Disciplinary Counsel v. Wallace

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as

Disciplinary Counsel v. Wallace, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-112.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before

the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2026-OHIO-112

DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. WALLACE.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it

may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Wallace, Slip Opinion No.

2026-Ohio-112.]

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—

Soliciting sexual activity with a client and stating or implying an ability to

improperly influence a government agency or official to achieve results—

One-year suspension with six months conditionally stayed.

(No. 2025-1003—Submitted September 16, 2025—Decided January 20, 2026.)

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme

Court, No. 2024-023.

__________________

The per curiam opinion below was joined by KENNEDY, C.J., and DEWINE,

DETERS, HAWKINS, and SHANAHAN, JJ. FISCHER, J., dissented. BRUNNER, J., did

not participate.

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, Bruce Sanford Wallace, of Mount Orab, Ohio, Attorney

Registration No. 0010876, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1983.

{¶ 2} In a September 2024 complaint, relator, disciplinary counsel, alleged

that Wallace committed three ethical violations by soliciting sexual activity from a

client while promising that her case would get priority if she complied and by

implying an ability to improperly influence the judge presiding over the case.

{¶ 3} The parties entered into stipulations of fact, misconduct, and

aggravating and mitigating factors, and they jointly proposed that one of the three

alleged rule violations be dismissed. They also submitted 13 stipulated exhibits

and jointly recommended that Wallace receive a conditionally stayed six-month

suspension for his misconduct.

{¶ 4} Wallace was the sole witness to testify at a hearing before a three-

member panel of the Board of Professional Conduct. After the hearing, the panel

issued a report finding by clear and convincing evidence that Wallace had

committed the two stipulated rule violations and unanimously dismissing the third

alleged violation. The panel concurred in the parties’ stipulated aggravating and

mitigating factors and recommended that Wallace be suspended from the practice

of law for six months, with the entire suspension stayed on the conditions that he

commit no further misconduct and fully comply with his existing contract with the

Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”).

{¶ 5} The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of law,

and recommended sanction but added an additional condition to the stayed

suspension—that Wallace be required to pay the costs of these disciplinary

proceedings. The parties have jointly waived objections.

{¶ 6} After independently reviewing the board’s report and

recommendation, the record, and our applicable precedent, we find that the

2

January Term, 2026

appropriate sanction for Wallace’s misconduct is a one-year suspension, with six

months stayed on the conditions recommended by the board.

MISCONDUCT

{¶ 7} The stipulated evidence and testimony shows that in August 2022,

Wallace agreed to represent J.W. in a parenting dispute regarding her three-year-

old daughter. J.W. informed Wallace that time was of the essence, as she wanted

to file for a court-ordered visitation schedule before her child’s father filed in

another county.

{¶ 8} On Friday, August 19, Wallace met J.W. for the first time in his office

conference room. During that meeting, he asked her numerous questions to the

effect of, “How serious are you about getting what you want with your daughter?”

and “How far would you be willing to go to get what you wanted?” Although J.W.

was unsure what Wallace meant by his questions, she responded that she would do

whatever she needed to do to ensure that her daughter was cared for.

{¶ 9} Wallace advised J.W. that he would represent her for a flat fee of

$2,500 plus a $240 filing fee, which she would have to pay before he started

working on her case. J.W. told him that she had $240 for the filing fee and that she

would have the rest of the money after a real-estate closing the following Monday.

Wallace agreed to the proposed payment schedule and again asked J.W. if she was

serious about doing anything that he asked of her; J.W. assured him that she was

serious. Before J.W. left the office, Wallace asked her whether she would be

available over the weekend if he needed any additional information to prepare the

necessary pleadings. J.W. told Wallace that he could call or text her over the

weekend and that she would be available to meet if necessary. J.W. paid Wallace

$240 for the filing fee before leaving his office.

{¶ 10} On Saturday, Wallace sent J.W. a text message identifying himself

and stating that he was checking in, that he assumed J.W. had not been served with

papers, and that he wanted to make sure that she had thought through the process.

3

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

J.W. responded, “[Y]es, I’ve thought this process through. I will do whatever I

need to make sure my child is with the parent that actually provides, loves and

wants to be with her.”

