Opinion

Erie Insurance Ex. v. United Services Auto, Aplt.

Court
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Jan 21, 2026
Status
Published
Author
Dougherty, Kevin M.
On the bench
Donohue, Christine; Brobson, P. Kevin; Dougherty, Kevin M.
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 38.2%

“The doctrine embodied in s[ection] 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the doctrine of promissory estoppel, is the law of Pennsylvania.”

How later courts described this case

  • “The doctrine embodied in s[ection] 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the doctrine of promissory estoppel, is the law of Pennsylvania.”
  • focusing analysis on whether it was appropriate, as a matter of public policy, to affirmatively “impose[ ] a duty in tort not to commit negligent spoliation of evidence”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

[J-23-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE A/S/O : No. 19 WAP 2024

BATES COLLISION, INC. JAMES MYERS, :

ANITA MORGAN, LOSSIE AUTO : Appeal from the Order of the

SERVICE, AND BENEDICTINE SISTERS : Superior Court entered December

OF ERIE, INC., : 21, 2023, at No. 1482 WDA 2021,

: Reversing the Judgment of the

Appellee : Court of Common Plea of Erie

: County entered November 12, 2021,

: at No. 12888-18.

v. :

: ARGUED: April 9, 2025

:

UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE :

ASSOCIATION, :

:

Appellant :

:

:

v. :

:

:

BATES COLLISION, INC., :

:

Appellee :

DISSENTING OPINION

JUSTICE DOUGHERTY DECIDED: JANUARY 21, 2026

I join Justice Brobson’s concurring and dissenting opinion to the extent he would

hold Erie had standing, and that even if there were any technical errors, “[i]n the absence

of settled law requiring us to deny Erie its day in court based solely on a technicality that

caused no prejudice,” we should “not deny relief on that basis.” Concurring and

Dissenting Opinion at 3. I respectfully disagree with Justice Brobson, however, that

Pyeritz v. Commonwealth, 32 A.3d 687 (Pa. 2011), forecloses Erie’s promissory estoppel

claim. On this point, I agree with Erie that Pyeritz’s reasoning and holding were limited

to negligent spoliation claims sounding in tort. See Pyeritz, 32 A.3d at 692 (focusing

analysis on whether it was appropriate, as a matter of public policy, to affirmatively

“impose[ ] a duty in tort not to commit negligent spoliation of evidence”). For promissory

estoppel claims, we need not determine whether the public policy considerations

discussed in Pyeritz support imposing a duty on the promisor, who acted on his or her

own volition when making the subject promise. See Erie’s Brief at 25 (“unlike tort claims

where the existence of a ‘duty’ is central to the analysis and analyzed with public policy

considerations in mind, a contractual claim has no such analysis because the contract

creates the duty in the first place”) (emphasis in original).

Moreover, while the Pyeritz Court was concerned with the speculative nature of

damages for a negligent spoliation tort, damages are handled differently in promissory

estoppel and contract actions. For one, although “[a]s a general rule, damages are not

recoverable if they are too speculative, vague or contingent and are not recoverable for

loss beyond an amount that the evidence permits to be established with reasonable

certainty[,]” we have recognized in contract actions that “mere uncertainty as to the

amount of damages will not bar recovery where it is clear that damages were the certain

result of the defendant’s conduct.” Spang & Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 545 A.2d 861, 866

(Pa. 1988) (citation omitted).

Additionally, damages available pursuant to a promissory estoppel theory are not

limited to expectation damages (which, admittedly, could be speculative in these

situations). See Restatement 2d Contracts §90(1) (“The remedy granted for breach may

be limited as justice requires.”); id. at cmt. d (“relief may sometimes be limited to restitution

or to damages or specific relief measured by the extent of the promisee’s reliance rather

[J-23-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 2

than by the terms of the promise”).1 Consider, for example, a scenario with facts similar

to the present case, where the promisee can prove it has spent money preparing to litigate

the underlying claim, but its lawsuit has been cut short by the promisor’s failure to

preserve evidence. Such reliance damages could certainly be ascertainable. It is

therefore unclear why the Pyeritz Court’s concern about the speculative nature of

damages in a negligent spoliation context would apply to preclude a promissory estoppel

cause of action in all cases.

I respectfully dissent.

1 Cent. Storage & Transfer Co. v. Kaplan, 410 A.2d 292, 294 (Pa. 1979) (“The doctrine

embodied in s[ection] 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the doctrine of

promissory estoppel, is the law of Pennsylvania.”)

[J-23-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 3

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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