or to specific individuals.” Id. at 1007. The Povacz II
Court explained:
11
“Conclusive causal connection” means that the proffered
evidence must support the conclusion that a causal
connection existed between a service or facility and the
alleged harm. It is not possible for evidence that is
inconclusive to be sufficient to meet the preponderance of
the evidence standard. Inconclusive means that the
evidence does not lead to a conclusion of a definite result
one way or the other. While the preponderance of the
evidence standard is not stringent, it does require that the
plaintiff’s evidence ever so slightly (like, with the weight
of a feather) supports the plaintiff’s contention. Evidence
that does not support a conclusion (or is inconclusive)
cannot meet that minimal burden. Accord Ethan Habrial
v. Metro[.] Edison Co[.], No. C-2018-3005907, 2020 WL
3840469, at *3 (Pa. P[ub. Util. Comm’n] June 29, 2020)
(“The decision of the Commission must be supported by
substantial evidence. 2 Pa.C.S. § 704. ‘Substantial
evidence’ is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. More is
required than a mere trace of evidence or a suspicion of
the existence of a fact sought to be established.”). Thus,
where scientific evidence is required to establish the safety
of a service or facility, use of the evidentiary standard of
“conclusive causal connection” to assess the evidence is
correct.
Povacz II, 280 A.3d at 1006-07. Therefore,
[t]o carry their [sic] burden of proof on a Section 1501 [of
the Code] claim, a smart meter challenger may be required
to present medical documentation and/or expert testimony
demonstrating that the furnishing of a smart meter
constitutes unsafe or unreasonable service in violation of
Section 1501 [of the Code] under the circumstances
presented.
Povacz II, 280 A.3d at 1000. Our Supreme Court stated, however, that “[e]ven if
[c]ustomers’ expert testimony was sufficient to meet the preponderance of the
evidence burden of proof, the [Commission is] free to conclude that the contrary
evidence was more weighty.” Id. at 1008.
Moreover, this Court has explained that “[o]nce approved, the tariff
provisions are legally binding on both the utility and its customers.” Kossman v. Pa.
12
Pub. Util. Comm’n, 694 A.2d 1147, 1151 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (citation omitted).
Therefore, “[t]he burden of showing that a tariff is . . . unreasonable . . . is on
[Petitioner]. This burden is very heavy because tariff provisions that have been
properly submitted to and approved by the Commission are prima facie reasonable.”
Id. (italics omitted); see also Section 316 of the Code, 66 Pa.C.S. § 316 (“Whenever
the [C]ommission shall make any rule, regulation, finding, determination or order,
the same shall be prima facie evidence of the facts found and shall remain conclusive
upon all parties affected thereby, unless set aside, annulled or modified on judicial
review.”).
In addition, this Court has declared:
The [Commission] is the ultimate finder of fact in formal
complaint proceedings. Milkie v. P[a.] Pub[.] Util[.]
Comm[’n], 768 A.2d 1217, 1220 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001);
Section 335 of the Code, 66 Pa. C.S. § 335. As fact[-
]finder, the [Commission] is empowered to review record
evidence, make credibility determinations, and accord
evidentiary weight. Milkie, 768 A.2d at 1221; Verizon
P[a.] LLC v. P[a.] Pub[.] Util[.] Comm[’n], 303 A.3d 219,
239 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023). When reviewing a decision of
the [Commission], an appellate court “should neither
substitute its judgment for that of the [Commission] when
substantial evidence supports the [Commission’s]
decision on a matter within the [Commission’s] expertise,
nor should it indulge in the process of weighing evidence
and resolving conflicting testimony.” Lehigh Valley
Transp[.] Serv[s.], Inc. v. P[a.] Pub[.] Util[.] Comm[’n],
56 A.3d 49, 56 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). Substantial evidence
is “relevant evidence which a reasonable mind would
accept as adequate to support the conclusion reached.”
T[wp.] of Exeter v. Zoning Hearing B[d.] of Exeter T[wp.],
. . . 962 A.2d 653, 659 ([Pa.] 2009) (citation and quotation
[marks] omitted). The [Commission’s] findings are
conclusive where they are supported by substantial
evidence. Hess v. P[a.] Pub[.] Util[.] Comm[’n], 107 A.3d
246, 258 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).