{¶ 11} Later that day, Wallace called J.W. to see if she was open to doing

anything he could possibly ask of her to obtain her objective. J.W. replied that she

was willing to do whatever he needed her to do, and Wallace reiterated that he

wanted to make sure there were no lines she would not cross or anything she would

not do. He also told J.W. that he had “connections” and that the juvenile-court

judge who would preside over her custody case was a former coworker and that

Wallace used to be his boss. In fact, the Brown County Probate and Juvenile Court

judge had previously worked as an associate in Wallace’s law office. Wallace

claimed that he had favors that he could call in but that he wanted to be sure J.W.

was someone on whom he should use a favor. J.W. told him that she was glad to

have him as her lawyer.

{¶ 12} J.W. again reassured Wallace that she would do anything to ensure

that she remained her daughter’s custodial parent, and he told her that she could

come into the office so that they could discuss some things and see how far she was

willing to go. After arranging childcare, J.W. went to Wallace’s office by herself.

Before entering, she set her cellphone to record their meeting because she was

“uneasy” about what Wallace might ask of her.

{¶ 13} When J.W. arrived, Wallace was the only person in the office. The

meeting began in the conference room, with Wallace once again asking J.W. how

serious she was. J.W. asked him, “What have you got for me?” Wallace responded,

“You—you tell me. I just want to make sure where the line is,” to which J.W.

replied, “There is no line.”

{¶ 14} Wallace and J.W. discussed her case for 15 to 20 minutes before

Wallace redirected the conversation to what J.W. was willing to do to demonstrate

her “seriousness” about her case. He then instructed her to leave her belongings in

4

January Term, 2026

the conference room and led her down a hallway to his personal office, which had

a desk and a couch. According to the grievance J.W. filed with relator, she became

highly uncomfortable at this point.

{¶ 15} As Wallace walked down the hallway with J.W., he asked her how

many tattoos she had and whether she would let him see them. When J.W. turned

around to show him a tattoo on her lower back, Wallace discovered her cellphone

in the back pocket of her shorts. He pulled up J.W.’s shirt and grabbed the phone

from her pocket, saying, “Here. Hang on. I’ll just get this out of here. These things

make me nervous.” Wallace told J.W., “I’m going to put this back up here, if that’s

okay,” and began walking back down the hallway with J.W.’s phone. J.W. told

him that he could not take her phone because her mother had her daughter and

might need to reach her.

{¶ 16} Wallace then redirected the conversation back to where J.W.’s “line”

was and whether she was going to change her mind about filing the motion to

establish parenting time. He explained that he would prioritize her case, but only

if she was “serious enough” and could assure him that she would not “back out.”

J.W. pledged, “[t]here’s no backing out,” and she reiterated the gravity of the

custody dispute and how important it was to her to protect her daughter. Wallace

then sought to clarify that there was nothing—not even something “personal”—that

he could ask of J.W. that she was not willing to do. He then invited her to “show”

him how serious she was. J.W. indicated that she would do anything and asked

Wallace to tell her what he wanted. Wallace replied, “In my position I am not in a

place where I can do that,” and he told J.W., “I have to leave that to you.”

{¶ 17} J.W. understood that Wallace wanted her to engage in physical

contact and/or sexual activity with him, and at his disciplinary hearing, Wallace

admitted that he was “asking her to engage in a sex act.” She asked him what would

happen after she did “the thing,” and he replied, “Your case gets priority.” J.W.

probed Wallace to find out what would happen if she did not cooperate, and he

5

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

stated that he would still handle her case but suggested that it may not get priority

scheduling.

{¶ 18} Wallace led J.W. back to the conference room where he again invited

her to “offer” what she was willing to do. J.W. stated that she was going to “wing

it,” but instead of telling Wallace what she was willing to do, she said, “I don’t

know now that I am under pressure. You can’t say what you want, so I can’t tell

you my secrets of what I was going to do.” Wallace, replied, “Okay. You

understand I’m not allowed to do that.” After J.W. stated that she understood,

Wallace told her, “I’m not making my representation of you in any way conditional

on this. That’s—that’s not—we don’t do that, okay?” before telling her, “I was just

trying to see how serious you were going to be. That’s all.”

