Com. v. Green, R.

J-S42039-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

RAHEEM GREEN :

:

Appellant : No. 179 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 17, 2025

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-22-CR-0002219-2023

BEFORE: OLSON, J., KING, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED: JANUARY 21, 2026

Raheem Green (“Green”) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed following his convictions for strangulation and simple assault.1 We

affirm.

We glean the following facts from the testimony and evidence presented

at trial. In 2023, Officer Evan McKenna (“Officer McKenna”) and another

officer responded to a 911 call outside of an apartment building in Harrisburg,

Pennsylvania, based on a report that a “male and female [were] arguing and

someone saying they . . . had been choked.” N.T., 10/29/24, at 112. After

arriving on the scene, Officer McKenna observed a visibly injured Katherine

Osorio (“Osorio”), who “appeared to be extremely intoxicated [and] had

urinated on herself,” arguing and fighting with her sister at the bottom of a

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1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2718(a)(1), 2701(a)(1).

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set of metal stairs leading up to an apartment residence. Upon breaking up

the physical altercation, the officers inquired into Osorio’s injuries, which

consisted of “bruising [and abrasions] on her neck [and] above her eye[.]”

Id. at 117, 136-38. In response, Osorio told police that her boyfriend of one

and one-half years, Green, had strangled her and “threw her into [a bath]tub”

during the birthday party taking place in the upstairs apartment. Id. at 110.

While Osorio additionally told police that she was mad at Green “for leaving

her at the party[,]” she did not mention any other cause for her injuries. Id.

at 111. Additionally, neither Osorio’s sister nor any of the other partygoers

approached police to tell them that Osorio “had [instead] injured them or

assaulted them[.]” Id. at 112, 116.

After giving the above statement to police, an ambulance arrived and

transported Osorio to a hospital for treatment of her injuries. Relevantly,

while she was in the emergency room (“ER”), Osorio reported to the triage

nurse that: (1) she had “rib pain[;]” (2) “it hurt[] to breathe[;]” and (3) she

suffered a “loss of consciousness after being choked.” Id. at 136.2 When the

hospital administered an abuse screening as a result of this report, Osorio

additionally responded “that she feels safe in her home but not safe in her

relationship.” Id. at 138. Police thereafter arrested Green, and the

Commonwealth charged him with strangulation and simple assault.

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2 A “CAT scan” of Osorio’s chest revealed that she had “a severely displaced

fracture of . . . her right seventh rib.” N.T., 10/29/24, at 150.

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Following multiple continuances, the matter proceeded to a jury trial,

during which the Commonwealth presented evidence in the form of a

recording of both the 911 call and the police body-worn camera footage from

the night of the incident, as well as a prison phone call between Green and his

cousin following Green’s arrest. The Commonwealth additionally presented

testimony from Osorio, Detective Shawki Lacey (“Detective Lacey”), Officer

McKenna, and Osorio’s ER physician, Doctor Andrea Tydir (“Doctor Tydir”),

who the trial court qualified as an expert in diagnosing and treating traumatic

injuries.

Notably, when the Commonwealth called Osorio as a witness, she

relayed a sequence of events which differed from what she told police and

hospital staff on the night of the incident. In doing so, Osorio testified that

while she was attending the birthday party with Green, she was “[v]ery

belligerent and high” due to her consumption of an ecstasy pill and multiple

forms of alcohol, and that this had resulted in her “cussing[,]” disrespecting

other guests, and “acting in those ways of taking the party down[.]” Id. at

80-81. Osorio explained that although Green was initially “just kind of

cheering [this behavior] on[,]” he eventually led her into the bathroom to tell

her that they should leave the party, as her behavior was concerning to him

and “something he’s never seen before.” Id. at 81. Despite Osorio’s

testimony that she was “in and out of consciousness” at the time, she recalled

that Green’s attempts to get her to leave the party “triggered [her] to get . .

