Tillman

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

Patricia L. Tillman and Joseph L. )

Mosely, Candidates for Governor and )

Lieutenant Governor )

)

Plaintiffs, )

v. ) Case 26 CV 218

)

)

Illinois State Board of Elections, et )

al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Patricia L. Tillman, acting pro se,1 commenced this

action by filing a sealed paper captioned, “Notice of Removal and

Motion for TRO and Preliminary Injunction,” ECF 1.2 I construe this

filing—which has since been unsealed, and which asserts claims

against various individuals and entities under 42 U.S.C § 1983 for

violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and requests

damages and an order for “Emergency Ballot Placement,” among other

1 Although the caption of this paper names two plaintiffs—Tillman

and Joseph L. Mosely—because plaintiff is not a lawyer, she may file

pleadings and motions only on behalf of herself. Accordingly, my

references to “plaintiff” refer to Tillman alone.

2 Plaintiff concurrently filed an application to proceed in forma

pauperis, ECF 4, which I granted, and a motion for attorney

representation, ECF 5, which I denied. ECF 8. I note that plaintiff

failed to fill out required portions of the motion for attorney

representation, see ECF 5 at ¶ 2, and although she checked the box

next to the text “I am currently represented by an attorney requested

by the Court in a federal criminal or civil case. The case is

described on the back of this page,” (emphasis in original), the

section the form provides for including such information is blank.

relief—as a combined complaint and ex parte motion for injunctive

relief. Because I conclude for reasons explained below that the facts

plaintiff alleges fail to articulate a plausible federal claim, I

dismiss the complaint and deny the associated motions.

The gravamen of plaintiff’s complaint is that defendants

unlawfully prevented her from participating in objection proceedings

challenging her inclusion on the ballot for the March 17, 2026,

primary election for Illinois governor.3 Those proceedings culminated

in a December 9, 2025, decision by the State Board of Elections,

acting through a State Officers Electoral Board, which sustained the

objection of Tanya D. Anderson to plaintiff’s nomination papers. In

its decision, the Electoral Board found that Anderson filed a timely

objection to plaintiff’s nomination on November 10, 2025; that the

assigned hearing officer held an initial case management conference

3 At a hearing held on January 16, 2026, plaintiff argued that her

case is not about whether she was “qualified to be on the ballot,”

insisting that “we’re not talking about state issue[s]. We’re talking

about my due process. It does not matter what they said about them

signatures. Because I can’t say the same thing about my opponent’s

signatures.” Tr. at 14:12-16. I am mindful that the claims plaintiff

asserts arise under the Constitution. As explained below, however,

her due process claim requires analysis of state law. Further, the

claims in this case arise out of plaintiff’s inability to participate

in opposition proceedings challenging her candidacy. Because

plaintiff does not claim to have filed, or attempted to file, any

objection to Governor Pritzker’s nominating petition, as “[a]ny

legal voter” in Illinois may do by filing “an objector’s petition

together with two copies thereof in the principal office or the

permanent branch office of the State Board of Elections, or in the

office of the election authority or local election official with

whom the certificate of nomination, nomination papers or petitions

are on file,” 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/10-8, her ability or

inability to do so has no bearing on her claims before me.

by phone on November 18, 2025, at which plaintiff appeared pro se

and Ms. Anderson appeared through counsel; and that the hearing

officer’s Initial Case Management Order was uploaded to the Petition

and Objection Portal the same day. The Initial Case Management Order

included notice of a record examination to be conducted at 9:00 a.m.

on November 24, 2025.

The record examination proceeded as set forth in the Initial

Case Management Order, and it yielded a determination that 2,949 of

the line objections to the 7,253 signatures plaintiff collected in

support of her candidacy were sustained. This left plaintiff with

4,304 valid signatures, or 696 below the statutory minimum of 5,000

signatures required by Section 7-10(a) of the Election Code. At 9:29

a.m. on November 24, 2025, plaintiff emailed an unsigned extension

affidavit requesting a 45-day continuance of the record exam and all

associated deadlines. The same afternoon, plaintiff filed a Motion

for Continuance for Record Exam/Extension, a request for a change of

hearing officer, and an unsigned affidavit to the Petition and

Objection Portal. The following day, November 25, 2025, plaintiff’s

request for a change of hearing officer was granted, and the matter

was reassigned to defendant Hearing Officer Michael Tecson. Also on

November 25, 2025, an Objection Detail Record and Objection Summary

Report summarizing the results of the record examination were posted

to the Petition and Objection Portal.