{¶ 19} Wallace attempted to get J.W. to leave her cellphone in the

conference room and return to his personal office, once again declaring, “Those

things make me nervous.” But J.W. refused. Before J.W. left the office, Wallace

asked that she inventory her tattoos and text him “with a number . . . or pictures of

all of them.” J.W. did not comply with his request.

{¶ 20} On August 26, 2022, Wallace paid the $240 filing fee and filed a

motion to establish parenting time in the Brown County Probate and Juvenile Court

on J.W.’s behalf. Less than a month later, J.W. texted Wallace to request that the

motion be dismissed. With J.W.’s consent, Wallace waited until a few days before

the scheduled hearing to dismiss the motion. Wallace did not charge J.W. for any

of the work he performed on her case.

{¶ 21} The parties stipulated and the board found by clear and convincing

evidence that Wallace’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j) (prohibiting a lawyer

from soliciting or engaging in sexual activity with a client unless a consensual

sexual relationship existed between them prior to the client-lawyer relationship)

and 8.4(e) (prohibiting a lawyer from stating or implying an ability to improperly

influence a government agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate

6

January Term, 2026

the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct or the law). We adopt the board’s findings

of misconduct.

RECOMMENDED SANCTION

{¶ 22} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all

relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the

aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions

imposed in similar cases.

{¶ 23} The parties stipulated and the board found that three aggravating

factors are present in this case—Wallace acted with a dishonest or selfish motive,

committed multiple offenses, and harmed a vulnerable victim. See Gov.Bar R.

V(13)(B)(2), (4), and (8). In her grievance, J.W. wrote, “I have never in my life

felt so violated by someone just by their ability to dance around what they wanted

without saying what they wanted.” She explained, “I know that any parent would

go to the ends of the earth for their child. But to be a good parent doesn’t mean that

they should have to ‘voluntarily’ give something of themselves to a man that they

are already paying or planning to pay to represent them.”

{¶ 24} As for mitigating factors, the parties stipulated and the board found

that Wallace had no prior discipline in his 41 years of practice, made full and free

disclosure to the board and exhibited a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary

proceedings, and presented evidence of his good character or reputation. See

Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1), (4), and (5). Wallace’s character evidence consisted of

seven letters—one from a judge, two from attorneys, and four from friends, at least

one of whom was also a former client—who attested to Wallace’s good character,

reputation, and extensive history of dedicated community service. In addition, the

board noted that Wallace exhibited remorse for his actions and acknowledged the

seriousness of his misconduct.

{¶ 25} We note that Wallace also has submitted evidence showing that he

experienced a mental-health crisis after the board certified the formal complaint

7

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

against him and that he has since been diagnosed with and treated for anxiety and

depression. He entered into a two-year mental-health contract with OLAP in

October 2024, and his treatment professional has opined that he is fit to practice

law. However, Wallace did not seek to establish either of his diagnosed disorders

as a mitigating factor—nor could he, because he submitted no evidence that his

disorders contributed to cause his misconduct. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7).

{¶ 26} In their stipulations, the parties compared the facts of this case to

three others in which we imposed conditionally stayed six-month suspensions on

attorneys who made inappropriate sexual advances toward their clients. See

Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Paris, 2016-Ohio-5581 (imposing a conditionally

stayed six-month suspension on an attorney who made unwelcome sexual advances

toward a female client and neglected her case by failing to appear at her criminal-

sentencing hearing); Disciplinary Counsel v. Hubbell, 2015-Ohio-3426 (imposing

a conditionally stayed six-month suspension on an attorney who attempted to

initiate a romantic relationship with a client he was representing pro bono in a

custody dispute); Toledo Bar Assn. v. Burkholder, 2006-Ohio-2817 (imposing a

conditionally stayed six-month suspension on an attorney who relentlessly asked a

client to go out with him over a period of months, made a sexually suggestive

comment to her, and inappropriately touched her on a single occasion). Relying on

Paris, Hubbell, and Burkholder, the board recommends that we suspend Wallace

from the practice of law for six months, fully stayed on the conditions that he refrain

from further misconduct, remain in compliance with his two-year OLAP contract,

and pay the costs of these disciplinary proceedings.

{¶ 27} “We have consistently disapproved of the conduct of lawyers who

have solicited or engaged in sexual activity with their clients even before the

adoption of Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j), and depending on the relative impropriety of the

situation, we have imposed a wide range of disciplinary measures for such

conduct.” Paris at ¶ 18, citing Akron Bar Assn. v. Miller, 2011-Ohio-4412, ¶ 18.