13
Hughes v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 322 A.3d 982, 993-94 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024). “The
Commission’s legal conclusions drawn from its findings, however, remain subject
to judicial review.” Hess, 107 A.3d at 259 n.7.
In Hughes, this Court held:
Like the customers in Povacz II, [the c]onsumers similarly
failed to prove that the installation of smart meters at their
residence would constitute unsafe or unreasonable service
in violation of Section 1501 of the Code. Although [the
c]onsumers testified and presented medical letters
describing their health conditions and the health
conditions of family members and claimed those
conditions would be exacerbated by exposure to a smart
meter, they did not present expert testimony to support
their claims. Instead, they relied upon an article to
establish a causal connection between the low-level RF
fields from a smart meter and adverse health effects, titled
“Stop Smart Meters NY.” However, the [Commission]
found that the article constituted “unreliable hearsay
evidence” because the author was not available for cross-
examination at the hearing. [Commission] Opinion at 11,
19-21. The [Commission] was not persuaded by [the
c]onsumers’ lay opinions as to the purported health effects
that RF emissions from smart meters would cause. Id. at
11.
Even if [the c]onsumers met their threshold burden, the
[Commission] found that PPL’s credible expert evidence
successfully rebutted any premise that the installation of
the PPL smart meter could cause adverse health effects or
exacerbate [the c]onsumers’ underlying health conditions.
Specifically, [Dr. Israel], a medical expert, testified that
“claimed symptoms related to Electromagnetic
Hypersensitivity [] are more accurately described as
Idiopathic Environmental Intolerance [], in which
‘idiopathic’ means ‘cause unknown.’” [Commission]
Opinion at 11. The [Commission] found that Dr. Israel
testified to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that
there is no reliable medical basis to conclude that RF fields
from the PPL smart meter will cause or contribute to the
development of illness or diseases. Id.
14
In addition, [Dr. Davis], a professor of electrical and
computer engineering with a Ph.D. in Physics, testified
that the PPL smart meter would not cause adverse health
effects. He testified that the levels of RF fields from the
PPL smart meters are 98,000 times lower than the RF
exposure safety limits established by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC). [Commission]
Opinion at 12. He also testified that the RF fields from the
PPL smart meter are much lower than typical sources such
as cell phones, which can be over 260,000 times higher
than a smart meter. Id. at 18. Persuaded by PPL’s expert
evidence, the [Commission] concluded that there is no
reliable medical basis to conclude that RF fields from the
PPL smart meter would cause, contribute to, or exacerbate
any of the symptoms claimed by [the c]onsumers, or any
other adverse health effects. [Commission] Opinion at 20.
As in Povacz II, the [Commission] in this case found that
the evidence of potential harm was inconclusive and
determined that [the c]onsumers failed to sustain their
burden of proof. The [Commission] weighed the evidence
presented and found that [c]onsumers’ lay testimony
regarding the potential harm from smart meters was
outweighed by the contrary expert evidence. Such
determinations are the sole province of the [Commission]
as fact[-]finder, and we will not disturb them on appeal.
See Milkie, 768 A.2d at 1221. Upon review, we conclude
that the [Commission’s] findings are supported by
substantial evidence and support the conclusion that no
causal connection exists between smart meters and the
alleged harm.
Hughes, 322 A.3d at 994-96 (footnotes omitted). Dr. Israel and Dr. Davis offered
similar evidence in the instant matter.
In McKnight v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 313 A.3d 337
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2024), the complainants similarly maintained that forcing them to
choose between accepting a smart meter and forgoing electric service was
unreasonable. The McKnight Court held:
Recognizing “the potential for overlap between an
‘unsafe’ inquiry and an ‘unreasonable’ inquiry,” our
Supreme Court [in Povacz II] observed that the customers’
15
challenges to both safety and reasonableness were “based
exclusively on their personal medical conditions [and]
relied on the same inconclusive research and studies
regarding the effects of RF emissions on human
health . . . .” Povacz [II], 280 A.3d at 1012. Based on the
[the Commission’s] finding that the [complainants] failed
to overcome [the EDC’s] contrary evidence of
inconclusiveness regarding the safety of emissions from
smart meters, our Supreme Court “discern[ed] no basis on
which to challenge the [Commission’s] conclusion that
[the c]ustomers failed to establish a violation of Section
1501 [of the Code] based on unreasonable service.” Id.