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. real angry[,]” to the extent that she “slapped” his phone out of his hand and

started “punching [and] kicking” such that she was “like beating him up [and]

putting [her] hands on him.” Id. at 81, 83.3 Osorio insisted that Green did

not fight back in response to these attacks, but instead managed to escape

from the bathroom and leave the party without her. Osorio then stated that

when she then attempted to follow Green out of the apartment, she was

“irate[,]” “hitting [her] head on walls[,]” and bumping into people and objects

alike. Id. at 85. Osorio clarified that by the time she finally managed to reach

the exit to the apartment, her inebriated and angered state caused her to fall

down the outside metal staircase. Id. at 86.

Upon reaching the bottom of the stairs, Osorio explained that she asked

her sister to call 911. Although Osorio initially claimed that she could not

remember what she and her sister said during this phone call, she conceded

that it was her on the 911 recording who was “[t]he person who says, I’ve

been assaulted[.]” Id. at 55. Osorio additionally testified that at some point

prior to police arriving on the scene, she and her sister got into “a big, big

fight[,]” such that they were “punching, kicking, [body slamming, pulling hair,

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3 At trial, both parties stipulated to the fact that Green “did not have to be

medically cleared and did not have any visible injuries [thirty-six] hours after

the incident in this case.” N.T., 10/29/24, at 118-19.

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and] everything you can think of being in a really big fight.” Id. at 56, 86.4

Osorio submitted that this fight ensued in part due to the fact that her sister

“wouldn’t let [her] pull [her] pants down” to urinate in the alleyway, and that

she had defiantly squatted down and urinated in her pants, regardless. Id.

at 57. Finaly, Osorio admitted to telling police that Green had strangled her

the night of the incident, but maintained that she could not remember if she

said the same to the ER triage nurse.5

Following Osorio’s testimony, Officer McKenna provided a contrasting

narrative, as we summarized above. In doing so, however, Officer McKenna

additionally opined, in his capacity as a lay witness and over Green’s objection,

that Osorio’s injuries and symptoms were consistent with that of

strangulation. Specifically, Officer McKenna stated that based on his five years

of employment with the Harrisburg Police Department, and his having

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4 Although Osorio initially claimed that this fight took place following the 911

call, she later testified that it instead took place just before, and that the

recording of the 911 call captured some of the resulting commotion. See N.T.,

10/29/24, at 56, 77, 86.

5 We note that following Osorio’s testimony, the Commonwealth called

Detective Lacey, a qualified expert from the Criminal Investigation Division,

to assist with the interpretation of a pretrial recorded prison phone call

between Green and his cousin, in which the Commonwealth alleged Green had

told his cousin via coded language to threaten Osorio to provide false

testimony at trial. During the phone call, Green told his cousin that he needed

his “muscle” and “someone that’s strong-minded, who knows how to swing a

fishing pole, bam bam[,]” to get in touch with and send a message to Osorio.

N.T., 10/29/24, at 101. Detective Lacey opined that Green’s usage of the

term “fishing pole” in this context was likely in reference “to a firearm.” Id.

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responded to multiple domestic violence cases involving strangulation during

that time, he believed that: (1) urinating oneself can be a sign of

strangulation; and (2) Osorio’s “bruising on her neck [was] consistent with

strangulation.” Id. at 116-17.6 Notably, the Commonwealth thereafter

presented the expert testimony of Doctor Tydir, who confirmed Officer

McKenna’s belief that Osorio’s injuries were the result of strangulation.

Specifically, Doctor Tydir testified that based on her review of Osorio’s patient

history, which noted Osorio’s report to the hospital triage nurse that she had

been strangled, and Doctor Tydir’s visual identification of “very specific” red

marks on Osorio’s neck that she explained are “only seen in cases of

strangulation[,]” her clinical impression was that Osorio’s injuries were caused

by “[a]ssault by manual strangulation[.]” Id. at 164, 166.

