Goldman v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 24-1920T

(Filed: January 21, 2026)

)

MICHAEL GOLDMAN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

)

THE UNITED STATES, )

Defendant. )

)

)

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

On November 20, 2024, Plaintiff, Mr. Michael Goldman, proceeding pro se, filed

suit for a tax refund in this Court, seeking recovery of an income tax overpayment for the

2017 tax year. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) at 5. On February 20, 2025, Defendant, the United

States, filed a motion to dismiss for, inter alia, failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”). ECF No. 13.

On March 21, 2025, Mr. Goldman filed his response, ECF No. 16 (“Pl. Resp.”); the

government filed its reply on April 3, 2025, ECF No. 17. For the reasons explained below,

Mr. Goldman is ORDERD to SHOW CAUSE why this Court should not dismiss this case

for failure to state a claim.

On October 24, 2023 — prior to initiating the present suit — Mr. Goldman filed an

administrative refund claim with the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) for recovery of his

2017 income tax overpayment. 1 ECF No. 1-3 (“Pl. Ex.”) at 40. The IRS denied his refund

claim. Id. Mr. Goldman appealed to the IRS Independent Office of Appels (“IRS

Appeals”), which ultimately upheld the denial of his claim. Id. at 46-47, 61. The central

issue with Mr. Goldman’s refund claim — according to the IRS — was that it was late

1 Because Mr. Goldman’s 2017 personal income tax return included a claim for a refund, Compl.

at 3, Mr. Goldman’s filing of his 2017 personal income tax return on October 24, 2023,

simultaneously constituted the filing of a (timely) administrative refund claim. See Wertz v. United

States, 51 Fed. Cl. 443, 446 (2002) (citation omitted)).

pursuant to § 6511(b)(2)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.). 2 Id. at 40, 61. I.R.C. §

6511(b)(2)(A) limits the amount of refund for a timely-filed administrative claim to the

portion of the overpayment, if any, made within the three years “immediately preceding

the filing of the claim[.]” I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2)(A). 3

Here, Mr. Goldman’s 2017 income tax was “deemed paid” on April 15, 2018, see

I.R.C. § 6513(b)(2) — more than five years before he filed his refund claim. Thus, absent

a specific exception to, or tolling of, I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2)’s look-back period, I.R.C.

§ 6511(b)(2)(A) limits Mr. Goldman’s recovery “to zero dollars,” and, therefore, his suit

“fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Murdock v. United States, 103

Fed. Cl. 389, 396 (2012).

To avoid the consequences of the look-back provision, I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2),

Mr. Goldman invokes the “financial disability” exception of I.R.C. § 6511(h) before this

Court — just as he previously did before IRS Appeals. 4 Compl. at 5; Pl. Ex. at 46-47. That

section provides for the suspension of all limitation “periods” in § 6511(a) and § 6511(b)

“while a taxpayer is unable to manage financial affairs due to disability.” I.R.C. § 6511(h).

Specifically, Mr. Goldman contends that he was “legitimately financially disabled during

the period from November 2017 through February 2022.” Compl. at 5. Thus, Mr.

Goldman argues that when accounting for tolling beginning from when his taxes were

deemed paid (i.e., in April 2018) until March 2022, his refund claim seeks a sum well

2 The I.R.C. is contained in Title 26 of the United States Code.

3 The Supreme Court treats I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2) as a “look-back” provision, explaining that “it is

not a [jurisdictional] ‘statutory time . . . limitation[ ]’ but rather a ‘substantive limitation[ ] on the

amount of recovery.’” Boeri v. United States, 724 F.3d 1367, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (second and third

alternations in original) (quoting United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 348, 352 (1997)). Thus, a

refund claim seeking sums paid that are outside the look-back period must be dismissed for

failure to state a claim. See Schallmo v. United States, 825 F. App’x 826, 828-29 (Fed. Cir. 2020)

(affirming trial court’s decision granting the government’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim where plaintiff’s taxes were paid more than three years prior to the filing of his otherwise

timely refund request — thus running afoul of I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2)).

4 This Court points out that while IRS Appeals denied Mr. Goldman’s financial disability claim,

it provided little explanation for that decision. Pl. Ex. at 61 (“We considered your protest[,] and

the evidence and arguments submitted in support of the [] claim for a refund of tax and/or

penalty. The information you submitted provided no basis to allow any part of your claim.”). Mr.