Our Supreme Court’s analysis and conclusions in Povacz
[II] concerning alleged violations of Section 1501 [of the
Code] are directly applicable and controlling here. The
[complainants], like the customers in Povacz [II], argued
that they established a violation of Section 1501 [of the
Code]’s safety and reasonableness requirement by
offering scientific evidence of the potential for harm,
along with medical evidence and their own testimony
concerning the specific effects they allegedly suffered
individually. As in Povacz [II], the [Commission] here
found the scientific evidence of potential harm
inconclusive and determined that the [complainants] failed
to sustain their burden of proof. Consistent with our
Supreme Court’s holdings in Povacz [II], [this Court]
discern[s] no basis here to disturb the [Commission’s]
finding that the [complainants] failed to prove a violation
of Section 1501 [of the Code].
McKnight, 313 A.3d at 345.
At the hearing in the instant matter, Petitioner offered a written opening
statement and numerous documents in support of his position that mandatory
installation of smart meters is unreasonable. In particular, he produced a National
Toxicology Program (NTP) report to support his claims of the potential carcinogenic
or otherwise harmful effect of RF emissions to the public and his household. PPL
objected to Petitioner’s documentary evidence as hearsay and because none of it was
authenticated and no one testified or could be cross-examined thereon. Relative to
16
the NTP report specifically, it was marked draft and not for attribution and was
distributed solely for peer review. See R.R. at 261. Notwithstanding, the ALJ
accepted the NTP report into evidence, to be given the probative value to which it
was due.
The Commission adopted the following ALJ Findings of Fact (FOF):
21. RF fields are part of the lower energy, non-ionizing
portion of the electromagnetic spectrum which consists of
lower frequency signals that do not have enough energy to
break chemical bonds in cells or DNA.
....
23. The . . . FCC has determined safe public exposure
levels for RF fields from devices that transmit RF signals,
such as the AMI meters.
....
42. The World Health Organization and a number of other
public health authorities have concluded that the scientific
research on RF exposures from cell phone use, which are
far higher than the RF from PPL’s smart meters, has not
shown that RF fields cause adverse health effects.
43. Several [] state public health authorities also have
investigated claims about health effects from smart meters
and have concluded that there is no credible scientific
evidence that RF fields from smart meters will cause or
contribute to any adverse health effects.
44. None of [Petitioner’s] exhibits are actual scientific
studies and most appear to be taken from activist websites.
45. [Petitioner’s] exhibits lack scientific objectivity, do not
offer a balanced assessment of the scientific research on
RF fields, and do not provide scientifically reliable or
useful data for reaching conclusions about RF fields and
the causation of any symptom or health effect.
46. There is no reliable medical basis to conclude that RF
fields from the AMI meters being used by PPL will cause
or contribute to the development of illness or disease.
17
47. There is no reliable medical basis to conclude that RF
fields from the AMI meters being used by PPL would
cause, contribute to, or exacerbate any of the symptoms
claimed by the [Petitioner], or any other adverse health
effects.
Initial Decision at 5-6, 8-9 (citations omitted).
The Commission specifically observed:
The NTP report pertains to matters which are clearly
hearsay in nature and not within an exception to the rules
prohibiting hearsay suitable for this Commission to accept
for the evidentiary purpose advocated by [Petitioner].[13]
Consequently, we are not able to make a finding of fact
based on the matters asserted in the NTP report. This is
so, even accepting the report in a light most favorable to
[Petitioner].
Final Order at 80 (footnote omitted). The Commission further stated: “[Petitioner],
as a lay person and lay witness, is not competent to provide an expert opinion
regarding potential carcinogenic and/or toxicolog[ical] effects of any selected
substance.” Id. at 81.
The Commission adopted the ALJ’s observation that Petitioner did not
aver that he or anyone in his household suffers from medical ailments that would be
negatively affected by an AMI meter. See Initial Decision at 13. The Commission
acknowledged Petitioner’s factual claim that the smart meter’s location will be in
close proximity to him while he sleeps. However, while recognizing its obligation
under Section 1501 of the Code, the Commission found credible PPL’s expert
testimony that the smart meter emits RF at a substantially lower level than a cellular
telephone, see FOFs 17, 25-33, and that RF signals occur in short, rather than
13
This Court has explained that, although evidentiary rules are relaxed in administrative
proceedings and an agency may receive all relevant evidence of reasonably probative value,
hearsay evidence, properly objected to, is not competent to support an administrative agency’s
factual finding. See Ives v. Bureau of Pro. & Occupational Affs., 204 A.3d 564 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2019).