On December 2, 2025, plaintiff filed a paper captioned, “Motion

to Disqualify [defendant] Kevin M. Morphew, Sorling Northrup

Attorneys for Miss Conduct (sic) Rule 8.4 and Ethical Misconduct,

and Extension of Record Exam, and All Proceedings Before the Illinois

State Board of Elections and Anyone Sitting as the Officers Electoral

Board.” In this submission, plaintiff requested an extension of the

record examination and all proceedings for at least 45 days; moved

to disqualify the objector’s counsel; and demanded disciplinary

actions against the previously assigned hearing officer, [defendant]

David Herman. Hearing Officer Michael Tecson reviewed the parties’

arguments and evidence and issued a recommended decision on December

3, 2025.

The Electoral Board adopted Mr. Tecson’s findings of fact,

conclusions of law, and recommendations in its December 9, 2025,

decision. First, the Board held that plaintiff had ample notice of

the record examination, and it denied as untimely her November 24,

2025, motion to continue the record examination, as she filed it

after the record examination had already begun. With respect to

plaintiff’s December 2, 2025, motion for a continuance of the record

examination and objection proceedings, the Board denied the motion

under Rule 1(a) of the Rules of Procedure, which states:

1. Expedited Proceedings

a. Timing. On all hearing dates set by the Board or its

designated Hearing Officer (other than the Initial

Meeting), the objector and the candidate shall be

prepared to proceed with the hearing of their case.

Due to statutory time constraints, the Board must

proceed as expeditiously as possible to resolve the

objections. Therefore, there will be no continuances

or resetting of the Initial Meeting or future

hearings except for good cause shown.4

The Board dismissed the portion of plaintiff’s motion that sought to

disqualify the objector’s counsel and to take disciplinary action

against the former hearing officer, holding that it lacked the

authority to grant the requested relief.

The Board’s decision is subject to judicial review pursuant to

Section 10–10.1 of the Illinois Election Code, which provides:

A candidate or objector aggrieved by the decision of an

electoral board may secure judicial review of such

decision in the circuit court of the county in which the

hearing of the electoral board was held. The party seeking

judicial review must file a petition with the clerk of the

court within 10 days after the decision of the electoral

board.

Kozel v. State Bd. of Elections, 533 N.E.2d 796, 800 (Ill. 1988)

(quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 46, par. 10–10.1). At plaintiff’s

ex parte hearing on January 13, 2025, she stated that she timely

filed such a petition but later dismissed it in favor the instant

action.

Although plaintiff’s complaint makes scattershot reference to

various constitutional theories and Supreme Court cases, the essence

4 The Rules of Procedure adopted by the State Board of Elections for

the hearing and passing upon objections to established party

candidates seeking to appear on the ballot for the March 17, 2026,

General Primary Election are publicly available at:

https://www.elections.il.gov/AboutTheBoard/ElectoralBoard.aspx

(last visited Jan. 12, 2026).

of her claim is that defendants interfered, in various ways, with

her ability to obtain the 5,000 valid signatures that Illinois

election law requires to appear as a gubernatorial candidate on the

primary ballot. To be clear, plaintiff does not claim that the

signature requirement itself is unduly burdensome. Accordingly, her

focus on the “Anderson-Burdick” framework is misguided.5 Rather, she

claims that defendants—who although named individually in the case

caption are generally lumped together in her substantive

allegations—acted to prevented her from appearing on the ballot as

a primary candidate for Illinois Governor. She groups her factual

allegations into five categories:

•

“Petition Interference,” in which she alleges that defendant

Wallace Gator Bradley, “a circulator for Governor J.B.

Pritzker, physically took Plaintiff’s petitions from voters’

hands and told voters not to sign Plaintiff’s petition”;

•

“Portal Exclusion (Nov. 11-21, 2025),” in which she alleges

that she was “blocked from access to the petition objection

5 This refers to the seminal ballot access cases, Anderson v.

Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), and Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S.

428, 434 (1992). In those cases, the Court established the standard

that courts must use to evaluate whether restrictions that state

election laws place on ballot eligibility unduly burden voters’

constitutional right to associate or to choose among candidates.

Here, however, plaintiff is not challenging any provision of Illinois

election law but rather the conduct of individuals who she claims

interfered with her ability to comply with it.

portal from its opening on November 11, 2025 to the end of

business on November 21, 2025”;6

•

“Assault at Official Hearing (Nov. 18, 2025),” in which she

claims that the attorney for the objector “forcibly twisted

Plaintiff’s arm, causing injury requiring hospital treatment

and a wrist brace,” while Board failed to intervene;

•

“Denial of Continuances; Illusory Access,” in which plaintiff

claims that her requests to continue the record examination and

proceedings were denied and met with demeaning remarks

concerning her competence; and

•

“Ongoing Harm,” in which plaintiff states that all of the

foregoing deprived her of a meaningful opportunity to be heard,

chilled protected political activity, and continues to impair

her ballot access.

Compl., ECF 1 at 7-8.