8

January Term, 2026

In Paris, we noted that we have imposed sanctions ranging from public reprimands

to permanent disbarment on lawyers who have engaged in inappropriate sexual

conduct with their clients. Id., citing Disciplinary Counsel v. Engler, 2006-Ohio-

3824 (publicly reprimanding an attorney who had two consensual sexual

encounters with a client while representing her in a divorce)1 and Disciplinary

Counsel v. Sturgeon, 2006-Ohio-5708 (disbarring an attorney who solicited sex

from clients in exchange for a reduced legal fee, made inappropriate sexual

comments to clients, touched them in a sexual manner, exposed himself to one of

his clients, and lied repeatedly during the disciplinary process). And we

acknowledged that “[i]n between those two extremes, we typically impose term

suspensions with all or part of the suspension stayed, depending on the severity of

the misconduct and the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors.” Id. at ¶ 19,

citing Disciplinary Counsel v. Bunstine, 2013-Ohio-3681, ¶ 32.

{¶ 28} In this case, the parties relied only on Paris, Hubbell, and Burkholder

to support their proposed sanction of a conditionally stayed six-month suspension.

They also identified and sought to distinguish three other cases in which we

imposed one-year suspensions with or without partial stays on attorneys who, like

Wallace, made unwelcome sexual advances toward a client. See Disciplinary

Counsel v. Dugan, 2024-Ohio-5118; Bunstine; Disciplinary Counsel v. Detweiler,

2013-Ohio-1747. While the parties have suggested that Wallace’s misconduct was

less severe than the conduct at issue in those cases, we find those cases relevant and

instructive.

1. We have since emphasized that “[t]he fact that a client appears to have consented does not mitigate

the attorney’s misconduct or provide a defense against a violation.” Disciplinary Counsel v. Sarver,

2018-Ohio-4717, ¶ 16; see also id., quoting Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j), Comment 17 (explaining that

“‘[Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j)] prohibits the lawyer from engaging in sexual activity with a client regardless

of whether the relationship is consensual and regardless of the absence of prejudice to the client,

unless the sexual relationship predates the client-lawyer relationship’” [emphasis added in Sarver]).

9

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

{¶ 29} In Dugan, the attorney stipulated to a single violation of

Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j) after he, over a period of months, sent a female domestic-

relations client whom he was representing pro bono a series of sexually explicit text

messages in which he repeatedly solicited sexual activity with her. Dugan at ¶ 4-

6, 10. Aggravating factors consisted of a public reprimand more than 15 years

earlier, Dugan’s selfish motive, and the harm he caused to a vulnerable client. Id.

at ¶ 17-19. Those factors were balanced against mitigating evidence of Dugan’s

efforts to seek interim rehabilitation for his excessive alcohol use, his full and free

disclosure to the board and cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings

(including his expressions of genuine remorse and acceptance of responsibility for

his misconduct), and evidence of his good character and reputation. Id. at ¶ 20-24.

We imposed a conditionally stayed one-year suspension on Dugan for his

misconduct. Id. at ¶ 32.

{¶ 30} In Bunstine, the attorney suggested that his female client in a child-

custody case could pay her legal fees by getting rid of her fiancé, finding a

babysitter for her children, and answering her door naked. He later went to the

client’s house to see what would happen, but he left after being confronted in the

driveway by the client’s fiancé and the fiancé’s father. We found that Bunstine

improperly solicited sexual activity from his client and that his conduct adversely

reflected on his fitness to practice law. Bunstine, 2013-Ohio-3681, at ¶ 25. Like

Wallace, Bunstine acted with a selfish motive and harmed a vulnerable client, but

he also had a history of prior discipline. Id. at ¶ 28. Additionally, Bunstine

attempted to blame his client for his misconduct and made excuses for his

inappropriate proposition to her. Id. at ¶ 18. No mitigating factors were present.

We suspended Bunstine from the practice of law for one year with six months

conditionally stayed. Id. at ¶ 34.