Goldman did not, however, raise a financial disability claim with his initial IRS claim. See id. at 55.

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within the three-year look-back, I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2). Id. Relying on I.R.C. § 6511(h),

Mr. Goldman argues that the IRS improperly denied his 2017 refund claim. Id.

Setting aside, for the moment, the government’s proffered arguments for why

Mr. Goldman’s claim should be dismissed, a critical piece of information is missing both

from Mr. Goldman’s submission to IRS Appeals — and now again to this Court —

pertaining to his financial disability claim. In each instance, Mr. Goldman acknowledged

that he retained an accountant to file his 2017 personal income tax return, provided the

accountant with full authorization to file the return, but admits that the accountant

ultimately failed to file it. Pl. Ex. at 55; Compl. at 3. The potentially fatal problem for

Mr. Goldman, however — and what is missing from each of his submissions — is the

precise duration of the accountant’s authorization.

While Mr. Goldman alleges that his accountant had worked for Mr. Goldman

during previous tax years, and that at some point the two “parted ways” due to

Mr. Goldman’s financial issues, the complaint does not specify the exact date their

professional relationship terminated. See Compl. at 3. Moreover, Mr. Goldman’s

submission to IRS Appeals does not mention either that Mr. Goldman and his accountant

eventually parted ways, or that Mr. Goldman had a working relationship with his

accountant in previous years. See Pl. Ex. at 55. As explained infra, these omissions as to

the precise duration of the accountant’s authorization, creates two distinct problems with

Mr. Goldman’s financial disability claim before this Court.

First, while I.R.C. § 6511(h)(2)(A) sets forth general conditions for a taxpayer to be

considered financially disabled, § 6511(h)(2)(B) provides that “[a]n individual shall not

be treated as financially disabled during any period that such individual’s spouse or any

other person is authorized to act on behalf of such individual in financial matters.” I.R.C.

§ 6511(h)(2)(A)-(B) (emphasis added). Simply put, the plain text of the financial disability

provision contemplates that even though a taxpayer may be financially disabled in

general, the taxpayer will “not be treated” as such, so long as there is another “person []

authorized to act on behalf of [that taxpayer] in financial matters.” I.R.C. § 6511(h)(2)(B)

(emphasis added). Thus, for any part of an otherwise bona fide period of financial

disability during which a taxpayer has authorized another person to transact on the

taxpayer’s behalf, the taxpayer cannot take advantage of the tolling in I.R.C. § 6511(h).

Accordingly, Mr. Goldman may invoke tolling of the three-year look-back period

in I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2) via the financial disability exception in I.R.C. § 6511(h) for whatever

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period Mr. Goldman was both financially disabled and did not have an authorized third-

party to act on his behalf in financial matters. 5 As an initial matter, Mr. Goldman alleges

he was financial disabled only from November 2017 until February 2022, Pl. Ex. at 53; on

October 24, 2023, Mr. Goldman filed his 2017 personal income tax return, Compl. at 4.

Thus, for approximately a year and nine months (i.e., from February 2022 through

October 24, 2023), there is no question that Mr. Goldman, by his own admission, was not

financially disabled.

That leaves Mr. Goldman with only approximately a year and three months of the

three-year look-back period during which he may potentially qualify for tolling.

Mr. Goldman’s 2017 personal income tax was “deemed paid” on April 15, 2018. See I.R.C.

§ 6513(b)(2). Therefore, absent tolling, the three-year look-back period of I.R.C.

§ 6511(b)(2) would begin to run on April 15, 2018. But Mr. Goldman would be entitled

to I.R.C. § 6511(h) tolling — such that he could take advantage of whatever remains of

the three-year look-back provision, see § I.R.C. 6511(b)(2) — if and only if Mr. Goldman’s

relationship with his accountant terminated less than approximately a year and three

months after April 15, 2018.

Mr. Goldman nowhere indicates the precise date of when he and his accountant

terminated their professional relationship, see Compl. at 3. Accordingly, this Court is

unable to determine if Mr. Goldman qualifies for tolling pursuant to I.R.C. § 6511(h) such

that he could take advantage of whatever little (or much) remains of the three-year look-

back provision, I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2). In the absence of any allegation in the complaint —

or anywhere else — regarding the precise duration of Mr. Goldman’s relationship with

his accountant, this Court is inclined to conclude that Mr. Goldman fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted because his recovery of any overpaid tax at issue is

completely precluded by the look-back provision, I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2). Murdock, 103 Fed.