Plaintiff organizes her claim into various counts, which she

labels “Due Process (14th Amendment, § 1983),” “First Amendment

Retaliation (§ 1983),” “Equal Protection (§ 1983),” “Ballot Access

6 Plaintiff references and attaches to her complaint an email dated

November 21, 2024, from defendant Sean Sarcu acknowledging that

plaintiff had been “unable to upload documents to the portal due to

a coding error in our system that we have encountered in other

cases,” but he advised that her “inability to file documents through

the Petition and Objection Portal has been resolved as of about 4:05

PM” using the “short-term fix” of listing her as attorney “until the

larger coding problem is solved.” ECF 1 at 15.

& Political Association (§ 1983),” and “Deliberate Indifference to

Safety and Medical Needs (14th Amendment, § 1983).” As her

formulation of these counts suggests, § 1983 “is not itself a source

of substantive rights, but merely provides a method of vindicating

federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Ghiles v. Municipal Electoral

Bd./Commissioners of Chicago Heights, Illinois, No. 19-CV-1775, 2020

WL 919002, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2020). Additionally, “Section

1983 addresses only state action.” L.P. v. Marian Catholic High

School, 852 F.3d 690, 697 (2017) (emphasis in original). Indeed, its

text “expressly includes a requirement that the defendant acted under

color of law,” since most constitutional rights, including those

plaintiff asserts here, “are protected only against infringement by

government.” Krupa v. Quinn, 596 F. Supp. 3d 1127, 1135 (N.D. Ill.

2022) (citations omitted). This means that “[p]urely private

conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful,” does not give rise to

constitutional claims. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Additionally, § 1983 liability requires an individual’s

personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation. Kuhn

v. Goodlow, 678 F.3d 552, 556 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[a]n individual

cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action unless he caused or

participated in an alleged constitutional deprivation.”). Finally,

states and their agencies are not subject to § 1983 liability because

they are protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Will v.

Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65–66, (1989).

The foregoing principles spell doom for most of plaintiff’s

claims. To begin, the misdeeds she attributes to private actors

Wallace Gator Bradley—maligning her to potential voters and

interfering with her efforts to obtain signatures—and to Kevin

Morphew—verbally and physically bullying plaintiff during objection

proceedings—bear none of the hallmarks of state action.7 The Illinois

State Board of Elections (and the state officials plaintiff names as

defendants, to the extent they are sued in their official

capacities), are shielded by the Eleventh Amendment. And plaintiff

has articulated no basis for inferring personal involvement in any

constitutional violation by any defendant to whom she attributes no

specific conduct: ISBE Board members Laura K. Donahue, Rick S.

Tervin, Sr., Jennifer M. Ballard Croft, Christina D. Cray, Tonya L.

Genovese, Catherine S. McCrory, Jack Vrett, and Cassandra Watson;

Attorney General Kwame Raoul; and Assistant Attorney General Lee B.

Stark.

This leaves three individual defendants susceptible to money

damages if plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated: ISBE

Legal Counsel Sean Sarcu, Hearing Officer David Herman, and Hearing

Officer K. Michael Tecson, and the ISBE, which I assume for

7 Nothing in plaintiff’s submissions suggests that either Bradley or

Morphew was a state actor. Morphew was the attorney for objector

Tanya Anderson. Bradley was allegedly circulating petitions for

Governor JB Pritzker. Even assuming that Bradley was acting on behalf

of Governor Pritzker’s campaign, “campaigning for reelection is

private activity.” Krupa 596 F. Supp. 3d at 1138.

discussion’s sake has authority to implement the injunctive relief

plaintiff seeks.8 Plaintiff’s individual claims against Mr. Sarcu

are non-starters, however, as the only conduct she attributes to him

is that he sent an email confirming that plaintiff had been unable

to upload documents to the election portal due to “a coding error in

our system that we have encountered in other cases,” but that the

problem had been resolved with a “short term fix” as of 4:05 p.m. on

November 21, 2025. There is no plausible constitutional violation

lurking in that conduct.

As for the hearing officers Herman and Tecson, plaintiff claims

that they deprived her of her constitutional rights by denying her

requests for continuances, framing this deprivation, first and

foremost, as a violation of due process. But having failed to invoke

the procedures that Illinois law provides to remedy the alleged

deprivation, she cannot now be heard to complain that her

constitutional rights were violated. “A procedural due process claim

consists of two elements: (i) deprivation by state action of a

protected interest in life, liberty, or property, and (ii) inadequate

state process.” Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230, 236 (2023) (citation

omitted) (emphasis added).