Green subsequently presented the testimony of Franklin Williams

(“Williams”), his cousin and a witness to the events at the party that evening,

before testifying himself. Relevantly, Williams testified that he witnessed

Green and Osorio enter into the bathroom during the party, and that while

they were in there, Osorio “went crazy[.]” Id. at 177. Williams elaborated

that because the bathroom door was open at the time, he was able to see

Osorio “yelling, screaming, [and] punching” Green, who “was [in turn] just in

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6 On cross-examination, Officer McKenna conceded that another “common

reason that someone might urinate on themselves” would be extreme

intoxication. N.T., 10/29/24, at 114.

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there screaming . . . with his hands up” and telling her to get off of him. Id.

at 177-78. Green then testified, inter alia, that: (1) he asked Osorio to go

into the bathroom with him so that he could calm her down; (2) while they

were in the bathroom he tried to take a video of her with his cell phone, but

had to stop because he “didn’t want her to throw [his] phone in the toilet[;]”

(3) when he stopped recording and attempted to leave, Osorio “started hitting

[him] on the back of” his head, and eventually hit him “with [a clay/ceramic]

item from [the] bathroom sink[,]” which caused his ear to swell up; (4) he

never strangled, hit, or put his hands on Osorio while they were in the

bathroom; and (5) he never instructed anyone afterwards to either prevent

Osorio from appearing at trial or force her to lie about what happened. Id. at

183-85. Additionally, while Green conceded that “people do use the word

pole” to refer to a gun, he insisted that “a fishing pole is not a gun[,]” and

that he instead used the term to instruct his cousin to reach out to Osorio

regarding the status of his and Osorio’s relationship following the party. Id.

at 186-87. Similarly, Green clarified that he “never said bam bam” during the

phone call, and that he instead “said, wam wam[,] which means quick, fast,

and hurry.” Id. at 187.

At the conclusion of the trial, a jury convicted Green of both

strangulation and simple assault. On January 17, 2025, following the

preparation of a presentence investigation report, the trial court imposed an

aggregate sentence of four and one-half to nine years’ imprisonment. Green

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did not file a post-sentence motion, but instead filed a timely notice of appeal,

whereupon both he and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Green raises the following issue for our review: “Did the trial court err

when it allowed the investigating officer to testify as to the medical symptoms

and causation, as well as diagnosis of the injuries of the victim, when his

testimony constituted expert testimony which the officer was not qualified

for?” Green’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Green’s sole issue challenges the admissibility of evidence at trial. We

review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings to determine whether the court

abused its discretion. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 325 A.3d 513, 518

(Pa. 2024). “An abuse of discretion is not simply an error of judgment, but is

an overriding misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will, or partiality.”

Id. at 519.

Relevantly, a witness may offer lay testimony in the form of an opinion

if it is: (a) rationally based on the witness’ perception; (b) helpful to clearly

understanding the witness’ testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and

(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. See

Pa.R.E. 701(a)-(c). By contrast, an expert must testify in relation to evidence

that requires explanation via “scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge . . . beyond that possessed by the average layperson.” Pa.R.E.

702(a).

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Although our appellate courts have not directly addressed whether a

party must produce an expert witness to testify to the physical processes

accompanying manual strangulation, as is the case here, our Supreme Court

has instructed that such testimony is required to explain those physical

processes accompanying ligature strangulation. See Commonwealth v.

Lopez, 854 A.2d 465, 470 (Pa. 2004) (explaining “[t]he average layperson is

generally unacquainted with the physical processes accompanying ligature

strangulation”). Accordingly, this Court has since required an expert to testify

in response to questions of whether a victim’s injuries were the result of

ligature strangulation. See Commonwealth v. Yocolano, 169 A.3d 47, 63

(Pa. Super. 2017) (holding that the trial court erred by permitting the

Commonwealth to ask a doctor and nurse, who were both testifying in their

capacities as lay witnesses, about whether the victim’s bruising on her ankles

and wrists was consistent with her account of being forcibly bound, as “[t]hese

conclusions required causation expertise[,] and there was no proffered

evidence that [either witness] regularly examined ligature and strangulation

marks[,] or had scientific knowledge on the subject”).