Cl. at 396; Martinez v. United States, 2013 WL 3940958, at *4 (Fed. Cl. July 25, 2013).

5 When analyzing I.R.C. § 6511(h)(2)(B), the critical question is whether a taxpayer authorized a

third-party to file his or her administrative refund claim (which is oftentimes included with a

taxpayer’s tax return, as was the case here with Mr. Goldman’s refund claim). Broad authority

to act in all other financial matters of the taxpayer is not required. See Plati v. United States, 99

Fed. Cl. 634, 640 (2011) (concluding that because taxpayer granted her son authority to file her tax

return (which included a refund claim due to a pervious overpayment), taxpayer did not qualify

for the § 6511(h) financial disability given the explicit “carve out” to that exception, I.R.C. §

6511(h)(2)(B)).

4

Second, I.R.C. § 6511(h)(2)(A) provides that “[a]n individual shall not be considered

[financially disabled] unless proof of the existence thereof is furnished in such form and

manner as the Secretary may require.” I.R.C. § 6511(h)(2)(A) (emphasis added). The

Secretary of the Treasury, via Revenue Procedure 99-21, sets forth the “form and

manner,” I.R.C. § 6511(h)(2)(A), in which a taxpayer must furnish proof of financial

disability to qualify for that exception pursuant to I.R.C. § 6511(h), and thus toll the

limitation “periods” in I.R.C. § 6511. Rev. Proc. 99-21, 1999-1 C.B. 960. Revenue

Procedure 99-21, in turn, requires a taxpayer to submit two statements to the IRS: (1) a

physician statement describing a specific impairment that “prevented” the taxpayer from

managing the taxpayer’s financial affairs during a “specific time period”; and (2) a

statement by the taxpayer seeking a refund, indicating either (a) that nobody “was

authorized to act on behalf of the taxpayer in financial matters during the period” set

out in the physician’s statement, or (b) “if a person was authorized to act on behalf of the

taxpayer in financial matters during any part of the period [set out in the physician’s

statement] the beginning and ending date[] . . . the person was so authorized.” Rev. Proc.

99-21, § 4. (emphasis added). Furthermore, Revenue Procedure 99-21 requires these two

statements “be submitted with the taxpayer’s claim for credit or refund of tax,” id. § 1,

and emphasizes that 6511(h)(2)(A) requires the statements “be furnished to the

[IRS,]” id. § 2.

While some judges of this Court demand a taxpayer’s “strict compliance” with

Revenue Procedure 99-21 to qualify for “financial disability” pursuant to I.R.C. § 6511(h),

see, e.g., Est. Rubinstein v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 640, 652 (2011) (citations omitted),

others require a taxpayer to — at the very least — “substantially comply” with Revenue

Procedure 99-21. See, e.g., Martinez, 2013 WL 3940958, at *8 (“Failure to . . . substantially

compl[y] with Revenue Procedure 99–21 denies a taxpayer recourse to the tolling

provision in § 6511(h).”). And, where this Court determines that a plaintiff had not met

the requirements of I.R.C. § 6511(h), that means the plaintiff cannot avoid the application

of § 6511(b), and dismissal is proper pursuant to RCRC 12(b)(6). See Schallmo, 825

F. App’x at 828-29.

Here, Mr. Goldman’s physician statement submitted to IRS Appeals certified that

he suffered from major depressive disorder, which prevented Mr. Goldman from

managing his financial affairs from November 2017 through February 2022. Pl. Ex. at 53.

That statement complied with the first requirement of Revenue Procedure 99-21. The

same, however, cannot be said about Mr. Goldman’s own required statement. Id. at 55.

For that statement, Mr. Goldman first certified that during the period between November

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2017 to February 2022 — i.e., the period set forth in the physician statement — “no person

including [his] wife [] was authorized to act on [his] behalf in financial affairs.” Id.

(emphasis added). But then Mr. Goldman further certified that his accountant “received

all the proper authorizations” to file Mr. Goldman’s 2017 personal income tax return. Id.

The problem, however, as explained above, is that Mr. Goldman never specified “the

beginning and ending dates . . . the [accountant] was so authorized.” Rev. Proc. 99-21, § 4

(emphasis added).