{¶ 31} And finally, in Detweiler, the attorney made repeated unsolicited and

unwelcome personal and sexual advances by text message, over a period of several

10

January Term, 2026

months, toward a financially vulnerable client. When the client ignored those

advances, Detweiler sent her a nude photograph of himself in a state of sexual

arousal. In addition to finding a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j), we found that

Detweiler’s improper sexual advances adversely reflected on his fitness to practice

law and created a conflict of interest that materially limited his ability to carry out

an appropriate course of action for the client. Detweiler, 2013-Ohio-1747, at

¶ 9-10.

{¶ 32} Like Wallace, Detweiler acted with a selfish motive and caused harm

to a vulnerable client, id. at ¶ 12; but we also found that Detweiler had previously

been disciplined for engaging in an improper sexual relationship with another client

and that his combined behavior from his two disciplinary cases constituted a pattern

of misconduct, id. As for mitigating factors, Detweiler exhibited a cooperative

attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, acknowledged the severity of his

misconduct, and expressed remorse for his actions. Id. We suspended Detweiler

from the practice of law for one year and conditioned his reinstatement on the

submission of proof that he had submitted to an OLAP evaluation and complied

with any resulting treatment recommendations. Id. at ¶ 21.

{¶ 33} In this case, Wallace’s repeated and inappropriate sexual overtures

occurred over a period of two days rather than months like those of Dugan and

Detweiler. They were, however, far more coercive than Dugan’s repeated

inappropriate text messages and Bunstine’s singular proposition and subsequent

appearance at his client’s home. During Wallace’s first meeting with J.W. on a

Friday, he pressed J.W., inquiring as to how serious she was about pursuing her

case and asking her things like, “How far would you be willing to go?” During a

phone call the next morning, Wallace continued that line of questioning and

suggested that he could use his personal relationship with the judge to improperly

influence the outcome of J.W.’s case. Wallace then lured J.W. to his office, which

was closed for the weekend, to discuss how far she was willing to go. After J.W.

11

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

arrived at his office alone, Wallace discussed her case for approximately 20 minutes

and then attempted to isolate her from her cellphone before escorting her down the

hallway to his personal office. There, he repeatedly pressed J.W. to perform sexual

favors for him in exchange for making her case a priority.

{¶ 34} There can be no doubt that Wallace understood that his conduct with

J.W. violated his ethical duties as an attorney. He told her as much when he

declined to answer her questions about exactly what he wanted from her—first

telling her, “In my position I am not in a place where I can do that . . . I have to

leave that to you,” and later stating, “Okay. You understand I’m not allowed to do

that.” Yet in his initial response to relator’s letter of inquiry regarding J.W.’s

grievance, Wallace claimed that his intention was to “get [J.W.] to realize the

importance of this endeavor” and encourage her to seek financial assistance from

friends, family, or other sources to secure his retainer. At that time, he expressly

denied that he had “any inappropriate intent, motive or plan.” He admitted his true

intentions only after he heard J.W.’s recording of their conversation—though in his

disciplinary-hearing testimony, he stated that he believed his response to the letter

of inquiry “was [his] honest recollection at the time.”

{¶ 35} On these facts, we conclude that Wallace’s repeated and brazen

attempts to convince J.W. to engage in sexual conduct with him, coupled with his

suggestion that he could use his relationship with the judge to influence J.W.’s case,

warrant a sanction greater than the conditionally stayed six-month suspension

recommended by the parties and the board. After examining our decisions in Paris,

Dugan, Bunstine, and Detweiler, we believe that a one-year suspension, with six

months stayed on the conditions recommended by the board, is necessary to convey

the seriousness of Wallace’s offenses and to protect the public from further

misconduct.

12

January Term, 2026

CONCLUSION

{¶ 36} Accordingly, Bruce Sanford Wallace is hereby suspended from the

practice of law in Ohio for one year, with six months stayed on the conditions that

he engage in no further misconduct, pay the costs of these proceedings, and remain

in compliance with the two-year OLAP contract he entered on October 23, 2024.

If Wallace fails to comply with the conditions of the stay, the stay will be revoked

and he will serve the entire one-year suspension. Costs are taxed to Wallace.

Judgment accordingly.

__________________

Joseph M. Caligiuri, Disciplinary Counsel, and Martha S. Asseff and Paige

A. Melton, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.

Kegler Brown Hill & Ritter, L.P.A., and Christopher J. Weber, for

respondent.

__________________

13