18
continuous, signals of approximately 84 seconds out of every 24-hour period. See
FOF 26 ; see also Final Order at 86. Moreover, the Commission declared that, even
if Petitioner’s claims were proven, Petitioner had the remedy of requesting that PPL
install the smart meter at a different location in his home,14 but there was no record
evidence that he sought that remedy. See id. Thus, ultimately, the Commission
determined that such evidence “did not meet the standard of substantial evidence on
which the Commission must base its determinations.” Final Order at 82.
Based on this Court’s review, substantial record evidence supports the
Commission’s factual findings. This Court will not “indulge in the process of
weighing evidence and resolving conflicting testimony[.]” Hughes, 322 A.3d at 995
(quoting Lehigh Valley Transp. Servs., 56 A.3d at 56). Given that Petitioner failed
to prove by a preponderance of evidence that AMI meter installation on his property
violates Section 1501 of the Code, he was not entitled to any accommodation.
Accordingly, the Commission did not err by not granting Petitioner an
accommodation.
14
The Commission stated in the Reconsideration Order:
PPL states that it currently offers a potential accommodation to
customers who have issues with the installation of an AMI meter on
their properties. Under [PPL’s] Commission-approved tariff,
customers can request that [PPL] relocate the AMI meter to an
alternate location, so long as they pay [PPL’s] estimated costs
associated with such relocation. See[] PPL Answer at 10, citing
Rule 4(I)(2) of PPL Electric’s Tariff, Supp. No. 59 to Electric Pa.
P.U.C. No. 201, Third Revised Page No. 8E (stating that “[t]he
relocation of [PPL] facilities, when done at the request of others, is
at the applicant’s expense and payment of [PPL’s] estimated cost of
the relocation is required in advance of construction.”).
Reconsideration Order at 16.
19
3. PPL’s Exceptions
Petitioner also argues that the Commission erred by granting PPL’s
Exceptions while simultaneously concluding that PPL’s introduction of extra-record
information in its Exceptions was procedurally improper.
Petitioner presented two exhibits at the hearing in support of his claim
that smart meters are a safety hazard - a March 2018 news article regarding an
electric meter fire, see R.R. at 320-324, and a compilation of articles regarding smart
meter fires and explosions. See R.R. at 325-366. PPL offered testimony from
Larson and Dr. Davis regarding the safety of its proposed AMI meters. The ALJ
made the following factual findings based on the record evidence, which the
Commission adopted:
48. PPL’s new AMI meters are equipped with software
and mechanisms that better alert [PPL] if there is an issue
with overheating. Specifically, there is a heat alarm set
within the meter software program, so when the
temperature of the meter hits an established level, [PPL] is
alerted of the issue.
49. PPL takes 15-minute interval temperature readings
from the meter, so it can track the meter’s temperature and
identify any current issues or problematic trends.
50. If [PPL] detects an issue with the meter’s temperature,
PPL will dispatch a technician to investigate.
51. PPL has conducted substantial research and taken
many steps to prevent fire incidents similar to the ones
alleged by [Petitioner]. From [PPL’s] research, “the root
cause of the vast majority” of any fires involving new
meters is the customer-owned meter bases wearing out and
producing loose connections between the “blade” of the
meter and the “jaw” of the meter base.
52. PPL has taken several steps to mitigate the risk of these
worn out meter bases, including analyzing the materials
utilized for meter bases, enhancing its inspection criteria
so that its service technicians are better able to “identify
20
loose jaws in the field,” and ensuring the new AMI meters
meet the American National Standards Institute [] and
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers []
requirements[.]
53. The Landis + Gyr Focus E350 AX-SD AMI meter to
be installed by [PPL] is neither a fire nor safety hazard.
Initial Decision at 9-10.
Despite those findings, the ALJ added fire safety recommendations for
PPL. See S.R.R. at 38b-39b. In its Exception, PPL declared that the ALJ’s fire
safety recommendations were unnecessary in light of the audited fire safety practices
and procedures it already had in place, which it supplied in its Exception for the first
time. See R.R. at 376-384. In his Reply Exception, Petitioner objected to PPL’s
Exception on the basis that PPL raised facts not previously presented before the ALJ.