In the event that this Court determines that the trial court abused its

discretion by improperly admitting expert testimony into evidence via a lay

witness, our courts have consistently held that an appellant is only due relief

if the admission does not constitute “harmless error.” Commonwealth v.

Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 671 (Pa. 2014). “The harmless error doctrine, as

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adopted in Pennsylvania, reflects the reality that the accused is entitled to a

fair trial, not a perfect trial.” Id. (citation omitted). As our Supreme Court

has explained:

Harmless error exists if the record demonstrates either: (1)

the error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de

minimis; or (2) the erroneously admitted evidence was

merely cumulative of other untainted evidence which was

substantially similar to the erroneously admitted evidence;

or (3) the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt

was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was

so insignificant by comparison that the error could not have

contributed to the verdict.

Id. at 671–72 (citation omitted and emphasis added).

Green argues that the Commonwealth improperly elicited expert

testimony from Officer McKenna when it asked him to expound on “the

symptoms of strangulation and whether [Osorio]’s injuries were consistent

with strangulation.” Green’s Brief at 10. Green maintains that because Officer

McKenna was testifying in his capacity as a police officer experienced in law

enforcement, he was not inherently qualified to testify as it relates to “medical

symptoms and diagnoses.” Id. Instead, Green contends that the

Commonwealth could only present this evidence via the testimony of a

medical expert.

In support, Green relies on Cominsky v. Donovan, 846 A.2d 1256,

1257 (Pa. Super. 2004), in which he asserts that this Court ruled the trial

court erred by allowing a comatose woman’s adult children to testify, in their

capacity as lay witnesses, that she “felt pain in a persistent vegetative state.”

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Id. at 12. Green asserts that just as this Court held that the adult children in

Cominsky did not have “the required medical knowledge to discuss the pain

suffered by the[ir] mother[,]” Officer McKenna did not have the requisite

medical knowledge to discuss “whether urination or the injuries [that Osorio]

suffered were caused by strangulation . . . to a degree of medical certainty.”

Id. at 13. Accordingly, Green avers that because Officer McKenna’s testimony

“was in essence a[n unqualified] diagnostic and medical opinion” given without

“a reasonable degree of scientific certainty[,]” it constituted inadmissible

testimony requiring the grant of a new trial. Id. at 14.

Lastly, Green argues that “the Commonwealth cannot meet its burden

to []prove harmless error[,]” as he contends that Officer McKenna’s testimony

was not cumulative with respect to Doctor Tydir’s diagnosis of strangulation,

as it instead “served to gloss over and bolster” the doctor’s conclusions. Id.

at 15. Further, Green insists that “the evidence was not so overwhelming to

establish guilt[,]” given that Osorio “testified that there was no altercation and

[that] she was incorrect in her earlier statements.” Id. Consequently, Green

maintains that because Officer McKenna’s improper assessment as to the

cause of Osorio’s injuries partially resolved the “battle of which testimony

should have been believed[,]” he asserts that “a new trial is necessary.” Id.

The trial court considered Green’s issue and determined that it was

without merit, reasoning as follows:

In the instant matter, Officer McKenna was a witness for the

Commonwealth. He is a police officer with the Harrisburg Police

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Department and has been working the midnight shift for

approximately five years. He testified that he has responded to

numerous domestic incidents over the five years that he has

worked as a police officer. He received a 911 call on March 25,

2023 stating that a male and female were arguing, and someone

said that they had been choked. He went to the address

mentioned in the 911 call and spoke with [Osorio,] the alleged

victim. [Osorio] reported that her boyfriend had strangled her

and thrown her into a bathtub.

Upon cross[-]examination, Officer McKenna noted [Osorio]

urinated on herself. He also acknowledged that a common reason

that someone might urinate on themselves is because of extreme

intoxication. Thereafter, on re-direct, and over [Green]’s

objection, Officer McKenna was asked if, in his experience dealing

with strangulation cases, urinating on yourself was a sign of

strangulation. Officer McKenna said yes to this question. Also[,]

over [Green]’s objection, Officer McKenna was asked if [Osorio’s]

injuries matched what she had reported as happening. Officer

McKenna testified that [Osorio] had bruising on her neck, which is

consistent with strangulation.