Essentially, then, Mr. Goldman’s statement included two mutually exclusive

factual certifications, while omitting critical, required information, contrary to Revenue

Procedure 99-21. That means that even if the IRS and this Court were to liberally construe

Mr. Goldman’s statement as certifying that nobody other than his accountant was

authorized to act on Mr. Goldman’s behalf in filing his 2017 personal income tax return,

Mr. Goldman’s statement would fall short of complying with Revenue Procedure 99-21

because Mr. Goldman did not specify “the beginning and ending dates” of his

accountant’s authorization.

Where a taxpayer certifies that someone was authorized to act on his or her behalf

in financial affairs, but fails to specify the exact window of that authorization, the

omission is fatal. I.R.C. § 6511(h)(2)(B) provides that “[a]n individual shall not be treated

as financially disabled during any period that . . . any other person is authorized to act on

behalf of such individual in financial matters.” I.R.C. § 6511(h)(2)(B) (emphasis added).

Once a taxpayer establishes the outer bounds of when he or she could be considered

financially disabled — i.e., via a physician’s statement which lists a specific period of

financial impairment — the second requirement in Revenue Procedure 99-21 serves to

either confirm that the taxpayer was financial disabled for the entire period listed in the

physician’s statement, or to limit the period of disability by excluding the period where

someone was authorized to act on the taxpayer’s behalf. A statement like Mr. Goldman’s,

which does not specify the exact period of any third-party authorization, does not permit

the IRS to determine the precise period of financial disability, and thus does not meet the

requirements to successfully invoke I.R.C. § 6511(h).

In Redondo v. United States, our appellate court, the United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit found that the plaintiff in that case failed to comply with Revenue

Procedure 99-21 and thus could not qualify for I.R.C. § 6511(h) tolling. 542 F. App’x 908,

911 (Fed. Cir. 2013). That, in part, was because the plaintiff submitted a physician

statement to the IRS that did not “indicate a specific time period during which [the

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plaintiff] was unable to attend to his financial affairs.” Id. at 910. Similarly, this Court is

inclined to conclude that Mr. Goldman flunked the requirements of Revenue Procedure

99-21 because he did not indicate a specific period during which his accountant was

authorized to handle Mr. Goldman’s financial affairs. In other words, Mr. Goldman’s

own statement neither “strictly” nor “substantially” complied with Revenue Procedure

99-21. See Rubinstein, 96 Fed. Cl. at 652 (explaining that some decisions of this Court

require “strict compliance” with Revenue Procedure 99-21); Martinez, 2013 WL 3940958,

at *8 (“Failure to . . . substantially compl[y] with Revenue Procedure 99–21 denies a

taxpayer recourse to the tolling provision in § 6511(h).”).

In sum, by failing to comply — substantially or otherwise — with Revenue

Procedure 99-21, Mr. Goldman did not conform with the IRS’s “form and manner”

requirements to obtain the benefit of I.R.C. § 6511(h)’s tolling provision.

I.R.C. § 6511(h)(2)(A) (emphasis added). As discussed supra, without the benefit of

tolling, Mr. Goldman’s administrative refund claim was filed more than five years after

he paid his 2017 income tax — well outside the three-year look-back of I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2).

Accordingly, this Court is inclined to conclude that Mr. Goldman fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted because his recovery of any overpaid tax at issue is

completely precluded by the look-back provision, I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2). Murdock, 103 Fed.

Cl. at 396; Martinez, 2013 WL 3940958, at *4.

It is far from clear whether this Court may determine de novo whether

Mr. Goldman qualifies for I.R.C. § 6511(h)’s tolling provision specifically where a plaintiff

has failed to comply with the IRS’s “form and manner” requirements. I.R.C.

§ 6511(h)(2)(A). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has explained,

for example, that “[t]he limited waiver of sovereign immunity in § 6511(h) does not grant

[] courts power to decide de novo that a taxpayer was financially disabled.” Abston v.

Comm’r, 691 F.3d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 2012); see also Chan v. Comm'r, 693 F. App'x 752, 756

(10th Cir. 2017) (concluding that because Revenue Procedure 99-21 requires proof of

“financial disability” be submitted to the IRS, “district court[s] cannot make a

determination of financial disability if [a taxpayer-plaintiff] did not first provide the

requisite proof to the IRS” (citing Abston, 691 F.3d at 995)). 6

6 While not binding on the undersigned, another judge of this Court has previously held that we

cannot decide de novo that a taxpayer qualifies for “financial disability” pursuant to I.R.C.