See R.R. at 387-396. The Commission agreed with Petitioner, stating that PPL did
not afford Petitioner notice or an opportunity to challenge PPL’s new fire safety
evidence. See Final Order at 92. The Commission nevertheless granted PPL’s
Exception “to the extent the fire safety recommendations shall be modified for
consistency with considerations addressed in . . . Schmukler v. PPL Electric Utilities
Corporation, Docket No. C-2017-2621285 ([o]rder entered July 23, 2019)[,]”
because Petitioner had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that PPL’s proposed smart meters presented an unreasonable fire hazard, which he
failed to do. Final Order at 92.
The Commission’s granting of PPL’s Exception meant that the
Commission disregarded the ALJ’s added fire safety recommendations and, instead,
relied for consistency on a prior Commission decision regarding the PPL smart
meter’s fire risks - also based on testimony from Larson and Dr. Davis, and which
this Court affirmed on appeal. See Schmukler, 302 A.3d 247. Notwithstanding,
because the burden of proving that PPL’s smart meters are a fire hazard was on
21
Petitioner, who failed to carry his burden, the Commission did not err by granting
PPL’s Exception while concluding that PPL’s introduction of extra-record
information in its Exceptions was procedurally improper.
4. Impeachment/Suppression
Petitioner also argues that the ALJ erred by denying Petitioner the
opportunity to dismiss Dr. Davis’s and Dr. Israel’s hearing testimony. He claims
that “without the witness testimony, [] Petitioner would have clearly established a
claim by a preponderance of the evidence and met his [b]urden of [p]roof that the
smart meters have a substantial risk of harm and multiple safety issues . . . .”
Petitioner Br. at 51-52.
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 607 states:
(a) Who May Impeach a Witness. Any party, including
the party that called the witness, may attack the witness’s
credibility.
(b) Evidence to Impeach a Witness. The credibility of a
witness may be impeached by any evidence relevant to
that issue, except as otherwise provided by statute or these
rules.
Pa.R.E. 607. In addition, Section 5.103(b) of the Commission’s Regulations
provides:
A motion may be made in writing at any time, and a
motion made during a hearing may be stated orally upon
the record, or the presiding officer may require that an oral
motion be reduced to writing and filed separately. Written
motions must contain a notice which states that a
responsive pleading shall be filed within 20 days of the
date of service of the motion.
52 Pa. Code § 5.103(b).
22
Petitioner admitted that he cross-examined Dr. Davis and Dr. Israel
during the hearing, and both expert witnesses admitted that they have testified
numerous times on PPL’s behalf, and that PPL has compensated them for their time.
See R.R. at 279-285, 310-313. The ALJ eventually instructed Petitioner to move on,
but allowed Petitioner to present any arguments regarding bias in his post-hearing
brief. See R.R. at 284-285. Petitioner did not raise an impeachment motion at the
hearing. Rather, Petitioner first made a motion to impeach Dr. Davis’s and Dr.
Israel’s testimony in his post-hearing brief. See R.R. at 166. Petitioner raised the
impeachment again in his post-hearing reply brief. See R.R. at 457-459. Petitioner
also sought to suppress Dr. Davis’s testimony pursuant to Section 42.34 of the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission’s Regulations, 16 Pa. Code § 42.34, on
the basis that his RF calculations were inaccurate. See R.R. at 462-464. The ALJ
did not address Petitioner’s motions in the Initial Decision.15
However, in the Final Order, the Commission declared that, although
bias was a proper subject for Petitioner’s brief and Exceptions, it was a matter of
credibility, weight, and probative value the Commission is empowered to determine.
See Final Order at 49-50; see also Hughes. The Commission further observed that
15
Petitioner claims that the ALJ’s failure to rule on the motions reflects the Commission’s
egregious misconduct, where the ALJ had an obligation to make Petitioner aware of any issues
and rules related to his motions. However,
[u]nder Pennsylvania law, pro se [litigants] are subject to the same
rules of procedure as are represented [litigants]. See Commonwealth
v. Williams, . . . 896 A.2d 523, 534 ([Pa.] 2006) (pro se [litigants]
are held to same standards as licensed attorneys).
Although the courts may liberally construe materials filed by a pro
se litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit upon a litigant,
and a court cannot be expected to become a litigant’s counsel or find
more in a written pro se submission than is fairly conveyed in the
pleading.
