“The doctrine embodied in s[ection] 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the doctrine of promissory estoppel, is the law of Pennsylvania.”
How later courts described this case
- “The doctrine embodied in s[ection] 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the doctrine of promissory estoppel, is the law of Pennsylvania.”
- focusing analysis on whether it was appropriate, as a matter of public policy, to affirmatively “impose[ ] a duty in tort not to commit negligent spoliation of evidence”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
[J-23-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WESTERN DISTRICT
ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE A/S/O : No. 19 WAP 2024
BATES COLLISION, INC. JAMES MYERS, :
ANITA MORGAN, LOSSIE AUTO : Appeal from the Order of the
SERVICE, AND BENEDICTINE SISTERS : Superior Court entered December
OF ERIE, INC., : 21, 2023, at No. 1482 WDA 2021,
: Reversing the Judgment of the
Appellee : Court of Common Plea of Erie
: County entered November 12, 2021,
: at No. 12888-18.
v. :
: ARGUED: April 9, 2025
:
UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE :
ASSOCIATION, :
:
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
BATES COLLISION, INC., :
:
Appellee :
DISSENTING OPINION
JUSTICE DOUGHERTY DECIDED: JANUARY 21, 2026
I join Justice Brobson’s concurring and dissenting opinion to the extent he would
hold Erie had standing, and that even if there were any technical errors, “[i]n the absence
of settled law requiring us to deny Erie its day in court based solely on a technicality that
caused no prejudice,” we should “not deny relief on that basis.” Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion at 3. I respectfully disagree with Justice Brobson, however, that
Pyeritz v. Commonwealth, 32 A.3d 687 (Pa. 2011), forecloses Erie’s promissory estoppel
claim. On this point, I agree with Erie that Pyeritz’s reasoning and holding were limited
to negligent spoliation claims sounding in tort. See Pyeritz, 32 A.3d at 692 (focusing
analysis on whether it was appropriate, as a matter of public policy, to affirmatively
“impose[ ] a duty in tort not to commit negligent spoliation of evidence”). For promissory
estoppel claims, we need not determine whether the public policy considerations
discussed in Pyeritz support imposing a duty on the promisor, who acted on his or her
own volition when making the subject promise. See Erie’s Brief at 25 (“unlike tort claims
where the existence of a ‘duty’ is central to the analysis and analyzed with public policy
considerations in mind, a contractual claim has no such analysis because the contract
creates the duty in the first place”) (emphasis in original).
Moreover, while the Pyeritz Court was concerned with the speculative nature of
damages for a negligent spoliation tort, damages are handled differently in promissory
estoppel and contract actions. For one, although “[a]s a general rule, damages are not
recoverable if they are too speculative, vague or contingent and are not recoverable for
loss beyond an amount that the evidence permits to be established with reasonable
certainty[,]” we have recognized in contract actions that “mere uncertainty as to the
amount of damages will not bar recovery where it is clear that damages were the certain
result of the defendant’s conduct.” Spang & Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 545 A.2d 861, 866
(Pa. 1988) (citation omitted).
Additionally, damages available pursuant to a promissory estoppel theory are not
limited to expectation damages (which, admittedly, could be speculative in these
situations). See Restatement 2d Contracts §90(1) (“The remedy granted for breach may
be limited as justice requires.”); id. at cmt. d (“relief may sometimes be limited to restitution
or to damages or specific relief measured by the extent of the promisee’s reliance rather
[J-23-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 2
than by the terms of the promise”).1 Consider, for example, a scenario with facts similar
to the present case, where the promisee can prove it has spent money preparing to litigate
the underlying claim, but its lawsuit has been cut short by the promisor’s failure to
preserve evidence. Such reliance damages could certainly be ascertainable. It is
therefore unclear why the Pyeritz Court’s concern about the speculative nature of
damages in a negligent spoliation context would apply to preclude a promissory estoppel
cause of action in all cases.
I respectfully dissent.
1 Cent. Storage & Transfer Co. v. Kaplan, 410 A.2d 292, 294 (Pa. 1979) (“The doctrine
embodied in s[ection] 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the doctrine of
promissory estoppel, is the law of Pennsylvania.”)
[J-23-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 3