§ 6511(h). In Ruebsamen, Senior Judge Smith dismissed a tax refund suit, where the plaintiff

unsuccessfully invoked I.R.C. § 6511(h) to toll the three-year statute of limitation in I.R.C.

§ 6511(a). Ruebsamen, 2022 WL 2315722, at *1, 4-5. In that case, the plaintiff submitted the two

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Accordingly, this Court ORDERS Mr. Goldman to SHOW CAUSE why this Court

should not dismiss this case for failure to state a claim pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(6) because

(1) Mr. Goldman, in his complaint, did not note the exact date he and his accountant

terminated their professional relationship; and (2) Mr. Goldman, during his IRS appeal,

failed to comply — substantially or otherwise — with Revenue Procedure 99-21 by

omitting “the beginning and ending dates” of his accountant’s authorization.

Mr. Goldman’s response shall be broken out into two separately numbered sections,

corresponding to these two issues. Mr. Goldman’s response to the first show cause issue

must indicate the precise date, if any, Mr. Goldman and his accounted terminated their

professional relationship. 7 His response to the second show cause issue must include —

at minimum — either: (a) a discussion of why and how it is still not too late for Mr.

Goldman to meet the “form and manner” requirements in I.R.C. § 6511(h)(2)(A); or (b) a

narrative — supplemented with proper documentation — that demonstrates that Mr.

Goldman did comply with the “form and manner” requirements during the IRS claims

process.

statements required by Revenue Procedure 99-21 directly to the Court (but had not submitted

them to the IRS). Id. at *1-2. Revenue Procedure 99-21, however, expressly requires the two

statements “be furnished to the Internal Revenue Service.” Rev. Proc. 99-21, § 2. Because the

plaintiff in Ruebsamen did not comply with Revenue Procedure 99-21, Senior Judge Smith

concluded that the “plaintiff fail[ed] to qualify for the financial disability exception under []

6511(h).” Ruebsamen, 2022 WL 2315722, at *5.

7 Mr. Goldman, in his response brief, alleges that in September 2022 his accountant first “stopped

performing . . . the tax preparation services . . . she had been paid for,” which ultimately triggered

their split. Pl. Resp. at 13. Mr. Goldman, however, contradicts that statement in a breach of

contract suit he filed in the Superior Court of New Jersey — which Mr. Goldman attached to his

response brief — alleging that his accountant was paid for filing his 2017 and 2018 tax returns

(only), but failed to file them. ECF No. 16-17 at 7. Specifically, the latter statement contradicts the

former in that it indicates: (1) Mr. Goldman’s accountant was not paid to file tax returns for 2019

and onward; and (2) Mr. Goldman’s accountant already stopped performing her duties by the

2017-18 tax periods and thus the two parted ways before September 2022. Moreover, neither of

those factual assertions in Mr. Goldman’s response brief can be squared with what Mr. Goldman

alleged in his complaint, where he alleges that the reason the two parted ways was because

Plaintiff “fell behind in paying [his accountant’s] fees” and therefore “[his accountant] stopped

work on [Mr. Goldman’s] account,” not the other way around. Compl. at 3 (emphasis added).

Suffice it to say that a response to this Court’s first show cause issue must include a consistent

narrative, indicating a single date of termination.

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Mr. Goldman shall file his response to the order to show cause on or before

March 9, 2026. Moreover, Mr. Goldman’s response to this show cause order shall not

exceed 15 pages, 12 pt. Times New Roman font, double-spaced, with singe inch margins.

Within 21 days of Mr. Goldman’s filing a response to this order, the government

shall file a response brief, subject to the same page and format restrictions. The

government’s response shall address, at minimum: (1) the standard of review generally

applicable to the merits of a tax refund suit in this Court; (2) the standard of review

applicable to a financial disability claim and, if it differs from the typical standard, why;

(3) whether Mr. Goldman’s response to the show cause order — including any newly

provided evidence — adequately addresses the concerns raised in this show cause order;

and (4) whether, in light of Mr. Goldman’s response, this Court should remand this case

to the IRS to consider any additional information or evidence regarding his claimed

financial disability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Matthew H. Solomson

Matthew H. Solomson

Chief Judge

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