Kozicki v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 299 A.3d 1055, 1063 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 766 (Pa. 2014)).
23
Section 42.34 of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission’s Regulations, on
which Petitioner based his suppression motion, governs proceedings before the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, not Commission proceedings. While
the Commission would have overlooked that error in the interest of speedy resolution
of the matter,16 it declined to do so because Petitioner’s impeachment and
suppression motions were not raised in accordance with Section 5.103(b) of the
Commission’s Regulations, which affected PPL’s due process rights. Because the
Commission could not find in the record that Petitioner made his motions pursuant
to Section 5.103(b) of the Commission’s Regulations, it determined that PPL had no
notice or opportunity to properly respond to either motion. Accordingly, the
Commission further concluded that
the testimony of witnesses [Dr.] Davis and [Dr.] Israel
[was] sufficient for the consideration of the Commission
in making a ruling in this Complaint. Giving the evidence
its probative value, [the Commission] conclude[s] that
PPL has met its burden of production in this Complaint
and, in so doing, [the Commission] agree[s] with the ALJ
that [Petitioner] did not meet his burden of proof by a
preponderance of evidence.
Final Order at 53. This Court finds no error in the Commission’s conclusions.
5. Discrimination
Petitioner also argues that applying a smart meter mandate that affects
only select customers, like him, constitutes discriminatory service under Section
16
Section 1.2(a) of the Commission’s Regulations provides:
This subpart shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy
and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding to
which it is applicable. The Commission or presiding officer at any
stage of an action or proceeding may disregard an error or defect of
procedure which does not affect the substantive rights of the parties.
52 Pa. Code § 1.2(a).
24
1502 of the Code and the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.17
Petitioner specifically contends that it is discriminatory to install a smart meter at his
property when EDCs that serve fewer than 100,000 customers are not subject to that
requirement.
Section 1502 of the Code specifies:
No public utility shall, as to service, make or grant any
unreasonable preference or advantage to any person,
corporation, or municipal corporation, or subject any
person, corporation, or municipal corporation to any
unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage. No public utility
shall establish or maintain any unreasonable
difference as to service, either as between localities or
as between classes of service, but this section does not
prohibit the establishment of reasonable classifications of
service.
66 Pa.C.S. § 1502 (emphasis added).
Based on this Court’s strict reading, Section 1502 of the Code prohibits
PPL from supplying unreasonably different services between localities or classes of
17
Although Petitioner references article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution and quotes
article I, sections 1 and 2 of the Pennsylvania Constitution relative to this issue, he does not offer
any analysis or conclusion related thereto. See Petitioner Br. at 57. “[W]here an appellate brief
fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority[,] or fails to develop
the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.” Ward v.
Potteiger, 142 A.3d 139, 143 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985
A.2d 915, 924 (Pa. 2009)). “Since [Petitioner] fails to reference or develop [his] [Pennsylvania
Constitution] argument on appeal, that issue is waived[.]” Ward, 142 A.3d at 143 n.7. Although
Petitioner added Pennsylvania Constitution quotes in his Reply Brief, he similarly failed to develop
his arguments related thereto. See Petitioner Reply Br. at 12-13.
Petitioner also mentions the federal Consumer Bill of Rights in his brief with this Court.
See Petitioner’s Br. at 58-60. However, it appears that Petitioner raised that claim for the first time
on appeal to this Court. It is well established that an appellate court may only consider a question
on appeal that was previously raised before the Commission. See Section 703(a) of the
Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 703(a); see also McKnight, 313 A.3d at 341 (quoting
HIKO Energy, LLC v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 209 A.3d 246, 261 (Pa. 2019)) (“[A] party waives
appellate review of a claim when it fails to raise the issue before an administrative tribunal
rendering a final decision.”). Because Petitioner failed to raise the federal Consumer Bill of Rights
before the Commission, he waived this Court’s consideration of that issue on appeal.
25
service. See id. Here, the record evidence reflects that PPL is installing smart meters
for all of its 1.4 million customers, including Petitioner. Because PPL has not treated
Petitioner differently than its other customers, it has not violated Section 1502 of the
Code. Accordingly, the Commission properly concluded that it “cannot discern any
unreasonableness in service that would support [Petitioner’s] allegations.” Final
Order at 67.