Upon review of Officer McKenna’s testimony, we find that he

did not provide expert testimony. Rather, he provided permissible

lay opinion testimony that was based on his experience as a police

officer who has previously responded to strangulation cases.

Officer McKenna testified that, in his experience, urinating oneself

can be a sign of both extreme intoxication and strangulation. This

is permissible lay testimony because it is based on facts within his

knowledge, specifically what he has personally observed in other

instances involving strangulation.

His testimony was also rationally based on his perception of

[Osorio]’s injuries and her report of what occurred on the night in

question. It does not require scientific[,] technical[,] or other

specialized knowledge to recognize that a bruised neck is

consistent with strangulation. Thus[,] it was permissible lay

testimony for Officer McKenna to opine that [Osorio]’s bruised

neck was consistent with strangulation.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/24/25, at unnumbered 2-3 (citations omitted).

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In the instant case, we preliminarily determine that we need not address

whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Officer McKenna’s

at-issue testimony into evidence, as we deem that any such error would have

nonetheless been harmless. In doing so, we recognize that we are side-

stepping the unexplored issue of whether the physical processes behind

manual strangulation are so distinct from those associated with ligature

strangulation that a separate analysis is required to determine whether they

are within the general understanding of the average layperson. However, in

reviewing the briefs submitted by both parties, we note that neither side cites

to any authority, either persuasive or controlling, to advance an argument

that directly answers this question.7 Consequently, although this panel is

inclined to agree with the trial court in this instance — that the average

layperson generally understands the physical processes associated with

manual strangulation to the extent that bruising might result from its

occurrence — we do not believe that this case offers the proper venue to make

such a distinguishable ruling. Accordingly, we limit our analysis herein to

determining whether any error made by the trial court in this regard was

nonetheless harmless.

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7 Although Green cites to Yocolano in his appellate brief, he only does so to

establish that “[e]xpert testimony must be based on reasonable degrees of

certainty.” Green’s Brief at 11.

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Here, we observe that Officer McKenna’s potentially impermissible

testimony, that Osorio’s neck bruising was a result of strangulation and that

her urination could be a symptom of said strangulation, went towards proving

the Commonwealth’s theory that Osorio had been strangled on the night of

the incident. Notably, however, this was not the only evidence that the

Commonwealth presented at trial in support of this fact. We highlight the

Commonwealth additionally presented both the 911 call, in which Osorio

identified herself as “[t]he person who says, I’ve been assaulted[,]” as well as

police body-worn camera footage which captured a visibly injured Osorio

stating to police that Green had strangled her and “threw her into [a bath]tub”

during the birthday party taking place in the upstairs apartment. N.T.,

10/29/24, at 55, 110.

Crucially, the Commonwealth also presented testimony from Doctor

Tydir, Osorio’s treating ER physician and a qualified expert in diagnosing and

treating traumatic injuries, who professionally opined that Osorio’s injuries

were consistent with “[a]ssault by manual strangulation[.]” Id. at 164. In

forming this medical opinion, Doctor Tydir explained that she relied on her

review of Osorio’s patient history, which noted Osorio’s report to the triage

nurse that she had been strangled, as well as Doctor Tydir’s visual

identification of “very specific” red marks on Osorio’s neck, which she

explained are “only seen in cases of strangulation[.]” Id. at 166.

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Given the existence of the above substantially similar, untainted

evidence that the Commonwealth provided to support a finding that Osorio

had been strangled, we discern that Officer McKenna’s testimony in this regard

was “merely cumulative” to other admissible evidence. Thus, any error made

by the trial court in admitting Officer McKenna’s testimony into evidence was

harmless. See Hairston, 84 A.3d at 671. Consequently, because we

determine that Green’s sole issue on appeal does not merit relief, we affirm

his judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judge King joins the memorandum.

Judge Olson concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 01/21/2026

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