Contrary to plaintiff’s mistaken view that the hearing

officers’ alleged obstruction establishes a due process claim, a

8 I express no opinion on whether this is correct as a legal or

factual matter.

procedural due process claim is not “complete” unless the state fails

to provide an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Id. See also Hudson

v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (“[A]n unauthorized intentional

deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a

violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy

for the loss is available.”). “When a plaintiff argues that state

officials acted in a random and unauthorized manner to deprive her

of due process, she must also avail herself of state post-deprivation

remedies or explain why those remedies are inadequate.” Ores v. Vill.

of Dolton, 152 F. Supp. 3d 1069, 1082 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (alterations,

internal quotation marks, and citation removed). As noted above, the

Illinois Election Code provides for judicial review of Board of

Election decisions in objection proceedings—a state remedy that

plaintiff elected to forgo in favor of filing a federal action on

the eve of ballot certification—and nothing in her submissions

suggests that these state-law remedies were inadequate to redress

the deprivations she alleges. Accordingly, she fails to allege “an

essential part” of her due process claim. Zimny v. Geneva Cmty. Unit

Sch. Dist. 304, 718 F. Supp. 3d 766, 792 (N.D. Ill. 2024).9

9 Although plaintiff explicitly claims violation of “procedural due

process,” her complaint makes occasional reference to concepts

frequently associated with substantive due process. But her claim

fares no better when viewed through the lens of substantive due

process, which “protects against only the most egregious and

outrageous government action,” Campos v. Cook Cnty., 932 F.3d 972,

975 (7th Cir. 2019), and requires conduct so arbitrary and irrational

Plaintiff’s remaining claims are equally deficient. To plead a

violation of the Equal Protection Clause, plaintiff must allege facts

plausibly suggesting that defendants’ actions were motivated by a

discriminatory purpose and had a discriminatory effect. Better

Broadview Party v. Walters, 159 F. Supp. 3d 885, 893 (N.D. Ill.

2016). Plaintiff does not claim that defendants’ conduct was

motivated by animus towards any protected group of which she is a

member, so I interpret her claim as alleging discrimination based on

a “class of one.” Accordingly, her allegations must suggest that she

was intentionally and irrationally singled out for differential

treatment. See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564

(2000). Here, two separate hearing officers determined that

plaintiff’s motions to continue—filed on November 24 and December 2,

2025, were untimely because they were filed after the record

examination had begun, although she had notice of the date and time

of the record exam no later than November 21, 2025.10 That is not an

arbitrary or irrational conclusion based on Rule of Procedure 1(a),

that it shocks the conscience. This standard is especially difficult

to meet in the “rough-and-tumble electoral context,” O’Dekirk v.

Roechner, No. 23-CV-4658, 2025 WL 524149, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 18,

2025), and plaintiff’s allegations concerning her delayed access to

the election portal and the hearing officers’ unwillingness to grant

her motions for continuances do not approach this level of

seriousness.

10 Plaintiff’s vague statement that the election portal “still didn’t

work” even after implementation of the “short term fix” granting her

access to it as of 4:05 p.m. on November 21, 2025, does not

meaningfully controvert the Electoral Board’s notice finding.

whose application to objection proceedings is apparently routine and

was facially appropriate in the proceedings here. Most importantly,

nothing in plaintiff’s submissions suggests that either the hearing

officers or the Electoral Board applied Rule 1(a) differently to

plaintiff than to any other candidate.

Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim likewise lacks

support in the allegations she asserts against either the hearing

officers or the ISBE (recall that no other defendant is susceptible

to either a damages award or an injunction pursuant to § 1983). Such

claims require a nexus between defendants’ actions and an intent to

chill plaintiff’s protected activity. See Dempsey v. Johnson, 69

N.E.3d 236, 246 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). As explained above, the

Electoral Board’s factual findings suggest a reasonable application

of the timing provisions in its Rules of Procedure, which strike a

facially appropriate balance between plaintiff’s exercise of her

First Amendment rights and the state’s interest in orderly elections.

Finally, plaintiff’s claim for “Deliberate Indifference to

Safety and Medical Needs (14th Amendment, § 1983)” does not

articulate an independent constitutional claim. “Deliberate

indifference is a heightened standard for determining whether state

actors are liable for violating a plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Deliberate indifference is not an independent cause of action.”

Hughes v. City of Chicago, No. 02 C 7267, 2003 WL 21518592, at *4

(N.D. Ill. July 2, 2003). As the Hughes court noted, deliberate

indifference “is most commonly, though not exclusively, applied to

prisoners’ § 1983 suits for Eighth Amendment violations.” Id. at n.

5. To be clear: no one should suffer a battery during objection

proceedings (or anywhere). But plaintiff’s recourse for the conduct

she alleges in this connection is not a federal lawsuit. Nothing in

the Constitution required defendants to summon law enforcement or

medical assistance, and as explained above, they did not violate

plaintiff’s constitutional rights by denying her request to proceed

at a later date.

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff has not articulated a

viable § 1983 claim against any of the defendants named in her

complaint. Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed, and the TRO and

preliminary injunction she seeks are denied.

ENTER ORDER:

Brsabel~

«Elaine E. Bucklo

United States District Judge

Dated: January 16, 2026

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