Regarding Petitioner’s constitutional claims, the Commission
concluded that although it is empowered to make certain constitutional
determinations within the authority and jurisdiction conferred upon it by the General
Assembly, it is not at “liberty to engage in the wholesale consideration and review
of a legislative provision which [it] must administer.” Final Order at 69. It is also
well settled that “[w]here a dispute raises constitutional and non-constitutional
questions, [appellate courts] will resolve it on non-constitutional grounds and avoid
the constitutional issue if possible.” Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, Inc. v.
Campbell, 310 A.3d 271, 278 (Pa. 2024); see also Commonwealth v. Janssen
Pharmaceutica, Inc., 8 A.3d 267, 271 (Pa. 2010) (“[I]t has long been the policy of
[appellate courts] to avoid constitutional questions where a matter can be decided on
alternative, non-constitutional grounds.”). Because the appeals in this matter can be
resolved on non-constitutional grounds, this Court need not consider Petitioner’s
constitutional arguments.18
18
Notwithstanding, if this Court did address Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment claim, it
would adopt its discussion in Povacz I. Therein, the consumers claimed that forcing them to endure
involuntary exposure to RF emissions implicated their fundamental liberty interest in personal
bodily integrity. The Povacz I Court declined to recognize such claims based on the analysis in
Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 69 F. Supp. 3d 830 (N.D. Ill. 2014), that
allegations of risk exposure are insufficient to state a claim for deprivation of bodily integrity under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and there were no facts showing that the
decision to implement the smart meter installations was arbitrary where the plan was part of a
nationwide effort to modernize the electrical power grid, increase energy efficiency, reduce
26
6. Reconsideration
Petitioner asserted in his Petition for Reconsideration: (1) nothing in
Act 129 requires every customer to endure involuntary exposure to RF emissions;
(2) Act 129 does not preclude PPL or the Commission from accommodating a
customer’s request to refuse smart meter installation; (3) the Commission violated
the Commonwealth Court’s decisions in the Povacz appeals (i.e., Povacz I); (4) the
Commission should consider an article stating that electro-hypersensitivity is a
newly-identified neurologic pathological disorder; (5) Petitioner has undertaken
additional mitigation efforts at his home; and (6) the Commission overlooked
Petitioner’s reasonable accommodation request. See R.R. at 1-28.
In the Reconsideration Order, the Commission found no merit in
Petitioner’s first three issues because he merely continues to make claims that
contradict the Supreme Court’s precedential and binding rulings in Povacz II. See
Reconsideration Order at 18-20. Regarding Petitioner’s proffer of the news article,
the Commission concluded that it “does not substantiate a grant of either
reconsideration and/or rehearing in this matter[,]” id. at 20, particularly because it is
unsubstantiated hearsay and Petitioner did not aver that he suffers from any medical
ailment negatively affected by an AMI meter. See id. at 20-21. Finally, the
Commission was not persuaded by Petitioner’s representations of additional
measures he has taken to avoid RF emission exposure, or his repeated request for an
accommodation (no smart meter at his home), for which he has not established
entitlement. See id. at 21-22.
A reconsideration request must identify new and novel arguments or
matters which the Commission may have overlooked. See Exec. Transp. Co., Inc.
emissions, and lower costs. See Povacz I. Because the Supreme Court denied allocatur as to any
constitutional claims, see Povacz - Allocatur, this Court’s ruling thereon stands. See Povacz II,
280 A.3d at 985 n.8.
27
v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 138 A.3d 145 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). Petitioner only raised
one new matter - the article. However, because that evidence was not competent to
support a finding of fact, see Ives v. Bureau of Prof’l & Occupational Affairs, 204
A.3d 564, 574 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (quoting Walker v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
Rev., 367 A.2d 366, 370 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1976)) (“Hearsay evidence, [a]dmitted
without objection, will be given its natural probative effect and may support a
finding of [an administrative agency], if it is corroborated by any competent
evidence in the record[.]”), the Commission did not abuse its discretion by denying
the Petition for Reconsideration.
Conclusion
For all of the above reasons, the Commission’s Final Order and
Reconsideration Order are affirmed.
_________________________________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
28
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
John Kline, :
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
Pennsylvania Public :
Utility Commission, : No. 918 C.D. 2024
Respondent :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 22nd day of January, 2026, the Pennsylvania Public
Utility Commission’s October 8, 2020 and May 23, 2024 orders are affirmed.
_________________________________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge